Social Exclusion, Resort Decline and the English Seaside

by

Steven Jakes

A thesis submitted to Plymouth University
in partial fulfilment for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Tourism and Hospitality

September 2015

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisory team – Professor Sheela Agarwal, Dr Martin Mowforth and Dr Stephen Essex. I could not have wished for a better team. All three have been absolutely ace and without them this thesis would not have been produced. Special thanks to Sheela – I cannot express how appreciative I am for everything you have done, for being completely sound. Thank you so much!

I would also like to thank Professor Paul Brunt and the team at the School of Tourism and Hospitality for being so supportive over the years.

Authors Declaration

At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of the Graduate Sub-Committee.

Work submitted for this research degree at the Plymouth University has not formed part of any other degree either at Plymouth University or at another establishment.

Word count of main body of thesis: 82,471

Social Exclusion, Resort Decline and the English Seaside

Steven Jakes

Abstract

Traditionally seaside resorts have been one of the least understood of Britain's 'problem areas'. This thesis breaks new ground by reporting on an exploratory data analysis to probe the influence of resort decline on social exclusion in England's seaside resorts. Drawing on a wide range of socio-economic datasets and quantitative methods of data analysis and GIS software, the study investigates the scale, nature and extent of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts, differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts and the factors that may explain these differences, and the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. A combination of univariate, bivariate and multivariate empirical analyses, undertaken at several geographic scales, illuminates the differential incidence of deprivation. The study findings reveal that the majority of seaside districts, small areas and resorts are experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple deprivation. Various facets of population composition (worklessness, education and skills, health, family stability, connectivity, and poverty) and place factors (employment base, economic prosperity, housing, and community safety) are significant for deprivation in seaside resorts. Four types of highly deprived resort areas emerged from the cluster analysis. Not only are the research findings of paramount importance in understanding both the pattern of socio-spatial disadvantage and the prospects for socio-economic regeneration, but they also contribute to an understanding of the outcomes of post-mature resort development, particularly in relation to the internal dynamics of resort change.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Appendix A Tables

District-level analysis – summary measures of multiple deprivation

District-level analysis – LSOA level indices of deprivation

LSOA-level analysis

Resort-level analysis

List Appendix B Tables

Chapter 1

Social Exclusion and the English Seaside: An Introduction

English seaside resorts have experienced relatively significant decline in recent decades and many of these formerly busy destinations appear to be suffering from a range of economic and social problems, which are more readily associated with inner-city areas (British Resorts Association, 2000; Agarwal and Brunt, 2005, 2006; Shared Intelligence, c2008; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010). Although the problems of many seaside resorts, when taken together, relate broadly to social exclusion, little is known of the exact nature and extent of their problems and of the implications for resort planning and management. The report of the House of Commons Communities and Local Government (CLG) Select Committee on Coastal Towns brought this issue into sharp focus. The report outlined that 'seaside towns are the least understood of Britain's "problem" areas' (CLG, 2007a: 42), indicating that the problems and challenges of seaside resorts have been insufficiently acknowledged and targeted. Indeed, seaside resorts have not generally been regarded as a discrete category of place in policy terms by Governments. As Local Futures (2007: 1) have noted, 'there has been a significant urban focus within the government's regeneration and renewal agenda, a policy framework that may exacerbate the challenges for some coastal areas because higher levels of investment are going to central urban areas'.

That said, in recent years, seaside resorts have moved up the regeneration agenda. The CLG Select Committee report, together with the evolving seaside regeneration framework, has spawned increasing demand for evidence of change at the national and local level. There has been an increasing interest in the processes driving area decline and renewal and the extent to which resorts and their neighbourhoods are susceptible to policy intervention (CLG, 2007a, 2007b). Thus, within the context of current academic and policy debates on social exclusion from which tourism has been conspicuously absent, the research reported here investigates characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts, factors that influence social exclusion, and the implications for policy of such factors. Such geographic research into

disadvantage can contribute to understanding of the socio-economic 'downside' to the restructuring of seaside resorts. This improved understanding, at a local level, can be used to inform local policy and delivery to better target resources and support and thereby reduce inequalities and genuinely improve the day-to-day lives of people living in seaside resorts. But it can also inform a national level agenda from which local initiatives usually derive. This chapter introduces the concept of social exclusion outlining its fundamental features, explains the background to the research, details its aims and objectives, sets out potential uses of the research and summarises the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Understanding social exclusion

1.1.1 Historical origins of social exclusion

The concept of social exclusion emerged from sociological and social policy debates on poverty, inequality and the role of the welfare state. The concept's birth is invariably located in France of the early 1970s, when it was coined by René Lenoir, a socialist government minister, to refer to the many groups of people without access to the employment-based social security system and thus unable to participate in different spheres of social and economic activity (Silver, 1994). Within France, the term later extended to incorporate new problems and social groups. It was used in the 1980s to refer to various types of social disadvantage related to social problems arising from economic upheavals and crises of the welfare state (Silver, 1994). The term was broadened to include spatial concentrations of disadvantage in the late 1980s, after a number of civil disturbances and violent incidents on French social housing estates (Silver, 1994). Exclusion came to denote a breakdown in social cohesion, a 'rupture of the social bond' considered central to the social contract between the republican state and its citizens (Silver, 1994: 535). In response to these concerns, strategies to promote social inclusion were key elements of French social policy through the 1980s and, under the presidency of Jacques Delores, began to influence European Commission policy.

The European Commission was a significant player in the dissemination of the concept. Since the 1990s, the Commission has promoted the concept of social exclusion rather than poverty within its political debates and social research programmes (Room, 1999). The shift of the Commission to exclusion issues met little obstacle at the national level. One of the reasons for this Europe-wide hospitality toward the concept was that:

> 'Member states adhered to different definitions of poverty and consequently some denied that poverty was a problem within their borders. This hostility towards the idea of poverty was coupled to the enthusiasm of some member states for the notion of social exclusion. … The notion of social exclusion thus offered a way of avoiding a possible impasse by allowing member states to commit themselves to an imprecise, but nonetheless worthy-sounding mission' (Marsh and Mullins, 1998: 751).

While its relative vagueness was a key quality leading European Union member states to adopt the concept, the UK New Labour government elected in May 1997 embraced the concept of social exclusion with considerable enthusiasm and gave it a twist. Originally the Labour Party saw the concept 'as rather unhelpful, combining as it did the traditional alleged imprecision of the French social philosophical debates with the echoes of earlier, discredited right-wing accounts of the ''underclass''' (Room, 1999: 166). But this situation changed. The concept was linked to the consensual 'Third Way' thinking underpinning New Labour's political economy and:

> '[Tony Blair] established in Downing Street itself a Policy Unit concerned with social exclusion; the Economic and Social Research Council established at the LSE [London School of Economics] a high profile Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion; and ''social exclusion'' recurs as a central point of reference throughout a wide range of government policy documents' (Room, 1999: 166).

By the time that the New Labour government entered its third term in office, Levitas (2005: ix) observed:

> 'The language of social exclusion is no longer the preserve of a temporary specialist unit. It has become commonplace in public discourse, and pervades government policy'.

Thus, social exclusion made its first appearance on the UK stage in the late nineties. However, it is now widely used by government and appears widely in the lexicon of academics, policy-makers and development practitioners. One reason for the rapid uptake of the term may be that it 'describes a phenomenon that already existed, but lacked a suitable name' (Page, 2000: 4). So what is it and how is it different from the more familiar concepts of "poverty" and "deprivation"?

1.1.2 Differences between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion

It is crucial to draw a firm distinction between social exclusion and poverty when seeking to understand the concept of social exclusion and its many causes and consequences. Poverty should be seen as just one dimension of exclusion. The concept of poverty has evolved over the last century. When Seebohm Rowntree attempted to define poverty in the latter part of the nineteenth century, he did it in absolute terms and as minimum subsistence. A family would be considered to be living in poverty if their 'total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency' (Rowntree, 1901: 186). The key weakness of this definition of poverty is that it fails to recognise the differing circumstances – temporal and spatial – and therefore income needs of different members of the global population, assuming that 'there is always a fixed level of basic needs and an income which is insufficient to provide these needs defines the poverty line' (Foley, 1999: 3).

In the second half of the twentieth century, the relevance of the absolutist or subsistence definition of poverty in industrialised countries became questioned by academics and social reformers. The general level of living had improved and most people in welfare states had a guaranteed minimum income. For these reasons, poverty was redefined in relative terms, placing emphasis on the distribution of income and wealth in a society. In measuring relative poverty, some analysts have priced a 'basket of goods' to set a poverty level, while others have used market research techniques to find out what society at large generally thinks is a reasonable minimum standard of living (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2010). The most commonly used

definition of poverty in Britain is that used by the European Union: low-income or impoverished households are defined as those with incomes of less than 60% of the national median income level (minus housing costs) (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013).

What all these measures have in common is that they are to do with income and how it is distributed. During the 1970s, there was a crucial change in the understanding of poverty in the academic as well as the public debate. There was a change in the focus from income to multidimensional poverty. The work of Peter Townsend is crucial here. Townsend (1979) defined multidimensional poverty as relative deprivation and argued that people could be considered as living in poverty:

> 'when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities' (Townsend, 1979: 31).

This definition raises awareness of the adequacy of resources needed to avoid poverty not only in terms of the ability to obtain material items (e.g., diet and amenities) but also so that people can avoid being *excluded from ordinary living patterns and activities*. This latter feature suggests that exclusion is a sub-component of the broader notion of deprivation, although this is a misleading assessment, as explained later.

The key feature of the definition of deprivation that links it to the notion of poverty is its emphasis on a lack of resources as being the underlying cause of deprivation. It follows that if deprivation can be defined, it can help to identify who is in poverty and also how much income is needed to avoid it. Although income is a primary determinant of the standard of living of most people, an exclusive reliance on income poverty as a measure of deprivation is problematic for the following reasons. First, it assumes that the (only) unit of analysis is the individual/household. Second, it assumes that deprivation should be measured solely in terms

of outcomes as opposed to risks or conditions. Third, it does not consider broader aspects of quality of life, such as, for example, neighbourhood, health, environment, access to transport and services, location and general life opportunities. Lastly, it narrows the focus of policy.

These wider issues have, since the social policy debates of the 1980s, increasingly been brought together under the term 'social exclusion'. Although there is a wide range of views about what the term social exclusion means (Silver, 1994), it tends to be defined in very similar ways to Townsend's view of relative deprivation. However, where poverty and deprivation research has emphasised lack of financial and material resources at the disposal of an individual or household (Walker, 1995), social exclusion emphasises a wider range of factors – social, political as well as economic – which may lead to individuals, population groups or geographical communities living a life which differs significantly from the mainstream of society. There is a stronger emphasis in the exclusion literature on relational issues, that is, 'inadequate social participation, lack of social protection, lack of social integration, and lack of power' (Room, 1995b: 105). Social exclusion is therefore a broader concept than poverty and deprivation 'encompassing not only low material means but also the inability to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life, and in some characterisations, alienation and distance from mainstream society' (Duffy, 1998: 241). According to Room (1995a: 243), it is a dynamic process 'of becoming detached from the organisation and communities of which society is composed and from the rights and obligations that they embody', and it may vary between the individual, household and the local community in its spatial dimension. Table 1.1 summarises the differences between the concepts of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion.

Table 1.1: Comparison of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Source: Collated from Barnes (2005), Berghman (1995), Room (1995a)

The conceptual distinction is now clear. Poverty is an outcome, denoting an inability to achieve an acceptable standard of living because of a lack of financial resources. Deprivation is different from poverty. Deprivation is multi-dimensional, whereas lack of financial resources (i.e., poverty) is one-dimensional. Deprivation is concerned with circumstance, particularly material, and how this impacts upon the condition of people's lives (Berghman, 1995). Thus, the concepts of poverty and deprivation deal with static outcomes. Social exclusion, in contrast, is a concept that refers to 'the multiple and changing factors resulting in people being excluded from the normal exchanges, practices and rights of modern society' (Commission of the European Communities, 1993: 1). The factors linked to social exclusion are summarised by Percy-Smith (2000) and range from globalisation and associated structural changes, universalistic forms of inequality, including segregation within a system of social processes, for instance, through class, race and gender discrimination or denial of basic citizenship rights, to inequality described in more particular terms. The latter includes inadequate rights in housing, education, health and access to labour markets. Other aspects are as diverse as the local context and, in particular, the effects of population, place and location. The crucial point here is that, poverty and/or deprivation are important and possible, but not necessary, ingredients of social exclusion. A visual annotation of the relationship between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion is illustrated in Figure 1.1. As can be seen, while there is a core of disadvantaged people who experience all three conditions, there are others who face only a single problem, or a combination of two of them. In summary then, poverty, deprivation and social exclusion are distinct, but overlapping concepts.



Figure 1.1: The relationship between poverty, deprivation and social exclusion
Source: Author's own elaboration

1.1.3 Social exclusion as a contested concept

Despite this distinction from poverty and deprivation, 'social exclusion is a contested concept' (Silver, 1994: 540). There is no exact or generally agreed definition. This point is exemplified by reference to the varying definitions that have been put forward for its meaning, as shown in Table 1.2. The term 'social exclusion' has been used to describe: groups at risk of exclusion; what people are excluded from; the states or problems associated with exclusion; the processes involved and levels at which they operate; and, the agents involved. This contested nature is also evident in the way that social exclusion has been defined across Europe. There are significant differences, reflecting diverse historical and political traditions (Silver, 1994). Not only are there a variety of national discourses about social exclusion, but also competing versions within individual countries. In the UK context, it is possible to detect three competing discourses (Levitas, 2005). These discourses range from: a redistributionist discourse (RED) within which social exclusion is associated with poverty; a social integrationist discourse (SID) which considers exclusion primarily in terms of labour market detachment; and, a moral underclass discourse (MUD) which relates to the idea of the underclass. Levitas argues RED, SID and MUD are:

> '… ways of thinking about exclusion that imply different strategies for its abolition. In RED, the assumption is that the resources available in cash or kind to the poor need to be increased both relatively and absolutely, implying both improved levels of income maintenance and better access to public and private services. In SID, the solution is increased labour market participation, for paid work is claimed to deliver inclusion both directly and indirectly through the income it provides. In MUD, the emphasis is on changing behaviour through a mix of sticks and carrots – manipulation of welfare benefits, sanctions for non-compliance and intensive social work with individuals' (Levitas, 2005: x).

Further evidence for a lack of any consensus comes from the work of Veit-Wilson (1998) who distinguished between 'weak' and 'strong' conceptions of social exclusion in Europe, whereby:

> 'In the 'weak' version of this discourse, the solutions lie in altering these excluded people's handicapping characteristics and enhancing their integration into dominant society. 'Stronger' forms of this discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing the excluding and therefore aims for solutions which reduce the powers of exclusion' (Veit-Wilson, 1998: 45).

Put differently, the weak version seeks to change socially excluded individuals, groups and communities. Addressing the capacities of the socially excluded is not only what the stronger version focuses on, looking additionally at structural processes, social mechanisms and the different institutions which lead to, and affect patterns of, exclusion. Thus, the strong version is more about change at societal level.

Table 1.2: Facets of ‘social exclusion’

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Source: Collated from Mathieson *et al*. (2008), Millar (2007), Peace (2001)

1.1.4 Previous research into social exclusion in the UK

Debate over the definition of social exclusion has not prevented researchers from identifying and analysing it, and the definition itself has evolved as new forms of exclusion have emerged, with the current position neatly summarised by New Labour’s David Miliband in 2006. He argued that in the UK ‘social exclusion exists in wide, deep and concentrated forms, and it is important not to confuse them’ (Miliband, 2006: 3). *Wide exclusion* refers to the large

number of people disadvantaged on a single or small number of domain-specific indicator(s). *Deep exclusion* refers to those who are disadvantaged on multiple and overlapping dimensions, while *concentrated exclusion* refers to the geographic concentration of problems and to 'area exclusion'. Deep exclusion and 'area exclusion' occur where different factors combine to trap individuals and areas in a spiral of disadvantage, resulting in severe negative consequences for quality of life, well-being and future life chances. 'Here we get closer to a more recognisable definition of social exclusion reflecting the most disadvantaged in society' (Miliband, 2006: 7).

But social exclusion is not particularly well understood in the UK, primarily because academic study until recently was couched in terms of poverty and deprivation and focused on attempts to discover the distribution, causes and consequences of social problems relating to the lack of financial and/or material resources (Walker, 1997). However, it is now widely recognised by academics that analyses of single problems associated with social exclusion, as for example through studies of employment or studies of income poverty, must be supplemented by analyses based on more general definitions of the problem (Millar, 2007). 'Social exclusion' itself is universally regarded in the academic and policy literature as involving severe, multi-dimensional disadvantage. A common approach to the analysis of social exclusion is then, as in the previous paragraph, to focus on disadvantaged groups or disadvantaged areas amongst whom, or within which, the incidence of disadvantage is disproportionately high.

To date, academic research and policy interest has largely focused on specific groups of people thought to be 'at risk' of or presently socially excluded, such as ex-offenders (SEU, 2002a), teenage runaways (SEU, 2002b), children in care (SEU, 2003) and older people (Scharf *et al.,* 2002; Davidson *et al.,* 2003; SEU, 2005, 2006). There has also been a specific focus on particular social issues, such as truancy and school exclusion (SEU, 1998a), rough sleeping (SEU, 1998b) teenage pregnancy (SEU, 1999a), young people not in education, employment or training (SEU, 1999b), crime (Grieve and Howard, 2004; Hale, 2005), housing (Pleace, 1998; Ratcliffe, 1998; Anderson and Sims, 2000) and long-term unemployment (Atkinson,

1998). Moreover, with the exception of a few studies that attempt to monitor social exclusion nationally (e.g., Aldridge *et al.*, 2011; Burchardt *et al.*, 1999; Gordon *et al.*, 2000), the vast majority of research has been undertaken within depressed inland inner-city neighbourhoods and some declining rural environments (Brennan *et al.*, 1998, 2000; Chapman *et al.*, 1998; Commins, 2004; Countryside Agency, 2000; Glennerster *et al.*, 1999; Lupton, 2001; Power and Wilson, 2000: Shucksmith and Chapman, 1998). Incidentally, such areas have been subject to considerable social policy intervention (i.e., New Labour regeneration and neighbourhood renewal initiatives), linked to attempts to reduce the geographic divide between Britain's most deprived areas and the 'mainstream of society' (SEUb, 2001).

It is somewhat ironic that much of the empirical literature on social exclusion (cited above) has focused on patterns rather than processes of generalised disadvantage. The empirical literature has concentrated on the characteristics and conditions of vulnerable groups and, to a lesser extent, specific disadvantaged areas. Relatively little attention has been paid to the processes that put individuals, population groups or geographical communities at risk of being socially excluded, or which protect them from it, and even less to identifying those social mechanisms, structures, and the different institutions which endorse and are thus responsible for accommodating various acts of exclusion. Perhaps the relative neglect of 'exclusionary processes' is because such processes are not readily amenable to measurement when compared to 'states of exclusion'.

The latter strand of research has, for the most part, approached social exclusion from the vulnerable group perspective, rather than from the domain perspective. Arguably, vulnerability is highly dependent on context. For instance, while older people are often described as vulnerable, it is not their age that causes the vulnerability but rather they may have pre-existing health problems, or live in isolation or on a low income. The crucial point here is that while vulnerable groups may contain some of the most severely socially excluded people, they also have a range of social and economic problems which are shared by larger groups. However, previous research has rarely examined social exclusion across a spectrum of social

groups, or across a number of exclusion domains, in entire communities or the population at large. There has been an almost exclusive focus on vulnerable groups and/or specific disadvantaged localities (i.e., policy-designated urban neighbourhoods or rural settlements).

Studies that are concerned with the condition (or the state) of social exclusion variously examine the levels of social exclusion, the risk of social exclusion according to socio-economic and demographic factors, the nature of the links which exist between different elements which may constitute the phenomenon, whether and how income and material exclusion is related to other forms of exclusion and, where longitudinal data are available, the persistence of social exclusion over time (e.g., Aldridge *et al.*, 2011; Burchardt *et al.*, 1999; Gordon *et al.*, 2000: Millar, 2007). This approach to studying social exclusion is through the construction of statistical indicators, often with the purpose of informing and guiding resource allocation or of supporting a case for resource targeting. That there should be a plethora of such studies is perhaps not surprising giving that, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, New Labour's strategy placed a strong emphasis on 'states of multiple deprivation', thereby giving prominence to marginalised groups and, to a lesser extent, marginalised areas as the defining feature of social exclusion.

The focus of poverty and deprivation policy is also important as it has influenced social exclusion policy. For the most part, the wide social exclusion experienced by a larger population, including those living in deprived neighbourhoods and those in poverty, has been addressed through individually targeted measures. There has been a strong emphasis on counting and targeting the poor (as individuals) through the tax and benefit systems. Doubtless, financial transfers through the tax and benefit systems are useful for addressing the poverty/deprivation suffered by the large number of people excluded on a single or small number of economic indicators. However, 'social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be captured by measures of income only, or even material resources more broadly, but must include a wider range of other factors' (Millar, 2007: 4). The crucial point here is that, while the use of means testing considers some household factors (e.g., income, size and type of

family, living in a jobless household), this approach does not take into account the fact that an individual's experience (i.e., socio-economic characteristics) is also generally shaped by i) household factors such as race and social class and ii) local-area factors (e.g., particularities of population, place and location).

Indeed, within the small but growing contemporary international 'area effects' literature, it has been argued that processes within localities and the relationship to the wider area (i.e., the town/city, city region, district or region) are both important because of their likely determining influence on an individual's life opportunities and living standards (e.g., Ellen and Turner, 1997; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Lupton, 2003). However, this idea that where people live (because of the concentration of socially deprived/excluded individuals and households within the local population or because of the nature of the area itself) affects their ability to participate in key domains of modern life has not been universally accepted. Many writers and particularly politicians have tended to dismiss or downplay the role of area effects, suggesting that family and the individual are more important (e.g., Gordon, 1996; Kleinman, 1999; Buck and Gordon, 2004). The role of geography or space per se has therefore added a further dimension to the social exclusion debate. At the present time, there is no clear consensus of evidence emerging. Area studies in Britain have yet to demonstrate how social exclusion develops, to what extent it is an individual or locational problem, and how important local-area factors are in this process.

Treatment of social exclusion in Britain may be criticised further as academic research and policy attention of social exclusion has been geographically constrained to inland inner-city neighbourhoods and some rural environments, and has neglected coastal areas. Consequently, little is known about social exclusion in English seaside resorts. This lacuna is surprising given that previous research noted that many English seaside resorts are in decline (Cooper, 1997; Agarwal, 1999, 2002; Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 1999; Department of Trade and Industry, 1999; English Tourism Council, 2001) and are experiencing severe economic, social and environmental difficulties (British Resorts Association, 2000;

Beatty and Fothergill, 2003; Agarwal and Brunt, 2005, 2006; CLG, 2007; Shaw and Coles, 2007; Shared Intelligence, c2008; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010; Centre for Social Justice, 2013), which, when taken together, relate broadly to social exclusion. Perhaps the lack of research is because seaside resorts are traditionally associated with the 'pleasure-periphery' (Turner and Ash, 1975) rather than as production spaces subject to economic and social change.

1.2 Social exclusion and English seaside resorts: the relevance

While there is widespread recognition that many English seaside resorts are exhibiting characteristics associated with social exclusion, its presence is unclear as many are not displaying any of the obvious signs of decline, such as loss of their tourism economic base, which has invariably been blamed for their predicament. This point is illustrated by the only national study of the economies of seaside resorts. Beatty and Fothergill (2003) assessed the economies of forty-three resorts over the period 1971-2001 and found that, far from declining, seaside resorts are experiencing increases in employment and population, the latter fuelled by steady flows of in-migration. Thus, Beatty and Fothergill (2003) present evidence that employment in seaside resorts is growing and that they remain attractive places to live and work.

However, the picture is actually more complex. Paradoxically, although seaside resorts may be growing in terms of population and employment, claimant unemployment is 'well above the level in surrounding areas and in a few towns it is high by national standards' (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003: 6). Moreover, there are 'high levels of recorded permanent sickness among the working age population of seaside towns' (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003: 41), which hides widespread unemployment. In emphasising coastal employment growth, moreover, Beatty and Fothergill (2003) may be glossing over the extent to which many of the jobs are taken by in-migrants than local residents. In addition, the quality of the jobs created is questionable, with many in the low-wage service sector, part-time and seasonal. This criticism aside, the growth

in employment may explain the reluctance of government to acknowledge the social and community issues facing seaside resorts.

It was not until 2006 that Government, led by the CLG, sent out a call for evidence. The CLG Commons Select Committee Inquiry received written submissions on coastal issues from local authorities and coastal organisations, visited several resorts, and invited experts to a number of oral evidence sessions at Westminster. In March 2007, the CLG Select Committee published a report in which they used the terms 'coastal towns' and 'seaside resorts' interchangeably, which is misleading, and identified several common challenges facing such areas (see Table 1.3). It was noted that coastal areas tend to have relatively low wage, low-skill economies with a seasonality of employment, suggesting a tendency for economic under-performance. The Committee said it was 'particularly struck by the demography of many coastal towns, where there is a combination of trends occurring, including the outward movement of young people and the inward movement migration of older people' which leads to a burden on the local public sector (CLG, 2007a: 3). The committee's report highlighted a range of housing issues in seaside resorts, including lack of affordability (owing to high levels of second home ownership), empty homes but conversely homelessness and disproportionate levels of unsuitable accommodation. It also noted relatively high numbers of houses in multiple occupations and vulnerable children and adults. Vulnerable people, in need of care or support, are more likely to move to seaside resorts because of the availability of low cost accommodation. Again, this in-migration is burdensome to the local public sector. The committee's report also drew attention to the Government's own statistics which showed a disproportionately high rise in the number of people claiming sickness and disability benefits in seaside resorts, a trend which has never been identified by Government and is also 'likely' to be linked to inward migration (CLG, 2007a: 24).

Table 1.3: Key issues facing seaside resorts

Changes in tourism trends - evolving tourist market (e.g., day trippers, short breaks, second holidays, conferences)
Low wage rates, part-time and seasonal employment
High levels of deprivation indicators - poor levels of education, skills and training
High levels of in-migration of - young, low-skilled migrants - people aged 35 and over - people aged 65 and over
High levels of out-migration of youth for education and opportunities
A range of housing issues, including - a lack of affordable housing due to high levels of second-home ownership - disproportionate levels of unsuitable accommodation - high levels of Houses of Multiple Occupation associated with tourist accommodation stock and transient population
Transient populations
Many 'vulnerable' residents - on sickness-related benefits, in care homes and hostels (young and old people)
Peripheral locations and weak transport links

Source: Compiled from CLG (2007a)

The Committee felt that the New Labour government had neglected the particular needs of coastal areas for far too long. The government was also rebuked for its poor understanding of how national policies and systems, such as the regulation of private rented housing and the benefits system, impact on seaside resorts specifically. Perhaps most damning of all is the criticism of a lack of cross-departmental liaison on seaside resorts because 'the Government does not sufficiently appreciate the needs of coastal towns' (CLG, 2007a: 42). The Committee felt that there were a number of areas that were in need of specific government action. Most significantly, it called for a national approach to be adopted by the government in addressing the social challenges of the seaside, together with the proactive management of seaside resorts (CLG, 2007a).

However, the government dismissed the report and its recommendations. The assessment was that, because the experience of different coastal areas is very varied, a national approach to the issues is not justified (HM Government, 2007). Angry exchanges followed. The chair of the Select Committee told CLG secretary Hazel Blears of her committee's:

> ‘deep dissatisfaction with the Government’s response to our report on Coastal Towns. The response appeared to fail to grasp the central premise of our report, that many coastal towns face significant challenges based on their combination of characteristics, and that as such coastal towns warrant specific attention and action by Government to address their challenges’ (CLG, 2007b: 6).

The Select Committee’s dissatisfaction was shared by the Director of the British Resorts and Destinations Association, who told Blears it was ‘difficult, in polite terms, to accurately describe to you the depth of displeasure that the government response has created among many Elected Members from all parties, public sector officers and our colleagues and partners in the private sector’ (quoted in CLG, 2007b: 5). Prompted by these criticisms, the CLG took the unusual step of issuing a second response, which has created a cross-departmental working group and a nationwide regeneration network to examine the problems affecting England’s seaside resorts (CLG, 2007b). The New Labour government called for more coastal research, noting that ‘there is not enough research into coastal towns to form a true picture of the issues involved’ (CLG, 2007b: 8).

Despite such calls, the only major national study of the multifaceted problem of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, by Agarwal and Brunt (2006), revealed variability in its manifestation. Based on the profiling and analysis of selected Census (2001) variables relating to key socio-economic characteristics, they found that, although there was remarkable similarity in nature and extent of multiple deprivation being experienced and that all 87 seaside resorts had several socio-economic characteristics in common, there was evidence that some of the most affected were characterised by particular socio-economic variables (Table 1.4). Such a finding enabled the identification of a typology which distinguished ‘all resorts’ from others labelled ‘young’, ‘old’ and ‘wealthy’ on the basis of specific socio-economic characteristics exhibited. The typology developed not only suggests that ‘social exclusion is affecting differentially different sections of the community’, but also implies that ‘there may be several different causes of multiple deprivation’ (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 667). They concluded that social exclusion appears to be ‘a more serious and complex problem’ in English seaside resorts ‘than has formerly been recognised’ (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 669).

Table 1.4: Typology of the socio-economic characteristics of English seaside resorts

Type	Characteristics
'All resorts'	High proportions in terms of average age, retired, white, with long-term illness or permanently sick or disabled, providing unpaid care, unemployed, no qualifications, one person households, lone parents with dependent children, without central heating, without car
'Young'	As above but higher proportions of lone parents and unemployed
'Old'	As above but particularly elderly population, lower unemployment but higher health related problems
'Wealthy'	As above but pockets of deprivation masked by wealthier wards, often with high average house prices

Source: Agarwal and Brunt (2006: 666)

Explanations for the existing conditions within English seaside resorts may be drawn from theoretical similarities between the causes and consequences of social exclusion and resort decline. These changes relate to the shift from Fordism, a regime based on relatively stable relations between production and consumption, to post-Fordism, a regime based on more flexible modes of accumulation (Dicken, 1998). This shift has contributed to heightened levels of competition and to the widespread economic restructuring of national, regional and local economies (Britton, 1991). With respect to social exclusion, the consequences of these structural changes have been precarious forms of employment, insecurity of employment and unemployment, especially, but not exclusively, within areas based on primary and manufacturing industries (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004; Munck, 2004). In terms of resort decline, post-Fordist related processes have undermined the appeal of the mass packaged and standardised seaside resort holiday (Agarwal, 2002). These processes include: flexible modes of production which have contributed to the growth of non-seaside destinations and products; the search for expanded capital accumulation as exemplified by the continuing internationalisation of the tourism industry; and, consumption changes toward preferences for more individual and niche forms of holidays demanded by the new or post-modern tourist (Agarwal, 2002). Many English seaside resorts are now dependent on a diminishing share of the holiday-market and on low-status, down-market visitors (Cooper, 1997).

Given the occurrence of these major transformations in the world economy, it therefore appears that English seaside resorts are perhaps more susceptible to decline, which in turn, has resulted in the occurrence of socio-economic problems that may be associated with social

exclusion. However, despite this contention and the fact that there are theoretical relationships between the causes and consequences of social exclusion and resort decline, there is a dearth of research which examines social exclusion in this context. Again, area-based studies of social exclusion in the UK have been geographically constrained to inland inner-city neighbourhoods and declining rural areas. In fact, academic study of social exclusion in post-mature coastal tourism resorts, whether northern European or Mediterranean, is conspicuously absent and, as a result, it is not clear whether, in what manner and to what extent social exclusion exists and whether there are similarities in its nature and form within these particular environments. In addition, little is known about its cause or causes, or whether and to what extent social exclusion inhibits resort restructuring.

The regeneration response to the effects of decline over the past two decades has been characterised by an approach that focuses on the tourism problems of seaside resorts. The central issue is assumed to be decline in tourist volume and expenditure, tourism-related employment and income, and resorts' market share. Addressing these concerns has been through market repositioning, which 'involves the realignment and strengthening of the resort's image in relation to potential target markets and existing holiday and business markets' (Agarwal, 2002: 31), and diversification, which involves expanding and varying the existing range of products that are available within the resort (Agarwal, 2002). Even though the implementation of such restructuring strategies may maintain and create new sources of demand, the occurrence, nature, and extent of social exclusion is likely to influence the restructuring process because it affects the resort's very ambience, essence and atmosphere. Such qualities are, of course, vital to a tourist destination. It follows that identifying, understanding and tackling social exclusion is critically important to the promotion of a positive restructuring process. Thus, having established the study context and discussed the project's theoretical underpinnings, the remainder of this chapter details the study's aims and objectives, contributions and thesis structure.

1.3 Aims, objectives and contributions of the research

The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion in English seaside resorts. This aim will be achieved through the following objectives:

1. To develop a national seaside resort database, which given the dearth of available specific seaside resort data, constitutes a significant and valuable resource;

2. To identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, drawing, in the first instance, on the Indices of Deprivation;

3. To assess the socio-economic structure and 'health' of resorts and, in doing so, investigate whether there are differences in socio-economic performance between deprived and non-deprived resorts and whether place- and population-based variables operate as resort advantages or disadvantages; and,

4. To investigate if there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities, and if so, whether a typology of excluded localities can be established. In other words, to identify, classify and map deprived seaside resort areas.

Thus this study aims to develop understanding of social exclusion in a post-mature mass tourism coastal resort context by investigating characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts. The study consists of three elements of research. The first stage focuses on establishing the nature, intensity and extent of social exclusion in all English seaside resorts and involves the construction of a national seaside resort database, drawing, in the first instance, on the Indices of Deprivation. The Indices of Deprivation dataset is ideally suited for the purposes of this analysis, as it covers a range of different and related aspects of deprivation which together are indicative of social exclusion. Since data does not correspond directly to resorts, district and available lower level super output area data will be collated for, and matched

to, identifiable seaside resorts, and will be subject to statistical analysis. A combination of univariate and bivariate statistical analyses, undertaken at several geographic scales, is employed to illuminate the differential incidence of social exclusion. The first element of the work therefore provides an account of how social deprivation differs between seaside and non-seaside areas, and how social deprivation varies within and between seaside resorts in England. Thus, this study makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts.

As a second step, in order to provide further insight into the different circumstances of resorts, a comparative analysis of the national averages of a set of variables selected as measures of area factors and population composition for seaside resorts is undertaken, providing both insight into the socio-economic performance of resorts and the differences in performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. The analysis – based on the manipulation of major datasets at LSOA and ward level – seeks to establish whether the variables operate as negative or positive influences and whether they have a large or significant effect. The second element of the work therefore aids understanding of some of the causes and consequences of exclusion, but it also enhances comprehension of the way in which place- and population-based factors might influence social exclusion in English seaside resorts.

Thus, by focusing explicitly on the consequences of decline through an investigation of the occurrence, nature and extent of characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts, this study makes a theoretical contribution by enhancing understanding of post-mature resort development, particularly in relation to the internal dynamics of resort change. From theoretical and practical perspectives, further insight may be gained, and the formulation of remedial policies advanced, by investigating the manifestation of social exclusion within local areas. In order to facilitate this, the scale of resolution changes in the third stage of the research and focuses on the intra-resort level where cluster analysis of a set measures of area factors and population composition for excluded resort localities is undertaken to reveal the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Cluster analysis is a method for

identifying groups whose members are similar to each other, but different to those in other groups. The resulting typologies are not explanations of processes per se, but are 'an attempt to systemise classification in aid of explanation' (Marcuse, 1997: 248). They provide a 'richer understanding of complex phenomena' (Mikelbank, 2004: 961) and as such provide useful insights into the structural bases of local areas. The third element of the research therefore affords a clear indication of some of the causes and consequences of local area exclusion, and of the variations in need between different groups of excluded resort localities, by using multivariate analytical techniques.

As well as enhancing understanding of the internal dynamics of post-mature resorts, by investigating social exclusion within a post-mature resort context, a number of practical implications for resort restructuring and regeneration policy are revealed. This study also generated three main practical research outputs, these being:

1. The completion of the first comprehensive and detailed comparative study of social exclusion in English seaside resorts through the manipulation and application of an existing dataset, namely the Indices of Deprivation. The results of this study will be of interest to a range of user groups, including voluntary organisation and agencies, local government officers, policy makers and academics. It will be of use in understanding the character and levels of multiple deprivation in seaside resorts and identifying the most and least deprived of the areas analysed.

2. The production of a bespoke place typology of excluded seaside localities, which might lead variously to understand: underlying trends, including how types of resort localities are changing in different ways; and, policy problems, including which kinds of localities need priority intervention, which can survive with reduced intervention in a time of severe public spending restraint and whether different policy responses are needed in different kinds of localities – and how many varieties are needed. Thus, the typology will have implications for policy development (i.e., allocation, types and levels of policy interventions). However,

it will also be of interest to academics, not least because it offers the necessary comparative basis for detailed empirical research on any one local area or collection of local areas.

3. The production of a national seaside resort database, which given the dearth of available specific resort data, constitutes a significant and valuable resource. The database itself has a variety of commercial applications beyond the identification of the factors which are influencing seaside resort performance. It can provide in-depth market intelligence on the demographic, social, and economic composition of English seaside resorts which may inform a variety of planning and development decision-making concerning the populations of such environments themselves, and how best to meet and/or service their needs.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is organised as follows. **Chapter 2** begins with an overview of the origins and development of social exclusion as a concept. Arguably, this term originated in France of the 1970s, but developed in the 1980s and largely in the policy of the European Union. This focus then leads to an analysis of how the concept has been mobilised and manipulated by the British to explain disadvantage in the UK. Particular interest is paid to the development of the concept in the hands of New Labour. The chapter argues that much of the debate on social exclusion has been characterised by an approach that focuses on individuals and population groups, ignoring those places marginal to the process of capitalist development. As a result, although New Labour implemented a raft of policies to tackle disadvantage, there was a strong emphasis on person-based policies and, in particular, on counting and targeting the poor (as individuals) through the tax and benefit systems. Not surprisingly, given the overwhelming focus on people rather than place, English seaside resorts remained on the margins of central government regeneration policy. Indeed, these formerly busy tourism destinations were not included in mainstream area-based social exclusion programmes such as the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and the Housing Market Renewal Programme. Thus, with respect

to the social exclusion agenda, the problems and challenges facing seaside residents are notable by their absence.

In **chapter 3**, the social and community issues facing English seaside resorts are examined. Partly by way of a backdrop to the main body of the review, the chapter opens with a short resume of the development of coastal resorts in Britain and reviews three key approaches to studying resort development. It argues that little attention has been paid to the non-touristic dimensions of resorts and goes on to examine conceptual issues important to an understanding of resort socio-economic change. The issues identified include the concept and definition of resort itself, different perspectives on resort change, measuring resort change and causes and effects of resort change. With these issues in mind, the final section of the chapter summarises the existing evidence and considers the role of socio-economic resort change in local area exclusion. The principal factors identified through a review of the literature as being potentially important for social exclusion in seaside resorts may be categorised according to whether they relate directly to the environment in which people live (i.e., place-oriented factors) or the characteristics of the seaside residents (i.e., people-oriented factors). Thus the chapter presents a framework for understanding resort change and social exclusion. This framework provides a basis for subsequent analysis, undertaken in the methodology, to determine how relevant variables are represented by the available data.

Chapter 4 clarifies the research objectives and sets out how the research was developed, both in relation to the process and the materials developed to provide the results. **Chapter 5** then provides a descriptive analysis of the nature, intensity and extent of social exclusion in seaside resorts. Attention turns in **Chapter 6** to the role that place- and population-based factors play in contributing to the presence of characteristics associated with social exclusion. Presentation of the results obtained from a comparative analysis of mean values for variables selected as indicators of area factors and population composition in the seaside resorts of England split between the deprived and non-deprived resorts is followed by a statistical analysis of the composition and characteristics of each cluster of excluded resort locality. Finally,

chapter 7 discusses how the findings established in Chapters 5 and 6 contribute to knowledge and understanding of social exclusion, and of its relationship with resort change. In addition, several policy-related implications are discussed and consideration is given to areas for further research.

1.5 Summary

This chapter has introduced the concepts of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion, considered the definition, scope and nature of each and explored the links between them. Social exclusion is a much broader concept than poverty and deprivation, and social exclusion may not be poverty- and/or deprivation-based. Its growth and regular appearance in both academic and policy debates since the late 1980s has occurred in response to the realisation of the need to re-evaluate what constitutes and causes disadvantage in advanced capitalist societies. However, despite over twenty years of use within the European Union, there is no universally accepted definition either theoretically or operationally. Thus, debate has centred on how it should be defined, the nature of the links which exist between different elements which may constitute the phenomenon, how it might be measured, its causes and the role that different factors play in creating, reducing and sustaining geographical concentrations of social exclusion, and how policy might best tackle the problems which emerge.

Treatment of social exclusion in the UK may be criticised as academic research and policy attention of social exclusion has focussed on discrete social issues, specific sectors of society and particular areas, such as depressed inland urban neighbourhoods and some declining rural environments, and has neglected coastal communities and seaside resorts. This neglect has occurred despite the fact that i) the dominant perspective on the recent history of English seaside resorts has been to treat them as places in decline and ii) there is increasing evidence of the presence of characteristics associated with social exclusion within some English seaside resorts. In light of these shortcomings, this research will investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In order to achieve such an aim, a number

of specific objectives will guide the work and these were detailed in the objectives section of this chapter. The project draws upon existing area studies of social exclusion and post-mature resort development and seeks to make a theoretical contribution to both these fields, with practical value. Academically, this study makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, and of its relationship with resort change. Practically, by investigating manifestations of social exclusion within a post-mature resort context, significant policy implications are likely to emerge from the study's findings which will inform the design of more appropriate approaches to tackling social exclusion in English seaside resorts and elsewhere.

Chapter 2

Social Exclusion: Origins, Development and Policy

Chapter One was concerned with the context of the study which argues that many English seaside resorts are facing a combination of economic and social pressures which represent the culmination of many years of decline. The visibility of problems in English seaside resorts has undoubtedly been obscured by successive governments focus on urban and rural categories. Yet seaside resorts are likely to be more vulnerable to economic change and its social and spatial consequences than inland inner-city and rural areas, as seaside resorts have a significantly different geography, urban morphology and economic ecology. However, despite this contention and evidence of characteristics associated with social exclusion in some English seaside resorts, these coastal environments are an under-researched entity in geographical studies of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. The lack of research of social exclusion in English seaside resorts may also be because 'the recognition and acceptance of social exclusion as a problem and a concept is a fairly recent phenomenon' (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 657).

This chapter therefore investigates the conditions in which the concept of social exclusion arose and how the concept has been mobilised and manipulated by the European Union and the British. Particular attention is paid to the development of the concept under New Labour, which heralded social exclusion as a substantial 'policy departure' from previous policy focus on 'poverty' (Miliband, 2005). Before drawing conclusions on the potential impact of New Labour's social exclusion agenda, however, there is a review of the earlier influences upon, and development of, New Labour's economic and social ideology. The Labour Party underwent deliberate political reinvention in the 1990s and embraced third way politics, which prioritised equality of opportunity over equality of outcome. It will be argued that individually-centred policies mark out New Labour's approach as a weak form of social exclusion, rather than strong form, which provides a possible explanation why there was a stalling of social exclusion outcomes. By reviewing the policy responses to social exclusion, the chapter clearly demonstrates that English seaside resorts remained on the margins of central government regeneration policy.

2.1 Tracing the beginnings of the concept

It is generally accepted that the term social exclusion originated in France in the mid-1970s. Initially, French socialist politicians used social exclusion to refer to the ten per cent of French citizens who were unable to access government services because of particular forms of vulnerability and discrimination, not all of which were because of income poverty. The people identified as living on the "margins of society" were the ‘mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance abusers, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, asocial persons and other social "misfits"’ (Silver, 1994: 532). In the 1980s, however, the term was used to refer to various types of social disadvantage related to social problems arising from economic crises and crises of the welfare state. Social exclusion in this context referred not only to the rise in long-term and recurrent unemployment, but also to ‘the growing instability of social bonds: family instability, single member households, social isolation, and the decline of class solidarity based on unions, the labour market, and the working class neighbourhood and social networks’ (Silver, 1994: 533). It later extended to incorporate those suffering multiple deprivation in worst affected areas (i.e., spatial concentrations of disadvantage) (Silver 1994). Exclusion was seen as the progressive rupture of social bonds – economic, institutional and meaningful – between individuals and society (Silver, 1994). Furthermore, social exclusion was viewed as a ‘failure of the Republican state in protecting the cohesion of society’ (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 414). Social policy was directed towards ‘insertion’ or ‘integration’ of the excluded to ensure social cohesion or social solidarity (Silver, 1994: 535).

The eighties proved crucial to the conceptualisation of the term. Beginning in the seventies industrialised countries underwent ‘a deep structuring of their socio-economic systems’ with their embrace of neo-liberalism/neo-conservatism (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 3). The neoliberal consensus arose as a reaction to the economic crises of the 1970s and prescribed industrial restructuring, the opening up of labour markets, moves to reduce workers protection and the retreat of state provided welfare to pump up economic growth (Quark, 2008). The new

economic policy generated the 'globalisation of capital and the restructuring of the labour market' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 3) causing disruptions to the equilibrium of society. There was 'a drastic ideological shift towards the supremacy of self-adjusting free-market mechanisms aimed at dissolving or circumventing most of the institutional forms inherited from the compromises of the Fordist growth regime' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 3). It has been argued that these deep socio-economic transformations have caused a shift from a Fordist era to a post-Fordist era. Fordism was not only about a mode of industrial organisation. It denoted a specific configuration of society. There was 'a certain degree of social integration' (Munck, 2004: 31). 'Fordist employment and compensation norms included internal labour markets and a family-supporting wage in exchange for a commitment of lifetime loyalty to a firm' (Vidal, 2012: 551). A secure job for a worker meant better participation in society in terms of social networks (Munck, 2004). In essence, Fordism implied stability and predictability (employment, family, community, welfare, lifestyle, leisure, consumption etc.) in society. Although there were economic problems (see Vidal, 2012: 556-558), the Fordist era of state-mediated capitalism was, for the most part, characterised by 'rising real living standards and a considerable degree of upward social mobility through expanding educational and occupational opportunities' (Quark, 2008: 7).

All that would change in the 1980s and, in an accelerated manner, in the 1990s as neoliberal globalisation impacted on society. Where once there was stability of employment now the buzzword is flexibility. 'Under current restructuring, labour flexibility is privileged in the competitive, globalised market' (Quark, 2008: 6). Labour flexibility meant 'precarious forms of employment and insecurity of employment… the loss of a stable link to the world of work was loss of access to social, political and cultural resources and the ability to sustain stable family life' (Munck, 2004: 32). That is why in the eighties social exclusion was not referring to various categories of people unprotected by social insurance. Rather, French socialist politicians talked of the 'social exclusion of industrial workers who lost not only their jobs, but also their way of life, as well as experiencing a breakdown of traditional workplace 'solidarity' when the economy made its post-industrial switch from manufacturing to service industries'

(Page, 2000: 5). Mass vulnerability was not confined to France. Many areas throughout the developed world have been adversely affected by the processes of global economic restructuring. Parkinson (1998: 1) describes these processes in the following terms:

> 'Rapid changes in the economic environment caused by internationalisation and industrial and corporate restructuring have transformed the character of local economies. They have brought a more fragmented labour market, a decline in manufacturing and a rise in the service sector, high levels of structural unemployment, an increase in part time, insecure and low paid employment, a shift in the balance of male and female employment and a growing gap between the highest and lowest household incomes. These changes are not only found in areas where the economy is in decline or during periods of recession. They are also a feature of booming economies'.

The implementation of the neo-liberal strategy of development has resulted in drastic socioeconomic implications for large sectors of national populations:

> 'People in many countries have experienced rates of unemployment above historical rates; a lack of job security, salary reductions and a loss of benefits as a result of the process of restructuration and rationalisation of private and public corporations; and a more restricted access to basic services such as health and education as a result of new fiscal policies. They have also experienced the negative consequences of high rates of inflation; a more unequal distribution of income; and, in some cases, the deterioration of institutional forms of resistance, such as labour organisations' (Diaz *et al.*, 2001: 2).

The post-Fordist era is depicted as 'creating increasing income inequality and a closure of mobility chances, generated as a result of three broad neoliberal tendencies, specifically: a shift in the share of incomes from labour to capital; a cut in cash welfare transfers to households; and increasing disparities in earned incomes' (Quark, 2008: 7). The above mentioned changes are felt acutely at the level of individuals and households as they result in unequal access to resources and life chances. Noting the growing social divide of this era and intensifying inequality on a number of axes, Madanipour (1998: 78) insists 'there are ever larger numbers in transition from inclusion to exclusion'.

It is crucial to make explicit a number of key points from the above discussion. Unlike definitions of poverty or deprivation, social exclusion is seen in a wider context. In particular it

is seen in the context of globalisation and the structural changes brought about by neoliberal globalisation. It is a consequence of the alleged Fordist–post-Fordist shift and is related to 'the deep economic restructuring necessitated by growing competition in the emerging global economy' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 415). Hence, the notion of 'social exclusion relates to socio-economic structural changes rather than to individual's behaviour or characteristics' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 4). However, although social exclusion can be seen as 'a consequence of *global* phenomena, it is nevertheless affected by the *national* context, notably the particularities of national economic policies, welfare regimes and rights of citizenship' (Percy-Smith, 2000: 5). For example, the French Government made policies that disqualified certain groups from receiving social insurance on the basis of specific criteria. 'If you wanted to be included amongst those who had access to social insurance you found a job, or you got married to someone who had a job' (Peace, 2001: 20). These *national* and *global* forces have different implications for different areas and different social groups. Thus, the concept of social exclusion draws attention to the underlying processes of change at work on, and in, society.

2.2 Social exclusion in the European Union

Since the late 1980s, the European Commission has promoted the notion of social exclusion rather than poverty within its political debates and social research programmes. The shift of the Commission to 'exclusion issues' is mainly attributed to the Jacques Delors presidency (from 1985 to the early 1990s) and was 'born in the context of the French policy discourse' (Ferrara *et al.,* 2002: 228). Initial references to social exclusion may be traced back to 1989. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (the Social Charter, as it is known) was the first major EU policy document to refer to social exclusion – the Social Charter incorporated the term in its preamble. However, within a few months the concept had made a substantial entry into EU thinking. The Resolution of the Council of Ministers for Social Affairs on Combating Social Exclusion was its birth certificate. In this document, social exclusion was coined as an outcome and process that involves multiple dimensions but is grounded in structural changes, with (reduced) access to the labour market as

particularly decisive (Council, 1989). The Council Resolution emphasised that 'combating social exclusion may be regarded as an important part of the social dimension of the internal market' and urged 'the need for economic development policies to be accompanied by integration policies of a specific, systematic and coherent nature' (Council, 1989: 1). Combating social exclusion has from then on become one of the important concerns for European social policy that however was still in its infancy and needed to be developed.

Room (1995c) has traced the development of the concept from EU anti-poverty programmes. From the first two (1975-80 and 1986-89) to the third (1990-94), the naming of the social problem of interest shifted from 'poverty' to 'exclusion':

> '"Poverty" was at the heart of the Council decisions that launched the first and second programmes… The third programme, in contrast, was concerned with the "integration" of the "least privileged"… By the time the programme was actually launched, *social exclusion became the fashionable terminology*. It was debatable how far these shifts reflect any more than the hostility of some governments to the language of poverty, and the enthusiasm of others to use the language of social exclusion' (Room, 1995c: 3. *Emphasis added*).

Part of the rise in popularity of the social exclusion concept has been attributed to its political appeal. It has been argued that it is perceived as less charitable (Silver, 1994), less blatant (Peace, 2001) and less accusing/threatening than poverty and deprivation (Berghman, 1995). In addition, its semantic flexibility allows it to be acceptable to a range of political positions. Right-wing governments, including UK Conservatives and Christian Democrats in Germany, did not recognise the existence of poverty in their own countries pointing out that as welfare states they guarantee a minimum income, while commentators on the left were becoming increasingly concerned with the growing social divide associated with the increasing income inequality (Silver and Miller, 2003). "Social exclusion" was sufficiently broad to accommodate both these political perspectives, and – crucially – allowed debates about social policy to continue at EU level. Indeed, many writers refer to the difficulties (from 1989 to the mid-1990s) the EU had in getting agreement for taking action on poverty to be included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The difficulties relate to the before-mentioned connotations of poverty, the fact

that ‘member states adhered to different definitions of poverty and consequently some denied that poverty was a problem within their borders’ (Marsh and Mullins, 1998: 751), ‘the principle of "subsidiarity" that assigned social protection responsibilities to the member states, as well as to British refusal to ratify that section of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty’ (Silver and Miller, 2003: 5). As a term, ‘social exclusion appeared to offer a less emotive, perhaps less understood and therefore less politically contentious alternative concept to poverty’ (Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000: 436). Put differently, social exclusion provided a way for ‘member states to commit themselves to an imprecise, but nonetheless worthy-sounding mission’ (Marsh and Mullins, 1998: 751).

The third (and final) anti-poverty programme (Poverty 3, as it is known) financed and established the European Observatory on National Policies for Combating Social Exclusion (1991-94). The Observatory has linked the notion of social exclusion to ‘the social rights of citizenship... to a basic standard of living and to participation in the major social and occupational opportunities of the society’ (in Room, 1993: 14). The principal focus of the Observatory’s work has been on the effectiveness of different national policies. It had to conceptualise social exclusion, discuss its measurement and suggest indicators for monitoring the effectiveness of policies for combating social exclusion (Room, 1995a). The Observatory’s researchers suggest that social exclusion should be conceptualised in terms of the breakdown of one or more of four societal institutions which support the basic rights of citizenship of European residents:

> ‘the democratic and legal system, which promotes civic integration; the labour market which promotes economic integration; the welfare system promoting what may be called social integration; and, the family and community system which promotes interpersonal integration’ (Berghman, 1995: 19).

According to the lead researcher (Room, 1995a), social exclusion could be analysed in terms of the denial or non-realisation of social rights and in circumstances where citizens are unable to secure their social rights, they will tend to suffer processes of generalised and

persistent disadvantage and their social and occupational participation will be undermined. Room (1995a) argued that such rights were implied in European policy statements rather than enshrined in legislation. The Observatory produced four annual reports which were accompanied by a number of thematic reports (all of these based on national reports). The Observatory, which reported back to the Council of Ministers, identified several key areas of policy on social exclusion – including access to social services (with welfare, housing, health, education and justice, expressly mentioned), measures to prevent exclusion (with access to technology, the prevention of life crises and the promotion of family solidarity specifically mentioned) and measures to help vulnerable groups (especially those with disabilities, those at risk of poverty and children with special needs). However, the Council of Ministers considered employment to be the most important. Social exclusion was roundly understood to be closely associated with the labour market process, particularly the long term, high levels of unemployment of the 1980s and early 1990s (European Commission, 1994; Room, 1995a). Indeed, the *White Paper on European social policy - the way forward for the Union* (European Commission, 1994) contained only one chapter on social policy. It focused on labour-market measures and identified reducing unemployment and promoting reinsertion into work as the single most important factor in combating social exclusion. Thus, after 1994, issues such as employability (skills, flexibility, adaptability, marketability) and job creation dominated the social agenda. The situation is neatly summarised by Daly (2006: 6):

> 'For at least five years [1989-94], a concern with a more solidarisitc social policy – which was a genuine thrust of the period and a hallmark of the Delors presidency – came to be replaced by the exigency of modernising social policy, as internal political problems (including opposition to Delors' Commission) and external problems associated with the relatively poor performance of the EU in the face of an increasingly globalised economy turned the collective mind away from a social policy for the sake of the social and towards the economic'.

The fight against "social exclusion" has primarily been undertaken with the European Social Fund (part of the European Structural Funds), which has spent in excess of €60 billion on labour market initiatives in the period 1995-99 (European Commission, 1999). However, such initiatives fail to address the social exclusion of people who are not in the labour market

(e.g., the young, the old, the disabled, care providers etc.). Another criticism is that the employment programmes are linked to the EU objective of achieving economic cohesion, meaning the potential beneficiaries are people in those regions within the EU that are worst off. Consequently, people who live in hardship in better off regions are not eligible for assistance from employment programmes. It is also questionable whether European governments should pool their budgets and concentrate their efforts on employment. Not only are they subsidising industry by shifting responsibility for job training from the private to public purse, governments also are diverting monies that might otherwise be spent on welfare, social programmes and public services.

Thus, the EU's actions have focused primarily on combating unemployment. Wider aspects of social exclusion have received comparatively little attention. It is necessary to emphasise that the principle of subsidiarity restricts the EU in the field of social policy, especially where member states are unable to agree a single definition and what the appropriate responses should be (Daly, 2006). Indeed, there are significant differences in the way social exclusion has been interpreted across Europe. The three-fold typology of paradigms for social exclusion developed by Silver (1994) has made a valuable contribution to understanding the ideological and political roots of these differences and highlighting the implications for policy/action to address social exclusion. Referring to the three paradigms of solidarity, specialisation and monopoly, Silver (1994: 539) notes:

> 'Each paradigm attributes exclusion to a different cause and is grounded in a different political philosophy: republicanism, liberalism and social democracy. Each provides an explanation of multiple forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political and cultural – and thus encompasses theories of citizenship and racial-ethnic inequality as well as poverty and long-term unemployment'.

The key characteristics of each paradigm are summarised in Table 2.1 and below:

1. The 'solidarity' paradigm is rooted in French Republican political ideology and attributes exclusion to the breakdown of social solidarity, that is, the social bond

between the individual and society. The solidarity paradigm, which is heavily informed by Durkheim's sociology, views society 'as something external, moral and normative rather than grounded in individual, group or class interests' (Silver, 1994: 541). Solidarity or social order arises out of shared values and rights. From this perspective, social exclusion is regarded as a break in the social fabric, of the bond between the individual and society, along with an erosion of widely accepted values and rules about the appropriate ways to behave within society. 'Like deviance or anomie, exclusion both threatens and reinforces social cohesion' (Silver: 1994: 542). In this model, the state and public institutions have an important role to play in promoting social integration for those that are excluded, specifically, by inserting groups (e.g., the poor, the unemployed, disaffected youth, ethnic minorities) back into the mainstream society and dominant culture. Even though individuals have political rights, they also have duties and obligations to maintain national solidarity. This model underpins the Republican State.

2. The 'specialisation paradigm' is embedded in Anglo-American liberalism. Here the basis of the social contract is considered to be in social differentiation. Individuals engage in voluntary economic and social exchanges based on their interests and motivations. Social exclusion occurs when barriers such as discrimination, market failures and unenforced rights prevent individuals from freely engaging in these exchanges (Silver, 1994). The specialisation paradigm stresses the pathological and micro-sociological causes of economic exclusion; however, social liberals are also cognisant of the effects of structural change. According to Silver (1994: 560), 'the split between supply-side and demand-side theories parallels the division between classical and social liberalism… In contrast to supply-side theoreticians who attribute poverty or unemployment to individual failings, most sociologists now accept that the new poverty and long-term unemployment have demand-side or structural causes'. Unlike the solidarity model, minimal public intervention is seen as the way to prevent exclusion. Government support in terms of welfare payments, for instance, is depicted as creating dependency rather than promoting a work ethic, leading to the development of a cultural

underclass (Silver 1994). Although this paradigm is dominant in the United States of America, it can be broadly equated with the ideology of the New Right in Europe including Britain during the 1980s and 1990s (and more recently too). 'The traditional solution to poverty and unemployment is to create jobs and raise productivity by lowering wages and eliminating rigid employment regulations' (Silver, 1994: 555).

3. The 'monopoly' paradigm, influential on the European Left, views exclusion as the result of the formation of group monopolies. Non-members of the dominant groups are restricted access to resources, goods and services. 'Drawing heavily on Weber, and, to a lesser extent, Marx, it views the social order as coercive, imposed through a set of hierarchical power relations. In this social democratic or conflict theory, exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the political interests of the included… Exclusion is combated through citizenship, and the extension of equal membership and full participation in the community to outsiders' (Silver 1994: 543). This model underpins the existing Western European structure of society and is influential in many North European countries and, to a certain extent, Britain. The social democratic State holds the balance of power and attempts to compensate through social protection.

Table 2.1: Three paradigms of exclusion

	Solidarity	**Specialisation**	**Monopoly**
Ideology	Republicanism	Liberalism	Social Democracy
Discourse	Exclusion	Discrimination, Underclass	New poverty, Inequality
Cause of Exclusion	Erosion of collective values, Break in bond between individual and society	Barriers to voluntary exchanges	Different hierarchical class access to resources
Solutions	Individual rights and obligations to solidarity (cultural and moral), Public institutions important	Rights and obligations in contractual sense, Limited public intervention	Extend equal citizenship rights, Social protection

Source: Modified from Silver (1994: 540)

It is crucial to make explicit a number of key points from the above discussion on the emergence and development of social exclusion in the EU. First, the concept of social exclusion was adopted for *both* conceptual and political reasons. Second, the term "social exclusion" has been linked to the EU objective of achieving economic and social cohesion. Third, although the language used by the European Commission/European Observatory in its discussions of social exclusion resonate with the Republican language of the solidarity paradigm (i.e., internal solidarity, shared values and rights, social integration) and the social democratic language of the monopoly paradigm (i.e., the concept of citizenship, social rights orientation), the policies proposed suggest that the Anglo-American neoliberal tones of the specialisation paradigm have been a greater source of influence. As discussed in the previous section, 'while the causes of social exclusion may be structural, its effects can be ameliorated or exacerbated by the attitudes, activities and policies of governmental bodies' (Percy-Smith, 2000: 6). For example, EU policies on labour market flexibility and reduced social protection are incompatible with promoting secure employment and, together with public spending cuts required to meet conditions for monetary union (i.e., economic cohesion), may actually increase the risk of poverty and social exclusion (Percy-Smith, 2000; Room, 1995a). The final point is that the European approach to social exclusion has, in practice, reflected a more limited concern with labour market exclusion. Indeed, even though the EU now (owing to the Amsterdam Treaty which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999) has a clear legal basis for work on

social exclusion that goes beyond the labour market, 'the EU's social policy portfolio mainly consists of components of employment/active labour market policy, industrial safety, promoting workers' rights, social dialogue, enabling labour mobility and gender equality' (Daly, 2006: 5).

2.3 Social Exclusion in the United Kingdom

Social exclusion made its first appearance on the UK stage in the late nineties. During Conservative rule (i.e., 1979-97) the notion did not enter policy debates. 'The concept of solidarity and social integration which underlies the notion of "social exclusion" in the French tradition is difficult to grasp for people working within a liberal individualistic tradition' (Gore, 1995: 2). Indeed, when the exclusion approach was given first consideration in the 1980s by a Conservative administration dismissive of the suggestion that income poverty was a significant problem, the emphasis shifted from social cohesion to individualism (Hills *et al.*, 2002). The New Right linked concerns about increased levels of unemployment, crime and family breakdown to the idea of an "underclass". This idea, which was imported from America and characterised by the work of Murray (1984, 1990), locates the causes of societal disadvantage within individuals themselves and draws together three explanations – dependency theory, the culture of poverty thesis and the cycle of deprivation. Indeed, Murray directly related poverty to the behaviour (i.e., parenting-, criminal- and labour market-behaviour) and decisions (e.g., on family relationships, marriage and child-bearing) of individual poor people and, furthermore, argued that poverty was transmitted culturally through an intergenerational cycle of deprivation. In short, poverty was viewed as the result of personal choices and therefore a matter of individual responsibility. According to Murray, it was the underclass culture itself that was holding people back, not structural inequality. Consequently, Murray's policy prescription was to limit the extent of government intervention so that poor people's behaviour and decisions were more constrained by economic reality – the idea being that the resultant circumstances/hardship would change individual attitudes and behaviours and thus reduce the size of the underclass. These were the arguments behind the Conservative government's

coercive policies including greater welfare restrictions (i.e., through greater emphasis on means-testing and through tighter definitions of need and of entitlement and stricter conditions) and increased deterrence through law enforcement and imprisonment (Lister, 1997; McAnulla, 2006). Thus, the Conservatives used the stick rather than the carrot and drastically reduced levels of social protection.

While the idea of a socially and morally inferior underclass is preferred by conservative thinkers and politicians (possibly because it blames the poor and diverts attention away from blaming the mechanisms through which resources and wealth are distributed), as other reviews on the issue indicate, the 'dependency culture' is not supported by research evidence (Walker, 1990). There is, however, clear evidence of social polarisation in the 1980s. Indeed, in-equality of wealth between the rich and the poor has been growing. During the 1980s, incomes substantially diverged and, in the 1990s, the income gap widened; for example, in 1983, 14% of households in the UK lacked three or more basic necessities because they could not afford them, a proportion which increased to 21% in 1990 and to over 24% by 1999 (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2000). Figure 2.1 shows income inequality in the UK as measured by the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality across the whole of society. Simply put, if all the income went to only one person (maximum inequality) and everybody else in society received nothing, the Gini coefficient would be equal to 1. If income was distributed equally, and everyone had exactly the same amount, the Gini would equal 0.

Figure has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Figure 2.1: The Gini coefficient
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies (2012: 36)

As can be seen, inequality increased rapidly during Conservative rule, with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.25 in 1979 to 0.34 in 1991. 'This was the largest increase in income inequality seen in British history and was larger than the rise that took place in other countries at the same time' (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2012: 2). Thus, inequality widened enormously during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the results of the growing divide between the rich and poor has been the growing marginalisation of particular social groups (e.g., the long-term unemployed, homeless, lone parents, ex-offenders, disabled and long-term sick, ethnic minorities) and the concentration of the poor in marginalised areas, 'particularly the large cities in northern Britain and inner London, but also former coalfield areas and some seaside towns' (North and Syrett, 2006: 72). British interest in social exclusion reflects the growing of socio-spatial inequalities over the 1980s and 1990s. Reversing this decline became one of the central challenges for the Labour party, which saw its best opportunity to win power in almost two decades.

2.3.1 New Labour – new exclusion?

The decision by the Labour Party to adopt a focus upon tackling social exclusion was not only due to the high levels of inequality in the UK in the mid-1990s. The problem of social exclusion formed part of the development of a new political language to ensure electoral success (Levitas, 1998). Indeed, the term social exclusion was adopted by the Labour Party from the EU as it underwent a process of deliberate reinvention from "Old" to "New" Labour. So what factors led to social exclusion forming a key focus for such a transition? The Labour Party sought to define itself in opposition to the excesses of Thatcherism and was influenced by the report of the *Commission on Social Justice* (1994) and the *Third Way* thinking of Giddens (1994).

With respect to Thatcherism, as indicated earlier, during Conservative rule the welfare state underwent significant change. The Conservatives were adamant on 'rolling back the state, promoting choice and consumerism, encouraging the mixed economy of welfare and reducing welfare dependency' (Powell, 1999: 4). Committed to New Right ideology, the Thatcher government believed that the state was too big and too involved and that 'it should do less by shifting responsibility for welfare back onto private individuals and families' (Driver and Martell, 1998: 84). Thatcher argued that 'spiralling welfare expenditure is both unsustainable and limits the competitiveness of the domestic economy in global markets' (O'Brien, 2002: 404). Consequently, 'the Conservatives cut benefits and put pressure on claimants to take up job opportunities that came along' (McAnulla, 2006: 128). In response to the Conservative approach, 'the defence of the welfare state and the promise of extra funding for social benefits and services were the centre pieces of the 1983 and 1987 Labour election manifestos' (Driver and Martell, 1998: 85). Likewise in 1992, the Labour party manifesto pledged 'to restore the value of child benefit, raise the basic pension and reintroduce the link between pensions and earning that the Conservatives had abandoned in 1981' (Purdy, 2000: 183). The Conservatives turned that into 'Labour's tax bombshell' and reminded the electorate of past failures, including

‘the winter of discontent, the IMF crisis, ‘lame duck’ nationalised industries and punitive direct taxation’ (Larkin, 2001: 51). Labour found itself losing the election.

The Labour Party’s response was to set up the Commission on Social Justice (CSJ). It was to carry out an independent inquiry into social and economic reform and produce recommendations for a strategy and programme of policy changes. The introduction to the report of the CSJ set out the values of social justice as ‘the equal worth of all citizens, their equal right to be able to meet their basic needs, the need to spread opportunities and life chances as widely as possible, and finally, the requirement that we reduce and where possible eliminate unjustified inequalities’ (CSJ, 1994: 1). The report cited extensive evidence of increasing inequality and acknowledged the forces of globalisation, deindustrialisation and technological change, as well as demographic changes, particularly the changed role of women in society. The CSJ argued that ‘inequality is very inefficient’ (1994: 23) and that ‘squalor and crime carry enormous economic as well as social costs’ (1994: 20).

The report referred to the ‘unwelcome’ process of social exclusion (1994: 81-82). The report discussed exclusion from work, transport, politics, education, housing, and leisure facilities as increasingly obvious features of British society. Accumulated disadvantages of unemployment, bad housing, poor schooling and high crime were understood to combine to produce areas where there was simply ‘no economy’. The CSJ remained unconvinced by descriptions of the underclass, but recognised that the dismantling of the welfare state brought with it consequences, including ‘increasing alienation and disaffection among many people’ (1994: 82). Social viability would depend upon building a society based on ‘inclusion’ in terms of an end to structural unemployment, a sustained attack on the accumulated disadvantages of deprived parts of the UK and effective support for families of all kinds (CSJ, 1994).

The economic analysis of the CSJ argued that inequality held back economic growth through costs to government and deterring investors from whole areas which were seen as disadvantaged. In contrast, social justice and investment in people could contribute to economic

growth. The report recognised that markets were not created by natural forces, but were the product of the values, institutions and political decisions that governed them, calling for 'intelligent regulation' to make markets work better for society (1994: 98). The CSJ viewed paid employment as crucial to a secure and stable life. Among the specific recommendations (i.e., intelligent regulation necessary to create a more inclusionary labour market) made by the CSJ were: policies to prevent discrimination of part-time workers; effective equal pay; anti-discrimination and anti-harassment legislation; a statutory minimum wage; and, family-friendly employment policies. The latter include: improvements in maternity leave; the introduction of parental leave and leave for family reasons; carers leave; and flexible working hours that meet employees' needs and not just employers' needs (1994: 155-157). The CSJ stressed that certain groups such as the young unemployed, long-term unemployed and lone parent families would require practical support (i.e., education, skills and training, child-care), as well as income support to secure insertion in society. This welfare-to-work initiative would sit comfortably with many of the EU ideas on social integration through labour market policies.

The CSJ argued for a future which combined the dynamics of a market economy with strong social institutions, families and communities. Labour modernisers had their sights fixed on 'third way politics'. The Third Way has been presented by the sociologist Giddens as a new approach to politics and policies which transcends the old categories of Left (i.e., top-down socialism) and Right (i.e., traditional neo-liberalism). Table 2.2 presents a summarised account of the Third Way. The idea was to reshape the way in which the state addressed inequality. Giddens (2000: 85-86) argued 'there is no future for egalitarianism at all costs' and that instead 'emphasis should be placed upon equality of opportunity'. The distinction between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity is crucial here. While equality of outcome demands reducing the privileges of the rich in favour of the poor through the tax and benefit systems (favoured by "Old" Labour), equality of opportunity does not. Equality of opportunity (although traditionally a more liberal stance) is more in keeping with the drive towards social cohesion and inclusion (providing opportunities for people to enter the labour market, making everyone

equally employable, addressing socio-spatial disadvantage) sought by the CSJ (and subsequently New Labour).

In the run up to the 1997 election, the New Labour manifesto promised to create equality of opportunity, not simply by redistribution through the tax and benefits system, but by reforming government, improving public services and targeting support for the most disadvantaged (Labour Party, 1997). Priority areas would be education and health, with specific pledges on reducing class sizes and hospital waiting lists. The welfare-to-work initiative (the New Deal, as it is known), comprising both the duty to seek work and proactive government programmes to support entry/re-entry into a flexible market, would also receive a high priority. By reducing claimant numbers, New Labour intended to release funds for investment in education and health. The New Deal, funded through a windfall tax on privatised utilities, would be linked to a comprehensive reform of welfare provision. In implementing a welfare programme, there would be no increase in the basic or top rates of income tax and a New Labour government would seek to manage the economy so as to maintain stable economic growth and low inflation. Welfare spending would be funded through the benefits of steady economic growth (Labour Party, 1997). This manifesto, together with the language and broad policy goals and means associated with the Third Way agenda (see Table 2.2), was meant to appeal both to Labour's traditional working-class base and to the middle income, middle Britain voters New Labour was courting.

Table 2.2: Dimensions of the Third Way in social policy

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Source: Barrientos and Powell (2004: 15)

2.3.2 Social exclusion and New Labour policy

Following a landslide election victory, New Labour came to power in May 1997 on a promise not to repeat the mistakes of earlier government social policy programmes. Social exclusion was a central part of this agenda, that is, the Third Way politics of equality of opportunity. The term social exclusion rose to prominence in the UK during the first term of the Blair premiership, owing in particular to the setting up of the interdepartmental Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in December 1997. According to David Miliband (2005: 2), the then Minister of Communities and Local Government, the creation of the SEU represented 'not just a change of terminology, or governmental plumbing, but a *policy departure* that occurred to address the moral vacuum at the heart of Conservative policy, but also the policy limitations in

inherited assumptions on the Left' (*Emphasis added*). Social exclusion was defined by New Labour as:

> 'A shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown' (SEU, 1997: 1).

Notably this definition does not refer to citizenship rights, but rather multidimensional disadvantage. Thus, New Labour's definition is focussed on outcomes and 'makes no reference to the processes that create the problems identified in the definition' (Percy-Smith, 2000: 4). Inevitably, policies were designed around the symptoms of social exclusion rather than preventative actions to tackle the underlying causes.

Indeed, New Labour implemented a raft of person- and place-based policies to tackle disadvantage. Place policies can be defined as interventions aimed at designated neighbourhoods/settlements, or groups of neighbourhoods which, when taken together, can be regarded a discrete category of places (Griggs *et al.,* 2008). Examples of place-based policies range from comprehensive regeneration schemes, including the New Deal for Communities Programme, to domain-specific neighbourhood renewal initiatives, such as Sure Start (i.e., neighbourhood nurseries, family centres), Employment Zones and Health Action Areas. Person policies include macro-level policies which generate support for individuals and households through the tax and benefit systems (Griggs *et al.,* 2008). Examples include government initiatives to address the problem of low pensioner incomes through the implementation of a Minimum Income Guarantee, strategies to tackle non take-up of benefits by older people, and Winter Fuel Payments. Person policies also include programmes which are applicable to individual needs rather than area specific, such as the New Deal programmes (for specific target groups, such as young adults aged 18-24, the disabled, lone parents, the long-term unemployed aged 25-49, partners of the unemployed, and those aged 50 years or more) and the Connexions strategy, which provides employment, education and training programmes for young people aged 13-18 years.

There are four phases into which the social exclusion agenda can be broadly divided: the establishment of the SEU in 1997 to 2001, when it formed part of the Cabinet Office; 2002 to 2005, when the unit moved to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; 2006–2007, when the SEU was merged with the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and re-named as the Social Exclusion Taskforce (SETF); and 2007–2010, with the SETF under the Brown government. This discussion is best organised in terms of two periods of engagement with social exclusion. The reason to identify two periods is substantive rather than temporal. Before and after 2006, social exclusion has varied in terms of priority, focus and intensity of activity. The change in the social exclusion agenda is broadly evident in a series of key policy reports (see Table 2.3). Over the fourteen year period in which these documents were written, some concerns remained the same. However, each subtle shift in focus alters the construction of the socially excluded and influences the policy response.

Table 2.3: Description and indicators relating to social exclusion 1997-2011

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Source: Modified from McNeil (2012: 48-49)

Before examining the two periods of engagement and drawing conclusions on the potential impact of New Labour's 'policy departure' (Miliband, 2005), at the outset it is important to remember that the concepts of "opportunity for all" and "rights and responsibilities" were key elements of New Labour's political programme and underpinned the social exclusion agenda. Being in employment, education or training was the main goal of "opportunity for all", 'with "responsibility" promoted through greater conditionality in the welfare system and "rights" through more programmes aimed at improving services and outcomes in the most disadvantaged areas' (McNeil, 2012: 20). It is also important to note the terms under which the assessment will be made. The work of Levitas (1998, 2005) is crucial here (see section 1.1.3).

According to Levitas (2005) who was writing prior to the closure of the SEU in 2006, New Labour's approach demonstrated 'an inconsistent combination of SID and MUD' (p. 28), with considerable 'pulling' towards the SID 'in which paid employment is the central means of social integration and social control, and unemployment the overriding element in social exclusion' (p. 48). Indeed, the labour market was always seen as the most promising route out of poverty and exclusion for all people of working age. Consequently, the labour market served as the main redistributive mechanism for New Labour. The introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 meant a more regulated labour market. The minimum wage was supposed to address the problem of poverty pay, which exists when the earnings from paid work do not result in a living wage and fail to lift people out of poverty. The higher wage was also to act as an incentive for people to supply their labour (i.e., work more hours, join the labour market). In order to assist entry/re-entry into the labour market, in 1998 New Labour instituted the New Deal programmes for six client groups (see Table 2.4). The young unemployed (i.e., people aged between 18 and 24 who have claimed Job Seekers Allowance for six months) and the long-term unemployed (i.e., those claiming Job Seekers Allowance for over two years) had to participate. Both programmes involved extra help with job search and training, a wage subsidy, and penalties for non-compliance. Under these schemes, those reliant on welfare would 'lose the whole of their benefit for two weeks' (Purdy, 2000: 187) and 'lose

40% of their benefit indefinitely if they refused to accept one of the welfare-workfare options presented to them' (Hay, 1999: 121).

Table 2.4: The New Deal programme

Client group	Conditions and eligibility	Provision
18-24 year olds	Compulsory after unemployed for six months	Personal adviser. Gateway period for four months (advice, guidance, preparation), then one of: training or education, job with wage subsidy, voluntary work, public sector employment through the environmental task force. Help with travel and childcare costs. Sanctions for non-compliance.
25-49 year olds	Compulsory after unemployed for 18 months	Personal adviser. Gateway period for four months (advice, guidance, preparation), then one of: training or education, job with wage subsidy, work placements. Help with travel and childcare costs. Sanctions for non-compliance.
Aged 50 and over	Voluntary after unemployed for six months	Personal adviser. Help with job search. One year's employment credit if move into low-paid work.
Lone parents	Voluntary for lone parents who are not working	Personal adviser. Help with job search, training, childcare arrangements and in-work support. Financial help for training and childcare. May join other New Deals.
Partners of unemployed people	Voluntary if partner claiming out-of-work benefit for six months	Personal adviser. Help with job search, training, childcare arrangements and in-work support. Financial help for training and childcare.
Disabled people	Voluntary if receiving disability-related benefits	Personal adviser and access to job broker.

Source: Compiled from Appendix 3 & 4 of Griggs *et al.* (2008)

During the first period (i.e., 1997-2006) New Labour not only implemented its policies on welfare to work, it also established the SEU. The purpose of the SEU was to raise the profile of social exclusion and coordinate policy between central government departments, and between central government, local authorities, the voluntary sector and private organisations (SEU, 1997). Initially, the SEU focused on four main issues – truancy and school exclusion (SEU, 1998a), rough sleeping (SEU, 1998b) teenage pregnancy (SEU, 1999a) and young people not in education, employment or training (SEU, 1999b). In all of the reports before mentioned, the SEU sought to frame the issue in terms of social exclusion and apply a broad methodology of costing the problem, analysing the systemic barriers, establishing accountability and focusing departments, authorities and agencies on key measures of success. Its recommendations resulted in a variety of government-funded programmes, but the geographic reach of these programmes was limited. A particular emphasis was given to those

living in deprived areas (Miliband, 2006). Thus, the SEU's achievements were limited by the relatively few areas in which many of the programmes operated. There was also a specific policy focus on groups of people thought to be 'at risk' or presently socially excluded, such as ex-offenders (SEU, 2002a), teenage runaways (SEU, 2002b), children in care (SEU, 2003) and older people (SEU, 2005, 2006). These reports encouraged agencies, along with central and local government, to be aware of their responsibilities in relation to such groups and respond to their needs effectively.

The emphasis on people and place in the early years of the social exclusion agenda was in January 2006 described by David Miliband as 'wide' and 'concentrated'. According to Miliband (2006), the scope reflected political priorities as well as analysis of need. Over time, there was a shift away from discrete issues, vulnerable groups and area-based concentrations of disadvantage to individuals and families facing multiple combined social problems, which Miliband (2006) labelled 'deep social exclusion'. The population facing deep social exclusion was identified as existing at the intersection of poverty and wider social exclusion: 'within the large minority of people who are below one or more of the basic minimum standards, there will be some who face exclusion on multiple counts. Here we get closer to a more recognisable definition of social exclusion reflecting the most disadvantaged in society' (Miliband, 2006: 7).

A visual annotation of the distinction between wide and deep exclusion is displayed in Figure 2.2. To be clear, many people suffer one or more forms of disadvantage. For example, they may live below the poverty line, have a long-term illness or struggle with basic literacy (see Table 2.3 for Miliband's examples of 'wide social exclusion'). However, just because a sector of the population (however large or small) may be deprived on a single or small number of indicators does not necessarily mean that they are socially excluded, although they are at-risk of social exclusion (hence the amber colour). Miliband's (2006) analysis suggests that there is a small group of people who face multiple intractable problems that when combined result in deep social exclusion.



Figure 2.2: Deep and persistent social exclusion
Source: Author's own elaboration

Miliband's (2006) examples of 'deep social exclusion' are given in Table 2.3. It is apparent from Table 2.3 that the policy focus on unemployment and economic inactivity remained over time, but there was a gradual shift from indicators of deprivation to include indicators of social dysfunction (e.g., learning difficulties, mental illness, family breakdown, criminality, addiction, institutional care). Doubtless, the inclusion of some of these indicators had to do with the election of 2005, during which anti-social behaviour emerged as a key voter concern (Levitas, 2005). Ultimately, the shift to address more acute disadvantage reflects the success – as much as the failure – of policy up to 2006. On the one hand, it was deemed that policies to tackle poverty and wider social exclusion such as the minimum wage, the New Deals and tax credits had helped the majority move from welfare into work (*Opportunity for All* / Department for Work and Pensions, 2005). That said, according to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (an organisation which monitors progress in tackling poverty and inequality), although progress was made in several high profile areas, such as employment and education, many measures of "low income" and "work" show a worse picture in 2005 than in 2000 (Aldridge *et al.*, 2011). On the other hand, there was a realisation that the SEU's group-led

approach to social exclusion had failed to reach the most severely excluded and some of the poorest, most isolated and vulnerable families (see Table 2.3).

That there should be a stalling of social exclusion outcomes is perhaps not surprising giving that New Labour's claim of a 'policy departure' is questionable on a number of points. First, underpinning New Labour's approach in particular was a focus on targets, as underlined in a number of government publications, notably the *Opportunity for All* reports. Beginning in 1999, the reports in the series have charted the success or otherwise of explicit targets towards the reduction of specific social exclusion features, in relation to three population groups – children and young people, people of working age and older people. For children and young people, dimensions of social exclusion focused on education (largely academic test scores, but also school exclusions), health outcomes (such as low-birth weights), family poverty and youth unemployment. For people of working age, dimensions of social exclusion were focussed primarily on unemployment, but also included low income jobs, as well as drug use and homelessness. The dimensions for older people centred on poverty (largely from reliance on state pension, but also from fuel poverty), health and life expectancy, fear of crime, poor housing and lack of independence (Department of Social Security, 1999: 5-7). Doubtless, such a wide range of indicators can be useful in providing a general picture of the extent of social exclusion and also to focus on its specific features. However, there are problems with this battery of single indicators. The problems identified include that they 'do not distinguish between risk factors and outcomes. They cannot prioritise one indicator, or potential field of intervention, over another. They say nothing about the interaction of different factors' (Levitas, 2007: 14). The failure to specify the nature of the links which exist between different elements which may constitute the phenomenon is crucial here. For example, reducing unemployment may lead to a reduction in social exclusion, but there is no explanation of to what extent or how, meaning that for New Labour, 'government is about solving discrete problems' (Lister, 2001: 433), which to a large extent undermines its 'multidimensional' approach.

Second, the major initial focus of New Labour's approach was a specific emphasis on integration through paid employment (Levitas, 2005). It reflected the twin belief that 'work strengthens personal independence, fosters greater social inclusion and is the best route out of poverty' and that 'there were groups of people locked into long-term dependency on benefits who [had] been denied the opportunities that work can bring' (*Opportunity for All* / Department of Work and Pensions, 2006: 5-6). The main policy initiative, as mentioned earlier, was the New Deal. The success of the New Deal is contested and 'very little information is available about the value of the schemes, in other words how people's lives have been changed by them' (Taylor, 2005: 197). 'The government claimed that the New Deal had assisted around 1.2 million people into paid work between 1998 and 2004, including 535,000 young people and 200,000 unemployed adults' (Taylor, 2005: 197). However, Taylor (2005: 197) points out that 'up to the end of 2004 it has been estimated that only 130,000 people actually moved directly from participation in the government's programme into unsubsidised employment at the end of the process'. Regardless of whether the figures are or are not misleading, the government paid subsidies to participating employers to take on the *young* and *long-term* unemployed (Sunley *et al.,* 2006). There was no incentive for employers to provide work experience to other groups (i.e., the disabled, lone parents, partners of the unemployed, and those aged 50 years or more). Thus, a key question is whether the intervention in favour of the young and long-term unemployed was detrimental to other target groups. Another question, closely linked to the previous one, relates to whether the job offered to a New Dealer is genuinely new or permanent. A job that is not new may actually increase social exclusion. The ability of the New Deal to accomplish social inclusion was questioned by Brennan *et al* as early as 1998 who noted that the policy would involve 'recycling lower skilled jobs to the socially excluded away from others who were slightly less deprived and disadvantaged' (Brennan *et al.,* 1998: 4). Put differently, the New Deals were liable to be inefficient as they displace problems to other sections of society.

Third, the assumption that employment is a route out of poverty and social exclusion is questionable. People can be in work and socially excluded, not least because they can be on

low pay/flat wages (which may not cover the rising costs of living - such as food prices, housing costs, utilities, child-care costs, and transport/fuel costs - but also Council Tax), caring for relatives or doing more than one job (which compromises family and/or recreational life). Moreover, the emphasis on work has overshadowed the needs of those for whom work is not an option. For pensioners and severely disabled people an employment-based strategy for alleviating poverty and exclusion is clearly not relevant. Although there was some financial redistribution to pensioners and to some disabled claimants, 'security for those who cannot work received very little attention' during Blair's first term in office (Stewart and Hills, 2005: 21). For example, the work capability test for Incapacity Benefit was strengthened, 'with a view to reducing the number of recipients' (Brewer *et al.,* 2002: 505). Again, the response consisted of welfare-to-work (i.e., the New Deal programmes), changes to incentives to make work pay (i.e., minimum wage, Working Families Tax Credit), and action on inequalities by improving public services.

Thus, Levitas argued New Labour understood social inclusion primarily in terms of participation in paid work; it is an understanding based heavily in SID (Levitas, 2005). She also suggested that certain welfare policies, such as benefit sanctions for New Deal participants, have undertones of MUD. However, as pointed out earlier, the SEU has given prominence to specific 'problem groups' as the defining feature of social exclusion, which is also a good example of MUD. In this respect, New Labour has 'discursively placed the unwanted characteristics of the socially excluded as outside those of mainstream society, the effect of which has been to distract attention from the essentially class divided character of society and to make conformity to mainstream society the focus of policy' (Sealey, 2009: 24). Again, according to Levitas (2005: 28), New Labour's approach demonstrated 'an inconsistent combination of SID and MUD' with considerable 'pulling' towards the SID. But the simplification that the Levitas position represents is unfair to New Labour, particularly when considering New Labour's second term in office (i.e., 2001-2005). There was extensive policy action in this period, such as the raft of person- and place-based polices mentioned earlier, which demonstrates that New Labour's approach has some foundations in RED.

In New Labour's second term in government, increases in in-work benefits, such as the Working Families Tax Credits aimed at some working families with children, were accompanied by increases in out-of-work benefits, like Income Support, at least for some client groups (Brewer *et al.,* 2002). Income support rates for single parent families, low-paid families with children and support for pensioners all increased, which is bizarre when considering that, all else being equal, they discourage paid work. The reason why the rates were increased was due to other government objectives. In particular, during the latter stage of his first term Tony Blair announced an aspiration to reduce relative income poverty for children and pensioners (*Opportunity for All* / Department of Social Security, 1999). Financial redistribution was not possible before 1999 largely because of 'the Government's commitment to stick to the previous Conservative Government's very tight spending plans for its first two years in office' (Brewer *et al.,* 2002: 8). What limited financial redistribution occurred during and after the second term was done by 'stealth'. Labour went into the 1997 and 2001 general elections pledging not to increase the standard or top rates of income tax (Labour Party, 1997, 2001). That is to say the emphasis shifted from direct to indirect taxation such as VAT, fuel duty, vehicle exercise duty, fossil fuel levies, stamp duty on house purchases, air passenger duties, tobacco and alcohol duties, insurance premium tax, TV licenses, custom duties etc. (Emmerson *et al.,* 2005).

Moreover, what limited financial redistribution occurred was constrained to 'improving the situation of those at the bottom relative to the middle with the position of those at the top considered unimportant' (Stewart and Hills, 2005: 15). Put differently, New Labour was concerned more about the distance between the bottom of the income distribution and the middle, and less about the distance between the middle and the top. Furthermore, the concern was with children and pensioners. There was little sympathy for working-age singles and couples without children or with non-dependent children (Stewart and Hills, 2005). Again, work was viewed as the best form of welfare for working-age adults. This criticism specifically questions the narrow focus of New Labour's Third Way within which, as mentioned earlier, 'problem selection' is prioritised over 'problem definition'. For New Labour, the concern was

not income poverty per se or overall income inequality, but a reduction in inequality in the bottom half of the income distribution, at least for children and pensioners.

Consequently, means-tested benefits were prioritised over universal benefits. To be clear, means-tested benefits are based mainly on a test of income, though some also include tests of assets or capital. The key means-tested benefits are Pension Credit, Jobseekers Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support and (since 2013) Child Benefit. Means-tests are extensively criticised in the literature – see, for example, Lister (1997) and Spicker (2014). Briefly, the advantages of means tests are they concentrate financial resources on those most in need and they are progressive, meaning they redistribute resources vertically from rich to poor. The disadvantages are: 'they are complex and difficult to administer; they often fail to reach those in need [the reasons commonly given for low take-up are ignorance, complexity, the effect of changing circumstances, fear, stigma, and the history of means-testing]; people's income changes rapidly [thus effective means-testing calls for constant reporting and frequent adjustment in the level of benefit]' (Spicker, 2014: 2); and, 'because it is based on the joint incomes of couples, it threatens to undermine women's financial independence and means that one partner's economic activity affects the other's benefit entitlement' (Lister, 1997: 8).

The main concern is that a means-tested approach is 'likely to marginalise the poor and their interests even further as the rest of society no longer has any stake in the welfare system' (Lister, 1997: 8). This position was adopted by the Institute of Fiscal Studies who warned New Labour, 'the extension of means-tested benefits might lead to a drop in support for the welfare state as the benefits are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution, and so offer little to the supposedly crucial voters of so-called middle Britain' (Brewer *et al.*, 2002: 12). Means tests thus, many would argue, represent a force for social exclusion rather than inclusion. Perhaps these concerns were partly why New Labour introduced universal benefits for the elderly, such as free eye tests, free prescriptions, the Winter Fuel Allowance, free TV licences and free bus passes.

It could be argued those perks for the rich were necessary for persuading them to help out their less fortunate fellow citizens. But there are strong principled reasons why means-tested benefits are important. For a start, a welfare state should not collect taxes from everyone – including from the least well-off – and then arbitrarily give some of that cash back to people who do not really need it. Consider also Child Benefit which, until relatively recently, was a universal benefit with take-up as high as 99 per cent in some years (Spicker, 2014). Doubtless, child benefit involved redistribution from poor single persons and poor couples without children to better-off families. Another reason for defending redistribution and ensuring the wealthiest contribute back to society with no expectation of receiving a bribe to do so is partly captured by the report of the CSJ which stated that, 'taxes are the contribution that we all make towards building a better society. Taxation in a democratic society is based upon consent; it is a *desirable good*, not a necessary evil… fair taxes, wisely and efficiently used, are a responsibility we should share and accept' (CSJ, 1994: 376. *Emphasis added*). The point here is taxes pay for public services (health, education, transport etc.) which benefit all private citizens (even if the rich do not use those services themselves) which in turn creates the conditions for a prosperous society. Thus, redistribution through means-tests, together with direct taxation ensuring that those who earn most pay most, need not be a force for social exclusion. Arguably, it is necessary in the drive towards social inclusion and cohesion.

The discussion so far has related to 1997-2006. The second period of the social exclusion agenda began in June 2006. It was marked by the announcement of the closure of the nine-year-old SEU, with its work transferred to a smaller Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF) in the Cabinet Office. Although a 'cross-departmental' approach remained at the heart of the SETF (SETF, 2006), its reduced size and profile suggests that social exclusion was no longer at the heart of government policy itself. The SETF adopted as its core focus the '2.5 per cent of every generation caught in a lifetime of disadvantage and harm', as set out in *Reaching Out: An Action Plan on Social Exclusion* (SETF, 2006: 5). This report builds on the distinction between wide and deep exclusion, and translates Miliband's (2006) analysis into a critique of

‘why even some of our most ambitious programmes aimed at breaking the cycle of deprivation have had only a modest impact to date on the most excluded’ (SETF, 2006: 20). The assessment was that, while there had been success in reducing poverty and wider social exclusion in the general population, ‘a small minority’ had effectively been left behind, and this minority was suffering from ‘deep and persistent social exclusion’ (SETF, 2006: 8). Significantly, *Reaching Out: An Action Plan on Social Exclusion* (hereafter referred to as "the Action Plan") recognises that for this minority, the barriers are not only economic but also social and cultural (see SETF, 2006: 17-20). More significantly, there was an acknowledgement of the perverse consequences of the group-led approach that characterised earlier efforts:

> ‘Individual agencies do generally focus on improving outcomes for the neediest within their services (for example the most mentally ill or the most prolific offenders) but often miss those who have multiple needs but need less help from any one service. Thus, people may not meet the threshold of any given agency to trigger a fuller intervention – despite the scale of their problems or the harms caused to the communities in which they live’ (SETF, 2006: 74).

There was a realisation that methods had to change, and this realisation led to an increased focus on the principles of early intervention, systematically identifying what works, better co-ordination of the many separate agencies, personalisation, and intolerance of poor performance (see Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Reaching Out - guiding principles

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Source: SETF (2006: 22)

It also identified the need for a 'lifetime approach':

> 'System reform can take years to deliver, and results can take decades to show. We will supplement our drive for deeper reform with more focused and immediate action that we are confident will make a difference. This Action Plan establishes a range of specific proposals that we believe to be of pivotal importance throughout an individual's lifetime, both in terms of their impact on the life chances of the most excluded and in order to strengthen the case for wider reforms' (SETF, 2006: 10).

Thus, in the Action Plan, a lifecycle approach is adopted, where policy/action is focused around age cohorts (see Figure 2.3). As can be seen, there are three age cohorts and, in the case of 'children and teenagers at risk' and 'adults facing chronic social exclusion', these cohorts are further broken down into at-risk target groups. Programmes are focussed on addressing the multiple issues and/or barriers facing the age cohorts in general and minority groups in particular.



Figure 2.3: A 'lifecycle approach' with specific target groups
Source: Author's own elaboration

The Action Plan stressed that breaking the cycle of disadvantage involves early intervention and prevention. A particular emphasis was placed on parenting and the early years (due to research showing their life-long impact on education, emotional wellbeing and resilience), and identification of the most at-risk households. The Action Plan argued that the process of identification should start before individuals are born and identified a number of 'risk factors', which, it announced, community midwives, health professionals and social workers will use to diagnose an unborn child's potential for future misbehaviour and exclusion (see Table 2.6).

Table 2.6: Early years – risk factors

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions

Source: SETF (2006: 46)

The existence of any or a combination of these factors could be enough to trigger intervention. Initiatives aimed at families and children included:

- health-led home visiting parenting support programmes based on the US Family-Nurse Partnerships (FNPs) model to provide intensive, home-based support for first-time mothers at risk during pregnancy and the first two years of a child's life. FNPs sought to improve mother-baby attachments and breastfeeding rates, reduce smoking during pregnancy, improve maternal health and diet and promote education and employment opportunities (see SETF, 2006: 52);

- Multi-Systemic Therapy programmes aimed at children and parents with emotional and behavioural problems (see SETF, 2006: 67);

- Treatment Foster Care programmes (a home-based alternative to group homes for children in care) to improve outcomes for children (see SETF, 2006: 67);

- a revised teenage pregnancy strategy (see SETF, 2006: 66); and,

- the development of commissioning tools and databases on evidence-based parenting programmes and intensive interventions (see SETF, 2006: 28-31).

This focus and approach informed the *Families at risk* review, which set out the principles and guidelines for what would become known as New Labour's *Think Family* approach to social exclusion. *Reaching Out: Think Family* was published in June 2007. This report identifies 140,000 severely disadvantaged families (about 2% of families across Britain) as a target group in recognition that:

> 'parental and wider family problems… cast a shadow that spans whole lifetimes and indeed passes down the generations. These family experiences can limit aspiration, reinforce cycles of poverty and provide poor models of behaviour that can have an impact on a child's development and well-being, with significant costs for public services and the wider community' (SETF, 2007a: 1).

While there was a tacit acknowledgement of wider societal barriers that inhibit inclusion (see SETF, 2007a: 15), overwhelming emphasis is placed upon the need to tackle what was perceived to be pathological family dysfunction. Parents and families were deemed a risk to children in the sense of unacceptable behaviour, values and intentions – in the main associated with substance misuse, high family conflict, domestic violence, parental neglect, anti-social behaviour, and criminality (see SETF, 2007a: 15). The SETF stated that *Think Family* 'is not a debate on the shape of families and we will not try to incentivise or engineer particular family structures' – rather, the emphasis was on the degree and severity of 'risk factors children face from their environment' (SETF, 2007a: 1). The report called for greater integration between adult and children's services. For example, prisons and children's social services, specifically ensuring a family gets the support it needs when a parent goes into jail, or comes out of jail. The report also called for more investment in family focused initiatives, such as Family Intervention Projects (FIPs). Introduced in 2006, FIPs are delivered by a combination of statutory agencies and social partners and

> 'provide holistic support designed to target some of the most disadvantaged and problematic families and improve their behaviour and deliver other outcomes. Interventions vary in intensity, partly reflecting the severity of the problems involved. These range from home visits and coordination of different service interventions, to full residential interventions where the family lives in adapted accommodation with 24-hour supervision and support' (SETF, 2006: 39).

Sanctions are seen as integral to the success of FIPs:

> 'The use of sanctions is an important lever for motivating families to change. Demoting tenancies or gaining possession orders suspended on the basis of compliance with the projects or, for some, the very real prospect of children being taken into care, can provide the wake up call to take the help on offer' (HM Government, 2010b: 1).

Premised on the idea that parental irresponsibility and family dysfunction are the main causes of social exclusion, FIPs have their origins within the moral underclass discourse. White *et al* (2008) undertook an independent evaluation of the 53 FIPs established during 2006 and 2007. They found that following participation in a FIP, levels of crime and anti-social behaviour declined considerably, the risk of eviction for families was reduced and several outcomes for

young people were improved, particularly with respect to truancy, exclusion and/or bad behaviour at school. However, no evidence was found for improved outcomes in relation to education, employment, health, or family functioning.

In summary, the SETF adopted as its core focus the '2.5 per cent of every generation caught in a lifetime of disadvantage and harm' (SETF, 2006: 5). This intractability was understood to stem in part from the way policies and services are designed. The assessment was that, because this problem is deeply systemic, severe and multiple disadvantage had been insufficiently acknowledged and targeted. As a result, the SETF set out a new vision for social exclusion policy in which all responses are underpinned by five key principles (see Table 2.5). In this respect, the explicit linkage of policy to social exclusion objectives and principles has marked an observable shift from the SEU's approach. With respect to the SEU, the focus was never at the people with the most complex needs. The SEU focused on highly visible social problems and particular groups. How the SEU, Tony Blair and other key ministers selected the groups was largely political: 'it was partly led by who they felt was falling through cracks between departments; however, it was also led by who had the most political purchase, who attracted the interest of politicians at the time, for example on teenage pregnancy' (McNeil, 2012: 23).

For the SETF, references to 'disadvantage and harm' are accompanied by prioritisation of 'specific hard-to-reach groups' (SETF, 2006: 95) and an emphasis on early intervention. In this sense, the SETF focused strongly on young people 'at risk' and 'problem families', although there was also a concern with 'adults facing chronic exclusion'. With respect to the latter, the SETF specified four target-groups who, together with young people 'at risk' and 'problem families', constitute 'the 2.5 per cent' (see Figure 2.3). The SETF assumed that many members of these small groups are likely to have 'chaotic lives and multiple needs' (SETF, 2006: 71). Although these terms were not defined, groups such as homeless people, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants, sex workers, travelling communities and addiction sufferers

may be variously identified in this sense. This list is not exhaustive and only aims to suggest some additional groups likely to experience multiple, entrenched and hidden needs.

The point of the list is to highlight that 'the 2.5 per cent' is far from a homogenous group, which raises a series of questions. For instance: what, if anything, do all these sub-groups have in common that warrants speaking about them in aggregate? Do these sub-groups have a considerably different experience of either social exclusion or of the provision of services to meet it? Furthermore, by identifying a number of sub-groups within 'the 2.5 per cent', is there a risk of over-simplifying the experiences and needs of those who fall within the same sub-groups? The reasons why people are in a particular sub-group may differ considerably, as might their need for services and support. For example, within the homeless population, there will be individuals whose exclusion is much deeper than others. Another issue, closely linked to the previous one, is that one establishes a false distinction between someone suffering five counts of social exclusion and someone suffering six. There is a tension to be reconciled then, between *severity* of need and *multiplicity* of need. One partial solution to this problem is to approach social exclusion through the lens of different domains (e.g., in terms of a hierarchy of domains, topics and indicators), rather than its impact on disadvantaged groups, not least because their individual characteristics vary and are dynamic.

In conclusion then, in the period 2006-2010, New Labour understood that people who face severe and multiple disadvantage need different forms of support. The welfare state plus universal public services are not enough. This realisation led to more targeted and intensive interventions. The mistake made by New Labour was that it focused exclusively on 'the 2.5 per cent', which had the effect of diverting attention away from social exclusion within the wider context of poverty and societal disadvantage. The emphasis on 'the 2.5 per cent' can be seen as locating policy in general towards the 'anti-egalitarianism' emphasis of the right, rather than the 'egalitarianism' of the left. Specifically, it suggests that the problems of alienation, isolation and poor life chances are confined to a tiny minority people. The implication being that social exclusion policy only needed to concentrate on a small number of individuals and families.

With respect to the analysis and policy prescriptions which emerged from the SETF, they have much more in common with the moral underclass discourse than the redistributionist discourse.

2.3.3 Social exclusion policy under the Coalition

With the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May 2010, the social exclusion agenda entered a new phase. It was marked by the announcement of the closure of the SETF, with its staff being absorbed into a new Office for Civil Society (OCS). The remit of the OCS was to promote the Conservative Party's "Big Society" agenda (Cabinet Office, 2010), which sought a retreat from state intervention and a greater role for citizens, communities, voluntary agencies and the private sector in problem solving and service delivery. Issues of multiple disadvantage were made the responsibility of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (Cabinet Office, 2010). A review of the DWP's literature reveals the term 'social justice' is substituted for 'social exclusion'. The Coalition's 'social justice' strategy also focuses on a narrow group facing entrenched social disadvantage and poverty, the causes of which are attributed to 'family breakdown, educational failure, welfare dependency, debt, drug dependency, or some other relevant factor. Many people are beset by a combination of these factors, interlinking with one another and driving a cycle of deprivation' (DWP, 2012: 10). As with *Reaching Out*, overwhelming emphasis is placed upon the health and stability of the family unit, which is perceived as being at the heart of the problem and the solution. Thus, FIPs continue to form a key part of the Coalition's social exclusion strategy and, in December 2010, David Cameron announced he would extend the initiative to cover 120,000 'troubled' families by March 2015. Local authorities wishing to access the programme's funding (which amounts to up to £4000 per family) are to use a four point criteria for identifying eligible families, as set out in Table 2.3.

The location of intervention is therefore set at a family rather than societal level. Indeed, like New Labour, the Coalition neglected the role structural forces play in producing and worsening aspects of multiple disadvantage. It articulated a strongly behavioural account of

poverty and disadvantage, as perhaps most evident from the setting up of the Behavioural Insight Team (BIT) in the Cabinet Office in 2010. As the forward of one early report published by the BIT argued, 'many of the biggest policy challenges we are now facing… will only be resolved if we are successful in persuading people to change their behaviour, their lifestyles or their existing habits' (Dolan *et al.*, 2010: 4). The moral underclass discourse has permeated virtually every aspect of the Coalition's welfare agenda, justifying ruthless policy responses such as the benefits cap, bedroom tax, the slashing of working tax credits, child tax credits, Council Tax relief, Housing Benefit payments and disability benefits, as well as the withdrawal of Health in Pregnancy Grant, the Sure Start Maternity Grant, Child Trust Funds and Educational Maintenance Allowance. The list goes on. Indeed, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government introduced radical public spending cuts and asserted that 'reducing the national deficit' is its social and economic policy priority. The Coalition's deficit reduction agenda has not only involved unprecedented welfare reforms, but also drastic cuts in public services. Campaigners have particularly raised concerns about cuts in the following services: community midwife services, prevention initiatives in health promotion, mental health support, outreach work (e.g., substance misuse, rough sleeping), youth centres and services, family and parenting support, care and respite services as well as leisure and recreation services (e.g., community art projects, library services). Thus, the current economic and social turmoil being experienced in many spheres of society by many people across Britain makes the need for examinations of the patterns and processes of generalised disadvantage even more pressing.

2.4 Summary

The evolution of the concept of social exclusion, from its origins in France in the 1970s, has been documented. Initially, this chapter reviewed the conditions in which the concept of social exclusion arose. It argued specifically that, in the context of globalisation and changing economic conditions, 'social exclusion is related to the deep economic restructuring necessitated by growing competition in the emerging global economy' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 415). Certainly, within the European context, there is an acceptance that economic change

serves to impoverish and alienate large sectors of the population in a multi-dimensional fashion. The European Union has varied over time in how it sees that process of alienation being overcome. Integration into employment is prominent in its reform agenda but civic, social and interpersonal integration is also present. However, the approach to social exclusion has, in practice, reflected a more limited concern with labour market exclusion.

This chapter has also examined how New Labour developed the concept of social exclusion to explain disadvantage in the UK since 1997. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that New Labour did not regard social exclusion as a characteristic feature of contemporary society, that is, an endemic phenomenon stemming from structural changes. Rather, the concept of social exclusion as used by New Labour reflects the idea that it is incumbent upon a kind or category of individual, and so does not signify a shift of perspective beyond the poverty paradigm. Furthermore, with regard to the claim made by New Labour of substantive change in the shift from poverty to social exclusion, significant limitations can be seen in New Labour's approach. For a start, New Labour's definition is focussed on outcomes and 'makes no reference to the processes that create the problems identified in the definition' (Percy-Smith, 2000: 4). A good example of New Labour's key features approach is the emphasis on a range of indicators for social exclusion within the *Opportunity for All* reports. At first glance, the emphasis on a wide range of indicators can be seen as addressing the weaknesses of the poverty approach to societal disadvantage. However, the point here is that New Labour's usage of social exclusion is atheoretical. As the analysis has shown, there is a lack of consistency and rigor in the understanding of how social exclusion comes about. Indeed, it is very difficult to identify what New Labour considers risk factors and outcomes, suggesting there is confusion of 'causation' with 'correlation'. Another issue, closely related to the previous one, is the failure to specify the nature of the links which exist between different elements which may constitute the phenomenon, which to a large extent undermined New Labour's 'multidimensional' approach.

New Labour's specific articulation of the individual 'causes' of social exclusion makes itself readily apparent in policy, concentrating on the most visible and extreme issues which are

likely to capture the attention of the wider public such as street homelessness, teenage mothers, the problems of the most deprived neighbourhoods, crime and policies to tackle anti-social behaviour. Moreover, policies like the New Deal and Sure Start are also in keeping with the emphasis in its definition of social exclusion on specific problem groups. Thus, the downgrading of the SEU to the SETF in 2006 did not occur as a result of social exclusion being solved, but rather, from a realisation that the group-led approach had failed to reach the most severely excluded and some of the poorest, most isolated and vulnerable families. This shift to address the characteristics of 'the 2.5 per cent' and move away from the early, more universalist underpinnings of the social exclusion agenda represented a move away from considering social exclusion within the wider context of poverty and disadvantage and meant social exclusion policy was targeted at a relatively small group. New Labour, and subsequently the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition and present Conservative government, assumed that the problems of isolation, alienation and poor life chances are confined to a tiny minority, rather than a larger population. Arguably, targeted policies concentrating on those with accentuated needs over a period of time are a complement but not a substitute for more generic polices.

The criticisms above specifically question the narrow focus of New Labour's approach within which 'problem selection' is prioritised over 'problem definition'. That such limitations are observable in New Labour's approach can be seen as relating to its overall emphasis on 'equality of opportunity' over 'equality of outcome'. The former is a fragmented discourse – it is also a more conservative discourse, not least because the socially excluded are usually discussed in relatively isolated terms and as employed is a behavioural account of poverty and disadvantage. Ultimately, overwhelming emphasis on equality of opportunity meant individualistically-centred policies, and these policies mark out New Labour's approach, and indeed the Coalition's approach, as a weak form of social exclusion, rather than strong form (see section 1.1.3). In closing, it is crucial to make explicit a key point from the above review. Regarding the social exclusion agenda, the problems and challenges facing seaside residents are notable by their absence.

Chapter 3

Understanding Seaside Resort Change

This review of the literature and existing evidence on seaside resorts aims to provide a statement about what is known about resort change in the UK at the present time. It argues that little attention has been paid to the non-touristic dimensions of resorts and develops a framework for understanding socio-economic resort change. The framework outlined in this chapter has two main purposes. First, it specifies the main variables which influence socio-economic resort change more clearly. Second, it provides a basis for subsequent analysis, undertaken in the methodology, to determine how the variables are represented by the available data. The review followed the traditional approach used in the social sciences. Books, articles and reports were searched for, initially with a broad focus on the concept of 'resort development' (i.e., evolution, transformation and restructuring) and developing to explore more specific topics and ideas associated with 'area change', 'area-based deprivation' and 'concentrated social exclusion'. Given the context for the review, attention was concentrated on recent UK literature, and on seaside resorts and disadvantaged localities, although sources from other countries in the developed world were investigated where these appeared to provide evidence particularly relevant to the UK context. From this literature, three principal questions have been formulated (Figure 3.1). Perhaps the most immediate question from a policy perspective is *how are seaside resorts changing?* What aspects of resorts are changing and at what pace? However, it is also necessary to know *what causes seaside resorts to change*, and which causal factors seem to be driving the changes observed at present. Lastly, of interest might be the *implications of seaside resort change* for public policy on regeneration.

Figure 3.1: Issues in socio-economic resort change
Source: Author's own elaboration

These questions and particularly the first two form the focus of this review. To be clear, this chapter is concerned with the *changing nature* of English seaside resorts. The history of the development of these pleasure landscapes has already been extensively documented and discussed in the literature (e.g., Gilbert, 1939; Walvin, 1978; Walton, 1983, 2000; Huggins, 1984; Farrant, 1987; Urry, 1990; Soane, 1992; Fletcher, 1993; Shaw and Williams, 1997; Morgan and Pritchard, 1999; Walton, 2000). Thus, it is not within the scope of this chapter to explore, in great depth, the large literature that covers the history of the seaside. However, what is necessary is a short background to inform the forthcoming investigation on contemporary socio-economic resort change.

3.1 The development of seaside resorts in Britain

It is widely accepted that the idea of taking a seaside holiday dates back to the eighteenth century. The initial growth of the seaside holiday stemmed from a belief that the sea water, like that of the earlier spa, had medicinal properties (Walton, 1983; Walvin, 1978). The proletariat was excluded from such benefits, at least until the development of the railways and the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. The democratisation of the seaside holiday resulted from specific aspects of general industrialisation. Several writers have thoroughly discussed the factors that culminated in attracting working-class residential tourists to the seaside (e.g., Walvin, 1978; Walton, 1983; Urry, 1990). In brief, these include: (1) cheap and effective transport to a suitable coastline; (2) the working classes had to have sufficient income to afford a holiday in times when holidays were not paid; (3) the seaside visitors would need several days holiday back-to-back in the summer; (4) the resorts had to have sufficient facilities, supply must meet demand; and, (5) the labour force must choose to spend their hard earned saved income at the seaside, so the resorts needed to be attractive.

Thus, various factors – including mobility, affluence, time, supply and demand – enabled the appeal of the seaside to trickle down through society. To satisfy demand, resorts were developed around the coastline to accommodate a variety of budgets and tastes (Urry,

1990; Shaw and Williams, 1997; Walton, 1983, 2000). Eventually, resorts became places where different classes of people mixed together and social conflict occurred between classes with very different lifestyles. As noted by Walton (1983: 3), 'the seaside brought mutually incompatible modes of recreation and enjoyment into close proximity'. Many resorts were seen as liminal, that is, 'as an exceptional and distinctive place where normal limitations did not apply, at least quite as much as normal' (Walton, 2000: 104). Consequently, the behaviour and practices associated with these places also came to disturb people that lived in them. According to Farrant (1987: 137), 'from the 1880s, the expectations of residents who wished to preserve the social tone and image of these places increasingly diverged from the aims of those whose livelihood depended upon providing tourist attractions'.

Many variables influenced resort development, including land ownership, local government, entrepreneurial activity, topography and transport (Huggins, 1984; Soane, 1992; Fletcher, 1993; Shaw and Williams, 2004). Some resorts were 'fashioned on sandy wastes originally devoid of settlement' (Barrett, 1958: 1). However, most resorts were grafted onto a pre-existing settlement (i.e., town, village, hamlet). Some of these settlements were not only resorts but had functions such as harbours, ports or market centres too (Barrett, 1958). Thus, in several instances, the development of resort activities coincided with the continued development of maritime activities. Changes in the relative importance of such economic activities meant some places had a short affair with tourism. For example, Bootle, Gravesend, Southampton, Swansea and Tynemouth flirted with tourism in 1800s, but their resort functions had edged away to take a back-stage role (relative to other economic activities) by Victorian times (Walton, 1983). The concentration of certain maritime activities in fewer and larger places resulted in the stagnation and decline of other places, which would be rescued by tourism. Old maritime towns rescued by resort development include, for example, Brighton, Deal, Folkestone, Margate, Newquay, St. Ives, Tenby, Weymouth and Whitby (Barrett, 1958). By the early twentieth century, there were nearly 150 resorts and

> 'Britain, and England in particular, had a system of coastal resorts whose scale and complexity was unmatched anywhere else in the world' (Walton, 2000: 27).

The growth of seaside resorts was to continue, driven by the expansion of the domestic seaside holidaymaking industry. However, the boom in tourism did not last. From the 1970s, many seaside resorts were experiencing a slow, but cumulative 'decline' (Agarwal, 2005). Although 'decline' is not really defined in the academic literature, it is a word that, in the context of destination development, conjures up a multitude of undesirable changes. Descriptions of 'resort decline' variously emphasises decline in: tourist volumes and expenditure; tourism-related employment and income; resorts' market share; environmental quality of destination; quality of visitor experience; appeal and investment. However, the central issue is assumed to be decline in tourist volumes, expenditure and market share.

The statistics that quantify this decline deserve a thorough explanation and should be treated with caution. Agarwal (1997a) clearly outlines the deficiencies that hamper understanding of resort decline, such issues falling under the specific areas of temporal discontinuity, spatial scope of analysis, lack of standardisation and reliability. The problems identified include:

> 'tourism data are often collected on a district basis and that which is available for seaside resorts are often not directly comparable either over a period of time or between individual resorts as the parameters of the information collection vary greatly even between local governments. Also tourism statistics are particularly prone to errors, omissions and oversights that are frequently incorporated within the data' (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 660).

Large-scale seaside tourism surveys invariably gather information based on a sample (of registered accommodation; of individuals' spend) which are then calculated for the population as a whole to produce statistics on trips or expenditure. Such estimates are further complicated by the fact that 'staying visits to the seaside have been measured on a national basis since the 1970s, but there is no equivalent data for day visits' (Middleton, 2001: 86). However, day visits and informal accommodation establishments and enterprises are probably very important in some resorts. Another issue is that 'seaside' does not always correspond to seaside resorts. Some ad-hoc assessments from consultants and official bodies have focused on well-defined seaside resorts, while others have covered the surrounding hinterland or whole local authority

districts (Middleton, 2001). Consequently, as Agarwal and Brunt (2006) have pointed out, some assessments incorporate tourism centres, for example, caravan and camp sites and holiday parks, in essentially rural coastal locations.

The limitations associated with tourism-related data have serious implications. In terms of this research, demonstrating a link between resort decline and social exclusion is problematic. More broadly, the failure of resorts, historically and presently, to systematically collect tourism data has been, and is, a barrier to effective 'decision-making', which is 'a factor that has contributed to their decline' (Gale, 2007: 23). Furthermore, the extreme paucity of data relating specifically to seaside resorts and the non-standard way in which tourism information is collated means that any attempt to interpret tourism trends for English seaside resorts over the short term is fraught with difficulty. Nonetheless, such data do provide an indication of the overall scale of resort decline. For example, an England Tourism Council (2001) report showed that, in the period 1973-1998, English seaside tourism had fallen from 32 million to 22 million trips while total domestic tourism remained more or less constant at 100 million trips. Over the same time period, the number of nights (i.e., one or more nights) spent on English seaside tourism had almost halved from 193 million to 104 million. Another report, by English Heritage (2003), paints a similar picture. Outlining the challenges facing resorts, which include failing to satisfy visitor expectations, English Heritage noted that in 1968 holidays in seaside resorts accounted for 75% of main holidays, but by 1999 that figure was only 44%. Thus, the data suggests that the number of holidays taken by the seaside was in decline, but still very important. It is clear that resorts have been subject to much change, with the latter being studied through a number of different approaches.

3.1.1 Approaches to studying resort development

Research evidence on resort development comprises three main strands of work. One is the morphology study, focusing on the detailed understanding of the form (i.e., the shape, appearance and configuration of the natural and built environment) and function of a resort, and

primarily using mixed methods to describe and explain change. Such studies have a relatively long history. Gilbert (1939) was one of the first geographers to discuss in general terms the layout and morphology of resorts. Gilbert (1939) recognised that tourism was modifying the landscape and transforming the settlement patterns on the English coast and distinguished resort towns from others. With a follow-up longitudinal study on Brighton, Gilbert (1949) drew attention to the changing spatial patterns and landscapes associated with resort development, and the reasons for these patterns, which included tourism urbanisation and transport evolution. Gilbert's research was followed by some important descriptive work based on social histories and case studies, which appeared concurrently with the beginning of morphological modelling.

In brief, morphological models may be divided into three categories: (1) static models (spatial axis emphasised); (2) historical models (temporal axis emphasised – often linked to theoretical models of resort development); and (3) integrated models (wider contextual factors and general applicability emphasised) (see Liu and Wall, 2009 for a review). Existing models of coastal resorts fall within the former two categories. Census data, holiday brochures and field maps dominated the early research, which described the spatial location of resort infrastructure and tourism activity. While Gilbert (1939, 1949) studied individual resorts, Barrett (1958) developed a generic model based on observations of features common to many seaside resorts of England and Wales. He undertook the only major national study of the layout and morphology of eighty seaside resorts, which found common features such as linear development along the coast, with the 'frontal strip' surrounded by numerous zones of resort activity, including recreational, commercial and residential districts, and density and price hierarchy.

Beginning in the 1980s, the resort morphology research agenda shifted away from a focus on the forms and functions of resorts towards the relationships between them, and how they changed over time. This body of work, again mainly focusing on the detailed understanding of individual resorts, has employed additional techniques, such as the interpretation of aerial photography involving time-series data, to describe and explain within-

resort change at different stages of resort evolution. Attention turned away from European coastal resorts but the focus on physical features and land use patterns remained. The neglect of the socioeconomic dimensions of coastal resorts, and the overwhelming emphasis on localised explanations (i.e., within-resort causal links) rather than wider change processes, has been criticism levelled at this body of work (Shaw and Agarwal, 2007).

A second strand of resort development studies, derived mainly from the sub-field of tourism geography, focuses on investigating the patterns (and processes, albeit to a lesser extent) whereby tourist areas evolve temporally through a number of stages or phases. This strand of work, which has developed mainly since the 1980s, has resulted in several theoretical models of resort development (e.g., Miossec, 1977; Butler, 1980; Gorsem, 1981; Wolfe, 1983; Young, 1983). Such representations ultimately are related to Christaller (1963) and his seminal work, which applied central place theory to tourism. Considering the spatial location of tourism within Europe, Christaller (1963) observed that tourism generally occurred in areas within countries away from industrial and urban agglomerations. Christaller's work was significant in that he convincingly described how tourist resorts as peripheral places undergo a 'typical course of development', proceeding from exclusive development through expansion and into decline as fashions changed and competition developed (see Christaller, 1963: 103 for a description of this process). These ideas were particularly influential on some later theorists of tourism, namely Cohen (1972) and Turner and Ash (1975), who have stressed the significance of the 'explorer' or 'drifter' in opening up peripheral areas to successive touristic intrusions, and Plog (1974), who related the rise and fall of destinations to the personal preferences and psychological characteristics of tourists. Thus, during the 1970s, several tourist typologies were devised (see Shaw and Williams, 1994: 68-75 for a review), all of which identified mass tourism as the final stage in the evolution of resorts.

Of the models devised to understand the dynamic nature of resort development, the Tourist Area Life Cycle (TALC) proposed by Butler (1980) is the most cited within the field of tourism studies (Hall, 2006; Gibson, 2008). The TALC (Figure 3.2) portrays change in both

tourism demand and supply, in stages and was initially based on the Costa Brava in Spain. Butler (1980) suggested that the pattern of visitor arrivals to a tourist area is similar to the S-shaped curve of the 'Product Life Cycle' in classical marketing theory. Drawing also on models of wildlife populations and Plog's (1974) cognitive-normative tourist typology, a six-stage hypothetical evolutionary sequence was described, consisting of exploration, involvement, development, consolidation and stagnation. In the final phase of the model (now routinely termed as the post-stagnation stage, although Butler does not actually use that term), various pathways from decline to rejuvenation are proposed. The potential for rejuvenation is dependent not only on intervention and investment, but also management, which was the main argument in the original model. As noted by Butler (2004: 162), the model was 'a commentary on the inevitability of loss of quality by destinations *in the absence of management*, not… the inevitability of decline regardless of intervention' (Emphasis added).

Figure has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Figure 3.2: The Tourist Area Life Cycle
Source: Modified from Butler (1980)

The TALC has been widely and frequently applied to various tourism products and environments (see Lagiewski, 2006 for a recent review). Where the TALC has been applied to individual English seaside resorts or destinations (i.e., seaside districts and regions), it has invariably been with intention of articulating their historical development and analysing the

evolution of their markets (e.g., Cooper and Jackson, 1989; Agarwal, 1997a; Cooper, 1997; Thornton, 1997). These studies have shown the model to be empirically relevant and that English seaside resorts are certainly in stagnation stage, if not the post-stagnation phase of the tourist area life-cycle. Overall, two main reasons were proposed to explain the steady reduction of demand for traditional seaside holidays since the 1970s, a more thorough account of which is provided by Shaw and Williams (1997), Agarwal (2002) and Gale (2007). The most commonly cited reason for the initial decline in tourism at English seaside resorts is the development of competition (i.e., problems of demand), although their decline is also attributed to a general deterioration of quality (i.e., problems of supply).

The English seaside has faced competition 'from overseas sun, sea and sand resorts initially in the Western, then Eastern Mediterranean, and subsequently throughout the pleasure-peripheries of the Caribbean and Latin America, southern Africa and Southeast Asia' (Gale, 2007: 24). However, in addition to competition from 'seaside' tourism products and destinations abroad, the English seaside has faced competition on the home front from non-seaside destinations and products. Indeed, 'the countryside and nowadays-rejuvenated inland cities are powerful competitors, chasing government funding, employment opportunities, education initiatives, leisure visitors, conferences and entertainment spectacles' (Powell and Gray, 2009: 7). The proliferation of more attractive holidays elsewhere in Britain and overseas is undoubtedly an important factor, but there are other trends in tourism markets affecting resorts. The trends identified include the growth in short breaks (i.e., 1-3 nights) and day trips, shift to self-catering and 'self-service' generally (so employment and income lower), individualisation of tourism markets (i.e., post-Fordist tourism) and off-season holidays (Shaw and Coles, 2007; Visit England, 2010). In addition to these adverse competitive conditions, resource depletion has undermined the competitiveness of English seaside resorts. Cooper (1997) clearly outlines the key features that mark the decline of the English seaside resort from a supply perspective, such indicators falling under the broad parameters of accommodation, employment, transport, environment and organisation. For the most part, these problems of

supply are related to decades of underfunding and neglect by government (Shaw and Coles, 2007).

Returning to the TALC, the idea of resorts or destination areas passing through stages of discovery, growth and stagnation is appealing. However, this model is not without its problems, chief amongst which is that it fails to take into account changes in the demand and supply sides (i.e., the internal and external factors that influence resort evolution, as explained later). There are six other primary criticisms of the model, a more thorough account of which is provided by Haywood (1986), Getz (1992) and Agarwal (1994). The problems identified include: scepticism that the evolution of a resort can be described through a single model; criticism of the product life cycle concept; criticism of the relationships between carrying capacity and the life-cycle; difficulties with the application of the model as a forecasting tool (e.g., the spatial unit of analysis, the unit of measurement, data availability, the relevant timeframe); and, criticism of the exact shape of the curve, sequence of stages and position of turning points. Furthermore, the post-stagnation phase of the model has provoked much discussion.

Agarwal (1994, 1997a) in particular has taken a key role in this discussion and her criticisms and contributions have found support (e.g., Priestley and Mundet, 1998; Knowles and Curtis, 1999; Hovinen, 2002). She applied Butler's (1980) model to Torbay (English Riviera, Devon) and to its resorts (i.e., Torquay, Paignton, Brixham) and found the single-product-dominated model too limited for dealing with the complexity and diversity of destination development. The application of the TALC is reasonably consistent with Butler's (1980) model, although 'each of the three resorts within Torbay varied greatly as regards the timing and speed of development' (Agarwal, 1997a: 72). The crucial point, however, is that Agarwal (1997a) had difficulty in reconciling the experience of Torbay with the later stages of the life cycle model. Butler's model predicts stagnation possibly followed by rejuvenation (i.e., growth in tourist volumes) or decline (in tourist volumes) and eventually the end or exit from tourism. However, the investigation revealed that the deterministic nature of the model did not

apply to the evolution of Torbay. 'In all three resorts, the 'post-stagnation' phase is characterised by positive attempts to rejuvenate and re-orientate, in order to cater for changing market needs and expectations' (Agarwal, 1997a: 72). Thus the on-going process of rejuvenation that was identified in Torbay did not fit the later stages of the model, which suggests that the consistent rising curve with a number of options after the stagnation stage needed rethinking in order to make it more applicable. Therefore, Agarwal (1994: 206) proposed the insertion of an 'additional stage [between the stagnation and post-stagnation stages of the original model] in order to take into account the series of restructuring efforts [and success or otherwise, resulting in a series of peaks and troughs] that are inaugurated before decline sets in'.

However, unilinear models of resort development such as the TALC may be criticised for their simplistic treatment of the 'local'. Again, these models assume that resorts have life cycles as different tourist types invade and establish themselves, causing other tourists to go elsewhere and resort characteristics to change (e.g., the structure and capacity of the resort's tourism resource base and the types of tourist staying in the resort and the activities undertaken). Therefore, one problem of the TALC model is its sole focus on tourism development. Such a limited focus is inevitably going to produce only a partial understanding of the internal dynamics of resort change. It is crucial to not only analyse tourism *in* a place, but also the changing qualities *of* a tourist place. Within-resort explanations of change emphasise how one dimension of a resort affects another, and how changes made at the local level can achieve beneficial effects, or produce undesired consequences. They may include explanations relating to the changing demographic, social and economic ecologies of resorts, the extent and nature of collective action (that actors – resort authorities, political decision-makers, land owners, developers, local entrepreneurs, traders, residents, etc. – of different resorts respond differently to resort challenges and change), and public policy (including levels of public investment and effectiveness of local services, and effectiveness of governance and political arrangements).

Unilinear models of resort development such as the TALC have also been criticised by theorists who argue that changes in resorts are the product of changes at higher spatial levels, for example, changes in economic structure. In this respect, Agarwal (2002) points to three processes associated with post-Fordism, namely the: (1) search for capital accumulation as exemplified by the growing internationalisation and arguably globalisation of the tourism industry; (2) flexibility of production made possible by new technologies; and (3) consumption changes toward preferences for more individual and bespoke forms of holiday. It is these processes, Agarwal (2002) contends, that have influenced the creation of new, and previously inaccessible and undeveloped destinations, a preference for independent and special interest holidays in non-resort environments, an increase in the popularity of rural and urban areas along with substitutes for the touristic experience, and the opportunity to customise products to a differentiated clientele. Taken together, these post-Fordist related processes have undermined the appeal of the mass packaged and standardised seaside resort holiday.

The rise and fall of destination areas is also attributed to what can be termed cultural shifts (Urry, 1990, 1997; Gale, 2005, 2007). These theorists acknowledge the role of competition from other tourism destinations and products, but argue that economic perspectives (at least in isolation) fail to 'sufficiently interrogate changes in fashion, style and taste which have transformed [Western society] in the past few decades' (Urry, 1997: 103). These theorists have loosely characterised such changes as 'post-modern'. Followers of post-modernism believe that the development of, and continued growth in, the middle class, consisting of 'occupants of managerial and professional posts working in both the private and public sectors' (Urry, 1997: 106) has brought with it cultural and political changes. The well-travelled middle class have imposed their values and beliefs onto society. These beliefs include the veneration of culture, nature and authentic experiences (Urry, 1997). The social diffusion of these values led to a restructuring of many social practices. Changes in ideology and taste meant the depreciation of resort infrastructure and amenities and disenchantment with the previous popular mass 'working class' resorts, which are no longer perceived as 'special' or 'extraordinary' (Urry, 1997; Gale, 2005). However, in the absence of empirical evidence in

support of this opinion, the question arises of whether this negative profile is really valid (or too simplistic, even a myth). This criticism aside, followers of post-modernism believe changes in ideology and taste have not only produced a hierarchy of coastal tourism resorts, but also helped promote non-seaside tourism destinations, products and practices.

Thus, some theorists have played down the local and see resort change as a manifestation of much wider economic and sociocultural changes taking place in Western society. However, this approach has a serious drawback. The more structural approach designated resorts or destination areas as essentially passive spaces in which change was effected by successive rounds of capital investment or disinvestment. Put differently, 'the circulation of capital within the global tourism system is the means by which resort development or decline takes place, as tourists and investments shift geographically over time' (Shaw and Williams, 2004: 237). From this perspective both the variability of resort development and the potential significance of local action in influencing resort change were overlooked. In contrast, a central tenet of more recent attempts to conceptualise the restructuring of tourism space is an acknowledgement of the interactional nature of the process. Proponents of the more structural approach now locate resorts within wider urban and economic systems, emphasising not only the processes that occur at different spatial levels, but also the connections between levels. This latter approach emphasises the causal significance of local context – particularities of place, population and local governance (Agarwal, 2005). It espouses that social, economic and political conditions and actions 'emanating from specific places will change, modify and transform the effects of global, international and national processes, resulting in specific outcomes, as well as contributing to these' (Agarwal, 2005: 352). This re-conceptualisation of resort change draws on different disciplinary achievements within geography, economics and sociology. It is detailed by Agarwal (2005) and summarised in Figure 3.3.



Figure 3.3: The English seaside resort in its wider context
Source: Author's own elaboration

Thus, increasing attention has been given to the resort setting in a wider context which has started to focus research efforts into understanding the international and national, social, economic and cultural trends and processes that operate on these tourism places. This strand of work has a more explicit focus on change but a less microscopic view of the resort. Within the British context, the problem raised has specifically been that of resort decline and the restructuring of tourism. Research on restructuring has focused on the consequences of exogenous demand and supply factors, including competition from foreign holidays, changing tourism consumption patterns, economic recession and restructuring, changing travel costs and demographic trends (Clegg and Essex, 2000; Gordon and Goodall, 2000; Agarwal, 1999, 2002; Beatty and Fothergill, 2004; Gale, 2005; Shaw and Coles, 2007; Rickey and Houghton, 2009). Apart from these social, economic and cultural processes, the role of the state (both at a national

and local level, and the relationship between them) has also been an important factor in understanding the process of resort decline and redevelopment.

In relation to the debate on resort restructuring, Smith (2004: 19) points out that the extent to which tourism plays a role in regeneration is dependent on 'the local authority's degree of conviction that it is still a viable option (local authorities still tend to be responsible for the planning and management of resorts in the UK)'. Agarwal (1997b) has explored such factors in depth, her work also underlining the crucial importance of local authority commitment in determining effective/appropriate policy responses. Various local factors – including the importance attached to the maintenance and further development of tourism, the importance and degree of development of tourism, resort size and the number and function of seaside towns contained within the local administrative area – impact upon commitment levels. Agarwal (2007) also considers global-local interactions and questions the effectiveness of local government in managing the fortunes of tourism within resorts. A number of factors have been identified for the capacity of resorts to respond effectively to global forces. Factors that inhibit resort capacity include: appreciation of the problem (i.e., the nature, influence and consequences of global forces); civic commitment; shared interests and trust; strong institutional presence; high level of contact, co-operation and information exchange; and, development of mutual awareness and common cause. However, the most notable problem was the lack of co-operation and trust within and between the public and private sectors.

The reason for the lack of co-operation and trust is not clear, but Agarwal (2007: 70) questions whether the public sector is 'helping or hindering' resorts with its complex and fragmented institutional landscape. 'What this now means for economic development is that decisions have to be made, and resources need to be shared across a range of public, quasi-public and non-public agents. Thus the potential for duplication, inertia and financial wastage is high' (Agarwal, 2007: 58). A similar concern is also raised by Shaw and Coles (2007). They found that 'certainly at the resort level there are still many policy gaps between […] regional-based strategies and those being formulated by local authorities' (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 54).

A research priority is, therefore, to resolve these uncertainties concerning the gap between the local and the regional policy scenario, and the role of actors (including the complex network of relationships between central, regional, sub regional and local organisations) involved in the process of resort restructuring.

3.1.2 Summary

This section provided a brief overview of the development of coastal resorts in Britain and then reviewed three key approaches to studying resort development. The first approach focuses on the morphological transformation of resorts. Such studies have a long history. Works by the British geographer Gilbert during the 1930s and 1940s marked the beginning of morphological research. Studies of this kind have focused on physical features and land use patterns in specific resorts. The neglect of the socioeconomic aspects of resorts, lack of details of development processes and failure to account for touristic differentiation over larger areas, especially complete nations or global regions, has been criticism levelled at this body of work. The second approach, which has developed mainly since the 1980s following Christaller's (1963) seminal work, focuses on investigating the process of development of destinations and the possible causes and consequences of their dynamic pattern of tourism development. A number of models and typologies have been suggested to explain development, most of which recognise the evolutionary nature of destinations. However, unilinear models of resort development such as the oft-quoted TALC have since been criticised for their simplistic treatment of the 'local', for their neglect of external/exogenous factors and for failing to consider the interdependencies of macro-level national and international processes of change with local socio-political systems.

Recent research has tended to develop knowledge of resort development from a predominantly structuralist perspective. This approach has the advantage of allowing a broader focus, not only on those structural changes that are ultimately responsible for the rise and fall of destination areas, primarily economic restructuring and cultural change (Agarwal, 2002;

Gale, 2007). While emphasising the role of such trends and processes as the motors of change, this approach does not deny the importance of local context and human agency in negotiating, mediating and resisting these structural forces (Agarwal, 2005). To date, research efforts have concentrated on the consequences of exogenous demand and supply factors for English seaside resorts and the institutional capacity of resorts to respond to such change. However, resort development raises not only the question of consumption and production processes, the changing quality of coastal resort tourism and related restructuring strategies. Resorts also undergo a transformation of place quality during their development (Shaw and Williams, 2004). Changes in demographic, social and economic structure are potentially important for English seaside resorts as they impact upon their image, role and function (Agarwal, 2012). Moreover, changing structures may have different implications for different resorts, neighbourhoods and different social groups, so producing advantage and disadvantage, inclusion and exclusion. However, evidence on all these impacts is relatively sparse. Indeed, with the exception of Beatty and Fothergill (2004), Agarwal and Brunt (2005, 2006), Shaw and Coles (2007) and Agarwal (2012), there are few studies that have focused in detail on the nature of change in English seaside resorts. Therefore, much uncertainty still exists about the differing character, problems and prospects for these post-mature coastal tourism resorts.

It is crucial to make explicit a key point in the above discussion: little attention has been paid to the non-touristic dimensions of English seaside resorts. Commenting on the existing knowledge base, described as 'superficial and general', Agarwal (2012: 1470) concludes 'the internal dynamics of English seaside resorts are poorly understood'. There is some evidence of recent resort change, but it is sparse. What such studies have exposed is how little is known in detail about the changing demographic, social and economic ecologies of English seaside resorts due to inadequate levels of information at the resort level. Moreover, debate has centred on the concept of resort itself, issues of space and time, and whether relative or absolute change is most relevant to measure. Before proceeding to examine the empirical evidence on socio-economic resort change, it will be necessary to consider those conceptual issues important to an understanding of resort change.

3.2 Understanding socio-economic resort change: conceptual issues

Perhaps the most critical issue underlying the study of resort change is the concept of the 'resort' itself. What are resorts and what do they consist of? It is not possible to provide a precise definition of a resort because 'a spectrum of resorts exists, ranging from those with a wholly tourist function to those where a significant amount of tourist activity occurs alongside a variety of other urban functions' (Pearce, 1987: 167). Beyond this distinction between 'tourist resort' and 'resort town', few clear definitions have been given by academics because such tourism environments vary widely in their evolution, morphology and character (Pearce, 1987; Shaw and Williams, 2004; Prideaux, 2009). Robinson (1976: 155) suggested that resorts are

> 'places, which attract large numbers of tourists and which tourism endows with special characteristics so that direct and indirect revenue produced by tourism plays a very important and even decisive role in their existence and development'.

Certainly, within a European context, the term resort predominantly describes a specific territorial form of geographical places whose reliance on tourism and smaller size and shape distinguish them, for example, from cities with diverse economies (Shaw and Williams, 2005; Prideaux, 2009). In contrast, the concept of resort is narrower in North America, where it is often viewed as being a substantial tourism facility providing highly specialised forms of production and consumption, usually self-contained and under singular management or ownership (Shaw and Williams, 2004; Prideaux, 2009). In a European context, the tourism functions of the 'resort town' have often evolved over a considerable period of time whereas, in a North American context, the self-contained 'tourist resort' has often developed in accordance with a preconceived plan (Shaw and Williams, 2004). However, it is not an either-or situation. Resorts that have evolved over time and resorts that were planned in their entirety may be found in both Europe and North America and indeed other regions of the world.

It is not possible, given the existing state of debate, to identify a global definition of resort, nor is it probably desirable to do so. However, at the national level, it is necessary to establish a clear definition. The report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Coastal

Towns brought this issue into sharp focus. It found that i) there is no standard definition of English seaside resorts and ii) government departments, local authorities and non-governmental organisations use a variety of typologies to define coastal settlements for their purposes (CLG, 2007a). The various definitions used relied on criteria such as land use, population density, economic characteristics and remoteness or location. Consequently, in the absence of a standardised definition, it is extremely difficult to compare national, regional and local coastal town research over time, and between areas. This situation has serious implications. The reality of coastal tourism resorts is heavily obscured, poorly articulated and only partially available to inform national policy and programmes. With these concerns in mind, the DCLG commissioned a report from Sheffield Hallam University to help better define seaside resorts (Fothergill, 2008).

Fothergill (2008) deliberated the attempts by researchers and policymakers to divide the existing spectrum of British coastal settlements into coherent categories, noting 'there has been much sloppy thinking on the definition of "coastal towns"' (Fothergill, 2008: 2) and that a 'one size fits all' approach is inappropriate given their diversity. Fothergill (2008: 13) thus argued that 'socio-economic research on seaside towns needs a consistent and defensible definition of the towns', that is to say, 'a clear geographical definition of the towns' (Fothergill, 2008: 4). Drawing on the *Seaside Economy* report (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003), Fothergill (2008) made a distinction between the settlements 'coastal' and 'seaside'. It was argued that, although the report of the Select Committee on Coastal Towns has tended to use the terms interchangeably, which is misleading, *coastal towns* and *seaside towns* indicate different places. Accordingly, Fothergill (2008) divided coastal towns in three categories, namely: seaside resorts/towns (n=37), other significant coastal towns/cities (n=18) and estuary towns/cities (n=7). They are all large settlements with populations above 10,000, but the first group features a resort function, while the second and third are principally commercial or industrial in nature.

So, on the issue of definition, Fothergill (2008) did not contribute anything new to the debate, promoting only the approach employed by Beatty and Fothergill (2003) for the *Seaside*

Economy report. That report, apart from size of settlement (determined by population), did not specify any other criteria for the identification of seaside towns, despite entering into discussions with the British Resorts Association (now known as the British Resorts and Destinations Association). Consequently, it is unclear how the resorts were identified for inclusion in the *Seaside Economy* report. This criticism aside, Fothergill (2008) stated that a seaside resort implies i) concentration of tourist activities (especially in the coastal zone) and infrastructure (e.g., promenades, piers), especially holiday accommodation (e.g., hotels, boarding houses, caravan sites) and ii) specialisation in, and dependence on tourism. He concluded that the terms *seaside resort* and *seaside town* are more interchangeable as coastal towns are believed to be a wider and more diverse group than seaside resorts/towns. On the contrary, seaside resorts/towns vary in terms of size and importance, location and physical environment, and tourism (i.e., differentiation between seaside resorts in terms of scale of tourism, strategies, tourism markets served, resources, innovation and future prospects).

Tourism is fundamental, but challenges and problems extend beyond tourism alone. It should be noted at this point the DCLG commissioned not only a report from Sheffield Hallam University to help define seaside resorts (Fothergill, 2008), but also two reports from that university to better understand their socio-economic characteristics. The second (Beatty *et al.,* 2008) and third (Beatty *et al,* 2011) reports have provided data on, respectively, the 37 seaside towns with populations above 10,000 (total pop. 2.9 million), and on 37 smaller seaside towns with population between 1,500 and 10,000 (total pop. 170,000). These 'benchmarking' studies provide a useful insight into the varying fortunes of different seaside towns. However, they fail to consider the diversity within towns and the urban geography of individual resorts, as have other recent discussions and comparative seaside town studies.

Thus to date, no studies have taken advantage of the small area geography developed following the 2001 census to explore in detail the differences in local circumstances amongst, between and within resorts, and the potential reasons behind any variability. Even the most economically prosperous resorts are likely to contain disadvantaged socio-spatial environments

(i.e., neighbourhoods). According to Galster (2001: 2112), the concept of neighbourhood includes both geographic (i.e., place-oriented) and social (i.e., people-oriented) components, namely:

- Environmental characteristics (e.g., topographical features, pollution);
- Proximity characteristics (influenced both by location and transport infrastructure);
- Characteristics of the buildings (e.g., type, design, materials, density, repair);
- Infrastructural characteristics (e.g., roads, streetscape);
- Demographic characteristics of the population;
- The existence and quality of local services;
- Political characteristics (e.g., political networks, involvement of residents);
- Social-interactive characteristics (e.g., quantity, quality of friend and family networks);
- Sentimental characteristics (e.g., sense of identification with place, historical significance.

In order to address the problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, policymakers need to recognise and understand both the spatial distribution of such neighbourhoods across areas, and the nature and diversity of such neighbourhoods (Lupton and Power, 2004). Measuring, mapping and classifying disadvantaged neighbourhoods thus becomes of paramount importance. This task is particularly relevant given that arguably, seaside resorts should not be regarded as just tourism places. Resorts must be seen as an urban type and, by extension, are made up of neighbourhoods. The fortunes and condition of resorts and their respective neighbourhoods are likely to be inextricably linked. That is to say, they are very closely related and affect each other. Considering the different characteristics of neighbourhood begins to raise awareness that different aspects of resorts may be changing in different directions and at different rates. The different characteristics of neighbourhood, furthermore, reinforce the contention here that resort change relates to a multitude of different change processes which occur at different temporal and spatial scales (see section 3.1.1 and Figure 3.3).

This discussion prompts three other, rather more practical, issues about how resort change should be measured. The first is about how seaside resorts should be spatially delineated for the purposes of analysing change. The approaches identified by Fothergill (2008) include using district-level data as a proxy for the seaside town within a district, which was adopted by government in its evidence to the Select Committee inquiry, and a ward-based definition of seaside towns, as developed by Sheffield Hallam University for the *Seaside Economy* report,

which ‘involved fine-grain maps overlaying ward boundaries on the underlying urban geography’ (Fothergill, 2008: 5). The former approach is nonsense. Just a few of the larger resorts can be matched to district boundaries, that is to say, the vast majority of resorts are only a part of a district. A small number of resorts straddle boundaries between local authority districts. Furthermore, as Powell and Gray (2009: 8) have pointed out, ‘information based on district boundaries also creates difficulties, for example, bypassing individual seaside resorts within each authority’. Noting some of these problems and that census and other statistical data are increasingly becoming available at ward level, Fothergill (2008: 5) insists:

> ‘in order to take forward meaningful research a settled, ward-based definition of seaside towns needs to be adopted, and the starting point should probably be the Sheffield Hallam definition from the *Seaside Economy* report’.

However, it is questionable whether such an approach offers a way forward. One problem is that seaside resorts do not fit neatly with ward boundaries, as Agarwal and Brunt (2006: 660) discovered, ‘this is particularly the case with the small and medium sized resorts as sometimes the ward and resort boundaries did not directly correspond and encompassed some of the surrounding rural hinterland’. Another closely related problem is that wards can vary in terms of area and population. With regards population, ‘wards are of different sizes, averaging about 5,000 people, but ranging from 1,000 [in some rural areas] up to about 32,000 [in big cities]’ (Lupton, 2001: 5). Therefore, information based on wards that form only a part of a resort distorts or threatens to distort, to a greater or lesser extent, the reality of seaside resorts. The call by Fothergill (2008) to employ a ward-based definition is surprising, particularly as lower-level super output areas (LSOAs) were developed by the Office for National Statistics in 2001. LSOAs are a sub-ward statistical geography averaging approximately 1,500 people and can be aggregated to form the resort with much greater accuracy. Furthermore, unlike wards, LSOAs are not subjected to regular boundary change, which can have serious implications when trying to keep track of statistics over time.

A second issue is that of the timescale over which resort change should be analysed. The importance of this question arises in relation to, for example, assertions about ‘tipping

points' beyond which 'an area' may become subject to a vicious circle of decline (North and Syrett, 2006). A long-term perspective, built up over several decades, will deliver an understanding of broader causes and consequences of change than a short-term view. However, while a long-term perspective is appropriate for wider change processes, such as economic restructuring (as measured, for example, by sectoral or occupational shifts over time), too long a focus is unlikely to capture important short-term processes, such as fluctuating levels of deprivation, or migration/settlement patterns of different social groups in certain resorts or neighbourhoods. Therefore, in researching resort change and social exclusion, historical factors, direction and speed of change may be important, as well as current factors. A third issue is whether relative or absolute change is most relevant to measure. It may be argued that relative change is always important, because what matters for equity purposes is the difference between resorts and neighbourhoods. That said, it may be argued that it is absolute improvements that make a difference to people's lives. For example, it might be relevant to know what position a resort has in the housing market, not just the absolute value of prices or rents. For these reasons, absolute improvements may matter more for some indicators and relative improvements for others. With these issues in mind, the final section of this chapter summarises the existing evidence on English seaside resorts and considers the role of socio-economic resort change in local area exclusion.

3.3 Reviewing evidence of socio-economic resort change

The main conclusion from the review of the literature is that current knowledge of the directions of socio-economic resort change is very limited. In many ways, this dearth of knowledge is not surprising, given the difficulties of defining resorts and the boundary problem mentioned earlier, the multiple dimensions and attributes that comprise resort, the contemporaneous occurrence of compositional and in situ changes, and the many influences on resort change, occurring at different spatial levels. Many of the theoretical understandings derived from Agarwal's (2005) conceptual framework for resort change have been difficult to translate into quantitative research designs. There have also been data problems, principally:

- Lack of data aggregated to resort level, whether from Census of Population, administrative sources or household surveys.

- Problems with changes in ward boundaries over time.

- Changes in indicators over time. For example, only one deprivation-related Census indicator (car access) has been consistent over all Censuses from 1971 to 2001 (Martin *et al.*, 2002).

- Inability to track individuals (or dwellings) over time, thus making it hard to tell whether changes at the resort level have arisen because of changes to people in situ or because of movement of people.

- Inability to link census and other socio-economic data with tourism statistics for English seaside resorts which, as explained in section 3.1, is due to the dearth of tourism data relating specifically to English seaside resorts, and to the non-standard way in which tourism information is collated. As noted by Fothergill (2008: 10), 'the absence of good information about the seaside tourist economy applies not just to its overall importance but also to trends through time and the differences between individual resorts'. Consequently, little is properly known about whether there are more declining resorts than previously, or fewer, and whether their populations are dwindling or growing. Again, there is no telling, given the extreme paucity of comparable and available tourism data at resort level. Evidence is therefore drawn from the supply side and primarily from labour market analyses of resorts (e.g., Beatty and Fothergill, 2003, 2004). However, other analysts have used commercial property values (Coles and Shaw, 2006; Gale, 2005) and planning application data (Clegg and Essex, 2000) to create a picture of resort 'health', although such information does need to be readily available for each individual resort, which is not always the case.

- Lack of data disaggregated to resort level. In some cases, trends at the resort level can only be inferred from changes at higher geographical levels. For example, much of the

> data on migration, migrant workers, earnings and business stock is at local authority level, whereas data on economic output and productivity is at sub-regional level and relate to counties or groups of unitary authorities. Thus, data on several key indicators is only available at local authority level and above, and it is hard to be sure of trends at the resort level.

It should be noted at this juncture that the 'benchmarking' studies published by the DCLG have helped to fill the evidence gap that existed on seaside resorts. They present a range of statistical evidence on socio-economic conditions in English seaside towns, and compare the figures with regional and English averages. However, the statistics are becoming dated. They provide a picture of trends from 1998/9 to 2005/6 (although only for some socio-economic variables) but there is a clear need for more up-to-date figures. Moreover,

> 'the report covers the key socio-economic issues for which data is reasonably readily available. The report is not intended to provide a comprehensive digest of all the statistics that might conceivably be assembled for seaside towns' (Beatty *et al.*, 2008: 10; Beatty *et al.*, 2011: 8).

In summary, there has been a dearth of socio-economic data specifically relating to English seaside resorts for many decades and where it is available the time-series is short, making a meaningful assessment of change very difficult. The national seaside resort database accompanying this thesis and product of the research, therefore, constitutes a significant and valuable resource (see section 1.4).

3.3.1 How resorts are changing

This section draws chiefly from the *Seaside Economy* report (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003, 2004). As mentioned earlier (see section 1.2), the only national study of the economies of seaside towns, by Beatty and Fothergill, covers the period 1971–2001. The study found, contrary to expectation, a surprising level of employment growth, with total employment increasing by about 317,000 jobs between 1971 and 2001. In contrast, levels of claimant unemployment (i.e., the numbers on Jobseeker's Allowance) showed a relatively minor

increase of only 19,000 over the same period. Employment growth had been particularly marked in the 1980s and 90s, with higher rates of job growth than the national average. However, an above-average proportion of the jobs are part time, thus leading to strong female employment growth but falling male employment.

Table 3.1 shows the change in employment by sector in seaside resorts between 1981 and 2001. It is apparent from this table that several primary industries (including shipbuilding, fishing, energy production and ports) have experienced relatively significant decline in recent decades. Thus, the seaside economy is largely characterised by service industries. Beatty and Fothergill (2003) found that 32 per cent of all jobs were in the accommodation, distribution and catering sector, and a further 26 per cent were in the public sector, thereby signalling an economy reliant on tourism and government. Both sectors recorded an increase in jobs, as did the construction sector albeit to a lesser extent, although the largest shift occurred in financial services (Shaw and Coles, 2007). Based on these findings, Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 7) conclude that:

> 'Seaside towns do not on the whole suffer from a downward spiral of decline. Whilst there has clearly been restructuring in the wake of the rise of the foreign holiday, the continuing resilience of employment in and around the parts of the local economy most dependent on tourism suggests that there has often been successful adaptation. The seaside tourist industry remains one to be nurtured, not written off as a lost cause'.

Table 3.1: Employment in seaside towns, 2001

	Seaside towns (n= 43)		**National**	**% change**
Sector	**Jobs (000)**	**%**	**%**	**1981-2001**
Agriculture and fishing	5	0.3	2	-68
Energy and water	9	0.7	0.6	-49
Manufacturing	131	10	14	-21
Construction	92	7	6	+37
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	413	32	25	+45
Transport and communications	56	4	6	-11
Banking, finance and insurance	196	15	20	+65
Public administration, health, education	341	26	22	+42
Other services	64	5	5	No data
Total	1,306	100	100	+29

Source: Shaw and Coles (2007: 45)

However, there are many good reasons to be sceptical. For a start, the whole industry has changed, and that has resulted in less money spent by the tourists remaining in local economies. That point should be emphasised. There are an ever-increasing number of national pub, restaurant, supermarket and accommodation chains. In addition, rising car ownership has meant that visitors are not restricted to seaside resorts once they arrive there. All the time, less money from tourism stays in the local economy, and that has a big impact on average incomes. Job growth may be heating up, but low incomes depress areas as well. However, in concentrating on readily available labour market statistics, Beatty and Fothergill (2003) have totally missed that vital point. Employment is important, but economic challenges and problems extend beyond employment alone (e.g., incomes, earnings, enterprise, levels of investment and access to regeneration funds). In emphasising coastal employment growth, moreover, Beatty and Fothergill (2003) underplay the part-time, low-job quality and low-wage/skill nature of much employment. The *Seaside Economy* report may be criticised further. Beatty and Fothergill (2003) may be overstating the importance of tourism. The hotel, catering and distribution sector covers most of the tourist-related jobs, but it is also quite a lot wider, including wholesale, retail and the motor trade for instance, much of which will not depend directly on the tourist trade. Beatty and Fothergill (2003) should have isolated the tourism-related jobs, rather than relied on an all-encompassing, standard statistical category. The alternative argument to the decline thesis might then have found support.

Resort economies are facing not only structural difficulties (i.e., lack of economic diversity and reliance on a declining tourism industry), but also cyclical difficulties. The economies of seaside resorts are seasonal, peaking during the spring and summer months between April and September. Employment and economic activity peak during this period with a range of temporary and part-time jobs in tourism and other low-wage, low-skill seasonal industries like fruit picking and packaging. According to Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 13), ‘an annual cycle of claimant unemployment is still evident [for both men and women]’. They also found that, taking all seaside towns together, claimant unemployment is marginally higher than

the national average. However, a number of individual towns have claimant unemployment that is unusually high by national standards. The extent of disadvantage in seaside resorts shows up more clearly in comparison with neighbouring areas – 35 of the 43 seaside towns studied have claimant unemployment rates higher than those in surrounding areas, and sometimes much higher (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003).

However, the level of unemployment is higher than it initially appears. Even though Beatty and Fothergill (2003) were able to provide employment data for seaside resorts specifically, there is hidden unemployment not captured in the figures. Indeed, the figures presented in the *Seaside Economy* report fail to capture the large numbers of economically inactive working age residents, including the long-term sick, the disabled and people who are looking after family or home. With regards the long-term sick, the DCLG Select Committee Inquiry obtained data from both the DWP and the Department of Trade and Industry, which suggests that between 1997 and 2006 the number of Incapacity Benefit claimants in seaside resorts increased by 12.3 per cent compared to 2.2 per cent across Britain. In 2006, 150,000 or 9.3 per cent of working age adults in seaside towns were in receipt of Incapacity Benefit (CLG, 2007a). Note that these figures are for sickness benefit and do not necessarily include those claiming disability benefits. Nonetheless, the figures demonstrate that there is extensive joblessness in seaside towns beyond that recorded by claimant unemployment.

A further, more general finding is that the total population of seaside towns grew by 12 per cent or 340,000 between 1971 and 2001, compared to 6 per cent nationally (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003). The vast majority of the 43 seaside towns have shared in this growth, but not all to the same extent. Population growth was attributable not so much to in situ changes (i.e., natural increase, which actually appears to be negative at least for adults of working age), but rather to in-migration. There was substantial in-migration from the working age population. Between 1971 and 2001, 360,000 people of working age moved into seaside towns (equivalent to nearly one quarter of the 1971 working age population). However, the migration into seaside towns is not distributed evenly across age groups. It can be seen from the data in Table 3.2 that

there was modest net in-migration amongst 16-24 year olds, notably more amongst women than men, but for 25-34 year olds there is virtually no in-migration. Each of the other age groups, up to state pension age, records substantial net in-migration. There is some evidence in the *Seaside Economy* report that in-migration to seaside towns is driven by residential preference. The *Seaside Economy* report contains a survey of 1,033 non-employed residents in four seaside towns (Blackpool, Great Yarmouth, Thanet and Southport). The survey found that a quarter of the non-employed had lived in the same town all their life. When the remaining three-quarters who had moved from elsewhere were asked to indicate reasons for moving into their present town, most of those surveyed indicated that it was not because of specific employment opportunities. Further analysis of the reasons for inward migration by duration of residence revealed subtle differences. It can be seen from the data in Table 3.3 that wanting to live by the coast and housing-related reasons were markedly more important for the 'recent' in-movers.

Table 3.2: Net in-migration of people of working age to seaside towns, 1971-1991

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 36)

Table 3.3: Reasons for moving to the seaside, by length of time in town

Table has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

N.B. Respondents could give more than one reason

Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2003: 85)

The *Seaside Economy* report also demonstrates that the population structures of seaside resorts tend to be particularly uneven, as evidenced by the significant in-migration from the over-35 working age population. However, the DCLG (2007a) also note the inward migration of retired and semi-retired people, as have other recent discussions (Shaw and Coles, 2007), with the latter outlining their influence on resort economies. Many seaside resorts have experienced rapid rises in residential property prices that are well above the national average, 'as migrants seek either to move permanently to seaside resorts, or purchase second homes for individual use or as investment opportunities' (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 47). Conversely, at the younger end of the age range, school leavers and college graduates tend to leave seaside resorts because of 'the shortage of employment opportunities, housing costs and the shortage of services and facilities for young people' (CLG, 2007a: 17). A consequence of the out-migration of young (especially young skilled) is the lower educational attainment and entrepreneurial

culture in remaining population. In summary, 'the net impact of these individual demographic trends is to leave many seaside towns with a higher than average older population and lower proportion of their population in the first half of their working age' (CLG, 2007a: 13).

There is, however, another dimension to the social structure of many seaside resorts. The CLG Select Committee Inquiry found evidence of the in-migration of vulnerable adults (i.e., statutorily homeless families, care-leavers, ex-offenders, adults with mental health problems, European Union migrants, asylum seekers). Although vulnerable people of working age may move to seaside resorts voluntarily, 'they may also be placed there by other authorities to identified suitable accommodation' (CLG, 2007a: 15). According to the British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA, 2007: 5), many seaside resorts have become 'dumping grounds for people facing problems such as unemployment, social exclusion and substance dependency'. The CLG Select Committee report identified the growth of Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMO) as a key factor for the inward migration of vulnerable adults. An HMO is a dwelling or converted residential building which is occupied by more than one household – households share basic amenities, such as kitchen, washroom or toilet (Housing Act, 2004). The decline in the traditional bed-and-breakfast and guesthouse market has led to either the closure or reuse of many of these premises as HMO. This private sector accommodation, often in poor repair, is (relatively) cheap, and that (the argument goes) suits Housing Benefit claimants from neighbouring areas and further afield. However, there is scant reliable evidence on this point.

Thus, the *Seaside Economy* report found that seaside resorts are experiencing increases in employment and population, the latter fuelled by steady flows of in-migration. Despite these upward trends in population and employment, a range of socio-economic problems have been identified (see Table 1.3) and many coastal areas suffer from high levels of deprivation. With respect to the latter, Figure 3.4 shows the 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation rankings for every lower layer super output area in England. The least deprived areas are dark green and the most deprived areas are dark grey. It is apparent that high levels of deprivation are not limited to

inner-city areas of England and that many coastal areas are deprived to a greater or lesser extent, with the most pressing problems in general terms in Cornwall, Devon, the East, the North East and the North West. In terms of socio-economic problems, the issues for residents of seaside resorts are economic, physical and demographic.

From an economic perspective, seaside resorts are characterised by fragile economic conditions, including an overreliance on tourism-related businesses and other service sector businesses, (un)employment problems (i.e., seasonal, part-time, low-skill, low-wage), significant shares of residents in 'skills poverty' (i.e., those qualified below NVQ2), low rates of economic activity and large numbers of people claiming sickness benefit (Beatty *et al.,* 2008). However, there is considerable diversity between resorts. The benchmarking study of the 37 seaside resorts with populations above 10,000 found that, in terms of the three 'economic' domains (i.e., income; employment; education, skills and training) of the Indices of Deprivation 2007, four resorts appear in the least deprived quartile every time and a further six appear twice. These resorts, which might therefore be seen as having the least economic problems among England's larger seaside resorts, are in alphabetical order in Figure 3.5. What is notable about this list is that seven of the ten best performing resorts are located along a relatively short stretch of the south coast from Exmouth to Brighton. At the other end of the spectrum, six resorts fell into the most deprived quartile in all three of the 'economic' domains in the Indices of Deprivation, and a further five appear twice. In all, eleven seaside resorts were identified as having the greatest economic problems (Figure 3.5). Thus, on the basis of the three economic domains in the deprivation indices, sixteen resorts neither rank among the strongest or weakest seaside economies.



Figure 3.4: Most and least deprived LSOAs in England, 2007
Source: ONS (2009: 98)

Best -

Bognor Regis, Exmouth,
Bournemouth, Brighton, Worthing,
Sidmouth, Southport, Swanage,
Whitley Bay, Whitstable/Herne Bay

Worst -

Bridlington, Clacton, Great Yarmouth,
Ilfracombe, Lowestoft,
Morecambe/Heysham, Penzance, Skegness,
Thanet, Torbay, Whitby



Figure 3.5: Economic performance – the variation between the larger seaside resorts
Source: Drawn from data contained in Beatty *et al.* (2008)

From a physical perspective, the housing market in seaside resorts is very unbalanced. There is a very large private rented sector, a proliferation of HMOs and poor housing conditions. Evidence from the English House Condition Survey reveals that, in 2001, nearly half of all stock was 'non-decent' (compared to 33 per cent elsewhere), 6 per cent was 'unfit' (compared to 4 per cent elsewhere) and 20 per cent fell into the privately rented category (twice the rate of elsewhere), with lower levels of social housing and owner occupation (CLG, 2007a). Research commissioned by CLG (Shared Intelligence, 2008) identified three key drivers which have led to this situation:

- The decline of tourism which has resulted in the reuse of hotels and guest-houses as HMOs;
- Lower than average house prices, the large size of the older properties, and the growth in the buy-to-let market have led to the conversion of houses into small units and growth of the private rented sector; and,
- The high number of rented properties and absentee landlords has fuelled the decline in the condition of the housing stock.

From a demographic perspective, as mentioned earlier, the population structures of seaside resorts tend to be particularly uneven. The key drivers of population change are: outmigration of youth for education and opportunities; the in-migration of vulnerable adults, owing to the availability of cheap rented accommodation and the placement practices of other local authorities; the in-migration of working age adults aged 35 years and older; retirement in-migration; and, an ageing population. Taken together, these demographic trends increase the strain on public services, particularly when the individuals concerned have high levels of need. Furthermore, a consequence of the in-migration of the low skilled and retired is 'a mismatch between the affordability ratio of earnings against house prices' (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 47). The lack of affordable housing is an issue in many seaside resorts, owing to 'the increasing in-migration of the retired, semi-retired and second-home owners who are drawn from more affluent groups' (Shaw and Coles, 2007: 48). Based on data compiled from the Select Committee Inquiry (CLG, 2007a), Shaw and Coles (2007) note that house prices are above the

national average in seaside resorts that are not only retirement areas, but also commuter settlements.

This section has aimed to give an overview of the main issues and trends identified in the literature as impacting at resort level. It is clear from this review that there are some key explanatory factors that may account for poor performance:

- **Decline of traditional tourist industry** and **failure to diversify:** many seaside resorts are over-reliant on public sector employment, the declining traditional tourism industry (i.e., domestic holiday market of 4+ nights) and other low-wage, low-skill and often seasonal sectors. The location (poor transport infrastructure, isolation and remoteness) of most seaside resorts, except for those within close commuting distance of major cities, does not make them an obvious first choice location for alternative industries (to traditional tourism) that can maintain the strength of the local economy;

- **Traditional building stock**: many seaside towns have a large stock of former holiday accommodation (old hotels, boarding houses, even caravan sites) that is highly suitable for single-resident occupancy dwellings. The presence of high levels of inactivity in these areas might, to some extent, be explained by the nature of the benefit system driving the inactive into areas with high levels of suitable housing; and,

- **High levels of in-migration**: there has been a growth in jobs in 41 of the 43 seaside towns over the period 1971-2001 (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003). However, job growth has not corresponded to increases in employment, due to in-migration by people wanting to live in seaside towns. This situation is leading to continuing imbalance in seaside labour markets.

Beatty and Fothergill (2003) found that poor economic performance (as expressed in relatively narrow terms, unemployment) was attributable not so much to local economic factors,

but rather to high in-migration. However, according to Shaw and Coles (2007: 47), 'many of the difficulties appear to relate to patterns of migration *and the low wage economy associated with many parts of the tourism sector* (Emphasis added). While it is tempting to try to isolate which are the major drivers of change, and how much economic and social decline/change is accounted for by each of the factors, case studies of resorts show that what produces change is the interaction of factors. Work undertaken for the DCLG suggests that resort change is not the product of one factor alone but of a combination of demographic, economic, social and policy changes (Shared Intelligence, 2008). Based on the perceptions and views of regeneration and housing managers on the ground in ten seaside resorts in England (Blackpool, Bridlington, Clacton, Falmouth, Great Yarmouth, Morecambe and Heysham, Skegness, St. Ives, Thanet, Whitby), Shared Intelligence (2008) highlighted the way in which some of the before-mentioned economic, physical and demographic factors interact with and reinforce one another (see Figure 3.4). According to Shared Intelligence (2008: 13),

> 'taken together, this combination of factors has created a cycle of decline. The interplay and relative importance of these factors will vary from place to place, but [the informants] highlight the lack of economic diversity as the key driver'.

Figure has been removed due to copyright restrictions.

Figure 3.6: Issues for residents of seaside resorts
Source: Shared Intelligence (2008: 13)

These factors – including weak labour markets, poor stock condition and housing market imbalances, high levels of population transience and in-migration – impact both on existing residents and on changing population composition. In highly disadvantaged resorts, they may well set in train a series of other mechanisms, for example, lack of inward investment, stigmatisation, poor public service provision, declining physical and social environments, diminishing social networks, poverty traps caused by a combination of long term benefit dependency and low paid work, thriving informal and illegal economies, high levels of crime and teenage pregnancy, and so on. It therefore appears that the twin challenges in understanding resort change and performance are to further understand these interactions (by studying resorts in detail and over time) and to identify patterns and combinations of circumstances that repeatedly occur, by quantitative studies incorporating all these factors.

3.3.2 Potential factors influencing social exclusion in English seaside resorts

Although it has been documented in the academic and policy literature that English seaside resorts are in decline and are exhibiting characteristics associated with social exclusion, these formerly busy destinations are an under-researched entity in geographical studies of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion. The introduction to this thesis emphasised the paucity of published research on social exclusion in English seaside resorts, noting that historically research has focused on 'urban' and, more recently, 'rural' locations. This research reveals that social exclusion is extensive in both environments, but there are some important differences in its nature and form. For example, socially excluded households in rural areas tend to be widely dispersed, whereas in inland inner-city areas they are often concentrated within social housing estates. Survey evidence suggests these estates have severe deprivation in breadth and depth, and all aspects of life are affected, including educational attainment, crime and safety, housing, jobs, skills, the environment, incomes and health. Benefit dependency is very high, employment is low (Brennan *et al.*, 1998, 2000; Glennerster *et al.*, 1999; Lupton, 2001). Some of the principal characteristics of rural exclusion include its invisibility, a perception that rural life is 'problem-free', the out-migration of younger people, a high proportion of older people and social isolation, and a high level of property ownership which, although it accords status, often

masks the existence of low incomes in particular (Chapman *et al.*, 1998; Commins, 2004; Countryside Agency, 2000; Shucksmith and Chapman, 1998). Indeed, social exclusion in rural areas is often hidden as socially excluded people tend to live alongside extreme affluence. Low incomes, seasonality of employment and access to services and housing are issues for residents in rural areas, whereas unemployment, housing quality and poor living conditions affect many residents of inner-city areas.

Thus, academic research of social exclusion has been geographically constrained to inner-city urban areas and some rural environments, and has neglected coastal locations. This research sets out to redress this imbalance by providing a descriptive analysis of the nature, intensity and distribution of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In doing so, it investigates whether there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities and explores the factors affecting social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In researching social exclusion in a spatial context, a key task is to think about the kinds of characteristics that areas have, and the reasons why these might be important. Theorists of local area exclusion suggest that area and neighbourhood characteristics are of two kinds:

- **Intrinsic or hard-to-change characteristics.** These include location, transport infrastructure, housing and economic base. These are usually determined by local factors and broader sub-national influences (Lupton, 2001; North and Syrett, 2006).

- **Population characteristics.** Changes in population composition are strongly linked to intrinsic characteristics, not least because 'workers locate close to industry. People with low skills and earning capacity move into areas of lower quality, lower cost housing. New migrants tend to settle near ports or in major cities, from which some will disperse. In cities with growing economies, areas of low cost private housing close to city centres become gentrified' (Lupton and Power, 2002: 29). Thus, population composition and dynamics are also attributed to sub-national influences, 'mitigated by local factors such as high crime or the quality and availability of housing' (Lupton, 2001: iv).

Table 3.4 summarises this approach to thinking about area characteristics with reference to English seaside resorts. It incorporates many of those factors identified in the previous section and gives some examples of how they may influence social exclusion. The contribution of these factors can be categorised according to whether they relate directly to the environment in which people live (i.e., place-oriented factors) or the characteristics of the seaside residents (i.e., people-oriented factors). Thus, the multifaceted phenomenon of resort change relates to the socio-economic structure (i.e., people) and 'health' (i.e., place) of seaside resorts. This framework provides a basis for subsequent analysis, undertaken in the methodology, to determine how the variables are represented by the available data.

Table 3.4: Understanding resort change: elements of 'change' and influences on social exclusion

Type of characteristics	**Factors/facets**	**Why important**
Intrinsic or hard to change characteristics of resort	**Geographical factors** such as resort size, location and proximity **Economic factors** such as industrial structure, economic diversity, economic activity, business stock, household income, house prices **Physical factors** such as housing stock (type, tenure and condition) and existence of transport infrastructure	Influence location of companies, access to jobs and services, how attractive an area is to live in (i.e., place based area effects)
Population composition and dynamics	**Compositional variables** such as age, ethnicity, family size and type, occupational class of residents, health **Migration** such as volumes, flows and age structure of migrants, immigrant workforce	Influence labour supply, household structure, service needs, social networks and norms, culture and preferences (i.e., population rooted area effects)

Source: Author's own elaboration

3.4 Summary

This chapter has sought to provide a statement about what is known about socio-economic resort change in the UK at the present time. Initially, it provided an overview of the development of seaside resorts in Britain and then reviewed three key approaches to studying resort development. The purpose of that review was to show the strengths and limits of existing resort development approaches. What all these approaches have in common is that they are to do with tourism activity, neglecting the socio-economic dimensions of tourist places. Consequently, 'the internal dynamics of English seaside resorts are poorly understood' (Agarwal, 2012: 1470). It is this body of knowledge, which can best be described as superficial and general, this study seeks to contribute to. Specifically, this study aims to make a contribution to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, and of its relationship with resort change.

Resort change is a combination of two concepts: resort and change. The former refers to the unit of study; the latter indicates the object of study. The second section of the chapter sought to understand the challenges associated with these two concepts and the consequences of these challenges for seaside resort research. It identified three key issues of debate. The first of these is that there is no clear answer emerging as to what definition of seaside is most appropriate in the English debate. The division of settlements into coastal and seaside areas is both complex and problematic, as evidenced by the fact that no single classification system has been adopted in England. Moreover, what constitutes a seaside resort remains weakly defined. Consequently, it is unclear what should be measured when measuring resort change. Drawing on the concept of neighbourhood, it was suggested that resorts are physical spaces, with intrinsic characteristics such as economic base, housing, transport and environment, which may alter over time, comprising resort change. However, given that the concept of neighbourhood also has a social component, any analysis of resort change must also include the changing characteristics of residents. The second issue is the question of how resorts should be spatially delineated for the purposes of analysing change. The ward-based definition underpinning the *Seaside Economy* report is questionable. It was argued that, in order to better understand trends

and challenges, seaside resort research needs to go to the smallest available statistical outputs and build upwards from them. Third, there are issues relating to the selection and interpretation of appropriate indicators for the measurement of change. In researching resort change, historical factors, direction and speed of change may be important, as well as current factors. Furthermore, both absolute and relative variables may be relevant.

The final section of the chapter examined what is currently known about socio-economic resort change and, in doing so, considered the role that such factors play in influencing local area exclusion. The main conclusion from the review of the literature is that current knowledge of the directions of resort change is very limited, principally because little data is available at the resort level, and because where it is available, the time-series is short, making a meaningful assessment of change very difficult. Such evidence as there is seems to suggest that English seaside resorts face a common and distinctive set of economic, physical and demographic problems. However, very little is known about the differing circumstances between and within resorts, and the potential reasons behind any variability. The principal factors identified through a review of the literature as being potentially important for social exclusion in seaside resorts may be categorised according to whether they relate directly to the environment in which people live (i.e., place-oriented factors) or the characteristics of the seaside residents (i.e., people-oriented factors). This framework for understanding resort socio-economic change provides a basis for subsequent analysis (undertaken in the methodology) to identify the available datasets that represent the different variables of the framework.

Chapter 4

Research Methodology

This chapter considers the how and why of the research that lies at the heart of this study. It begins by laying out the philosophical dimensions of the research, which is followed by an explanation of the three stage method adopted in this study. Each stage is then considered in turn, wherein the materials and methods employed to meet the objectives are detailed. The aims and objectives of the research were stated at the start of this thesis but they are repeated here for the benefit of the reader. The main aim of this research project is to contribute to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, and of its relationship with resort change. The following model may serve as a guide to understand the structure of the empirical analyses (see Figure 4.1). Solid arrows in the model indicate relationships that will be directly studied in the analyses. Dashed lines indicate themes that have been discussed theoretically, but not studied directly empirically. The numbers on the model refer to the research objectives. This research seeks to:

1. Identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In this respect, the research provides an account of how social exclusion differs between seaside and non-seaside areas, and how social deprivation varies within and between resorts;

2. Determine how the socio-economic performance of seaside resorts differs from that of England as a whole and provide an assessment of whether there are "true" differences in socio-economic performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. In this respect, the research seeks to ascertain the degree to which place- and population-based factors might contribute to the presence of characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts; and

3. Investigate if there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities, and if so, whether a typology of excluded localities can be established. The typology building exercise undertaken in this thesis allows the socio-spatial structure of excluded resort

localities to be understood with reference to a broad number of factors or indicators. The third element of the research therefore provides a better understanding of some of the causes and consequences of local area exclusion, and of the variations in need between different areas.



Figure 4.1: Research model – social exclusion in English seaside resorts
Source: Author's own elaboration (see also Figure 3.3)

4.1 Overview of research methodology

The research methodology for this study is summarised in Table 4.1. In this study, the paradigmatic perspective adopted is that of positivism. This paradigm holds certain beliefs about the nature of reality (i.e., ontology) and knowing (i.e., epistemology). Ontologically, positivism assumes that there is a single, external and objective reality that is separate from any knowledge of it and, epistemologically, this reality can be uncovered through the application of scientific methods (Guba, 1990). Positivist methodological approaches rely heavily on quantitative methods (Creswell, 1994). Research involves data collection that is invariably

numeric and the researcher tends to use statistical and mathematical techniques as the methodology of data analysis. Positivist research searches for patterns and regularities and focuses on prediction and control (Creswell, 1994). The emphasis is placed on measuring variables precisely and testing hypothesis that are linked to casual explanations. The positivist research paradigm, therefore, entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research. It moves from the general to the specific, and its main aim is to test theory.

This research employs a non-experimental, quantitative approach in an attempt to develop understanding of the relationship (if any) between social exclusion and resort change. A progressive three stage approach is adopted which, as shown in Table 4.1, runs parallel to the three research objectives. These objectives led to the use of quantitative measures and secondary data analysis as a research method. Hakim (1982: 12) describes secondary data analysis as:

> 'any further analysis of an existing dataset which presents interpretations, conclusions or knowledge additional to, or different from, those presented in the first report on the enquiry as a whole and its main results'.

For social exclusion, the data in this study are primarily drawn from the Indices of Deprivation. Regarding the examination of the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion, it was necessary to determine how the variables (of the framework for understanding resort socio-economic change, see Table 3.4) are represented by the available data. This task involved reviewing datasets available at both the ward level and LSOA level. The survey was necessary given that the benchmarking study for DCLG (Beatty *et al.,* 2008) did not set out to cover socio-economic and community issues in any depth. It assessed larger seaside towns on a number of standard indicators, which have been used in other academic work – namely the Marine Management Organisation study of coastal areas (MMO, 2011). But these indicators do not allow for a comprehensive assessment of the socioeconomic structure and 'health' of seaside resorts. Thus, a list of available secondary data was compiled. Then, a wide range of data representing characteristics of socio-economic structure/composition and indicators of decline was assembled from a range of data sources, including Census of Population, Labour

Force Survey, Annual Business Inquiry, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and Customs, Experian, Land Registry, Home Office, ONS, Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix etc. The data was collated for seaside resort LSOAs and wards, and matched to all identifiable 'seaside' resorts within each seaside district, and added to the newly created national seaside resort database. For the typological investigation of excluded seaside localities, the data compiled for resort LSOAs was used.

The data collation undertaken for this study, therefore, has been enormous. The construction of the national seaside resort database was a prime consideration from the outset. The design and construction of the database was determined by the information collected, and also by the manner in which recording of data took place. The purpose of the database was to host, first, Indices of Deprivation data for seaside and non-seaside local authority districts and LSOAs in England and, second, information relating to the themes of socio-economic performance for all identified 'seaside' resort wards and LSOAs, with data for the latter small area geographies being aggregated to the resort level. Thus, two main phases of data collection took place. The first phase involved the utilisation of the Indices of Deprivation database, area classification and implementation of a three step process to identify the resorts to be included in the analysis of social exclusion. Having identified seaside resorts, wards and LSOAs, the second phase of the data collection process was then initiated and involved researching the available datasets at the LSOA and ward level. Again, the purpose of the survey was to collect, first, socio-demographic data about the circumstances of people living in seaside resorts and, second, information relating to aspects of area decline. Thus, the second phase of data collection was lengthy.

The national seaside resort database was designed and created using Microsoft Excel. The database consists of seven spreadsheets, four of these relate to seaside regions, districts, wards and LSOAs, whereas the fifth relates to resorts (i.e., ward and LSOA data aggregated to resort level). The sixth sheet is a geographic look-up table, which details the LSOA names and codes, ward names and codes and postcodes for every seaside resort. The seventh sheet contains the Indices of Deprivation data for seaside and non-seaside areas. Microsoft Excel was utilised

as it is easy to use and readily available on most computers, thus allowing ease of data-migration and accessibility. Microsoft Excel is also easily compatible with other Microsoft applications, such as Microsoft Access, which is a relatively new tool that provides both the functionality of a database and the programming capabilities to create end-user screens. To anyone with basic knowledge of both Excel and Access, it will be immediately obvious that the latter is far superior in terms of storing and manipulating large amounts of information. Access is composed of tables, queries, forms, reports, macros and modules. Given these functions, a project is now underway to move the data from Excel to Access, thus enhancing the potential for future dissemination of parts of the database. Analyses of data have been undertaken using Excel (2013) and the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.0 programme. The methods of analysis, as indicated in Table 4.1, are discussed in detail in the following sections of this chapter, alongside the data to which they relate.

Table 4.1: Summary of research methodology

Philosophy	Positivism
Ontology	Objectivism
Epistemology	Empiricism
Approach	Non-experimental, quantitative, exploratory-descriptive
Design	Three stage method Stage 1: Examination of social exclusion in all English 'seaside' resorts Stage 2: Examination of the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion Stage 3: Typological investigation of excluded resort localities
Method and data	Construction of a national seaside resort database Stage 1: Indices of Deprivation Stage 2: Datasets available at the LSOA and ward level Stage 3: Datasets available at the LSOA level
Analysis	Secondary data analysis Stage 1: A combination of univariate and bivariate analyses (i.e., chi-square and Pearson's correlation analyses) Stage 2: A combination of univariate and bivariate analyses (i.e., t-tests) Stage 3: Multivariate analysis (i.e., principal components analysis, cluster analysis) and bivariate analyses (i.e., one-way analysis of variance and chi-square analysis).

Source: Author's own work

4.2 Examination of social exclusion in English 'seaside' resorts

'Social exclusion' is universally regarded in the academic and policy literature as involving multi-dimensional disadvantage. It is important to note, however, that there is no generally accepted definition of social exclusion and so there is no universally agreed mix of indicators. Indeed, a chief characteristic of social exclusion studies to date has been the variation in indicators employed in constructing a composite measure of the concept (see Levitas *et al.*, 2007 for a review). Previous area-based studies of social exclusion have used various indicators from a range of data sources such as administrative sources, ONS and the Census of Population. Such variation serves to exemplify the absence of a generally approved approach to the concept and measurement of social exclusion.

This study draws principally on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The IMD was considered the most suitable vehicle through which to examine the occurrence, nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts for four main reasons. First, it covers a range of different and related aspects of deprivation that together are indicative of social exclusion. Second, it is based on a robust, transparent methodology. Third, although the data are not available at a resort level, it is possible to collate and apply the LSOA level data to resorts. Fourth, it is easily accessible and understandable. Thus, the IMD was adopted for both pragmatic and conceptual reasons. This section first provides an overview of the IMD and its construction. It will then go on to describe the process used by the study to identify the seaside resorts to be included in the analysis. Then, the analysis strategy is detailed.

4.2.1 Data source

The IMD forms part of a package of indices – the English Indices of Deprivation – produced by the Department of Social Policy and Intervention at the University of Oxford, on behalf of the DCLG. A detailed document describing the purpose, methodology and sources for construction of the indices is available for download from the DCLG website (McLennan

et al., 2011). According to the DCLG, the IMD and its component indices are the main mechanisms used in government to distinguish between small areas for the purposes of analysing area change, monitoring performance, setting targets and allocating funding (McLennan *et al.*, 2011). The IMD is based on the premise that multiple deprivation consists of individual components which can be measured separately, but also combined to form an overall single index measure. Each of the component domains of deprivation is comprised of a number of indicators which cover aspects of this deprivation as comprehensively as possible. Based on these indicators, every LSOA in England is then given a score. The scores in each domain are standardised, and each domain is weighted. The DCLG note that the weights applied were the result of a combination of analysis of the data, expert opinion and consultation (McLennan *et al.*, 2011). These weighted scores are combined to give a composite score (or index value) for each LSOA. As shown in Figure 4.2, the IMD is a composite score based on 38 indicators grouped across seven domains. Each domain's contribution to the overall score is weighted differently, with income and employment deprivation weighted the most. Income and employment deprivation make up 45% of the IMD between them. Once domain scores have been established for each area the individual areas are ranked. Areas are ranked for each domain and for the combined IMD measure according to their position relative to all others in the country. There are 32,482 LSOAs in England; the LSOA with a rank of 1 is the most deprived and 32,482 the least deprived.



Figure 4.2: Index of Multiple Deprivation – indicators, domains and relative weighting (out of 100)

Source: Compiled from McLennan *et al.* (2011)

A number of summary measures which describe differences in the IMD between local authority districts are also available. These measures are:

- **Average of LSOA scores** which describes the district as a whole, taking into account the full range of LSOA scores across a district. It is the population weighted average of the combined scores for LSOAs in each district and takes into account that the more deprived LSOAs may have more extreme scores.

- **Average of LSOA ranks** which summarises the overall measure of deprivation across the district taken as a whole, including both deprived and less deprived LSOAs. It is the population weighted average of the combined ranks for the LSOAs in a district.

- **Extent** which shows how widespread ***high levels*** of deprivation are in a district and is the proportion of a district's population living in the most deprived LSOAs in the country. It only includes districts containing LSOAs which fall within the most deprived 30% of LSOAs in England.

- **Local concentration** which identifies ***hot spots*** of deprivation within a district. It is the population weighted average of the ranks of the district's most deprived LSOAs that capture exactly 10% of the district's population (which may not always capture a whole number of LSOAs).

- **Scale (2 measures)** which captures the number of people experiencing (1) income and (2) employment deprivation at district level.

No single summary measure is favoured over another as there is no best way of describing or comparing districts. There are less local authority districts in the 2010 indices (n = 326) than there were in 2007 and 2004 (n = 354) due to local government reorganisation in 2009, which resulted in the formation of a number of single, or unitary, authorities. For each measure, the district is given a rank. Again, when considering ranks, low numbers are always worse than high ones.

The Indices of Deprivation were first published at ward level in 2000, then at the smaller LSOA level in 2004, 2007 and 2010. Thus, the latter three versions measure pockets of deprivation more accurately than the Indices of Deprivation 2000. A second improvement is that the Indices of Deprivation 2004, 2007 and 2010 include two additional domains of deprivation: 'crime' and 'living environment'. Given that the Indices of Deprivation which relate to 2004, 2007 and 2010 are based on the same approach, structure and methodology, comparison between the indices is possible. The data in this study are primarily drawn from the Indices of Deprivation 2010, although the previous two versions are also referred to. An important point to note here is that there is typically a two year time lag between the publication of deprivation indices and the period covered by the data which comprise those indices. Thus, the most recent Indices of Deprivation typically rely on 2008 data, which should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results.

There are, however, a number of other limitations to be aware of when using the Indices of Deprivation to analyse areas. For a start, the indicators identify areas with characteristics associated with deprivation – not deprived people. It follows that not all people living in areas classified as 'deprived' necessarily reflect the characteristics of the area they live in. Making an erroneous assumption in this regard is known as an 'ecological fallacy' and is more likely when larger spatial units of analysis are used. Therefore, this study mainly uses data at the LSOA level but reference is also made to local authority districts. Another important point is that the Indices of Deprivation provide a good overview of relative patterns of deprivation in England but they do not, on their own, allow absolute statements about the level of deprivation within individual areas. For example, it is not possible to say that LSOA X, ranked 20 is twice as deprived as LSOA Y, which is ranked 40. However, it is possible to say that X is more deprived than Y. Furthermore, care must also be exercised over the interpretation of indices. The Income domain, for instance, does not measure income. Its main inputs are measures of the number of people on particular benefits in each area (and so assumed deprivation in terms of income). It follows that the indices is not a measure of affluence. Low levels of income deprivation do not necessarily mean an area is affluent. Finally, as well as questioning the

suitability of indicators to summarise deprivation, it is also important to remember that not all deprivation indices are weighted equal, as shown in Figure 4.2. Income deprivation and employment deprivation are weighted the most, resulting in an increased IMD score for income and employment deprived LSOAs relative to less-deprived ones. It follows that the pattern of multiple deprivation – or social exclusion – across England might appear different if the weights applied to combine the scores from each of the domains were balanced or less biased. However, despite such difficulties, the IMD remains the most appropriate composite multi-dimensional measure available for investigation of the multifaceted problem of social exclusion. Thus, having described the data source used to indicate the occurrence, nature and extent of social exclusion characteristics in English seaside resorts, it is next necessary to explain how the seaside resorts were identified for inclusion in the study.

4.2.2 Identification of seaside resorts – criteria and methods

There is no standard definition of England's seaside resorts. An empirical investigation therefore needs a working definition to be constructed. This study has defined a seaside resort as *any sizeable coastal settlement in which tourism is a significant source of economic activity and whose visitor product is primarily linked to the seaside*. To capture the economic activity element (in the absence of data at a resort level), only settlements within 'seaside' districts were considered. Specifically, settlements within 'seaside' districts were deemed a resort if they met all of the following inclusion criteria:

(i) Settlements must be adjacent to the sea;
(ii) Settlements must have a beach; and,
(iii) Settlements must have a population above 10,000 in the 2001 Census.

There were two stages to the process of identification. The first consisted of identifying 'seaside' districts, which involved classifying the local authority districts of England. Pre-2009 local authority boundaries (from 2001) were used in this study since some local authority districts were merged in the 2009 local government reorganisation, influencing local

geographies in the North East, the West Midlands and the South West. Thus, this study has defined seaside resorts using pre-2009 local authority boundaries, when the number of authorities was greater and boundaries were drawn more tightly around resorts in the North East and the South West. Based simply on proximity to the coast, the 354 local authority districts of England were sub-divided into two categories: 'coastal' and 'inland'. A total of 84 districts were classified as 'coastal' and these districts were subject to further area classification in order to enable a distinction to be made between those districts that are 'seaside' as opposed to 'coastal'. 'Seaside' reflected tourism as an important form of employment (i.e., above average levels of employment in tourism-related businesses).

The available data on employment is rooted in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), which is based on industry group activity. An important point to note here is that, as argued in section 3.3.1, the share of employment in the hotel, catering and distribution sector does not adequately reflect the importance of tourism (because it is too broad). However, there is no defined set of tourism industries, with several having been used for institutional or statistical purposes. In this study, the definition of 'tourism-related industries' is that adopted by the ONS in 'Labour Market Trends', namely SIC groups 551 to 554, 633 and 925 to 927. It includes, for example, employee jobs in hotels, restaurants, bars, libraries, attractions, sport and other recreation activities. Thus, the ONS approach results in a much narrower definition of tourism given that its calculation excludes employment in other service industries (i.e., wholesale, retail, the motor trade) of the hotel, catering and distribution sector. The figures, based upon data from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) published by the ONS, were assembled from the National On-line Manpower Information System (NOMIS) website, which provides labour market profiles for local authority districts in England.

So, 'seaside' reflected tourism as an important form of employment, that is, 8.2% or above employed in tourism-related businesses according to the ABI (2001). 'Coastal' districts that recorded tourism-related employment below this national average had more diverse economies. Of the 84 local authority districts initially classified as coastal, 24 were re-classified as 'coastal' because they appeared to be less reliant on tourism and 60 as 'seaside'. (However,

as indicated in Figure 4.3, not all these 'seaside' districts contained places with resort status. Of the 60 districts classified as 'seaside', 39 contained resorts and 21 did not. These districts are termed, respectively, 'seaside with resort' and 'seaside without resort'. The location of the districts is shown in Figure 4.4.)

Having identified the 'seaside' districts (n = 60), the second stage of the identification process was then initiated and involved applying the criteria to the settlements located within those districts. The first step involved creating a list of all places along the coast in each 'seaside' district. This list was informed by careful scrutiny of Ordnance Survey maps. As a second step, each place was checked to establish whether a beach is a dominant feature. This exercise relied upon information sourced from both the UK Coast Guide website (2010) and the beaches and coastline section of the Enjoy England website (2010). Having identified places along the coast with a beach, attention then turned toward establishing the population of each place.

As Census 2001 data does not correspond directly to seaside resorts, but instead to local authority, ward and output geographies, a ward-based definition was initially adopted to enable the population of each place to be established. Essentially, there are two types of ward in England – electoral wards and census wards. Electoral wards change their boundaries over time, as populations and local areas change. Census wards, however, provide a fixed geographical area. Consequently, census wards are useful for comparison of data over time. It is for this reason, and because LSOAs are nested within the boundaries of census wards, Census Area Statistics (CAS) wards were examined. Thus, for each 'seaside' district, the codes and names of all CAS wards were exported from the ONS Ward History Database (2009). CAS wards within the 60 'seaside' districts were examined by a visual study of Ordnance Survey maps, local authority internet sites and resort brochures to ascertain which wards formed part of, or wholly encompassed, the underlying urban geography of each place in question. Population figures were then assembled from the Neighbourhood Statistics website, allowing for the status of settlements to be established and, consequently, settlements excluded from, or included in, the study.

The boundaries of the resorts, defined by CAS wards, were also matched to LSOAs to enable the use of data compiled at LSOA level. Identifying the names and codes of the LSOAs within each CAS ward involved extracting the information from 'Output Area Look-up Tables', which are available from the ONS website. Again, the respective population figures were sourced from the Neighbourhood Statistics website. Then, each seaside resort was defined using its constituent LSOAs. All LSOAs within each CAS ward that covered less than half of the urban geography were excluded and the population figures revised. In all, 58 individual seaside resorts were identified as a result of this process (see Table 4.2) and they are the basis of the subsequent analysis in this study. Figure 4.5 shows how the seaside resorts are distributed around the coastline. They are listed in Table 4.3, ranked by their total resident population (of constituent LSOAs) in 2001. With a population of above 10,000, all the resorts included here qualify as 'urban' settlements on official criteria (ONS, 2001). Thus, the population threshold meant the inclusion of all the major seaside resorts.

In summary, this study identified 58 seaside resorts through the use of the newly created specific seaside resort definition, together with the local authority district area classification and small area geography. Indeed, each seaside resort has been defined in terms of the resident population of constituent LSOAs, which involved fine-grain maps overlaying LSOA boundaries on the underlying urban geography. This approach is much superior to the 'subjective judgement' and ward-based definition of seaside towns (n = 37 with a population of more than 10,000) developed by Sheffield Hallam University for the *Seaside Economy* report (Beatty and Fothergill, 2004: 463). The approach of this study is also an improvement on that deployed in Agarwal and Brunt (2006). They used a district classification similar in principle to this study, but only differentiated between coastal and seaside districts (failing to recognise 'seaside with resort' and 'seaside without resort' districts). Moreover, like Beatty and Fothergill (2004), Agarwal and Brunt (2006) also matched ward and resort boundaries. They identified 32 'seaside' districts and 87 seaside resorts, but did not name all these resorts or specify in which districts they are located. Another deficiency is that Agarwal and Brunt (2006: 662) claim

to have investigated deprivation by resort size, but provide little evidence of this analysis, including how the 87 resorts were split in the analysis.

Within this study analysis is undertaken for the 58 largest seaside resorts split between the 25 larger seaside resorts and 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. This split has been determined based on the resident population of the LSOAs which comprise the seaside resorts. While the use of thresholds of population size can be arbitrary in its division of settlements of different sizes, that proposed by ONS (2001) has attained widespread acceptance and is adopted here. As indicated above, urban settlements are defined as those with population of more than 10,000 in 2001. However, ONS has proposed a classification of urban settlements according to the amount of population they contain. As shown in Table 4.4, the core of the classification is a four-fold grouping of areas. With a population ranging from 10,124 to 163,351, the resorts fall into the 'larger market town' and 'other urban' categories. Therefore, it was felt that the threshold figure of above 39,999 was appropriate to determine 'large' seaside resorts. Thus, using the 2001 census population figures at LSOA level, the 'large' resorts are those resorts with a population more than or equal to 40,000; the 'mid-sized' resorts are defined as those which have a population between 10,000 and 39,999.



Figure 4.3: The area classification of local authority districts
Source: Author's own work



Figure 4.4: The location of 'coastal' and 'seaside' districts, England, 2001

Source: Author's own work

Table 4.2: Identifying seaside resorts

Region	All coastal local authority districts	%	>8.2	Resorts
South West				
	Isles of Scilly	30.7	S	
	West Somerset	24.9	S	Minehead
	Penwith	20.6	S	Penzance
	Restormel	19.7	S	Newquay
	Weymouth & Portland	17.3	S	Weymouth
	Torbay	16.7	S	Torquay Paignton Brixham
	Purbeck	14.8	S	Swanage
	North Cornwall	14.2	S	
	North Devon	13.7	S	Ilfracombe
	Caradon	13.4	S	
	East Devon	12.9	S	Exmouth Sidmouth
	Bournemouth	12	S	Bournemouth
	Teignbridge	12	S	Teignmouth Dawlish
	South Hams	11.8	S	
	Torridge	11.6	S	
	Carrick	10.5	S	Falmouth
	Christchurch	10.4	S	Christchurch
	Sedgemoor	9.8	S	Burnham-on-Sea
	West Dorset	9.1	S	
	Kerrier	8.5	S	
	North Somerset	8.3	S	Weston-s-Mare Clevedon
	Plymouth	8	C	
	Poole	7.7	C	
South East				
	Isle of Wight	15	S	Ryde
	Rother	13.1	S	Bexhill-on-Sea
	New Forest	12.8	S	
	Brighton and Hove	11.9	S	Brighton Hove
	Shepway	11.6	S	Folkestone Hythe
	Arun	10.8	S	Littlehampton Bognor Regis
	Wealden	10.4	S	
	Eastbourne	10.3	S	Eastbourne
	Chichester	10	S	
	Portsmouth	9.5	S	Southsea
	Canterbury	8.9	S	Herne Bay Whitsable
	Dover	8.9	S	Deal Dover
	Thanet	8.9	S	Margate Ramsgate Broadstairs
	Gosport	8.4	S	
	Hastings	8.4	S	Hastings
	Havant	8.2	C	
	Swale	7.4	C	
	Lewes	7.2	C	
	Medway	7	C	
	Worthing	7	C	

	Adur	6.2	C	
	Fareham	5.5	C	
East				
	Great Yarmouth	15.4	S	Great Yarmouth
	North Norfolk	13.1	S	
	Waveney	11.1	S	Lowestoft
	Tendring	10.5	S	Clacton-on-Sea
	Maldon	10.2	S	
	Suffolk Coastal	9.7	S	
	Rochford	9.2	S	
	Southend-on-Sea	8.9	S	Southend-on-Sea
	King's Lynn & West Norfolk	8.4	S	
	Thurrock	7	C	
	Castle Point	7	C	
East Midlands				
	East Lindsey	16.1	S	Skegness
	Boston	5.6	C	
	South Holland	4.4	C	
Yorkshire & the Humber				
	Scarborough	18.9	S	Scarborough Whitby
	East Riding of Yorkshire	7.7	C	
	N.E. Lincolnshire	7.2	C	
North East				
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	19.2	S	Berwick
	Alnwick	17.7	S	
	Castle Morpeth	9.9	S	
	South Tyneside	9.3	S	South Shields
	Hartlepool	8.3	S	
	North Tyneside	8.2	C	
	Blyth Valley	7.9	C	
	Redcar & Cleveland	7.8	C	
	Wansbeck	7.4	C	
	Sunderland	6.6	C	
	Easington	5.9	C	
North West				
	South Lakeland	20	S	
	Blackpool	16.4	S	Blackpool
	Allerdale	12.7	S	
	Lancaster	10.4	S	Morecambe Heysham
	Wyre	9.9	S	Thorton-Cleveleys Fleetwood
	Sefton	9.5	S	Southport Crosby Formby
	Fylde	9.1	S	Lytham St Annes
	Wirral	8.6	S	New Brighton Hoylake West Kirby
	Copeland	7.8	C	
	Barrow-in-Furness	7.4	C	
	West Lancashire	6.5	C	

Continued overleaf

Region	n=C	%	n=S	n=R
South West	23	9	21	19
South East	22	8.2	15	18
East	11	7.7	9	4
North East	11	8.4	5	2
North West	11	8.2	8	12
East Midlands	3	7.6	1	1
Yorkshire & the Humber	3	7.7	1	2
England	**84**	**8.2**	**60**	**58**

Notes:

C = all coastal local authority districts (as opposed to inland).
S = all seaside local authority districts (as opposed to coastal).
% = Number of tourism-related jobs as a proportion of total employee jobs. Tourism-related includes the following sectors:

- Hotels;
- Camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation;
- Restaurants;
- Bars;
- Activities of tour operators, travel organisers and travel agencies;
- Library, archives, museums and other cultural activities;
- Sporting activities; and
- Other recreational and entertainment activities.

Employee jobs exclude self-employed, government-supported trainees and HM Forces.

8.2 = The national average for employment in tourism-related businesses (ABI, 2001)
R = Settlements granted resort status

Source: Author's own work



Figure 4.5: Location of England's seaside resorts

Source: Author's own work

Table 4.3: Population of England's seaside resorts, 2001

Resort	District	Population
Bournemouth	Bournemouth	163,351
Southend-on-Sea	Southend-on-Sea	160,257
Brighton	Brighton & Hove	155,587
Blackpool	Blackpool	142,283
Hove	Brighton & Hove	92,230
Southport	Sefton	90,336
Eastbourne	Eastbourne	89,667
Hastings	Hastings	85,029
South Shields	South Tyneside	81,583
Weston-s-mare	North Somerset	71,758
Torquay	Torbay	63,998
Lowestoft	Waveney	61,999
Great Yarmouth	Great Yarmouth	54,153
Clacton-on-Sea	Tendring	51,284
Weymouth	Weymouth & Portland	50,868
Southsea	Portsmouth	50,346
Scarborough	Scarborough	50,135
Paignton	Torbay	48,251
Crosby	Sefton	48,119
Folkestone	Shepway	45,064
Christchurch	Christchurch	44,325
Lytham St Annes	Fylde	41,327
Bexhill-on-Sea	Rother	40,495
Margate	Thanet	40,386
Ramsgate	Thanet	40,339
Herne Bay	Canterbury	35,188
Exmouth	East Devon	32,972
Morecambe	Lancaster	32,091
Thornton-Cleveleys	Wyre	31,157
Whitstable	Canterbury	30,979
Deal	Dover	28,768
Dover	Dover	28,156
Fleetwood	Wyre	26,841
Littlehampton	Arun	25,593
Formby	Sefton	24,996
Broadstairs	Thanet	24,370
Ryde	Isle of Wight	23,788
Bognor Regis	Arun	22,555
Clevedon	North Somerset	21,957
Newquay	Restormel	21,953
Penzance	Penwith	21,168
Falmouth	Carrick	20,775
Skegness	East Lindsey	18,910
Burnham-on-Sea	Sedgemoor	18,401
Brixham	Torbay	17,457
Heysham	Lancaster	16,136
Hoylake	Wirral	15,662
West Kirby	Wirral	15,548
New Brighton	Wirral	14,450
Teignmouth	Teignbridge	14,413
Hythe	Shepway	14,170
Whitby	Scarborough	13,594
Sidmouth	East Devon	13,135
Dawlish	Teignbridge	12,819
Minehead	West Somerset	11,699
Berwick	Berwick-upon-Tweed	10,882
Ilfracombe	North Devon	10,840
Swanage	Purbeck	10,124
Seaside resorts		**2,544,017**

Source: Author's own calculations based on Census of Pop. 2001

Table 4.4: The urban classification of areas

Categories	**Population range**
Larger Market Town	an urban area with between 10,000 and 39,999 population in 2001
Other Urban	an urban area with between 40,000 and 249,999 population in 2001
Large Urban	an urban area with between 250,000 and 749,999 population in 2001
Major Urban	an urban area with population above 750,000 in 2001

Source: Modified from ONS (2001)

4.2.3 Analysis strategy

One objective of this study is to identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. In order to achieve this objective, the research was conducted in three stages. The process of the work and the tasks of each stage are detailed in this section. Due to the fact that the IMD data are not collected for seaside resorts specifically, the research began at the local authority district level.

Stage 1: District-level analysis

Task: To establish the factual basis regarding whether local authority districts classified in this study as 'seaside with resort' differ from other district types, or from the general situation in England, with regard to a range of measures of deprivation.

Process: There were two phases to the district-level analysis. The first phase involved analysis of the local authority district level indicators of multiple deprivation. The six summary measures for districts in each area classification category (see Figure 4.3) were recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases (see Table 4.5) and cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses were undertaken to ascertain whether there are "true" differences in the incidence and level of multiple deprivation between the types of districts. In the second phase of the district-level analysis, data at LSOA level is used to examine how different types of districts perform on the IMD and its constituent domains. To enable comparison between the indices, it was necessary

to use pre-2009 local authority boundaries. LSOAs were matched to their respective districts and grouped using the area classification of district. The LSOAs within each district type were then recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases (see Table 4.6) and, in a similar fashion to the previous district-level analysis, a combination of univariate and bivariate analyses illuminates the differential incidence of deprivation. But the second phase also examined the distribution of LSOAs by district classification and IMD deprivation decile, thus providing a more precise picture of deprivation. Deciles are created by ranking all LSOAs from most to least deprived and then dividing into ten groups, each containing an equal number of LSOAs (see Table 4.7). For instance, decile number one is England's most deprived 10 per cent of LSOAs. Decile number two contains the LSOAs falling in the range of 10-20 per cent worst, and so on. The tenth decile represents England's 10 per cent least deprived LSOAs.

Table 4.5: National deprivation quartiles for local authority districts

Quartiles	**ID 2004, 07**	**ID 2010**
Q1 Most deprived	1-88	1-81
Q2 Above average	89-177	82-163
Q3 Below average	178-266	164-245
Q4 Least deprived	267-354	246-326

Note: Quartiles were applied as they provide a good robust general overview of deprivation variation. As quartile groupings are broader they are less subject to minor change, making them a reliable comparator over time. However, as there are less local authorities in the 2010 index than there were in 2007/04 due to the formation of unitary authorities in 2009, no meaningful time series analysis of the district measures of deprivation could be undertaken.

Source: Author's own work

Table 4.6: National deprivation quartiles for LSOAs

Quartiles	**ID 2004, 07, 10**
Q1 Most deprived	1-8120
Q2 Above average	8,121-16,241
Q3 Below average	16,242-24,362
Q4 Least deprived	24,363-32,482

Source: Author's own work

Table 4.7: National deprivation deciles for LSOAs

Deciles	**ID 2004, 07, 10**
D1 Most deprived	1-3,248
D2	3,249-6,496
D3	6,497-9,744
D4	9,745-12,992
D5	12,993-16,240
D6	16,241-19,488
D7	19,489-22,736
D8	22,737-25,984
D9	25,985-29,232
D10 Least deprived	29,233-32,482

Note: Unlike quartiles, deciles provide more detailed analysis. However, decile groupings are more sensitive to small fluctuations in deprivation and should be interpreted with some caution; they will show more of the short term fluctuations in deprivation as well as the longer term trends shown by quartiles.

Source: Author's own work

Stage 2: LSOA-level analysis

Task: To establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social exclusion occur within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and severity of these characteristics.

Process: In order to establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social exclusion occur within seaside resorts, all LSOAs within each 'seaside with resort' district were categorised as 'resort' or 'other' depending on their correspondence with identifiable resort areas. The 'resort' and 'other' LSOAs were then recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases and cross-tabulations and chi-square analyses were undertaken so that their association with deprivation may be ascertained. This work also provided the basis for subsequent univariate analysis to identify, first, the overall distribution of deprivation for the resorts and how this compares with England and, second, the type and level of deprivation that resort LSOAs appear to be experiencing. Then, in order to establish the extent to which multiple deprivation is associated with other aspects of deprivation in seaside resorts, a series of scatterplots of the 'resort' LSOAs were

produced. A scatterplot visually represents the correspondence between two variables – in this instance the overall IMD rank and the individual domain ranks. Each scatterplot reports a value 'r' (also called a 'correlation co-efficient'), which indicates whether there is a relationship and, if so, whether the relationship is positive or negative. Thus, the results of the correlational analysis shed light on the character of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts.

Stage 3: Resort-level analysis

Task: To provide an account of how multiple deprivation varies between and within seaside resorts.

Process: There were three phases to the resort-level analysis. Initially, there was further investigation of the nature and severity of multiple deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts through the manipulation and analysis of data produced at the LSOA level. Univariate statistical analysis was used to ascertain, first, the number of resorts with at least one LSOA in the upper quartile and, second, the number of component domains on which each resort LSOA ranks within the most deprived 25% of LSOAs nationally. This work provided a basis for subsequent analysis to identify the seaside resorts experiencing particular problems of multiple deprivation.

The second set of analyses examined the distribution and characteristics of multiple deprivation and how these vary by resort size. In order to establish whether there is a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation, the LSOAs initially classified as 'resort' were reclassified as either 'large' or 'medium' resort LSOAs. The LSOAs in each classification category were then recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases, and cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses against all of the 'large' and 'medium' resort LSOAs were undertaken so that their association with deprivation may be ascertained. Data analysis continued by investigating whether there were differences in the nature of multiple deprivation between the larger and mid-sized resorts. In this analysis, the correlation

coefficients between the overall IMD rank and the individual domain ranks for the 'large' and 'medium' resort LSOAs were examined.

In the third and final phase of the analysis, the variation in multiple deprivation between and within the seaside resorts was explored. As a first step, in order to ascertain whether the levels of multiple deprivation were similar between the resorts, the overall IMD measure was applied in national quintiles at the LSOA level for the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts separately. A quintile contains one fifth the total number of LSOAs; there are five quintiles in total: most deprived, above average deprivation, average, below average deprivation, and least deprived. The reason for adopting this approach is because the DCLG and many analyses of discrete places (i.e., towns and cities) use the most deprived 20% of LSOAs as a cut-off, as areas that fall in the top 20% most deprived in the country are able to access grants and funding from government and other organisations (McLennan *et al.*, 2011). Based on the quintile distribution of LSOAs, the seaside resorts were compared with England as a whole and to each other, to establish whether there are any differences in the levels of multiple deprivation.

As a second step, in order to provide further insight into the differences in the levels of multiple deprivation between the resorts, the median LSOA rank for each of the seaside resorts was calculated. The median rank is a better measure than the average (i.e., arithmetic mean) rank which can be distorted by extreme values. This measure, however, does not take account of the difference in population size between LSOAs in each resort. Consequently, it only provides indicative data on resort level deprivation. Thus, the average LSOA rank for each of the seaside resorts was calculated following the methodology used by the DCLG when calculating the ranks for local authorities. The average ranking of each resort is a population-weighted average of the ranking of each constituent LSOA. The proportion of the population for a resort within an LSOA is multiplied by the rank of that LSOA and then the results are added together for all LSOAs in that resort. The above methodology was also applied to calculate the average rank for England. The purpose of calculating this average was to assess,

first, how the resorts fare on the individual deprivation domains and compare with England as a whole and, second, the variation in the nature of deprivation within and between resorts. The latter involved ranking the resorts by the average LSOA rank for each deprivation domain and overall IMD. Then, in order to illuminate differences in the patterns of deprivation between the resorts, the incidence of the deprivation measures was plotted in a series of radar charts for the 25 larger seaside resorts and 33 mid-sized seaside resorts.

4.3 Examination of the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion

Having identified the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, **the next objective was to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion.** The main task was therefore to try to identify one or more indicators that can represent each of the factors/facets of the framework outlined in the previous chapter (see Table 3.4). Again, based on the framework for understanding resort socio-economic change, this study is using two main types of indicators of resort fortunes. The first type measures features of the area that impinge on the fortunes of residents and also influence population mix (e.g., economic factors such as industrial structure, physical factors such as housing stock). The second type of indicator is that of population composition and dynamics. Population characteristics are important because of their determining influence on labour supply, household structure, service needs, social networks and norms, culture and preferences. It follows that the list of indicators for inclusion in the analysis ended up being substantial – with 67 indicators included.

As with any use of data for the purpose of measuring the socio-economic composition of a population and/or health of a place, it can only be a general indicator. No measure is perfect and 'data availability often has to determine what is included' (Lupton *et al.,* 2011: 29). Indeed, data availability at both the LSOA level and the ward level is far more limited than for districts. In some cases, the data available is a good match for the characteristics described in the literature. For example, DWP publishes data on benefit claimants at the LSOA level and

therefore it is possible to include a range of good quality indicators on worklessness/benefit dependency. In other cases, the indicators chosen are a proxy or 'closest fit' for the characteristic. For example, limited robust data on health is available at LSOA and ward level and therefore Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance and Disability Living Allowance/Attendance Allowance claimant rates have been used as a proxy for poor health. In a small number of cases (e.g., social networks, lack of civil society, stigma, fear of crime, migrant workers, earnings, business stock), relevant data is not available at LSOA and ward level and therefore it has not been possible to suggest indicators to represent these characteristics.

Table 4.8 outlines the indicators that have been included in the analysis. The rationale for including each indicator is given in Table 4.9. As can be seen from Table 4.8, datasets that are available on an annual basis (and for 2010) have been prioritised over those that are published less frequently (because the deprived and less-deprived seaside resorts were identified using the IMD 2010). That is not to say that the decennial Census has no value. On the contrary, it remains the most valuable and comprehensive data set available for investigations of the multidimensional concept of social exclusion. This point is exemplified by reference to the work of Levitas *et al.* (2007). They reviewed the literature, including previous studies of area-based deprivation, and provided a list of 64 Census-based variables from which to select indicators to investigate the multifaceted problem of social exclusion. Although the relevant Census data available for LSOAs and wards was collated for, and matched to, identifiable 'seaside' resorts within each 'seaside' district, and added to the newly created specific seaside resort database, only a fraction of the Census data is used in this analysis because other (non-Census) data was available for the year 2010. The research used data from the 2001 Census, which was unavoidable because of the absence of disaggregated 2011 Census data at the time of undertaking the analysis. (Data from the 2011 Census at LSOA and ward level was released in batches at different times. ONS released the first batch of disaggregated Census data into the public domain at the beginning of February 2013.)

Thus, data was collated for those LSOAs and wards previously identified in the study as comprising a seaside resort. The data were then aggregated to produce means for the 58 seaside resorts, including the 33 less deprived seaside resorts and 25 most deprived resorts. The most deprived resorts were identified during the resort level analysis of social exclusion. These resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, in terms of the proportion of LSOAs falling within the most deprived national quintile. Again, this measure was chosen as it has been used within government and more widely to analyse patterns of deprivation, to identify areas that would benefit from special initiatives or programmes and as a tool to determine eligibility for specific funding streams (McLennan *et al.*, 2011). The analyses of data begin by examining the levels of socio-economic performance experienced by seaside resorts compared with England as a whole. It went on to investigate whether there were differences between deprived and less deprived resorts, including whether the place- and population-based variables tend to operate as resort advantages or disadvantages and whether they have a large or significant effect. Unrelated *t*-tests were used to determine if the mean values of the variables were different for deprived and less-deprived resorts. The appropriate effect size metric for a *t* test is Cohen's *d*, which indicates whether or not the difference between two groups' means is large enough to have practical meaning, whether or not it is statistically significant. Due to the fact that Cohen's *d* is not available in SPSS, it was necessary to calculate the value of *d* based on the following formula: $d = 2t/\sqrt{(degrees\ of\ freedom)}$. A number of textbooks cite the work of Cohen (1988) in their guide to effect sizes: below 0.2 as 'very small', 0.2-0.49 as 'small', 0.5-0.79 as 'moderate', and 0.8 or above as 'large'. It is widely acknowledged that effect sizes of 0.5 or above are meaningful on a practical level.

Table 4.8: Summary list of indicators of resort socio-economic performance

Measures of area factors				
Factors/facets	**Indicator**	**Source**	**Date**	**Geography**
Industrial structure	% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in primary industries	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in secondary industries	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tertiary industries	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
Economic diversity	% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in public sector	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in distribution, hotels and restaurants	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tourism-related jobs	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
	Location quotient for public sector	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	W
	Location quotient for distribution, hotels and restaurants sector	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	W
	Location quotient for tourism jobs	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	W
Employment rate	% of pop. aged 16+ in employment	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	W
Employment base	% of all employee jobs that are full-time	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
	% of all employee jobs that are part-time	Annual Business Inquiry / ONS	2010	L & W
Enterprise	% of working age pop. self-employed	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Prosperity and wealth	Median gross annual household income	Experian	2010	L & W
Housing – prices	Mean house prices	Land Registry	2010	W
Housing – tenure	% of all occupied household spaces owned	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of all occupied household spaces rented privately	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Housing – condition	% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of households with no central heating	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of households living in overcrowded conditions	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Housing – unoccupied	% of household spaces vacant	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Community safety	Total recorded crimes per 1,000 residents	Home Office	2010	W

Source: Author's own work

See overleaf for measures of population composition

Measures of population composition and dynamics				
Factors/facets	**Indicator**	**Source**	**Date**	
Age	Median age of population	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Age structure	% pop. children	ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. working age	ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. pensionable age	ONS	2010	L & W
	% pop. retired	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Ethnicity	% pop. white	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Household composition	% of households single person	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of households single pensioner	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of households lone parent with dependent children	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of dependent children in lone parent families	HMRC	2010	L & W
Occupational class	% of working age pop. in employment, classified as professionals, white collar workers	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of working age pop. in employment, classified as manual workers	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Poverty and low income	% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families	HMRC	2010	L & W
	% of working age pop. claiming Income Support	DWP	2010	L & W
	% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element	DWP	2010	L & W
Worklessness	% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits	DWP	2010	L & W
	% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)	DWP	2010	L & W
	% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months	DWP	2010	L & W
	% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months	DWP	2010	L & W
	JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.	DWP	2010	L & W
Health and disability	% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance	DWP	2010	L & W
	% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance	DWP	2010	L & W
	% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance	DWP	2010	L & W
Education and skills	% of working age pop. with no qualifications	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
	% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications)	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Connectivity	% of households without access to a car or van	Census / ONS	2001	L & W
Migration	Inflow rate, total and by broad age group	Census / ONS	2001	W
	Outflow rate, total and by age broad age group	Census / ONS	2001	W
	Net flow rate, total and by age broad age group	Census / ONS	2001	W

Note: L = data available at the LSOA level, W = data available at the ward level

Source: Author's own work

Table 4.9: Rationale for use of indicators

Measures of area factors	
Indicator	**Rationale**
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in primary industries	Measure of type of employment (where primary industries = agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining).
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in secondary industries	As above (where secondary industries = manufacturing, construction, energy and water).
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tertiary industries	As above (where tertiary industries = transport and communications, banking/finance, public sector, distribution, hotels and catering)
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in public sector	Resident exposure to a growing sector / counter-cyclical
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in distribution, hotels and restaurants	Resident workforce exposure to a growing sector / seasonal employment
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in tourism-related jobs	Resident workforce exposure to a vulnerable sector / seasonal employment
Location quotient for public sector	Sectors which have both high LQ typically form an area's economic base. Less resilient to change, low value sectors often have inherent structural problems (e.g., seasonal employment) which are themselves constraints to growth.
Location quotient for distribution, hotels and restaurants sector	As above.
Location quotient for tourism jobs	As above.
% of all employee jobs that are full-time	Full-time employment may be considered a prerequisite for quality employment. Measure of job quality.
% of all employee jobs that are part-time	There are two possible interpretations of high part-time work: that it reflects individual choice and a range of opportunities available to people to domestic and other preferences; or that it reflects a lack of opportunities for full-time work.
% of working age pop. self-employed	A high proportion of self-employment in a labour market may be an indicator of a dynamic labour market with a strong entrepreneurial culture and a high rate of new firm generation. (Although this may also indicate insecure employment in some areas).
Median gross annual household income	Measure of prosperity, wealth and material well-being of an area.
Mean house prices	Measure of how attractive an area is to live in (i.e., 'quality of a place'), where high prices equal better well-being. This is because high prices normally reflect the quality of an area, for example, transport links, schools, greenspace, safety.
% of all occupied household spaces owned	While home ownership levels may indicate economic security, it is also likely to indicate how transient a population is.

Continued overleaf

% of all occupied household spaces rented privately	This is a contextual indicator of households with limited means, mobility and reduced responsibility. People living in privately rented tenure include those who can't afford to become owner occupiers, students and those who choose to live a mobile lifestyle for personal or professional reasons. The occupier has freedom from the responsibility to maintain and invest in the property.
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social	This is a contextual indicator of households with high need, vulnerability and limited means. Social housing is allocated according to need. The criteria is different for every local authority but can include homelessness, overcrowding, medical or welfare issues, financial circumstances and number of dependents.
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet	The conditions in which people live affect their health, relations between household members, and the development of children.
% of households with no central heating	The conditions in which people live affect their health, relations between household members, and the development of children.
% of households living in overcrowded conditions	Lack of housing availability can manifest itself in overcrowding, homelessness and rough sleeping. Overcrowding almost invariably occurs in households with large numbers of children. It is associated with a higher rate of child accidents and the resulting lack of privacy can be a considerable cause of mental stress.
% of household spaces vacant	Empty homes may be an indicator of low housing demand and the decline of particular neighbourhoods.
Crime rate	This is an indicator of how safe and secure people are in the places where they live and work. Measure of community safety.

Source: Author's own work

See overleaf for measures of population composition

Measures of population composition and dynamics	
Indicator	**Rationale**
Median age of population	Age can impact both on the nature of goods and services demanded and their delivery.
% pop. children	This is a contextual indicator of child dependents. The under 16-age group may require specific services to be tailored to meet the unique needs of children and young people. Some children become vulnerable and may be under increased risk in places where greater poverty and social inequalities exist.
% pop. working age	Scale of local area labour force
% pop. pensionable age	This is a contextual indicator of older people. The over 65-age group may require specific services to be tailored to meet the unique needs of vulnerable older people. Older people within this age group are more likely to be at risk of ill health, loneliness and fraud. They may be more reliant on others for their health, social care, transport and accessibility needs. Older people may be at increased risk in places where poverty and high crime rates exist.
% pop. retired	As above. While retirees may make significant contributions to their communities and the economy, they also demand quality-of-life services, such as leisure and healthcare, and they have an impact on the resort through, say, increased development to cater for their needs, tastes, preferences etc.
% pop. white	Relates to ethnic composition / diversity.
% of households single person	Single person households are both more likely to be poor and more likely to be rich than the average – implications for poverty and inequality. Living costs are often higher for single person households. People living alone can face greater isolation and worse health and mental health. Single person households are more vulnerable to crime.
% of households single pensioner	This is a contextual indicator of vulnerable older people. Single pensioners are vulnerable to distraction burglary, fraud, fire, ill health, loneliness and isolation. Single pensioners will have specific needs that need to be met to mitigate against these vulnerabilities.
% of households lone parent with dependent children	This is a contextual indicator of vulnerable families with reduced means. In order to bring up children as a lone parent and secure an income additional support is often needed. Lone parents with dependent children tend to be at particular risk from poverty, unemployment and health inequalities.
% of dependent children in lone parent families	Measure of strength of families.

Continued overleaf

% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers, professionals and white collar workers	Measure of 'knowledge workers'. Higher social classes may be more likely to be involved in local area.
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as manual workers	Lower social classes may be less likely to be involved in local area.
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families	Measure of children's economic stability and family role models
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support	Measure of economic security
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element	Measure of economic security
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits	This is an indicator of worklessness and benefit dependency. People on out of work benefits are not able to generate enough income to support themselves and are dependent on their benefits for their income security.
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)	Measure of unemployment
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months	Measure of long-term unemployment
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months	Measure of long-term unemployment. It is thought that those who have been out of employment the longest are least likely to possess the skills and experience that employers are seeking.
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.	Measure of youth unemployment
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance	Measure of health of population
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance	Measure of health of population
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance	Measure of disability. Scale of working age pop. that has care and/or mobility needs as a result of a mental or physical disability.
% of working age pop. with no qualifications	Job opportunities for resident labour depend on skills and qualifications. The level of qualification held by people of working age in the population provides an indication of the quality of labour supply. It can be surmised that a healthy labour market is one with a high proportion of the workforce qualified to a high level. The converse is also true, in the sense that a healthy labour market would have fewer people with lower level qualification or no qualification at all.
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications)	See above. Also, a measure of 'knowledge workers'.
% of households without access to a car or van	This is a contextual indicator of mobility. Households with no car are reliant on public transport, cycling and walking to get about and access key services or dependent on services coming to them.
Migration, total and by broad age group - Inflow rate - Outflow rate - Net flow rate	Measure of in-migration, outmigration and net flow. Rate is the flow count as % of number of residents at the 2001 Census.

Source: Author's own work

4.4 Typological investigation of excluded seaside resort localities

Having identified the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts and investigated the influence of resort socio-economic performance, **the final objective was to establish whether there are different types of excluded seaside resort localities.** Cluster analysis was employed as the mechanism for achieving this objective. Cluster analysis is a statistical technique which groups cases (in this study, deprived areas) so that the cases within a group are similar to each other, but different to those in other groups. As such, it can be useful tool in helping understand the nature of particular groups which can in turn enable better targeting. In the context of deprived areas, cluster analysis can help understand which deprived areas are similar to each other (and why). This improved understanding should enable better approaches to regeneration to be developed. The approach taken to developing a typology of excluded resort localities is described in this section. First, however, an important decision is required: how to define the excluded localities to be included in the analysis?

4.4.1 Defining excluded localities

As the objective is to establish whether there are different types of excluded resort localities, it is important to start by determining which areas should be included in the analysis. The geography chosen must represent a meaningful definition of 'local area' in terms of deprivation and the potential for regeneration. Taking the lead from DCLG (2008) *Transforming Places; Changing Lives*, deprivation is best identified using the smallest geographical units available. The smaller the geographies used, the less likely pockets or neighbourhoods of deprivation are 'hidden'. Therefore, it was decided to use LSOA areas for the analysis. The reasons for adopting this spatial unit include: (1) the IMD is available at LSOA level; (2) LSOAs are the smallest geographical unit at which population, employment and benefits data is available; (3) LSOAs can be easily grouped to form larger neighbourhoods, estates or areas where appropriate; and, (4) compared to other small area geographies such as electoral wards, they are stable (i.e., not subject to administrative changes) and have a uniformity of size.

Having selected the most appropriate spatial unit of analysis, the next task was to identify excluded resort localities. Here, the research opted to make use of the most recent IMD. Thus, the 'resort' LSOAs were cross-tabulated with the overall IMD 2010. While a upper quartile threshold (i.e., resort LSOAs in England's most deprived 25 per cent) was initially envisaged as the point in the national IMD rankings above which resort LSOAs would be classed as 'excluded', the research eventually opted for a upper quintile threshold, partly to focus the study on the most disadvantaged places and partly because, as noted earlier, DCLG and other organisations use the most deprived 20% of LSOAs as a cut-off, for example, when assessing applications to access regeneration funds. The results obtained from the examination of social exclusion in all English seaside resorts facilitates this stage of the work by allowing the identification of excluded resort localities. This section is not the place to set out the results, except to say that there are 1,686 resort LSOAs and of these LSOAs, 399 were in the worst performing 20% of LSOAs in England on the IMD 2010. Thus, 24% of all resort LSOAs were included in the analysis.

4.4.2 Producing the typology

This section provides an account of the development of a classification designed to provide greater insight into the different circumstances of excluded resort localities. The statistical and mathematical processes used in the classification process are well established and have been widely applied to many different types of situation in the social sciences (see Lupton *et al.*, 2011 for a review of place typologies). The description of these processes can be simplified (although it is difficult to remove the technical jargon entirely) and set out in terms of the following steps:

(1) The selection of variables;
(2) The preparation of variables;
(3) Finding patterns of variation in the data;
(4) Scoring excluded resort localities on the dimensions of variation; and,
(5) Grouping the localities according to their scores on the main dimensions in the data.

Step 1: The selection of variables

The first step was to decide which variables should be included in the cluster analysis, that is, what characteristics of the excluded resort localities should be explored for similarity/difference. As the framework for understanding resort socio-economic change highlighted, the causes and consequences of local area exclusion are complex and therefore a wide range of characteristics are important to consider. It follows that the list of indicators for inclusion in the analysis ended up being substantial – with 50 indicators proposed (under two main headings: measures of area factors, measures of population composition and dynamics). Table 4.8 presents the variables included in the analysis, and a brief explanation of each variable is set out in Table 4.9. When inspecting Table 4.8 and 4.9, it should be noted that only datasets available at the LSOA level were used in this analysis (because the excluded resort localities are themselves LSOAs). As a result, ward-level data characterising migration and several measures of area factors (i.e., location quotient for sectors, mean house prices, crime rate) were not included in the analysis. Unfortunately, migration and house price data is not available at the LSOA level and therefore it has not been possible to suggest indicators to represent these characteristics. But it was possible to represent crime (using the crime rank measure provided by the IMD 2010, see Figure 4.2) and industrial structure (using ABI data on employment in different sectors). Thus, the typology building approach is started using 50 indicators of resort socio-economic performance obtained from ONS Census data and other administrative datasets and is applied to 399 excluded resort localities.

Step 2: The preparation of variables

Cluster analysis requires normally distributed data. Therefore, missing values, highly skewed distributions and distributions with outliers can create problems. In this data set, there are no missing data for the variables. All the variables (except the crime domain rank and median gross annual household income) are measured as percentages, generally expressed in terms of numbers of residents, households, claimants and employee jobs. However, because the range of each percentage across the 399 LSOAs can be widely different for each variable, a

standardised measure comparable between variables is actually input into the analysis. If left un-standardised, those variables with larger values will swamp the effect of indicators with smaller values. Thus, in order to ensure that all variables have the same weight in the classification, the variables included in the analysis were standardised to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standardisation was accomplished in SPSS during the course of Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which was used to reduce the 50 variables to a smaller set of variables for cluster analysis.

Step 3: Finding patterns of variation in the data

Patterns of variation in the data are identified by the way in which groups of variables are related to each other. PCA is used to identify such relationships. At the start, a numerical relationship (correlation coefficient) between each variable and every other variable in the data is calculated. The resulting table of coefficients (the correlation matrix, as it is known) displays a more or less complex pattern with some pairs of variables correlating high and positive (high values with high values) with each other and others high and negative (high values with low values). Other pairs of variables will display little relationship. This inter-correlation structure is useful as it suggests that certain types of variables are measuring a common underlying dimension. The intent of PCA is to elicit these underlying dimensions from the inter-relationships between the variables. The resulting 'principal components' can then be interpreted/named from the variables of which they are comprised. Usually, a small number of such components will be representative of a large amount of the total variation that exists in the data.

Prior to undertaking the PCA, the suitability of the data for PCA was assessed. Six conditions must be satisfied for a dataset to be considered suitable:

1. Minimum number of cases
2. Sample to variable ratio
3. Factorability of the correlation matrix
4. Bartlett's test of sphericity
5. Sampling adequacy for set of variables
6. Sampling adequacy of individual variables

Thus, there are two sample size requirements (i.e., items 1 and 2). In terms of the minimum number of cases, it is widely acknowledged that the use of larger samples in PCA is necessary to yield distinct and reliable principal components. However, a wide range of recommendations regarding sample size in PCA have been proposed. For instance, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) state that a minimum of 300 cases are needed, whereas Hair *et al.* (1995) suggest that sample sizes should be 100 or greater. The lack of agreement is noted in a number of PCA textbooks, which invariably cite the work of Comrey and Lee (1992). They provided the following scale of sample size (100 = poor, 200 = fair, 300 = good, 500 = very good, 1,000 or more = excellent) and urged researchers to obtain samples of 300 or more observations whenever possible. As such, the literature suggests that the sample size of 399 LSOAs is adequate. Regarding the sample to variable ratio, the work of Gorsuch (1983) is widely referenced in the PCA literature. The ratio of cases to variables in a PCA should be at least 5 to 1. With 399 cases and 50 variables, the ratio of cases to variables is 7.9 to 1, which exceeds the requirement for the ratio of cases to variables.

When performing PCA in SPSS, the first body of output concerns data screening, assumption testing and sampling adequacy. The initial output is the correlation matrix, which should be screened for two reasons. One reason is because PCA requires that there be some correlations greater than 0.3 between the variables included in the analysis. If there are few correlations above 0.3, it is a waste of time carrying on with the analysis, as PCA attempts to clump subgroups of variables together based upon their correlations (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). For this set of variables, there are 351 correlations (out of 1,225) in the matrix greater than 0.3, satisfying this requirement. Second, it is important to check the correlation between variables to verify that there are no serious multicollinearity problems. If there are more correlations in the matrix that are above 0.8 than 0.3, then the PCA function in SPSS will not produce valid component loading values (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). For this set of variables, there are 9 correlations in the matrix greater than or equal to 0.8 (see Table 4.10), which is very small number compared to the 351 correlations above 0.3. Although common sense suggests that one of each pair of highly correlated variables should be removed because

much of the information is redundant, there is actually another way of thinking about highly correlated variables:

> 'It is likely that variables that can predict the value of other variables would enable the classification to predict other behaviours. Therefore, there is an advantage in retaining a high proportion of highly correlated variables as they can be seen as powerful predictors' (Voas and Williamson, 2001: 64).

Ultimately (and strictly speaking), because PCA is being used and the components themselves are actually input into the cluster analysis, the presence of a small number of highly correlated variables is not an issue.

Table 4.10: Highly correlated variables

Demographic dependency ratio	% pop. working age	-0.976
% of all employee jobs that are full-time	% of all employee jobs that are part-time	-0.926
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months	% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months	0.925
% of working age pop. claiming JSA	% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6	0.859
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals	% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other manual	-0.855
Median age	% pop. pensionable age	0.850
% of working age pop. self-employed	% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals	0.826
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications)	% of working age pop. with no qualifications	-0.810
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support	% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance	0.809

Note: two variables appear twice: % of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months; and % of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals.

Source: Author's own work

Besides assessing the correlations, several statistical tests should be used to evaluate the suitability of the data for PCA. These tests include Bartlett's Test of Sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO MSA). The Bartlett Test of Sphericity tests whether the correlations between variables are sufficiently large for PCA to be appropriate. It does so by comparing the correlation matrix with a matrix of zero correlations (technically called the identity matrix, which consists of all zeros except the 1's along the diagonal). PCA

requires that the probability associated with the test statistic be less than the level of significance (i.e., p = less than 0.05). In this case the test statistic is significant, χ^2 = 36320.217 (df. 1225) p <0.001, indicating that the correlations within the correlation-matrix are sufficiently different from zero to warrant PCA. Regarding the KMO MSA, the test statistic takes values between 0 and 1, with small values meaning that overall the variables have too little in common to warrant a PCA. Kaiser (1974) recommends a bare minimum of 0.5 (for each individual variable as well as the set of variables) and that values between 0.6 and 0.69 are 'mediocre', values between 0.7 and 0.79 are 'good', values between 0.8 to 0.89 are 'great' and values above 0.9 are 'superb'. The overall MSA for the set of variables included in the analysis was 0.81, which exceeds the minimum requirement of 0.5 for overall MSA and falls into the range of being 'great', thus indicating that the sample size is adequate for PCA. The MSA for the individual variables is located along the diagonal of the 'anti-image correlation matrix' (another output returned by the PCA function in SPSS). On iteration 1, the MSA for 42 of the individual variables included in the analysis was greater than 0.5, supporting their retention in the analysis. Thus, 8 variables had values below 0.5 (Table 4.11). Consequently, these variables were removed and the PCA was computed again.

Table 4.11: Variables with an MSA value below 0.5

% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in agriculture and fishing	0.300
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in energy and water	0.144
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in manufacturing	0.264
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in construction	0.256
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in distribution, hotels and restaurants	0.435
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in transport and communications	0.138
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in banking, finance and insurance	0.265
% pop. aged 16+ in employment, working in public administration, education and health	0.348

Source: Author's own work

To be clear, PCA is an iterative process. If conditions are not met and the remedial action meant the removal of variables, then the PCA must be computed again. On iteration 2, with 399 cases and 42 variables, the ratio of cases to variables is 9.5 to 1, which exceeds the

requirements for the ratio of cases to variables. For this set of variables, there are 861 correlations in the matrix and of these, 346 are greater than 0.3 and 9 are greater than or equal to 0.8, which indicates the presence of substantial correlations. The probability associated with the Bartlett Test of Sphericity is less than 0.001 (χ^2 = 34798.620, df. 861), which satisfies this requirement. Lastly, PCA requires that the KMO MSA be greater than 0.5 for each individual variable as well as the set of variables. The MSA for all of the individual variables included in the analysis was greater than 0.5, supporting their retention in the analysis. In addition, the overall MSA for the set of variables included in the analysis was 0.84, which exceeds the minimum requirement of 0.5 for overall MSA. Thus, all conditions regarding the appropriateness of PCA were met on iteration 2. The next task, therefore, was to extract the components.

In PCA, the number of components extracted is equal to the number of variables being analysed. Thus, an issue which confronts all PCA-based investigations is how many components are truly meaningful and worthy of being retained, interpreted, and used in subsequent analyses. Numerous extraction approaches have been proposed to determine the optimum number of components, including:

1. Kaiser's stopping rule;
2. Scree test;
3. Percent of cumulative variance; and,
4. Number of non-trivial components.

No single method should be relied on to determine component extraction (Gorsuch, 1983; Hair *et al.,* 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). It is widely acknowledged that 'the simultaneous use of multiple decision rules is appropriate and often desirable' (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001: 200). Each of the four ways of deciding on the appropriate number of components is now considered in turn.

Again, the number of components extracted in a PCA is equal to the number of observed variables being analysed. So, because 42 variables were analysed in the present PCA, 42 components were initially extracted. However, SPSS also extracted components based on

Kaiser's stopping rule, which states that only the number of components with eigenvalues over 1.0 should be included in the analysis. The rationale for this criterion is neatly summarised by Rourke and Hatcher (2013: 17):

> 'Each observed variable contributes one unit of variance to the total variance in the data set. Any component that displays an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 is accounting for a greater amount of variance than had been contributed by one variable. Such a component is therefore accounting for a meaningful amount of variance, and is worthy of being retained. On the other hand, a component with an eigenvalue less than 1.0 is accounting for less variance than had been contributed by one variable. The purpose of principal component analysis is to reduce a number of observed variables into a relatively smaller number of components; this cannot be effectively achieved if you retain components that account for less variance than had been contributed by individual variables. For this reason, components with eigenvalues less than 1.0 are viewed as unimportant, and are not retained'.

Table 4.12 shows the importance of each of the 42 principal components. Only eight components have eigenvalues over 1.0, and together these explain 80% of the total variability in the data. Kaiser's criterion has been shown to produce the correct number of components when the sample size exceeds 300 observations and the mean communality is greater than or equal to 0.60 (Stevens, 1986). Thus, the output called 'communalities' was checked. The communalities help explain the total amount an individual variable shares with other variables included in the analysis. The average of the communalities was found by adding them up and dividing by the number of communalities (i.e., 33.5/42 = 0.797). This finding leads to the conclusion that an eight component solution is probably appropriate.

A second, more subjective method for determining the number of components to retain is the scree test, which involves the visual exploration of a graphical representation of the eigenvalues. In this method, the eigenvalues associated with each component are plotted against their ordinal numbers (i.e., first eigenvalue, second eigenvalue, etc.). Afterwards, the graph is examined to determine the point at which the last significant drop or break takes place, in other words, where the line levels off. The recommendation is to ignore all of the points along the level part of the line including the transition point, and count the points along the precipitously dropping part of the line to ascertain the number of important or major components (Hair *et al.*,

1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). The scree plot is shown in Figure 4.6. It can be seen that the curve begins to tail off after four components, but there is another drop after six components before a stable plateau is reached. Thus, this scree plot indicates that a six-component solution would be appropriate.

The third approach is to retain enough components so that the cumulative percent of variance is equal to some minimal value. Reading down the far right column in Table 4.12 reveals the percentages of cumulative variance for the components in the analysis. The addition of each component adds some new variance to the cumulative variance. The question that arises is at what point the adding process should be stopped. While no absolute threshold has been adopted, for the social sciences a minimum of 70% cumulative variance is recommended (Hair *et al.,* 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). In the case of the 42 measures on the 399 excluded resort localities, 6 components summarise just over 70 % of the total variation in the original data.

Table 4.12: Initial PCA for the 42 variables of resort socio-economic performance

Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	10.476	24.943	24.943
2	8.849	21.069	46.012
3	4.496	10.705	56.716
4	2.696	6.419	63.135
5	2.433	5.793	68.928
6	2.043	4.865	73.793
7	1.364	3.247	77.04
8	1.146	2.729	79.769
9	0.927	2.206	81.975
10	0.738	1.757	83.733
11	0.697	1.66	85.392
12	0.618	1.471	86.864
13	0.599	1.426	88.289
14	0.533	1.269	89.558
15	0.5	1.191	90.749
16	0.47	1.119	91.868
	0.405	0.963	92.831
	0.34	0.811	93.642
	0.322	0.766	94.408
	0.305	0.726	95.134
	0.285	0.68	95.814
	0.242	0.576	96.389
	0.2	0.476	96.866
	0.184	0.438	97.304
	0.161	0.384	97.688
	0.147	0.35	98.038
	0.135	0.32	98.359
	0.124	0.296	98.655
	0.113	0.27	98.925
	0.098	0.233	99.158
	0.076	0.182	99.34
32	0.065	0.154	99.495
33	0.056	0.134	99.629
34	0.046	0.109	99.738
35	0.042	0.101	99.839
36	0.031	0.075	99.913
37	0.014	0.032	99.946
38	0.013	0.03	99.976
39	0.01	0.024	100
40	1.70E-05	4.05E-05	100
41	4.30E-07	1.02E-06	100

Number of components to extract:

The **eigenvalue-one criterion** for number of factors to derive would indicate that there were 8 components to be extracted for these variables.

Number of components to extract:

The **cumulative proportion of variance criteria** can be met with 6 components to satisfy the criterion of explaining 70% or more of the total variance.

Source: Author's own work



Figure 4.6: Scree plot from a PCA of 42 variables of resort socio-economic performance
Source: Author's own work

A final criterion for solving the number of components problem is the assessment of component triviality. This strategy involves proceeding to component rotation and assessing the number of 'loadings' and their absolute magnitude. Component loadings are a measure of the importance of the variable to the component. If a component does not have at least three variables loading above the threshold of 0.40 on it, then it is a 'trivial' component and the variables should be eliminated and the analysis repeated (Hair *et al.*, 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). Again, in order to identify whether there were any trivial components, it was necessary to proceed to component rotation.

Rotation maximises high variable loadings and minimises low variable loadings, therefore producing a more interpretable and simplified solution. There are two rotation techniques: orthogonal rotation and oblique rotation. Researchers have several methods to choose from both rotation options (see Hair *et al.*, 1995 for a review). Orthogonal rotations produce component structures that are uncorrelated. In contrast, oblique rotations produce components that are correlated. Orthogonal 'varimax' rotation was used in this study.

Compared to other rotation methods, ‘a varimax rotation tends to maximise the variance of a column of the factor pattern matrix (as opposed to a row of the matrix). This rotation is the most commonly used orthogonal rotation in the social sciences’ (Rourke and Hatcher, 2013: 21).

The rotated component matrix is displayed in Table 4.13. By default, SPSS returns all loadings. However (following convention), it was requested that all loadings less than 0.4 be suppressed in the output and so there are blank spaces for many of the loadings. It is apparent from this table that only one component (i.e., component 8) had less than three meaningful variables loading on it. This finding leads to the conclusion that neither an eight (i.e., based on the eigenvalue-one criterion) nor six (i.e., based on the scree test; the cumulative proportion of variance) component solution is appropriate.

Table 4.13: PCA (with varimax rotation) loadings for eight components

Source: Author's own work

Variables	Component							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other white collar	-0.877							
% of working age pop. with no qualifications	0.773							
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications)	-0.767							
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other manual	0.765					-0.405		
Median gross annual household income	-0.731							
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as skilled manual	0.526							
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)		0.919						
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months		0.895						
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months		0.842						
JSA claimants as % of Out-of-Work benefits claimants		0.823						
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.		0.764						
% of household spaces vacant		0.685						
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance			0.904					
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support			0.87					
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance			0.771					
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits		0.535	0.704					
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance			0.614					
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element			0.597	0.522				
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families			0.511					
% of dependent children in lone parent families			0.417					
% pop. working age				0.847				
Demographic dependency ratio				-0.847				
% of households living in overcrowded conditions				0.56		0.515		
% of households without access to a car or van		0.454		0.541				
% of all occupied household spaces owned			-0.442	-0.507			0.5	
% pop. White	0.418			-0.491				
% of households single pensioner					0.872			
Median age of population				-0.476	0.775			
% pop. Children					-0.728			
% of households single person					0.704			
% pop. pensionable age				-0.667	0.676			
% of households lone parent with dependent children					-0.593			
% of working age pop. self-employed						0.817		
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals	-0.506					0.715		
% of all employee jobs that are tourism-related						0.691		
Crime rank						0.596		
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet						0.449		
% of households with no central heating							0.806	
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social	0.441						-0.718	
% of all occupied household spaces rented privately						0.484	0.535	
% of all employee jobs that are full-time								-0.991
% of all employee jobs that are part-time								0.991

Number of components to extract:

Component 8 has less than three meaningful variables loading it, thus indicating that it is a 'trivial' component. So, seven components should be extracted

Thus, the two variables loading above the threshold of 0.40 on component 8 were removed and the analysis repeated. Again, the first phase of a PCA is devoted to assessing the suitability of the dataset. A PCA requires:

- The ratio of cases to variables must be 5 to 1 or larger;
- The correlation matrix for the variables must contain 2 or more correlations of 0.3 or greater
- The correlation matrix for the variables must contain more correlations above 0.3 than 0.8;
- The Bartlett Test of Sphericity is statistically significant;
- The overall MSA is 0.50 or higher; and,
- Variables with a MSA less than 0.50 must be removed.

Table 4.14 presents the results obtained from the assumption tests. All requirements were met.

Table 4.14: Appropriateness of PCA – results from the assumption tests

Tests	**Results**
Sample to variable ratio	399 cases / 40 variables = 9.97
Factorability of the correlation matrix	Of the 780 correlations in the matrix, 346 were greater than 0.3 and 8 were greater than or equal to 0.8
Bartlett Test of Sphericity	<0.001 (χ^2 = 33427.766, df. 780)
Sampling adequacy for set of variables	The overall MSA for the set of variables included in the analysis was 0.812
Sampling adequacy of individual variables	The MSA for all of the individual variables included in the analysis was greater than 0.5

Source: Author's own work

Given these overall indicators, PCA was conducted with all 40 variables. The eigenvalue and component loading were set at conventional high values of 1.0 and 0.4 respectively. Applying the eigenvalue-one criterion on the number of principal components to be extracted suggest that seven components should be extracted as their respective eigenvalues are greater than 1.0. This conclusion is supported by the test of communalities. Earlier it was stated that Kaiser's criterion is accurate when, first, the communality value for each variable is 0.50 or higher and, second, the average communality is greater than 0.6. It is apparent from Table 4.15 that there are no variables with communalities less than 0.50 (the average communality of the variables was 0.79). It is also apparent from Table 4.15 that the seven

components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 together accounted for 78.7% of the total variance, thus satisfying the cumulative proportion of variance criteria (which says that the extracted components together should explain at least 70% of the variation). Furthermore, there are at least three variables with significant loadings on each component.

So far this section has described the process of PCA for the 50 variables of resort socio-economic performance. To recap, on iteration 1, eight variables were removed from the analysis because they failed to meet a minimum criteria of having a MSA value of 0.50 or above. On iteration 2, one component only had two variables loading above the cut-point of 0.40 and, therefore, these variables were removed. A PCA of the remaining 40 variables produced seven components which together summarise almost 80% of the total variation in the original data. Having obtained a component model that satisfies all requirements, it was next necessary to interpret this final solution.

Table 4.15: PCA (with varimax rotation) loadings for seven components *Source:* Author's own work

	Component							
Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Communality**
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other white collar	-0.872							0.851
% of working age pop. with no qualifications	0.774							0.845
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as other manual	0.770							0.876
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications)	-0.768							0.838
Median gross annual household income	-0.740							0.807
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as skilled manual	0.528							0.501
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)		0.919						0.912
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months		0.894						0.892
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months		0.841						0.771
JSA claimants as % of Out-of-Work benefits claimants		0.823						0.879
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.		0.764						0.722
% of household spaces vacant		0.685						0.719
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance			0.905					0.886
% of working age pop. claiming Income Support			0.867					0.896
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance			0.772					0.749
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits		0.535	0.708					0.819
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance			0.617					0.609
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element			0.596	0.526				0.708
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families	0.402		0.504					0.702
% of dependent children in lone parent families			0.409					0.512
Demographic dependency ratio				-0.852				0.880
% pop. working age				0.851				0.938
% pop. pensionable age				-0.677	0.669			0.938
% of households living in overcrowded conditions				0.557		0.517		0.786
% of households without access to a car or van		0.454		0.535				0.829
% pop. White	0.407			-0.492				0.606
% of households single pensioner					0.873			0.833
Median age of population				-0.485	0.768			0.918
% pop. Children					-0.727			0.838
% of households single person					0.708			0.936
% of households lone parent with dependent children					-0.589			0.748
% of working age pop. self-employed						0.810		0.790
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals	-0.515					0.708		0.896
% of all employee jobs that are tourism-related						0.710		0.552
Crime rank						0.603		0.570
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet						0.450		0.593
% of households with no central heating							0.804	0.743
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social	0.446						-0.719	0.928
% of all occupied household spaces rented privately						0.482	0.533	0.895
% of all occupied household spaces owned			-0.437	-0.501			0.504	0.862
Eigenvalue	10.476	8.846	4.481	2.661	2.432	1.445	1.157	
Variance Explained (%)	26.190	22.115	11.202	6.653	6.081	3.612	2.892	

Table 4.15 shows which variables (or indicators) comprise each of the components. Again, following convention, only those loadings with a value of 0.4 or greater are included. Notice that 12 of the 40 variables have a relationship to two or more of the derived components; the presence of cross-loading variables is referred to as 'complex structure'. There are a variety of prescriptions for handling complex variables (Hair *et al.*, 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). One approach is to leave as is (i.e., include the variables in multiple components). A second approach is ignore the complexity and treat the variable as belonging to the component on which it has the highest loading. Another simple solution to complexity is to scratch the variables out and ignore them in the interpretation. Other prescriptions are to remove all variables with complex structure and repeat the PCA or try different methods of component rotation to see if a more interpretable solution can be found. The recommendation is to repeat the analysis only if the overall solution demonstrates complex structure (Hair *et al.*, 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). Thus, given that the overall solution demonstrated simple structure (i.e., 28 of the 40 variables have one substantial loading on a component), it was not necessary to eliminate the complex variables from the PCA. Since the purpose of undertaking the PCA was to reduce the large number of indicators to a smaller set of variables for cluster analysis (and not dimension reduction of data per se), a strict interpretation of the components is not warranted. If, say, the components were not going to be used in subsequent analysis then it would, for the sake of interpretability, be sensible to assign the complex variables based on their loadings to a particular component or ignore such variables in the interpretation of the components (both of these options provide easier interpretation of results, but sacrifice information just for interpretability sake). Thus, this study chose to include variables with complex structure as a variable in multiple components. Summary descriptions of each component are provided in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16: Summary descriptions of component characteristics

	High score on this component means:
Component 1	• High proportion of persons with no qualifications and consequently a lower proportion with a degree or higher. • High proportion of jobs held in manual occupations and consequently a lower proportion in professional/managerial and other white collar occupations • Lower than average household income • High proportion of children in out-of-work families • High proportion of white ethnic groups • High proportion of social rented housing
Component 2	• High level of Jobseekers Allowance claimants • High level of youth unemployment • High level of long-term unemployment • High proportion of car-less households • High proportion of household spaces vacant
Component 3	• High proportion claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance • High proportion claiming Disability Living Allowance • High proportion claiming Employment and Support Allowance • High proportion claiming Income Support • High proportion of older people claiming Pension Credit • High proportion of children in out-of-work families • High proportion of children in lone parent families • Low proportion of owner-occupied housing
Component 4	• High proportion of persons of working age • Low proportion of persons of pensionable age, but many older people that are resident claim Pension Credit • Low average age • Low proportion of owner-occupied housing • High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions • High proportion of car-less households • High proportion of population non-white
Component 5	• Low proportion of persons of young age • High proportion of persons of pensionable age • High average age • High proportion of single-person households • High proportion of single-person households with occupants above pensionable age. • Low proportion of lone parent households with dependent children
Component 6	• High level of self-employment • High proportion of jobs held in professional/managerial occupations • High proportion of tourism-related jobs • High proportion of private rented housing • High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions • High proportion of households without sole use of bath, shower or toilet • High levels of burglary, theft, criminal damage and violence
Component 7	• High proportion of owner-occupied housing • High proportion of private rented accommodation and consequently a lower proportion of social rented housing • High proportion of households without central heating

Source: Author's own work

The label attached to each component/dimension is as follows:

Component 1	White, working-class social housing neighbourhoods with disadvantages
Component 2	Limited access to employment opportunities
Component 3	High levels of benefit claimants, much poor health
Component 4	Prime age demographic
Component 5	Older demographic profile
Component 6	Professionals, tourism jobs, private renters and poor housing conditions
Component 7	Mixed private housing neighbourhoods with high levels of home ownership

Step 4: Scoring excluded resort localities on the dimensions of variation

The next stage in the process calculates a 'score' on the identified dimensions in the data as if they were variables in their own right – which they are, but of a much more general nature than the original input variables. Scoring the excluded resort localities was accomplished in SPSS using the 'Factor Score' command, as shown in Figure 4.7. Three different procedures may be used to calculate component scores. However, the regression method provided the most appropriate method for two main reasons. One reason is because the PCA was based on a correlation matrix as opposed to a covariance matrix. The second reason is because the score it provides is a linear composite of the optimally-weighted observed variables (Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). In other words, it includes *all the observed variables*, as opposed to *only the variables that demonstrated meaningful loadings* for the component in question. Once the scores were calculated and saved as variables, they were standardised to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Those values were then entered into the cluster analysis.



Figure 4.7: Obtaining each LSOA's component scores
Source: Author's own work

Step 5: Grouping localities according to their scores on the main dimensions in the data

The final task is to group the 399 excluded resort localities according to their scores on the 7 dimensions in the data. The statistical procedure used to form groups that share similar characteristics is called cluster analysis. Before the cluster analysis can be undertaken, three important decisions are required. These decisions relate to:

(i) Choice of clustering procedure;

(ii) Choice of clustering method; and,

(iii) Choice of similarity or distance measure.

In SPSS, cluster analysis can be performed using *hierarchical methods* (with <1,000 cases) or *non-hierarchical methods* (with 100 to 100,000 cases), each of them relying on a different algorithm to create the clusters. In hierarchical procedures the clustering process begins with each case representing an individual cluster (i.e., there are as many clusters as cases). These clusters are then successively merged depending on their similarity. At each step in the hierarchical procedure, either a new cluster is formed or one case joins a previously

grouped cluster. This process continues until only one cluster is left (see Figure 4.8). After clustering is complete, the optimum number of clusters is then chosen based on the agglomeration schedule. The alternate procedure of non-hierarchical clustering is very different from the hierarchical clustering procedure, which is applied when there is no prior knowledge of how many clusters there may be. Another difference is that non-hierarchical clustering is not based on distance measures. Whereas hierarchical clustering uses the between-cluster variation as measure to form homogenous clusters, non-hierarchical clustering uses the within-cluster variation (see Figure 4.9). The procedure starts by randomly assigning cases to the number of clusters specified by the researcher. After calculating the means of the temporary clusters, it will move cases between the clusters, trying to minimise variation within clusters. If the reallocation of a case to another cluster decreases the within-cluster variation, this case is reassigned to that cluster. This iterative process continues until no transfer of a case to a cluster results in improvement in the within-cluster variation. After clustering is complete, the means of each cluster for each variable can be checked to assess how distinct the clusters are.



Figure 4.8: Hierarchical cluster analysis
Source: Mooi and Sarstedt (2011: 244)



Between-cluster variation = Maximise (Hierarchical cluster analysis)
Within-cluster variation = Minimise (Non-hierarchical cluster analysis)

Figure 4.9: Three cluster diagram showing between-cluster and within-cluster variation
Source: Author's own elaboration

In this project, hierarchical clustering provided the most suitable procedure to form the groups of LSOAs for two main reasons. First, the number of clusters in the solution need not be specified in advance and second, the procedure allows for the comparison of the clustering result with an increasing number of clusters. Within this approach to cluster analysis there are a number of different methods available to determine which clusters should be joined at each stage. Hierarchical methods (also referred to as algorithms or linkage measures) include, for example, single linkage (nearest neighbour), complete linkage (furthest neighbour), median linkage and centroid clustering. Figure 4.10 illustrates these methods for two randomly framed clusters. However, the most commonly used hierarchical clustering method is Ward's method. This method is preferred because:

> 'it uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. In general, this method is very efficient. Cluster membership is assessed by calculating the total sum of squared deviations from the mean of a cluster. The criterion for fusion is that it should produce the smallest possible increase in the error sum of squares' (Burns and Burns, 2008: 557).

To be clear, the main advantage of Ward's method is its statistical power. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that Ward's method returns more accurate agglomeration coefficients than any

other hierarchical cluster method (see Gore, 2000 for a review). The coefficients represent the 'distance' (i.e., similarity) of the clusters combined at every stage in the hierarchical cluster analysis. An agglomeration schedule with accurate coefficients means a more robust overall solution. For this reason, Ward's method was selected as the clustering method. This decision meant that the question of how to measure 'distance' (in other words, how similar are different LSOAs to each other?) is entirely sidestepped. A number of different measures have been proposed to measure 'distance' for interval data (see Figure 4.11). However, when the Ward, Centroid or Median method is requested it is not possible to use any other measure but the squared Euclidean distance measure. The squared Euclidean distance is the sum of the squared differences over all the variables. At each step in the procedure, the squared Euclidean distance between all pairs of cases and clusters is calculated and the pair of cases or clusters with the smallest squared Euclidean distance will be combined with one another.



a. Single linkage (or nearest neighbour)



b. Complete linkage (or furthest neighbour)



c. Average linkage



d. Centroid clustering

Figure 4.10: Hierarchical clustering methods
Source: Author's own elaboration



Figure 4.11: Measures of similarity or distance for interval data
Source: Author's own screenshot

In practice, since it cannot be known at the outset the number of clusters that will emerge, a two-step sequence of analysis is undertaken:

1) *Hierarchical cluster analysis* was completed using *Ward's method* applying *squared Euclidean distance* as the distance measure, in order to determine the optimum number of clusters within the sample.

2) Hierarchical cluster analysis was repeated with the selected number of clusters, in order to allocate every LSOA in the sample to a particular cluster.

So, the main objective is determining how many clusters exist. The hierarchical cluster analysis calculated every possibility between every LSOA forming their own cluster (as many clusters as there are LSOAs) and every LSOA belonging to the same cluster, giving a range in the set of data from 1 to 399 clusters. The results of the hierarchical cluster analysis are summarised in the agglomeration schedule (Table 4.17). Each row in the schedule shows a stage at which either two LSOAs are combined, individual LSOAs are added to existing clusters, or two existing clusters are combined. For example:

- **At stage 1**, LSOA 374 is clustered with LSOA 380. The squared Euclidean distance between these two LSOAs is very small at 0.075. Neither LSOA has been previously clustered (as indicated by the two zeros under Cluster 1 and Cluster 2), and the next stage when this cluster of two LSOAs combines with another LSOA or LSOA cluster is Stage 260.

- **At stage 10**, LSOA 115 joins the LSOA-123 cluster (LSOA 123 was previously clustered with LSOA 195 back in Stage 6, thus creating a cluster of 3 cases: LSOAs 115, 123, and 195). The squared Euclidean distance between LSOA 115 and LSOA-123 cluster is 1.311. LSOA 115 has not been previously clustered (as indicated by the zero under Cluster 1), and LSOA 123 was previously clustered at Stage 6. The next stage when the LSOA-115 cluster combines with another LSOA or LSOA cluster is stage 91.

Thus, the first stage in the procedure combined the two most similar LSOAs, resulting in a very small agglomeration coefficient. The last stage combined the final two aggregate clusters into a single cluster, containing every LSOA in the sample. The agglomeration coefficient associated with this final grouping is therefore the largest. (The agglomeration schedule shown in Table 4.17 has been cropped. Only the top and the bottom of the schedule are shown as it becomes quite long with a large number of LSOAs.)

Analysis of the agglomeration coefficient provides direction in the choice of the number of clusters. It is necessary to stop cluster formation when the increase in the coefficients between two consecutive stages is large. A large difference between the coefficients of two adjacent stages is an indication that the clusters being combined are too dissimilar to form a homogeneous group. The recommendation is to look at this figure from the last row upwards, as the goal is to identify the lowest possible number of clusters. So, reading from the bottom upwards (Table 4.17), it is apparent that for one cluster there is agglomeration coefficient of 2786, for two clusters 2545.733, for three clusters 2320.689, etc. To get a better overview of the changes in the coefficients as the number of clusters increase, the coefficients were rewritten as in Table 4.18. The final column, headed ‘Change’, indicates to stop at the four cluster solution, after stage 394, as succeeding clustering adds very much less to distinguishing between clusters. Once the number of clusters was identified, the hierarchical cluster analysis was repeated to place the 399 LSOAs into one of the four clusters. This action meant a new variable was generated at the end of the SPSS data file, providing the cluster membership for each LSOA in the sample. In the results chapter, the composition and characteristics of each cluster will be explored using analysis of variance.

Table 4.17: Agglomeration schedule

	Cluster combined			Stage cluster first appears		
Stage	**Cluster 1**	**Cluster 2**	**Coefficients**	**Cluster 1**	**Cluster 2**	**Next stage**
1	374	380	0.075	0	0	260
2	193	233	0.171	0	0	42
3	315	397	0.27	0	0	234
4	210	347	0.38	0	0	101
5	334	389	0.522	0	0	245
6	123	195	0.666	0	0	10
7	176	197	0.811	0	0	222
8	173	239	0.975	0	0	133
9	188	236	1.142	0	0	84
10	115	123	1.311	0	6	91
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
391	2	24	1573.527	382	388	392
392	2	71	1695.175	391	387	395
393	5	37	1821.219	385	390	396
394	1	21	1950.038	389	380	396
395	2	16	2109.838	392	384	397
396	1	5	2320.689	394	393	398
397	2	18	2545.733	395	386	398
398	1	2	2786	396	397	0

Source: Author's own work

Table 4.18: Reformed agglomeration table (not provided on SPSS)

No of clusters	**Agglomeration last step**	**Coefficients this step**	**Change**
2	2786	2545.733	240.267
3	2545.733	2320.689	225.044
4	2320.689	2109.838	210.851
5	2109.838	1950.038	159.8
6	1950.038	1821.219	128.819
7	1821.219	1695.175	126.044
8	1695.175	1573.527	121.648

The first large difference in coefficient values, a clear demarcation point.

Source: Author's own work

4.5 Summary

The main purpose of this study is to contribute to knowledge and understanding of social exclusion in a post-mature mass tourism coastal resort context. It does so by investigating characteristics associated with social exclusion in English seaside resorts, factors that influence social exclusion of resident populations and the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. This chapter has explained the process and methodology of the research, which adopts a positivist paradigmatic perspective and a non-experimental, quantitative approach given that there is a dearth of knowledge of social exclusion in seaside resorts. Using the working definition of a seaside resort, a progressive three stage method was devised, with each stage corresponding to a research objective. These objectives led to the use of quantitative measures and secondary data analysis as a research method. It follows that a national seaside resort database was constructed in order to facilitate the analysis. The most logical and pragmatic first step was to begin the analysis of social exclusion with an examination of its nature and extent, using the newly invented local authority district area classification, small area geography and relevant, well-established deprivation measures. As a second step, in order to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion, a resort-level analysis of a set of population- and place-based measures for deprived and less-deprived resorts was undertaken. These measures were identified by reviewing datasets available at the ward level and the LSOA level. This work also affords a basis for subsequent cluster analysis to identify the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Thus, a combination of univariate, bivariate and multivariate empirical analyses were undertaken at several geographic scales to illuminate variations in the incidence of a number of key exclusion-related variables. Having detailed the procedures and methods guiding this investigation, it is next necessary to document the study's results.

Chapter 5

The Nature and Extent of Social Exclusion in English Seaside Resorts

To identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, analyses were undertaken on Indices of Deprivation data at several geographic scales (for details Section 4.2). First, due to the fact that such data are not available for seaside resorts specifically, a statistical analysis at district level was employed to illuminate geographical variations in the incidence of a number of key deprivation-related variables. This work addresses the question of whether multiple deprivation corresponds to 'seaside' districts in general and 'seaside with resort' districts in particular. The results of these analyses are given in Section 5.1. Second, a small-area analysis of the local authority districts classified as 'seaside with resort' was completed in order to establish the extent to which deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion occurred within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and severity of these characteristics. The results are given in Section 5.2. Third, a resort-level analysis was undertaken and, in particular, there was further investigation of the nature and severity of deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts corresponding to the 1,686 'resort LSOAs'. These resorts are then analysed, put into the context of the national picture and compared with each other. The focus here is on the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts which this study has defined based on resident population. Comparisons of deprivation patterns for the seaside resorts with England as a whole are drawn for 2004 and 2010. The seaside resorts were compared with each other both in terms of overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and using the individual deprivation domains, to assess if there are any differences in the patterns of deprivation. The results of these analyses are set out in Section 5.3. Finally, a summary drawing together the results of all the above-mentioned analyses, and providing a basis for the discussion in Chapter 7, is provided in Section 5.4.

5.1 District-level analysis

The aim of the analyses presented in this section is to establish the factual basis regarding whether local authority districts classified in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ differ from other district types, or from the general situation in England, with regard to a range of measures of deprivation. It sought to assess whether there were differences between seaside and non-seaside districts, and if so, the scale and the extent of the differences. The analysis is split into two sections here. The first looks at the six district level summary measures, as many of these summarise different aspects of multiple deprivation, and the second analyses the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and individual domains, in order to understand the channels through which deprivation might affect different types of district and in particular, seaside districts with resorts.

5.1.1 Local authority district level indicators of multiple deprivation

In 2010 there were 326 districts in England as opposed to 354 for the two previous indices. Examination of the spatial distribution of the districts defined as ‘seaside’ or ‘coastal’ reveals that the majority of ‘seaside’ districts are located in southwest England, whilst the majority of ‘coastal’ districts are situated in England’s southeast. Both the South West and South East regions, however, contain the majority of seaside districts with resorts (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Distribution of districts by region, 2010

District type **Region**	Inland	Coastal	Seaside	Seaside (-R)	Seaside (+R)
East Midlands	37	2	1	0	1
East of England	36	2	9	5	4
London	33	0	0	0	0
North East	5	4	3	1	2
North West	28	3	8	2	6
South East	45	7	15	4	11
South West	19	2	16	4	12
West Midlands	30	0	0	0	0
Yorkshire & the Humber	18	2	1	0	1
Total	**251**	**22**	**53**	**16**	**37**

Note:
1. Non-inland districts were classified as either 'coastal' or 'seaside' based on the proportion of their workforce employed in tourism-related businesses. Using the Annual Business Inquiry employee estimates for 2001, the 'coastal districts' are those districts which had a proportion lower than the national average of 8.2%; the 'seaside districts' are defined as those which had 8.2% or above employed in tourism-related businesses.
2. 'Seaside' districts were subdivided according to whether the districts contained identifiable seaside resorts.
3. See section on identification of seaside resorts – criteria and methods, in the methodology, for a fuller explanation of the items above.

Source: Author's own work

Univariate analysis is a sensible starting point for the investigation of the geography of deprivation, providing both insight into the incidence of multiple deprivation and the major individual components of multiple deprivation. With respect to the former, which is the focus of this section, the extent of multiple deprivation is substantially greater in both 'coastal' and 'seaside' districts than in 'inland' ones (see Table 5.2). In terms of the average of LSOA scores indicator of multiple deprivation, which is most commonly used to make comparisons as it records the population weighted average of the combined scores for the LSOAs in a district, only 43.8% of inland districts are among England's most deprived fifty per cent. The corresponding figure for seaside districts is 69.8% and coastal districts 72.1%. Similar patterns are evident with regard to the other five indicators of multiple deprivation. However, although it may appear at first glance that England's 'coastal' districts appear to be suffering more from multiple deprivation, seaside districts with resorts score overwhelming worse than other district types (i.e., 'inland', 'coastal', 'seaside without resort') on all six summary measures of overall multiple deprivation.

Table 5.2: Per cent of districts in England's most deprived 50 per cent, 2010

Deprivation domain	Inland districts	Coastal Districts	Seaside Districts	Seaside (-R) Districts	Seaside (+R) Districts
Av. rank of LSOA scores	43.8	72.7	69.9	43.8	81.1
Av. rank of LSOA ranks	43.4	77.3	69.8	43.8	81.1
Extent rank	45.8	68.2	62.3	25.0	78.4
Local concentration rank	45.8	68.2	60.4	25.0	78.4
Income rank	47.8	59.1	56.6	18.8	73.0
Employment rank	47.4	63.6	56.6	18.8	73.0

Source: Author's own work

The analysis reported in Table 5.2 is based on the proportion of districts falling within England's worst fifty per cent. Results may differ at different levels of deprivation. Table 5.3 therefore reports results for the six summary measures of overall multiple deprivation by upper quartile. Here, while 'coastal' districts, when compared with 'inland' and 'seaside' districts, contain a greater share of local authorities in England's most deprived 25 per cent, local authorities with very high levels of deprivation are also more prevalent in seaside districts with resorts, particularly with regard to the first two indicators of overall multiple deprivation and the measure of local concentration. These findings suggest that: i) the degree of multiple deprivation in seaside districts with resorts (27.0% / 32.4% respectively) is contributed to not only by income and employment (both 18.9%) but also by other elements; and, ii) although seaside districts with resorts contain few local authorities with widespread high levels of deprivation (18.9%), they are characterised by hotspots of severe multiple deprivation (37.8%). It is noticeable that very few seaside districts without identifiable resorts exhibit a level of multiple deprivation in the upper quartile, which indicates social exclusion is not a major or widespread problem in the local authorities associated with this type of district.

Table 5.3: Per cent of districts in England's most deprived 25 per cent, 2010

Deprivation domain	Inland districts	Coastal Districts	Seaside Districts	Seaside (-R) Districts	Seaside (+R) Districts
Av. rank of LSOA scores	25.1	31.8	20.8	6.3	27.0
Av. rank of LSOA ranks	23.9	36.4	24.5	6.3	32.4
Extent rank	26.3	31.8	15.1	6.3	18.9
Local concentration rank	22.3	40.9	30.2	12.5	37.8
Income rank	27.1	27.3	13.2	0.0	18.9
Employment rank	26.7	31.8	13.2	0.0	18.9

Source: Author's own work

The remainder of this section is concerned with the question of whether or not deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion correspond to 'seaside' districts in general and 'seaside with resort' districts in particular. To assess whether there are true differences in deprivation level between seaside and non-seaside districts, the six local authority summary measures of multiple deprivation were recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases and cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses were undertaken. Cross tabulations of deprivation quartiles with district type as a binary variable are given in Appendix Tables A1–18. Results of these tests have been summarised within the forthcoming tables.

Although this section is concerned primarily with the districts defined as 'seaside with resort', it commences with a brief analysis of multiple deprivation in 'seaside' and 'coastal' districts. No significant differences were found between the two aforementioned district types as both exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. As shown in Table 5.4, valid results were obtained with the 2004 data and some 2007 data on four of the six summary measures of multiple deprivation. When compared with 'inland' districts, 'coastal' and 'seaside' districts had higher levels of multiple deprivation, in which the focus is placed on the average rank of LSOA scores and average rank of LSOA ranks indicators of multiple deprivation These results are significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. However, it is apparent from the data in Table 5.4 that there are stronger associations within 'seaside' districts, which indicates, albeit crudely, that they are experiencing generally higher levels of deprivation. Furthermore,

in terms of the income and employment indicators of deprivation, while the chi-square test did not show any significant differences in the case of 'coastal' districts, statistically significant associations were found with respect to 'seaside' districts. When compared with 'inland' districts, 'seaside' districts had higher income and employment deprivation levels.

Turning now to the evidence on whether deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion correspond to the districts of 'seaside with resort', when compared with 'seaside without resort' and 'coastal' districts, and where the six summary district measures of deprivation were recoded into quartiles, the chi-square test results were invalid because the expected counts for the cells are very small. This problem, however, did not occur in the case of 'inland' districts. Indeed, analysis of multiple deprivation in 'inland' and 'seaside with resorts' districts revealed that there are statistically significant differences between the two district types. As Table 5.5 shows, the degree of multiple deprivation, as portrayed by the average rank of LSOA scores and average rank of LSOA ranks indicators, is generally higher in 'seaside with resorts' districts than in 'inland' ones. When compared with 'inland' districts, 'seaside with resort' districts also had more districts with LSOAs that contained pockets of severe deprivation.

The fact that there are statistically significant differences between 'inland' and 'seaside with resort' districts was further confirmed by collapsing both the upper two quartiles and the lower two quartiles (see Table 5.6). However, the rationale for recoding the data were because of the results in Table 5.5, which suggest there might be an association between district type (i.e., the districts 'seaside with resort' and 'seaside without resort') and deprivation level. Further analysis revealed that there are statistically significant differences between the two district types as 'seaside with resort' districts exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. The most striking result to emerge from the data in Table 5.6 is that the effect sizes, as denoted by the value of phi, indicate there are stronger associations in 'seaside without resort' than in 'inland' districts. Thus, when compared with 'seaside with resort' districts, while 'inland' and 'seaside without resort' districts are experiencing generally

lower levels of multiple deprivation, the magnitude of difference between ‘seaside with resort’ and ‘seaside without resort’ is more pronounced.

Given the two aforementioned district types are places apart in terms of level of multiple deprivation yet united by tourism-related employment at or above the national average, the differential incidence of multiple deprivation may be due to the nature of the seaside district itself. The seaside destinations in those districts that did not contain identifiable resorts have a population of less than 10,000 and all are therefore officially ‘rural’ settlements according to ONS definitions. It follows that the seaside resorts included in this study are significant urban areas in their own right. Thus, when taken together, these seaside resorts resemble an urban type and, as a result, the districts defined in this study as ‘seaside with resort’ share common characteristics with some inland districts that contain large urban centres, which may account for the greater variation in the levels of deprivation between the district types.

Having established that there are statistically significant differences in deprivation levels when comparing those districts defined as ‘seaside with resort’ with ‘seaside without resort’ and ‘inland’ districts, it is now necessary to examine the district level indicators of multiple deprivation within ‘seaside with resort’ districts. Table 5.7 shows ‘seaside with resort’ districts grouped ‘domain’ ranking and deprivation level. With respect to the average rank of LSOA scores measure, 30 out of 37 districts fell into the upper ranked half of all districts categorised as ‘most deprived’ and ‘above average’, while the remaining 7 districts fell into the ‘below average’ category. Thus, no districts exhibit a level of multiple deprivation in the lower quartile. Of those that fell into the ‘most deprived’ (MD) and ‘above average’ categories, ten were in Southeast England (MD, n=5), seven in the Southwest (MD, n=1), five in the Northwest (MD, n=2), four in the East (MD, n=1), two in the Northeast (MD, n=1) and one in both the East Midlands (MD, n=1) and the Yorkshire and the Humber (MD, n=0). Although it would seem at first glance that districts in the southern regions of England and the Northwest region of England appear to be experiencing acute levels of multiple deprivation, this regional pattern may be explained by the fact that there are more resorts and therefore more incidences of

multiple deprivation. When viewed against the total number of districts defined as 'seaside with resorts' located in each English region, the East (4/4), the Northeast (2/2), the East Midlands (1/1) and Yorkshire and the Humber (1/1) appear to be suffering more from multiple deprivation than the Southeast (10/11), the Northwest (5/6) and the Southwest (7/12). A similar regional distribution pattern is evident with regard to the average rank of LSOA ranks measure. Taken together, these findings suggest that all 'seaside with resort' districts in all regions, taking into account both deprived and less deprived LSOAs, as a whole are experiencing multiple deprivation.

In terms of both the extent rank and local concentration rank indicators of multiple deprivation, 29 out of 37 districts fell into the upper two quartiles. Regarding the extent rank, nine were in the Southeast (MD, n=2), seven in the Southwest (MD, n=0), five in the Northwest (MD, n=3), four in the East (MD, n=1), two in the Northeast (MD, n=1) and one in both the East Midlands (MD, n=0) and the Yorkshire and the Humber (MD, n=0). In contrast, the remaining eight districts fell into the 'below average' and 'least deprived' categories, with the majority (5) occurring in the Southwest, two in the Southeast, and one in the Northwest. With respect to the local concentration rank, nine were in the Southeast (MD, n=4), seven in the South west (MD, n=1), five were in the Northwest (MD, n=1), four in the East (MD, n=3), two in the Northeast (MD, n=1) and one in both the East Midlands (MD, n=0) and the Yorkshire and the Humber (MD, n=1). The previous extent rank figures given for the lower two quartiles also apply to the local concentration rank. Perhaps the most striking observation to emerge from the data here is that, in terms of extent, seven districts (in four of seven regions) populate the highest deprivation quartile whereas, in the case of local concentration, the corresponding figure is fourteen (in six of seven regions). Accordingly, it appears that the high levels of multiple deprivation in 'seaside with resort' districts is less widespread as it is spatially concentrated. These pockets of severe deprivation are to be found in numerous districts located in all but one of England's coastal regions.

The analysis so far has focussed on those district-level measures which illustrate the degree, extent and local concentration of multiple deprivation. The results obtained on the scale of employment and income deprivation can be found in Table 5.7. Incidentally, the analysis reported in Table 5.7 is based on the most recent 2010 data. Results on a measure-by-measure basis, which include the analysis of 2004 and 2007 data, are given in Appendix Tables A19-24. The reader is reminded, though, that it is impossible to compare deprivation ranks over time, as there are less local authorities in the 2010 index than there were in 2007/04 due to the formation of unitary authorities in 2009. Thus, no meaningful time series analysis of the data could be undertaken. Another criticism to be levelled at the summary measures of multiple deprivation is that they conceal small pockets of deprivation in districts associated with the district types. For these reasons, attention now turns to the LSOA indices of deprivation and, in particular, the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation.

Table 5.4: P values of the Pearson's chi-square test (Inland v Coastal; Inland v Seaside; Coastal v Seaside)
Source: Author's own work

		Inland										Coastal				
		Coastal					Seaside					Seaside				
Deprivation level Domain		MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)	MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)	MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)
Average rank of LSOA scores	2004	C	C	C	I	0.043 (0.167)	I	S	S	I	0.001 (0.231)	C	S	C	S	0.150 NS
	2007	C	C	I	I	0.014 (0.190)	I	S	I	I	0.000 (0.273)	C	S	S	S	Invalid
	2010	C	C	I	I	0.018 (0.192)	I	S	I	I	0.000 (0.292)	C	S	C	S	Invalid
Average rank of LSOA ranks	2004	C	C	I	I	0.032 (0.173)	S	S	I	I	0.002 (0.213)	C	S	=	S	0.762 NS
	2007	C	C	I	I	0.003 (0.220)	S	S	I	I	0.000 (0.263)	C	C	S	S	Invalid
	2010	C	C	I	I	0.012 (0.200)	S	S	I	I	0.000 (0.262)	C	S	S	S	Invalid
Extent rank	2004	C	C	I	I	0.128 NS	I	S	S	I	0.014 (0.180)	C	S	S	S	0.114 NS
	2007	C	C	I	I	0.053 (0.162)	I	S	S	I	0.004 (0.203)	C	S	S	S	0.064 NS
	2010	C	C	I	I	0.125 NS	I	S	I	I	0.000 (0.245)	C	S	C	S	Invalid
Local concentration rank	2004	C	C	C	I	0.026 (0.178)	I	S	I	I	0.077 NS	C	S	=	S	0.100 NS
	2007	C	C	I	I	0.016 (0.187)	S	S	I	I	0.227 NS	C	S	S	S	0.244 NS
	2010	C	C	C	I	0.063 NS	S	S	I	I	0.191 NS	C	S	C	S	Invalid
Income rank	2004	C	C	I	I	0.337 NS	I	S	I	I	0.004 (0.199)	C	S	C	S	Invalid
	2007	C	C	C	I	0.227 NS	I	S	I	I	0.005 (0.196)	C	S	C	S	Invalid
	2010	C	C	C	I	0.471 NS	I	S	I	I	0.004 (0.209)	C	S	C	S	Invalid
Employment rank	2004	C	C	I	I	0.140 NS	I	S	S	I	0.009 (0.188)	C	S	S	S	Invalid
	2007	C	C	I	I	0.087 NS	I	S	I	I	0.004 (0.202)	C	S	S	S	Invalid
	2010	C	C	C	I	0.289 NS	I	S	I	I	0.004 (0.210)	C	S	C	S	Invalid

Note:
1) In this table as well as in all similar forthcoming tables within this chapter the yellow highlighted cells represent non-statistically significant relationships existed between the two variables. Furthermore, 'invalid' refers to instances where the expected value is too small due to low frequency of the observed count. The equals sign (=) indicates that both district types share the same percentage in the quartile and there is therefore no difference. MD 'most deprived', AA 'above average', BA 'below average', LD 'least deprived' denote quartiles 1-4 respectively.
2) Detailed results are available in Appendix Tables A1-9.

Table 5.5: P values of the Pearson's chi-square test – 'seaside with resort' districts vis-à-vis inland, coastal and seaside without resort districts
Source: Author's own work

		Inland					Coastal					Seaside (-Resorts)				
Deprivation level Domain		MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)	MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)	MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)
Average rank of LSOA scores	2004	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.292)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2007	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.298)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.318)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
Average rank of LSOA ranks	2004	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.264)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2007	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.289)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.292)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
Extent rank	2004	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.251)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2007	I	S(+R)	=	I	0.000 (0.268)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2010	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.319)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
Local concentration rank	2004	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.001 (0.234)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2007	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.002 (0.218)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.002 (0.226)	C	S(+R)	C	S(+R)	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
Income rank	2004	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.001 (0.238)	C	S(+R)	C	S(+R)	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2007	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.001 (0.234)	C	S(+R)	C	S(+R)	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2010	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.259)	C	S(+R)	C	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
Employment rank	2004	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.001 (0.239)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2007	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.246)	C	S(+R)	C	S(+R)	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid
	2010	I	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.261)	C	S(+R)	C	S(+R)	Invalid	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	Invalid

Note:
1) In this table as well as in Tables 5.6 and 5.11 within this chapter the blue highlighted cells represent those districts defined in this study as 'seaside with resort' and where statistically significant results were detected.
2) Detailed results are available in Appendix Tables A10-18.

Table 5.6: P values of the Pearson's chi-square test – 'seaside with resort' districts vis-à-vis inland, coastal and seaside without resort districts
Source: Author's own work

		Inland			Coastal			Seaside (-Resorts)		
Deprivation level Domain		MD	LD	Sig-level (Phi)	MD	LD	Sig-level (Phi)	MD	LD	Sig-level (Phi)
Average rank of LSOA scores	2004	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.225)***	S(+R)	C	0.256 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.457)***
	2007	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.238)***	S(+R)	C	0.677 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.011 (0.327)**
	2010	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.249)***	S(+R)	C	0.524 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.010 (0.373)**
Average rank of LSOA ranks	2004	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.213)***	S(+R)	C	0.590 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.008 (0.341)**
	2007	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.240)***	=	=	0.976 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.011 (0.327)**
	2010	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.252)***	S(+R)	C	0.748 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.010 (0.373)**
Extent rank	2004	S(+R)	I	0.001 (0.186)***	S(+R)	C	0.759 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.487)***
	2007	S(+R)	I	0.003 (0.169)**	C	S(+R)	0.781 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.001 (0.416)***
	2010	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.218)***	S(+R)	C	0.384 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.506)***
Local concentration rank	2004	S(+R)	I	0.001 (0.186)***	S(+R)	C	0.759 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.001 (0.443)***
	2007	S(+R)	I	0.001 (0.189)***	C	S(+R)	0.955 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.001 (0.443)***
	2010	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.218)***	S(+R)	C	0.384 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.506)***
Income rank	2004	S(+R)	I	0.005 (0.160)**	S(+R)	C	0.441 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.460)***
	2007	S(+R)	I	0.006 (0.157)**	S(+R)	C	0.271 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.460)***
	2010	S(+R)	I	0.004 (0.168)**	S(+R)	C	0.270 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.502)***
Employment rank	2004	S(+R)	I	0.012 (0.142)**	C	S(+R)	0.893 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.479)***
	2007	S(+R)	I	0.004 (0.164)**	S(+R)	C	0.935 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.460)***
	2010	S(+R)	I	0.004 (0.171)**	S(+R)	C	0.451 NS	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.502)***

Table 5.7: Seaside with resort districts grouped 'domain ranking' and deprivation level, 2010 *Source:* Author's own work

Deprivation level Domain	**Very deprived (Rank 1-81)**			**Above average (Rank 82-163)**			**Below average (Rank 164-245)**			**Least deprived (Rank 246-326)**
Av. rank of LSOA scores	Blackpool	6	NW	Eastbourne	84	SE	Canterbury	166	SE	
	Hastings	19	SE	Scarborough	85	Y&H	Teignbridge	184	SW	
	Thanet	49	SE	Tendring	86	E	North Somerset	201	SW	
	South Tyneside	52	NE	West Somerset	90	SW	East Devon	215	SW	
	Great Yarmouth	54	E	Sefton	92	NW	Purbeck	218	SW	
	Wirral	60	NW	Weymouth & Port.	94	SW	Christchurch	230	SW	
	Torbay	61	SW	Shepway	97	SE	Fylde	236	NW	
	Brighton and Hove	66	SE	Bournemouth	102	SW				
	East Lindsey	73	EM	Southend-on-Sea	106	E				
	Portsmouth	76	SE	Cornwall	110	SW				
				Waveney	115	E				
				Lancaster	116	NW				
				Isle of Wight	126	SE				
				Dover	127	SE				
				Northumberland	135	NE				
				North Devon	137	SW				
				Rother	139	SE				
				Sedgemoor	152	SW				
				Arun	154	SE				
				Wyre	163	NW				
Av. rank of LSOA ranks	Blackpool	10	NW	Cornwall	82	SW	Teignbridge	175	SW	
	Hastings	23	SE	Scarborough	83	Y&H	Wyre	185	NW	
	West Somerset	45	SW	Weymouth & Port.	88	SW	Purbeck	199	SW	
	South Tyneside	47	NE	Shepway	89	SE	East Devon	209	SW	
	Torbay	49	SW	Bournemouth	96	SW	North Somerset	224	SW	
	Thanet	50	SE	Wirral	103	NW	Christchurch	228	SW	
	Great Yarmouth	57	E	Isle of Wight	106	SE	Fylde	235	NW	
	East Lindsey	58	EM	Waveney	112	E				
	Brighton and Hove	67	SE	Sefton	114	NW				
	Eastbourne	68	SE	Southend-on-Sea	117	E				
	Portsmouth	76	SE	Dover	122	SE				
	Tendring	81	E	North Devon	126	SW				
				Rother	132	SE				
				Lancaster	133	NW				
				Northumberland	144	NE				
				Arun	151	SE				
				Sedgemoor	154	SW				
				Canterbury	163	SE				

Deprivation level Domain	Very deprived (Rank 1-81)			Above average (Rank 82-163)			Below average (Rank 164-245)			Least deprived (Rank 246-326)		
Extent rank	Blackpool	16	NW	Torbay	82	SW	Isle of Wight	165	SE	East Devon	250	SW
	Hastings	24	SE	Brighton and Hove	84	SE	Canterbury	170	SE	Purbeck	294	SW
	South Tyneside	39	NE	Weymouth & Port.	90	SW	West Somerset	173	SW			
	Wirral	54	NW	East Lindsey	91	EM	Teignbridge	192	SW			
	Thanet	57	SE	Portsmouth	93	SE	Christchurch	197	SW			
	Great Yarmouth	64	E	Southend-on-Sea	97	E	Fylde	218	NW			
	Sefton	80	NW	Scarborough	99	Y&H						
				Eastbourne	101	SE						
				Lancaster	104	NW						
				Bournemouth	105	SW						
				Tendring	112	E						
				Shepway	120	SE						
				Waveney	123	E						
				Northumberland	124	NE						
				Dover	131	SE						
				Wyre	135	NW						
				Sedgemoor	148	SW						
				Rother	153	SE						
				Cornwall	154	SW						
				North Devon	157	SW						
				Arun	158	SE						
				North Somerset	159	SW						
Local concentration rank	Blackpool	1	NW	Northumberland	87	NE	Canterbury	170	SE	East Devon	246	SW
	Wirral	14	NW	Waveney	92	E	Isle of Wight	178	SE	Purbeck	294	SW
	Hastings	19	SE	East Lindsey	94	EM	West Somerset	183	SW			
	Thanet	26	SE	Bournemouth	96	SW	Teignbridge	192	SW			
	Great Yarmouth	30	E	Weymouth & Port.	99	SW	Christchurch	201	SW			
	Sefton	43	NW	Wyre	101	NW	Fylde	220	NW			
	Portsmouth	52	SE	Shepway	102	SE						
	Brighton and Hove	54	SE	North Somerset	115	SW						
	Scarborough	56	Y&H	Eastbourne	116	SE						
	Lancaster	59	NW	North Devon	146	SW						
	Torbay	61	SW	Dover	147	SE						
	Southend-on-Sea	73	E	Arun	148	SE						
	Tendring	74	E	Cornwall	152	SW						
	South Tyneside	77	NE	Sedgemoor	153	SW						
				Rother	155	SE						

Deprivation level Domain	Very deprived (Rank 1-81)			Above average (Rank 82-163)			Below average (Rank 164-245)			Least deprived (Rank 246-326)		
Income rank	Cornwall	9	SW	Portsmouth	84	SE	Sedgemoor	165	SW	Weymouth & Port.	255	SW
	Wirral	22	NW	Southend-on-Sea	88	E	Wyre	174	NW	Fylde	280	NW
	Sefton	45	NW	Thanet	95	SE	North Devon	190	SW	Christchurch	308	SW
	Northumberland	53	NE	Bournemouth	96	SW	East Devon	192	SW	West Somerset	311	SW
	Brighton and Hove	57	SE	Torbay	97	SW	Rother	202	SE	Purbeck	318	SW
	Blackpool	74	NW	Tendring	99	E						
	South Tyneside	77	NE	East Lindsey	107	EM						
				North Somerset	109	SW						
				Isle of Wight	116	SE						
				Hastings	124	SE						
				Great Yarmouth	126	E						
				Lancaster	127	NW						
				Waveney	128	E						
				Arun	131	SE						
				Scarborough	133	Y&H						
				Canterbury	137	SE						
				Shepway	144	SE						
				Dover	153	SE						
				Eastbourne	158	SE						
				Teignbridge	162	SW						
Employment rank	Cornwall	8	SW	Portsmouth	88	SE	Sedgemoor	167	SW	Fylde	253	NW
	Wirral	10	NW	Southend-on-Sea	92	E	Teignbridge	171	SW	West Somerset	313	SW
	Sefton	26	NW	Bournemouth	93	SW	East Devon	204	SW	Christchurch	315	SW
	Northumberland	29	NE	North Somerset	98	SW	North Devon	205	SW	Purbeck	322	SW
	Brighton and Hove	48	SE	Torbay	99	SW	Rother	218	SE			
	South Tyneside	62	NE	Thanet	101	SE	Weymouth & Port.	219	SW			
	Blackpool	63	NW	East Lindsey	104	EM						
				Tendring	107	E						
				Lancaster	113	NW						
				Isle of Wight	114	SE						
				Hastings	126	SE						
				Great Yarmouth	127	E						
				Waveney	134	E						
				Scarborough	135	Y&H						
				Arun	145	SE						
				Canterbury	146	SE						
				Shepway	154	SE						
				Dover	157	SE						
				Wyre	162	NW						
				Eastbourne	163	SE						

5.1.2 LSOA level indices of deprivation

As a second step, in order to provide further insight into the differences in the levels of multiple deprivation between seaside and non-seaside areas, the incidence of the LSOA-level domain variables and overall Index of Multiple Deprivation was examined for each of the district types in England. To enable comparison between the indices, it has been necessary to use pre-2009 local authority boundaries. LSOAs (a sub-ward geography averaging approximately 1,500 people) were matched to their respective districts and then grouped depending on their correspondence with type of district. Table 5.8 shows the breakdown of LSOAs according to district type. Overall, there are 32,482 LSOAs in England. The vast majority of LSOAs were classified as 'inland'. Of those LSOAs that were categorised as 'seaside', 9.7% were in 'seaside with resort' districts.

Table 5.8: Data profile of 'inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside' local authority districts

District type	**Inland**	**Coastal**	**Seaside**	**Seaside (-R)**	**Seaside (+R)**
LSOAs					
- Number	26,048	2,107	4,327	1,186	3,141
- Percent	80.2	6.5	13.3	3.6	9.7

Source: Author's own work

In a similar fashion to the previous section, first, univariate analysis is employed to illuminate geographical variations in the incidence of multiple deprivation. The section then goes on to analyse the extent to which deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion occur within 'seaside' districts and 'seaside with resort' districts in particular. Finally, in relation to the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, it is useful to consider the distribution of LSOAs across deprivation deciles, in order to complete the general overview.

The geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in all coastal district types than in 'inland' districts. It can be seen from the data in Table 5.9 that less than 50% of LSOAs in 'inland' districts are among England's most deprived fifty per cent. The corresponding figures for 'seaside' districts and 'coastal' districts are 52.5% and 54.1% respectively. This pattern is

not dissimilar to that which emerged from the data in Table 5.2. However, the LSOAs of coastal districts do not exhibit the highest deprivation levels on all of the domains. In terms of the barriers to housing and services and living environment indicators of deprivation, 'seaside' districts contained a greater share of LSOAs in England's most deprived fifty percent. With respect to the crime domain, 'inland' districts had a higher proportion of high crime environments.

The LSOAs associated with 'seaside with resort' districts had the greatest incidence of multiple deprivation at 57.1%. In fact, LSOAs that correspond to 'seaside with resort' districts, when compared with 'inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside without resort', score worse on the domains of income, employment, health, and living environment. However, the localities within 'seaside with resort' districts appear depressed particularly with regard to health and disability (62.0%) and employment (61.9%). Another interesting observation is that 'seaside with resort' districts score overwhelmingly worse than 'seaside without resort' districts, on all measures except for that of barriers to housing and services. It is important to note, however, that the difference is not markedly so. That said, when examining the proportion of LSOAs falling within England's worst 25 per cent, it does certainly seem that access to housing and services is a more pressing issue within 'seaside without resort' districts (see Table 5.10).

Table 5.9: Per cent of LSOAs in England's most deprived 50 per cent, 2010

Deprivation domain	**Inland**	**Coastal**	**Seaside**	**Seaside (-R)**	**Seaside (+R)**
Overall Index of M.D.	49.3	54.1	52.5	40.2	57.1
Income	49.6	52.0	51.6	38.1	56.7
Employment	48.4	57.9	55.8	39.7	61.9
Health	48.7	58.5	53.8	32.0	62.0
Education	48.5	63.1	52.8	46.3	55.3
Housing / Services	50.7	36.8	52.2	54.2	51.4
Crime and disorder	53.9	41.6	30.6	17.3	35.6
Environment	50.4	36.7	54.3	48.6	56.5

Source: Author's own work

Table 5.10: Per cent of LSOAs in England's most deprived 25 per cent, 2010

Deprivation domain	Inland	Coastal	Seaside	Seaside (-R)	Seaside (+R)
Overall Index of M.D.	25.7	26.4	20.3	9.3	24.5
Income	25.9	25.0	19.7	9.4	23.6
Employment	24.6	30.1	25.1	12.9	29.8
Health	24.9	31.0	22.8	9.6	27.8
Education	24.7	34.5	22.4	16.1	24.8
Housing / Services	25.5	14.7	27.1	35.7	23.8
Crime and disorder	27.7	18.9	11.9	5.6	14.4
Environment	25.1	15.5	28.7	22.3	31.2

Source: Author's own work

From the data in Table 5.10, it is apparent that inland areas are remarkably consistent across all aspects of deprivation. All deprivation domains are in the range 24.6 – 27.7 per cent. In contrast, there is more variation in the nature of social deprivation within each coastal district type. For instance, poor education, health and employment are greater problems in 'coastal' districts compared to other aspects of deprivation, while living environment and housing are less prevalent. In the case of 'seaside' districts, when compared to other aspects of deprivation, poor quality of people's immediate surroundings both within and outside the home, poor access to housing and services and high unemployment are considerable issues, while crime is less significant. More specifically, with regard to those districts defined as 'seaside without resorts', poor access to housing and services (followed by poor quality of the local environment) presents as an inordinate problem and, in the case of 'seaside with resorts', poor living environment, high unemployment and bad health are substantial issues. Overall, these results suggest that the problems of bad health and low employment are common to both 'seaside with resorts' and 'coastal' districts, whereas deprivation in the quality of the local environment is more specific to seaside type districts. Otherwise, there appear few similarities in the type and level of deprivation among the three coastal district types.

To explore whether there are "true" differences in the extent of deprivation across domains between 'seaside with resort' districts and other district types (i.e., 'inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside without resort'), 72 Pearson's chi-square tests were carried out to investigate the

significance of the observed frequencies of LSOAs in each deprivation quartile in relation to the expected values, in order to determine whether the observed cases fit the expected distribution. The results show that all but one of the 72 tests are statistically very strongly significant at the $p = 0.001$ level. Full results of the chi-square tests performed are available in Appendix Tables A25-48. These results are summarised in Table 5.11 and below.

Table 5.11 shows the channels through which deprivation might affect social exclusion in the following three types of local authority districts: Seaside without resort, Coastal, Inland. Furthermore, the table shows the results from the comparison of the observed and expected cell counts. That is to say, the district type which had more LSOAs (by deprivation quartile) than might be expected. It can be seen from the table that, when compared to 'seaside without resort' districts, 'seaside with resort' districts had higher levels of deprivation than might be expected across the majority of the domains of deprivation. The only exception was the barriers to housing and services domain as, in this case, the results were reversed. LSOAs within 'seaside with resort' districts had better than expected access to housing and services. Another interesting observation is that 'seaside with resort' districts are characterised by strong over-representation of LSOAs with 'high' and 'middling' levels of crime deprivation (i.e., quartiles 1-3). However, when compared to 'coastal' districts, 'seaside with resort' districts had lower crime levels and more districts with LSOAs that contained very high levels of deprivation in terms of both the living environment and barriers to housing and services domains of multiple deprivation. In relation to inland districts, 'seaside with resort' districts are characterised by strong over-representation of LSOAs with 'high' and 'middling' levels of deprivation in terms of the following three domains: employment; health and disability; and education, skills and training (in order of their prevalence).

Table 5.11: P values of the Pearson's chi-square test – 'seaside with resort' LSOAs vis-à-vis inland, coastal and seaside without resort LSOAs
Source: Author's own work

		Inland					Coastal					Seaside (-Resorts)				
Deprivation level Domain		MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)	MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)	MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)
Overall IMD	2004	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.116)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.113)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.237)
	2007	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.112)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.105)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.214)
	2010	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.099)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.111)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.197)
Income	2004	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.116)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.107)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.224)
	2007	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.119)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.130)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.189)
	2010	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.112)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.125)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.207)
Employment	2004	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.154)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.143)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.288)
	2007	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.136)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.120)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.264)
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.129)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.103)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.256)
Health	2004	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.152)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.169)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.381)
	2007	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.141)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.155)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.355)
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.137)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	0.000 (0.139)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.321)
Living Environment	2004	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.252 NS	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	C	0.000 (0.188)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.170)
	2007	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.050)	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	C	0.000 (0.242)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.113)
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	I	0.000 (0.048)	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	C	0.000 (0.218)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.098)
Housing / Services	2004	S(+R)	I	I	S(+R)	0.000 (0.045)	S(+R)	C	C	C	0.000 (0.186)	S(-R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.109)
	2007	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.023)	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	C	0.000 (0.132)	S(-R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.128)
	2010	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.030)	S(+R)	S(+R)	C	C	0.000 (0.158)	S(-R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.132)
Education	2004	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.075)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.132)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.127)
	2007	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.081)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.126)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.124)
	2010	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	I	0.000 (0.074)	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.108)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.101)
Crime and disorder	2004	I	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.121)	C	C	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.114)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.264)
	2007	I	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.090)	C	C	C	S(+R)	0.000 (0.096)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.274)
	2010	I	I	S(+R)	S(+R)	0.000 (0.129)	C	C	C	S(+R)	0.000 (0.091)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(+R)	S(-R)	0.000 (0.217)

The analysis reported above is based on the proportion of LSOAs falling within England's worst 25 per cent. Results may differ at different levels of deprivation. The forthcoming figures therefore depict results for the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation by deprivation deciles. Detailed results of the per cent of LSOAs in England's most deprived 10 per cent and other deciles are given in Appendix Table A49. However, in order to facilitate the comparison between the district types, the decile results are presented here separately: first, for the three major district categories (i.e., 'inland', 'coastal', 'seaside'); and second, for the different coastal district types (i.e., 'coastal', 'seaside with resort', 'seaside without resort').

Figure 5.1 depicts the decile distribution of LSOAs across the three main district types of England. In the decile distribution, for England as a whole, there are 10% of LSOAs in each decile. If those districts that are defined as 'seaside' are reflective of England as a whole, they will have a similar proportion of LSOAs in each decile. If there are more than 10% of LSOAs in the most deprived decile then the 'seaside' districts are likely to be more deprived than England as a whole. If there are less than 10% of LSOAs in the most deprived decile, then the 'seaside' districts are likely to be less deprived than England as a whole. However, it is the overall pattern in the decile distribution that will determine whether the districts have similar or different levels of multiple deprivation than England in general.

It is apparent from Figure 5.1 that, while 'inland' districts contain a greater share of LSOAs in England's most deprived 10 per cent, LSOAs with very low levels of deprivation are also more prevalent in inland districts. In other words, although 'seaside' districts contain few LSOAs of extreme deprivation (i.e., deciles 1-2), they have few areas of very low deprivation. Rather, 'seaside' districts are characterised by strong over-representation of LSOAs with 'lowish' and 'middling' levels of deprivation (i.e., deciles 4-8).



Figure 5.1: Distribution of deprivation across 'inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside' districts, 2010

Source: Author's own work

Figure 5.2 shows the decile distribution of LSOAs across all three coastal district types. It can be seen that the districts defined in this study as 'seaside with resort' contain a higher proportion of LSOAs (10%) in the most deprived decile than 'coastal' (9.7%) and 'seaside without resort' (3.3%) districts. However, although the level of extreme multiple deprivation (i.e., deciles 1-2) in 'seaside with resort' districts is broadly similar with that of England as a whole, it is noticeable that, when viewed against other district types, 'seaside with resort' districts contain fewer LSOAs with very low levels of deprivation. Indeed, this district type had smaller proportions of LSOAs in the least deprived deciles (i.e., deciles 8-10). Another interesting finding is that there is a general downward trend, with a greater proportion of LSOAs in the fifth decile (13.6%) compared with the least deprived decile (3%). The two other district types followed broadly the same pattern, especially 'seaside without resort' districts. Overall, these results show that, while 'seaside with resort' and coastal' districts share similar levels of extreme multiple deprivation on a par with that of England, multiple deprivation varies considerably in the two seaside district types. However, although the overall deprivation pattern for both types of seaside district was not consistent across all deciles, 'seaside with resort' districts had a higher proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived decile.



Figure 5.2: Distribution of deprivation across 'coastal', 'seaside with resort' and 'seaside without resort' districts, 2010

Source: Author's own work

More in-depth examination of the overall index of multiple deprivation within 'seaside with resort' districts revealed that, of the 39 districts, 30 have at least one LSOA in the most deprived 10% of areas nationally (see Table 5.12). Thus, more than three quarters (77 per cent) of the districts contained localities that were extremely deprived. Ten of the 30 local authority districts are located in the South East region, eight in the South West, five in the North West, four in the East, with the other three districts located in the North East, Yorkshire and the Humber and the East Midlands. However, although it may appear at first glance that the Southeast 'seaside with resort' districts appear to be suffering more from severe multiple deprivation, when viewed against the total number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent for 'seaside with resort' districts as a whole, this number being 314, the Northwest (n=134, 42.7%) had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived 10% and, as such, these districts contain more of the LSOAs with the very highest levels of multiple deprivation in England. Second in rank is the Southeast (n=79, 25.2%), which is followed by the Southwest (n=41, 13.1%), the East (n=34, 10.8%), the Northeast (n=11, 3.5%), Yorkshire and the Humber (n=8, 2.5%) and the East Midlands (n=7, 2.2%). Indeed, the Northwest district of Blackpool was the local authority with the highest proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived decile of the

Index of Multiple Deprivation in both 2004 and 2010. Wirral, also in the North West, is the local authority with the largest number of LSOAs that are amongst the most deprived in 2010, this was also the case in 2004.

Perhaps the most striking result to emerge from the data in Table 5.12 is that, of the 30 'seaside with resort' districts, four have fewer LSOAs amongst the most deprived decile in 2010 than in 2004. Moreover, in relation to England, in 2004 the 30 local authorities with the highest proportions of deprived LSOAs accounted for 259 (8%) of the most deprived decile, which has risen to 314 (10%) in 2010. The number of local authorities with at least one LSOA in the most deprived decile in 2010 is 30 (8.5%), out of 354 authorities, compared to 28 (7.9%) in 2004.

Table 5.12: Seaside with resort districts with the highest proportion of their LSOAs in the most deprived decile of Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 and change since 2004

District	Region	All LSOAs in district	IMD 2010		Change from 2004	
			LSOAs in the most deprived 10%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 10%	Number of least deprived LSOAs	Percentage
Blackpool	NW	94	35	37.2	10	10.6
Hastings	SE	53	15	28.3	3	5.7
Wirral	NW	207	48	23.2	-4	-1.9
Great Yarmouth	E	61	13	21.3	2	3.3
Sefton	NW	190	35	18.4	-2	-1.1
Thanet	SE	84	14	16.7	4	4.8
Torbay	SW	89	12	13.5	8	9.0
Brighton and Hove	SE	164	19	11.6	5	3.0
Portsmouth	SE	123	14	11.4	1	0.8
Scarborough	Y&H	71	8	11.3	1	1.4
Lancaster	NW	89	10	11.2	2	2.2
South Tyneside	NE	103	11	10.7	-9	-8.7
Weymouth and Portland	SW	39	4	10.3	3	7.7
Bournemouth	SW	107	10	9.3	4	3.7
East Lindsey	EM	80	7	8.8	2	2.5
Wyre	NW	69	6	8.7	3	4.3
Eastbourne	SE	59	5	8.5	4	6.8
Southend-on-sea	E	107	9	8.4	4	3.7
Tendring	E	90	7	7.8	3	3.3
North Somerset	SW	124	9	7.3	4	3.2
Waveney	E	73	5	6.8	0	0
Shepway	SE	65	4	6.2	1	1.5
Penwith	SW	38	2	5.3	0	0
North Devon	SW	58	2	3.4	0	0
Rother	SE	58	2	3.4	2	3.4
Arun	SE	94	3	3.2	3	3.2
Sedgemoor	SE	68	2	2.9	1	1.5
Carrick	SW	58	1	1.7	1	1.7
Restormel	SW	64	1	1.6	-1	-1.6
Dover	SE	67	1	1.5	0	0
Berwick-upon-Tweed	NE	17	0	0	0	0
Canterbury	SE	90	0	0	0	0
Christchurch	SW	30	0	0	0	0
East Devon	SW	82	0	0	0	0
Fylde	NW	51	0	0	0	0
Isle of Wight	SE	89	0	0	0	0
Purbeck	SW	29	0	0	0	0
Teignbridge	SW	84	0	0	0	0
West Somerset	SW	23	0	0	0	0
Seaside districts		3,141	314	10	55	1.8

Note: Further summaries of the 2010, 2007 and 2004 overall Index of Multiple Deprivation are presented in Appendix Tables A50-52.

Source: Author's own work

5.1.3 Summary of district-level results

Section 5.1 of this chapter has sought to provide a factual overview for understanding multiple deprivation within 'seaside with resort' districts by comparing such districts, as a whole, to other district types in England. 'Inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside without resort' districts were used here in order to provide an understanding of 'seaside with resort' districts relative status nationally. The intention was not merely to assess how deprivation varies across different types of district, but to ascertain whether multiple deprivation corresponds to 'seaside with resort' districts and identify the districts which were experiencing significant problems.

Statistically significant differences in the level of deprivation across each of the summary indicators of multiple deprivation were observed when the upper and lower quartiles were combined (section 5.1.1). The degree, extent and local concentration of multiple deprivation was significantly lower in 'inland' and 'seaside without resort' districts than in 'seaside with resort' districts. However, the differences between 'seaside with resort' and 'coastal' districts were not statistically significant as both district types exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. Further analysis revealed that all districts in all regions, taking into account both deprived and less deprived LSOAs, as a whole are experiencing multiple deprivation.

With respect to the LSOA level indices of deprivation (section 5.1.2), as above, when the 'most deprived' and 'above' average quartiles were combined, 'coastal' districts and 'seaside with resort' districts both exhibited higher levels of deprivation than might be expected. The geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in 'seaside with resort' districts than in other district types, although this result changes when looking at the upper quartile. Here, while marginal, coastal and inland districts have a higher proportion of deprived areas than 'seaside with resort' districts. Perhaps the most striking finding to emerge from the data is that the overall level of multiple deprivation and the level across each of the separate domains of deprivation are of similar magnitude in inland districts. In contrast, there is more variation

in the nature of social deprivation across each type of coastal district. These results would seem to suggest that such local authorities face different types of deprivation. However, what can be said with a greater degree of certainty is, some aspects of deprivation are worse in 'seaside with resort' districts than other district types. In particular, deprivation of the quality of people's immediate surroundings both within and outside the home is more of an issue in 'seaside with resort' districts. Other dominant aspects of deprivation include, in order of their prevalence, low employment and poor health. The inferential statistics results revealed that higher levels of deprivation are associated with seaside districts that contain sizeable resorts as opposed to those seaside districts with smaller destinations. Moreover, these results indicate that, 'seaside with resort' districts, despite their high levels of multiple deprivation, actually compare quite favourably to coastal and inland districts on some but not all domains of deprivation. Looking at national deciles for the index of multiple deprivation, however, a disturbing result emerged. When viewed against other district types, 'seaside with resort' districts contained a greater share of LSOAs in England's most deprived 10 per cent and had fewer LSOAs with very low levels of deprivation.

The results of the district-level analysis provide a useful overview of the intensity and distribution of multiple deprivation in England, especially in coastal areas. However, the main goal of Section 5.1 was to determine whether multiple deprivation corresponds to 'seaside with resort' districts. It is clear from the results obtained from the analysis of the Indices of Deprivation data and presented here that multiple deprivation is a problem in such districts. Indeed, the results indicate that 'seaside with resort' districts are on average more acutely affected by multiple deprivation than 'inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside without resort' districts. The majority of districts defined as 'seaside with resort' are experiencing high levels of multiple deprivation. The form of multiple deprivation is, on average, as much widespread as it is concentrated, although this result differs when considering the upper quartile as a level of analysis. Here, 'seaside with resort' districts score overwhelming worse on the measure of local concentration.

Having explored some of the general characteristics of multiple deprivation in 'seaside with resort' districts at a general level in relation to other district types, the intention now is to take a detailed consideration of 'seaside with resort' districts at the local level. The next section therefore examines patterns of deprivation at the lower super output level within 'seaside with resort' districts, in order to establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social exclusion occur within seaside resorts.

5.2 Lower-level super output area analysis

The main aim of the analyses presented in this section is to establish the extent to which deprivation characteristics associated with social exclusion occur within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and severity of these characteristics. In pursuit of this goal, first, all lower level super output areas within each 'seaside with resort' district were categorised as 'resort' or 'other' depending on their correspondence with identifiable resort areas. The outcome of this exercise was that a total of 3,141 LSOAs comprised the 37 English 'seaside with resort' districts, of which 1,686 corresponded directly to 58 identifiable English seaside resorts and were coded as 'resort LSOAs', while the other 1,455 were labelled, 'other LSOAs'. Second, the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the seven indices of deprivation were recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases. Third, cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses against all of the seaside district's 'resort' and 'other' LSOAs were undertaken so that their association with deprivation may be ascertained. Full results of the chi-square tests performed are available in Appendix Tables A53-60. These results are summarised in Table 5.13. It is apparent from this table that all 24 tests are statistically very strongly significant at the $p = 0.001$ level.

Table 5.13: P values of the Pearson's chi-square test – deprivation level by settlement type

Deprivation level Domain		MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)
Overall IMD	2004	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.167)
	2007	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.165)
	2010	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.179)
Income	2004	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.200)
	2007	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.193)
	2010	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.204)
Employment	2004	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.190)
	2007	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.211)
	2010	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.216)
Health and disability	2004	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.223)
	2007	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.254)
	2010	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.274)
Living environment	2004	R	O	O	O	0.000 (0.117)
	2007	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.103)
	2010	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.096)
Barriers to housing and services	2004	O	O	R	R	0.000 (0.116)
	2007	O	R	R	O	0.000 (0.185)
	2010	O	R	R	O	0.000 (0.173)
Education	2004	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.090)
	2007	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.083)
	2010	R	R	O	O	0.000 (0.099)
Crime and disorder	2004	R	R	R	O	0.000 (0.244)
	2007	R	R	R	O	0.000 (0.277)
	2010	R	R	R	O	0.000 (0.298)

Note: The blue highlighted cells represent those LSOAs defined in this study as 'resort'. O = 'other LSOAs'.

Source: Author's own work

Examination of multiple deprivation at small area level within this study's 39 'seaside with resort' districts found that there are significant differences between the two settlement types as 'resort' areas exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. In 2010, a quarter of LSOAs in the sample fell within the upper quartile, but for 'resort' LSOAs the figure is higher at 30.8% and for 'other' LSOAs it is lower at 17.2%. Furthermore, the results, as shown in Table 5.13, indicate that the highest levels of deprivation, in terms of six out of seven aspects of disadvantage related to multiple deprivation, are more likely to be associated with seaside 'resort LSOAs' as opposed to 'other LSOAs' within the seaside districts. The only exception concerned the barriers to housing and services domain, which measures both the financial accessibility to housing and the physical accessibility to key local services including general practitioner premises, primary schools, post office branches and

supermarket/convenience stores. When compared with 'other' LSOAs, areas within the seaside resorts had better than expected access to such facilities and housing. This result is not surprising given that, in many cases, the 'other LSOAs' within 'seaside' districts were located in remote rural areas. Notwithstanding the latter, these findings suggests that not only are 'seaside with resort' districts associated with higher levels of multiple deprivation, but also within them, those areas that comprise the seaside resorts are shown to be where it is concentrated.

Further analysis of the LSOA level indicators of deprivation revealed: i) the overall distribution of deprivation for seaside resorts and how this compares with England; and, ii) the type and level of deprivation that resort LSOAs appear to be experiencing (see Figure 5.3). This analysis found that, for the index of multiple deprivation, seaside resorts had higher proportions of LSOAs in the 'most deprived' and 'above average' quartiles than England overall. A similar pattern is evident with respect to the following deprivation domains: employment; health and disability; living environment; income; and, education, training and skills (in order of their prevalence in the upper quartile). Thus, five out of seven LSOA-level domains had more than the England average of LSOAs in the upper two quartiles in 2010. When viewed against the proportion of resort LSOAs in the upper quartiles for the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, this being 64.1%, it is apparent that 'health and disability' (73.4%), 'employment' (70.4%) and 'income' (65.7%) were greater problems in English seaside resorts compared to 'living environment' (60.6%) and 'education, skills and training' (59.2%) deprivation, while access to housing and services and crime were much less prevalent. Indeed, with respect to the latter two indicators of deprivation, there was a greater proportion of LSOAs in the least deprived quartiles, compared with the two most deprived quartiles. Moreover, the proportion of LSOAs which fell within each deprivation quartile in the crime domain and to a lesser extent, the access domain, was more evenly distributed and therefore more reflective of England as a whole. Thus, although the overall deprivation pattern for the seaside resorts was not consistent across all domains, the deprivation levels for five out of seven domains were found to be broadly similar to that of the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation.



Figure 5.3: Distribution of 'resort' LSOAs by deprivation quartile against domains, 2010
Source: Author's own work

Before proceeding to examine changes in deprivation between 2004 and 2010, it will be necessary to reflect on the relationship between the domain ranks and the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation. The reason is because the evidence presented so far suggests that multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts might be characterised by poor health and disability, high unemployment rates, low income households, poor environment conditions and low educational attainment rates. In order to test this evidence as well as the correspondence between the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the other individual domains, a series of 'scatterplots' (see Appendix Figures A1-7) of the 1,686 resort LSOAs were produced. A scatterplot visually represents the correspondence between two variables – in this instance the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation (plotted on the horizontal axes) and each of the seven domains (plotted on the vertical axes). Each scatterplot provides a value '*r*', which is also known as a Pearson product moment 'correlation coefficient'. The correlation coefficient varies from 0, where no relationship between the variables is found, to -1 or 1 where a perfect linear relationship between the variables occurs. Thus, it also provides information not only about the strength of the relationship, but also the direction of the relationship, which can be positive, negative or zero. When high values on one factor are associated with high values on the other factor, and low values on one factor are associated with low values on the other factor, the direction of the relationship is positive. A negative relationship is where a higher value in one

factor implies a lower value in the other. Coefficients lying more towards 0 (either positive or negative) indicate little or no statistical relationship between the variables under investigation. The results of the correlation analysis are displayed in Table 5.14.

Given the weight allocated to income (22.5%) and employment (22.5%) deprivation in the calculation of the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation score, it is not surprising to find that these two domains are most strongly associated with the IMD2010. The correspondence of overall deprivation with health and education deprivation and crime is somewhat weaker (domain weights of 13.5%, 13.5% and 9.3% respectively). The relationship with living environment and barriers to housing and services is weaker still (domain weights of 9.3% and 9.3% respectively). To put it another way, environmental conditions and geographical access to services and housing affordability have a much weaker association with overall deprivation in English seaside resorts. In summary, these results indicate that areas that rank highly on the overall Index of Multiple deprivation also tend to rank highly on the income, employment, health, education and crime domains. It would therefore seem that seaside resorts with a relatively high level of multiple deprivation are also likely to be characterised by disadvantage in the before mentioned aspects of deprivation, although the characteristics of each affected resort may differ. Moreover, as there are obvious links between the deprivation types, it also appears that seaside resorts are suffering from social exclusion.

Table 5.14: Correlation coefficients between IMD and domain ranks in seaside resorts

Overall IMD2010 with Income Domain	0.96
Overall IMD2010 with Employment Domain	0.95
Overall IMD2010 with Health Domain	0.88
Overall IMD2010 with Education Domain	0.78
Overall IMD2010 with Crime & Disorder Domain	0.74
Overall IMD2010 with Living Environment Domain	0.63
Overall IMD2010 with Barriers to Housing/Services Domain	0.24

Note: Correlations are significant at the p = <0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Author's own work

5.2.1 Changes since 2004 and 2010 at LSOA level

Finally, in order to provide as comprehensive an insight as possible to the problems of English seaside resorts, the remainder of this section considers how resort LSOAs have changed in recent years, by means of looking more closely at changes in the Indices of Deprivation between 2004 and 2010. Indeed, as the English Indices of Deprivation 2010 are based on broadly the same methodology as the previous versions, and as the total number of LSOAs in England has remained the same, it is possible to compare the current pattern of deprivation with the pattern in 2004. When comparing the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation for 2004 with 2010, the levels of deprivation in the seaside resorts were broadly similar (see Table 5.15). That said in 2010 the overall distribution of LSOAs was a little more widely spread than in 2004, with a smaller proportion of LSOAs in the more deprived quartiles (64.5% in 2004 compared with 64.1% in 2010) and a greater proportion of LSOAs in the lesser deprived quartiles (35.5% in 2004 compared with 35.9% in 2010). More in-depth examination, however, of the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation at LSOA level revealed the movement of resort LSOAs across national quartile groups between 2004 and 2010. Table 5.15 illustrates this movement and shows that approximately four-in-five (81.7%) LSOAs remained in the same quartile, 8.7 per cent (147 areas) became relatively less deprived (went into a higher numbered quartile) and 9.5 per cent (161 areas) became relatively more deprived (went into a lower numbered quartile). Summarising this movement, it can be said that overall there has been a slight deterioration in the seaside resorts deprivation status relative to other areas in England, with a greater proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived quartile (30.8% in 2010 compared with 28.4% in 2004).

Table 5.15: Cross tabulation of resort LSOAs in IMD quartiles in 2004 and 2010

	IMD2004				
IMD2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	448	71			519 (30.8%)
AA	32	478	51		561 (33.3%)
BA		60	311	39	410 (24.3%)
LD			55	141	196 (11.6%)
	480 (28.4%)	609 (36.1%)	417 (24.7%)	180 (10.8%)	1,686 (100%)

Note: Cells shaded yellow represent resort LSOAs where there was no change in quartile grouping between 2004 and 2010. Green indicates a movement to lesser deprivation, red indicates a movement to more deprivation.

Source: Author's own work

Quartile composition change was also investigated for the LSOA indicators of deprivation (although they have not been presented here in the interests of space and clarity). Detailed cross-tabulations are given in Appendix Table A61. The results, as summarised in Table 5.16, indicate that overall seaside resorts have become relatively more deprived on five out of the seven LSOA-level domains of deprivation. The differences between the results of the Indices of Deprivation 2010 and 2004 are mostly fairly moderate, though there have been some notable changes. First, there are increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived 50% in the health and disability, living environment, access and education domains, which must contribute to the increased relative deprivation noted earlier. Second, with respect to the before mentioned domains, the crime domain and to a lesser extent, employment, the changes have been somewhat erratic. As can be seen from the data in Appendix Table A61, the resort LSOAs which improved or worsened have done so by more than one quartile and, in many cases, by three quartiles. Even though the indices of deprivation are about relative deprivation not absolute changes, such changes in deprivation levels of resort LSOAs cannot be due to the improvement or worsening of deprivation rankings of other small areas elsewhere in England alone. Indeed, the remarkable changes in deprivation levels, both positive and negative, might lead one to infer that resort-level influences in general and neighbourhood factors in particular are instrumental in shaping the fortunes of the resort LSOAs.

Table 5.16: Comparison of Indices of Deprivation 2004 and 2010: Resort LSOAs

Domain	% of LSOAs that are:			Overall change from 2004	% of LSOAs in upper quartiles:		Change from 2004
	Similar	Getting worse	Getting better		2004	2010	
Health	68.4	21.2	10.4	-10.8	68.7	73.4	4.7
Living environment	74.0	17.2	8.8	-8.4	57.5	60.6	3.1
Housing and services	52.9	26.2	20.9	-5.3	43.5	48.4	4.9
Education	78.2	13.2	8.6	-4.6	56.7	59.2	2.5
Crime and disorder	55.9	23.8	20.3	-3.5	45.3	46.2	0.9
Employment	77.3	10.6	12.1	1.5	73.3	70.4	-2.9
Income	79.9	8.5	11.6	3.1	66.6	65.7	-0.9

Note: Green indicates a movement to lesser deprivation, red indicates a movement to more deprivation

Source: Author's own work

Lastly, considering now briefly national percentiles and in particular, upper deciles, gives a better impression (compared to national quartiles) of the extent and severity of deprivation. It is apparent from the data in Table 5.17 that, when comparing the number of LSOAs in the first two deciles, deprivation in English seaside resorts has increased both in extent (number) and concentration (severity), with 37 more (2.2% more) LSOAs being in the 20% most deprived nationally since 2004. Moreover, there has been an increase in resort LSOAs in the most deprived 10% of areas nationally – 12.3% of LSOAs in 2010 fell into the most deprived 10 per cent compared to 8.8% in 2004 and 10.1% in 2007. Again, a comparison of the Index Multiple Deprivation data for 2004 and 2010 at LSOA level reveals not only did seaside resorts generally have greater levels of deprivation than the rest of England in 2010, but also that seaside resorts as a whole have become relatively more deprived.

Table 5.17: Change in distribution of resort LSOAs by IMD percentiles, 2004 and 2010

	Most deprived ←					→ Least deprived	
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	50-100%	Total
Number of resort LSOAs falling into national percentiles							
IMD 2004	148	214	249	260	218	597	1,686
IMD 2010	207	192	249	232	200	606	1,686
Change	59	-22	0	-28	-18	9	
Percentage of resort LSOAs falling into national percentiles							
IMD 2004	8.8	12.7	14.8	15.4	12.9	35.4	100
IMD 2010	12.3	11.4	14.8	13.8	11.9	36	100
Change	3.5	-1.3	0	-1.6	-1	0.6	

Note: The % of resort LSOAs in each decile group for 2004, 2007 and 2010 is given in Appendix Table A62.
Source: Author's own work

5.2.2 Summary of LSOA-level results

Section 5.2 of this chapter employed bivariate analysis using cross-tabulations and statistical tests at small area level within this study's 39 'seaside with resort' districts to illuminate variations in the incidence of a number of key deprivation-related variables. This analysis found that, within the seaside 'resort LSOAs', in addition to the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, six out of the seven LSOA-level domains (employment, income, health and disability, living environment, crime and disorder and education, skills and training) recorded an observed significance value of < 0.001. **These results indicate that the highest levels of deprivation are associated with seaside 'resort LSOAs' as opposed to 'other LSOAs' within the districts defined as 'seaside with resort'.** Further interrogation of the LSOA-level data revealed the type and level of deprivation that 'resort LSOAs' seem to be experiencing. This examination showed that seaside resorts had greater levels of deprivation than England as a whole with respect to: employment; health and disability; living environment; income; and, education, training and skills. In light of these findings, a Pearson's product moment correlation were used to determine the correspondence between overall deprivation as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation and each specific 'domain' of deprivation for all resort LSOAs. The results of the statistical analysis show highly significant positive associations (p = < 0.01) between the index of multiple deprivation and the seven domains. Moreover, some strong positive relationships were found to exist. Resort areas that score highly

on the overall index of multiple deprivation also tend to score highly on the income (r = 0.96) employment (r = 0.95), health (r = 0.88), education (r = 0.78) and crime (r = 0.74) domains. Due to the linked nature of the problems being experienced, it can therefore be assumed that social exclusion is very much an issue within English seaside resorts.

Changes in levels of deprivation also were explored with reference to the 2004 and 2010 versions of the Indices of Deprivation. Even though a relatively short time frame, it offers an important insight into where positive and negative change is occurring. Analysis of quartile composition change demonstrated that for the Index of Multiple deprivation and for five out of seven deprivation domains (health and disability, living environment, housing and services, education and crime and disorder), overall seaside resorts had become relatively more deprived. Since 2004, there had been a slight improvement in the proportion of resorts LSOAs suffering from income and employment deprivation. However, (along with health and disability) employment and income still remain the more pressing aspects of deprivation in seaside resorts, as indicated by the per cent of LSOAs in the upper quartiles. With respect to the erratic (+/-) changes that have occurred, as quartile groupings are broader and therefore they are less subject to minor change, it is contended here that resort-level and neighbourhood effects must influence multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts. The changes cannot be due to the relative nature of the Indices of Deprivation database alone. Another striking result to emerge from the data is that, in relation to national percentiles and in particular, the most deprived 20% and 10% of LSOAs in England on the Index of Multiple Deprivation, overall deprivation has increased both in extent (number) and concentration (severity). This finding is particularly disturbing as it suggests not only are seaside resorts suffering from acute levels of multiple deprivation, but also the problem is deepening.

Taken together, these results provide a useful overview of the nature, intensity and distribution of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts. Further insight may be gained, and the formulation of remedial policies advanced, by investigating the variation in multiple deprivation between and within seaside resorts. The section that follows seeks to address this important objective.

5.3 Resort-level analysis

The analysis presented so far has related to seaside resorts as a whole. This section of the chapter presents findings on the variation in multiple deprivation between and within seaside resorts. The analysis is split into three sections here. First, there is further investigation of the severity of multiple deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts. Second, there is an assessment of whether there are "true" differences in deprivation between the larger and mid-sized seaside resorts. Third, there is a more in-depth examination of deprivation within the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. Here, the resorts are compared with each other, to see if there are any differences in the patterns of deprivation. A summary of the results of all the above mentioned analyses is then provided.

5.3.1 Experience of multiple deprivation in seaside resorts

This study found that the 1,686 'resort LSOAs' related to 58 seaside resorts and that more than four-in-five resorts (86.2%) have at least one LSOA in the upper quartile of most deprived LSOAs of England when tested against the index of multiple deprivation at LSOA level (see Table 5.18). With the exception of the access to housing and services domain and to a lesser extent, crime, a similar pattern is evident for the seven other domains. These findings reinforce the foregoing analysis that the majority of seaside resorts appear to be experiencing similar types of multiple deprivation, which when linked together relate to social exclusion.

Table 5.18: Number of resorts with at least one LSOA in the upper quartile

Domain	2010	2004	Change since 2004
Index of Multiple Deprivation	50	48	2
Employment	54	53	1
Income	51	52	-1
Education, skills and training	51	50	1
Health and disability	50	47	3
Living environment	50	52	-2
Crime and disorder	43	36	7
Barriers to housing and services	42	41	1

Source: Author's own work

As explained in the methodology, the Indices of Deprivation allow examination of the composition of deprivation in an area. Taking the most deprived 25% (upper quartile) of resort LSOAs on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010, it is possible to ascertain the number of component domains on which each resort LSOA ranks within the most deprived 25% of LSOAs nationally. The results obtained from this detailed investigation are summarised in Table 5.19. This table is quite revealing in several ways. First, thirty-one of the most deprived 519 resort LSOAs on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on all seven component domains. Second, the majority (55.7%) of the 519 resort LSOAs rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on five or more domains. Third, almost all (98.1%) of the 519 resort LSOAs rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on three or more domains. Fourth, all of the 519 resort LSOAs rank in the most deprived 25% of LSOAs on at least two domains.

Table 5.19: Number of domains on which the most deprived 25% of resort LSOAs are in the most deprived quartile, 2010

Number of domains	Number of LSOAs (Number of resorts)	Percentage of LSOAs	Cumulative percentage of LSOAs
7	31 (7)	6.0	6.0
6	117 (27)	22.5	28.5
5	141 (38)	27.2	55.7
4	146 (45)	28.1	83.8
3	74 (30)	14.3	98.1
2	10 (8)	1.9	100.0
1	0	0.0	100.0
0	0	0.0	100.0
Total	519 (50)	100.0	

Note: Refer to the Indices of Seaside Resort Performance for details of the LSOAs deprived by number of domains.

Source: Author's own work

Thus, many of the most deprived seaside resort areas in England face multiple issues with the majority of these LSOAs amongst the most deprived in at least three of the seven composite domains in the Indices, and over half being amongst the most deprived in at least five of the domains. Based on the latter measure, a number of seaside resorts were identified also as experiencing particular problems of multiple deprivation. In all, 289 LSOAs fell into this classification and are located within 39 individual resorts, which are located within 30 (out

of 39) seaside districts scattered around England. Table 5.20 lists the 39 most deprived seaside resorts ranked by number of LSOAs. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that, thirteen seaside resorts had more than 25% of their neighbourhoods affected by deprivation. Furthermore, seven seaside resorts had a third or more of their small areas suffering from deprivation. The seven seaside resorts are (in order of their prevalence) Margate, Blackpool, Hastings, Ilfracombe, Dover, Fleetwood and Skegness. None of these resorts share the same seaside district and all are situated in different regions of England.

Table 5.20: Particularly deprived English seaside resorts, 2010

Resort		Size	'Seaside' district	Region	Number of LSOAs in most deprived quartile on five or more LSOA level domains	Total number of LSOAs within the seaside resort	
						(n)	(%)
Blackpool	*(22)	L	Blackpool	NW	44	94	46.8
Brighton	*(3)	L	Brighton and Hove	SE	28	101	27.7
Hastings		L	Hastings	SE	23	53	43.4
Bournemouth	*(1)	L	Bournemouth	SW	16	107	15.0
Southend-on-Sea		L	Southend-on-Sea	E	15	107	14.0
Margate	*(1)	L	Thanet	SE	13	27	48.1
Scarborough		L	Scarborough	Y&H	11	34	32.4
Great Yarmouth		L	Great Yarmouth	E	11	36	30.6
Torquay	*(1)	L	Torbay	SW	11	43	25.6
Eastbourne	*(2)	L	Eastbourne	SE	10	59	16.9
Folkestone		L	Shepway	SE	9	31	29.0
Weston-s-mare		L	North Somerset	SW	8	48	16.7
Lowestoft		L	Waveney	E	7	42	16.7
Dover		M	Dover	SE	6	18	33.3
Fleetwood		M	Wyre	NW	6	18	33.3
Ramsgate		L	Thanet	SE	6	26	23.1
Clacton-on-Sea		L	Tendring	E	6	32	18.8
Morecambe		M	Lancaster	NW	5	21	23.8
South Shields		L	South Tyneside	NE	5	55	9.1
Hove		L	Brighton and Hove	SE	5	63	7.9
Skegness		M	East Lindsey	EM	4	12	33.3
Penzance		M	Penwith	SW	4	13	30.8
Littlehampton	*(1)	M	Arun	SE	4	17	23.5
Weymouth		L	Weymouth & Portland	SW	4	31	12.9
Ilfracombe		M	North Devon	SW	3	8	37.5
Bexhill-on-Sea		L	Rother	SE	3	28	10.7
Southsea		L	Portsmouth	SE	3	32	9.4
Paignton		L	Torbay	SW	3	34	8.8
Heysham		M	Lancaster	NW	2	11	18.2
Bognor Regis		M	Arun	SE	2	15	13.3
Ryde		M	Isle of Wight	SE	2	16	12.5
Whitstable		M	Canterbury	SE	2	21	9.5
Herne Bay		M	Canterbury	SE	2	23	8.7
Whitby		M	Scarborough	Y&H	1	9	11.1
Brixham		M	Torbay	SW	1	12	8.3
Burnham-on-Sea		M	Sedgemoor	SW	1	12	8.3
Thorton-Cleveleys		M	Wyre	NW	1	21	4.8
Crosby		L	Sefton	NW	1	32	3.1
Southport		L	Sefton	NW	1	60	1.7

Notes:

1) Resorts highlighted in yellow had more than 25% of their neighbourhoods affected by multiple deprivation
2) * (n) denotes resorts that had LSOAs rank among the 25% most deprived nationally on all seven deprivation domains (and the number of LSOAs).

Source: Author's own work

5.3.2 Multiple deprivation and resort size

The research question addressed in this section is whether or not there is a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation. To answer this question, the 58 seaside resorts were classified as either 'large' or 'mid-sized' based on resident population. Using the 2001 census population figures at LSOA level, the 'large' resorts are those which had a population more than or equal to 40,000; the 'mid-sized' resorts are defined as those which had a population between 10,000 and 39,999. Employing this population threshold revealed that, of the 1,686 resort LSOAs, 1,235 LSOAs corresponded to 25 'large' seaside resorts, while the other 451 related to 33 'mid-sized' resorts. After determining the population size of the resorts, the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the seven indices of deprivation were recoded into national quartiles based on their rankings calculated in the respective Indices of Deprivation databases. Cross-tabulations and Pearson chi-square analyses against all of the 'large' and 'medium' resort LSOAs were then undertaken so that their association with deprivation may be ascertained. More specifically, chi-square tests were conducted to compare the percentages for large/medium resort LSOAs with the percentage of the total column across each deprivation quartile. Cross tabulations of deprivation quartiles with resort size as a binary variable are given in Appendix Tables A63–70. These results are summarised in Table 5.21.

The results, as shown in Table 5.21, indicate that, although both the large and the medium-sized seaside resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, the highest levels of multiple deprivation are associated with 'large resort LSOAs' ($p = < 0.001$). In 2010, 30.8% resort LSOAs fell within the upper quartile, but for 'large resort LSOAs' the figure is higher at 33.8% and for 'medium resort LSOAs' it is lower at 22.6%. A similar pattern is evident not only for both the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 and the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004, but also for each of the seven LSOA-level domains (see Figure 5.4). It can be seen from this figure that the medium-sized seaside resorts have lower levels of deprivation compared with large seaside resorts as shown by a smaller percentage of LSOAs in the most deprived quartile. However, differences in the extent of deprivation across the domains

vary in magnitude. The differences between resort size categories are greater for health and disability deprivation (15.2%), crime (8.8%), education, training and skills deprivation (8.4%), living environment deprivation (8.4%) and employment deprivation (8.2%), while barriers to housing and services (3.7%) and income deprivation (2.8%) are less significant in terms of size. With regard to the extant literature and the general hypothesis that medium (and small) sized resorts were more likely to have higher levels of multiple deprivation, there was weak support (although this study did not include seaside destinations with populations below 10,000). This study found that, overall, medium-sized seaside resorts are less deprived than their larger counterparts.

Table 5.21: P values of the Pearson's chi-square test – deprivation level by resort size

Deprivation level Domain		MD	AA	BA	LD	Sig-level (C.V)
Overall IMD	2004	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.118)
	2007	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.122)
	2010	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.120)
Income	2004	L	M	M	M	0.012 (0.081)
	2007	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.110)
	2010	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.128)
Employment	2004	L	M	L	M	0.072 NS
	2007	L	M	M	M	0.090 NS
	2010	L	M	M	M	0.008 (0.084)
Health and disability	2004	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.125)
	2007	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.147)
	2010	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.171)
Living environment	2004	L	M	M	M	0.008 (0.084)
	2007	L	M	M	M	0.000 (0.123)
	2010	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.108)
Barriers to housing and services	2004	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.148)
	2007	M	L	L	M	0.000 (0.118)
	2010	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.116)
Education, skills and training	2004	L	M	M	L	0.002 (0.095)
	2007	L	M	M	L	0.002 (0.002)
	2010	L	M	M	L	0.000 (0.106)
Crime and disorder	2004	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.231)
	2007	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.279)
	2010	L	L	M	M	0.000 (0.176)

Note: L = 'large', M = 'medium' resort LSOAs. Cells are shaded blue simply to aid comparison.

Source: Author's own work



Figure 5.4: Indices of Deprivation domain quartile distribution of LSOAs for the 'medium' sized English seaside resorts, the 'large' seaside resorts and England, 2010

Source: Author's own work

Having established that people living in large seaside resorts do generally face higher levels of multiple deprivation than those living in medium-sized resorts, it now needs to be ascertained whether the nature of multiple deprivation is similar in both large and medium-sized resorts. As before with the LSOA-level analysis of resorts as a whole, the correlation between the Index of Multiple Deprivation rank and the individual domain ranks, this time for the 1,235 'large resort LSOAs' and 451 'medium resort LSOAs', was calculated. Table 5.22

reports the correlation coefficients between the variables for ‘large’ and ‘medium’ resorts. The overall correlation coefficients (i.e., medium-sized and large resorts combined) are also presented for comparison and context. As can be seen, the great majority of domains are positively correlated to the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation. There is strong positive correlation between the multiple deprivation measure and income, employment, health, education and crime. The correlation is at least 0.72 for these five deprivation measures in both the ‘large’ and the ‘medium’ resorts, which is consistent with resorts as a whole. Living environment also has a positive correlation with multiple deprivation. The degree of association, however, is not as strong in large resorts compared with medium-sized resorts. Perhaps the most striking result to emerge from the data comparison is that the relationship between overall deprivation and barriers to housing and services is confined to large resorts. Withstanding the latter, these findings suggest that both the ‘large’ and the ‘medium’ seaside resorts are experiencing similar types of multiple deprivation and as there are obvious links between deprivation types, it also appears that they both are suffering from social exclusion.

Table 5.22: Correlation coefficients (*r*) between Index of Multiple Deprivation and deprivation domains

Deprivation domain	**All resorts**	**Large resorts**	**Medium resorts**
Income	0.96	0.96	0.97
Employment	0.95	0.95	0.95
Health	0.88	0.88	0.85
Education	0.78	0.78	0.79
Crime & Disorder	0.74	0.74	0.72
Living Environment	0.63	0.59	0.72
Barriers to Housing/Services	0.24	0.30	0.00

Note:
1. Correlations are significant at the p = <0.01 level (2-tailed).
2. *r* = 1.0 equates to identical rankings; -1.0 to perfectly inverted rankings

Source: Author’s own work

The remainder of this section gives a summary of changes between the Indices of Deprivation 2004 and 2010. The proportion of ‘large’ and ‘medium’ resort LSOAs that fall within national quartiles is shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 respectively. As can be seen, the

differences between the results of the Indices of Deprivation 2010 and 2004 are mostly fairly minor. Considering first the Index of Multiple Deprivation, the levels of deprivation were broadly similar in both the larger and medium-sized resorts. Since 2004, there has been a slight contraction in the proportion of LSOAs classed nationally as above average deprived (i.e., quartiles one and two) and a slight expansion in the proportion classed nationally as below average deprived (i.e., quartiles three and four). Nonetheless, there remain high levels of multiple deprivation, with increases in the proportion of LSOAs populating the upper quartiles in both the large and the medium-sized seaside resorts. When inspecting the data for the domains, in the larger seaside resorts there were increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived quartiles on five out of the seven domains (health, living environment, income, education and housing and services). The crime domain and, to a much lesser extent, employment, became more evenly distributed when comparing 2004 with 2007, with a slight contraction in the proportion of LSOAs exhibiting a level of deprivation in the upper quartiles. The domains which had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the upper quartiles in both 2004 and 2010 were the 'health deprivation and disability' domain and the 'employment deprivation' domain. The latter domain had the greatest proportion of all domains in 2004 (73.4% compared with 71.1% for the 'health deprivation and disability' domain) whereas the former had the greatest proportion of all domains in 2010 (77.5% compared with 72.2% for the 'employment deprivation' domain).

Regarding the medium-sized seaside resorts, there were increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived quartiles on all but one of the seven deprivation domains, this exception being employment. The domains which had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the upper quartiles in both 2004 and 2010 were, in order of their prevalence in 2004, 'employment deprivation', 'health deprivation and disability' and 'income deprivation'. However, income deprivation became the more pressing aspect of deprivation in 2010, followed by health and employment deprivation. It is important to bear in mind the differences between the results, as measured by the percentage change, are minor. Perhaps the most striking observation of the data comparison is that crime and the barriers to housing and services domain had

overwhelmingly more than 50% of LSOAs in the lower quartiles as a whole in both 2004 and 2010, although since 2004 there were increases in the proportion of LSOAs in the upper quartiles.

Summarising these findings, it can be said that overall the ‘large’ seaside resorts have become relatively more deprived on five of the domains, whereas the ‘medium’ seaside resorts have become relatively more deprived on six of the domains. Across most aspects of deprivation, the medium-sized seaside resorts were more similar to England than the larger seaside resorts. It is clear that the larger seaside resorts have the highest levels of deprivation.



Figure 5.5: Indices of Deprivation domain quartile distribution for the large English seaside resorts and England, 2004 and 2010

Source: Author's own work



Figure 5.6: Indices of Deprivation domain quartile distribution for the medium-sized English seaside resorts and England, 2004 and 2010

Source: Author's own work

5.3.3 Deprivation in large and mid-sized seaside resorts

This section considers in more detail the different dimensions of deprivation in the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts. It begins by investigating whether the levels of multiple deprivation are similar between the resorts. At this stage, in order to gain a meaningful insight into differences in deprivation, the 'large' and the 'medium' resort LSOAs are grouped together based on national deprivation quintiles (as opposed to quartiles). However, the matter of establishing how deprived the larger and the mid-sized seaside resorts are is only one part of the story. It is also important to consider how deprivation manifests itself. Here, the variation between the resorts is further explored by calculating the average rank of the LSOAs in each seaside resort on the Index of Multiple Deprivation and domains, which provides a basis for subsequent analysis to identify the pattern of multiple deprivation in seaside resorts.

Looking at national deprivation quintiles first of all, this study found that there was no consistent pattern of deprivation among the 25 larger seaside resorts and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts in 2010 when tested against the Index of Multiple Deprivation, in terms of the proportion of LSOAs within each resort falling in the most deprived and the least deprived 20% of LSOAs in England. Put another way, there is variation in the levels of multiple deprivation in the resorts. Consider Figure 5.7, which shows the 25 larger seaside resorts and their local LSOAs split by Index of Multiple Deprivation rank national quintiles. A total of 324 (26.2%) 'large resort LSOAs' fall within the most deprived 20% nationally. However, these LSOAs are not distributed evenly. Although all 25 of the larger seaside resorts had an LSOA exhibiting a level of multiple deprivation in England's most deprived 20%, every one of the first 15 resorts on the list down as far as Southend-on-Sea had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. Moreover, a number of the 15 resorts had at least a third of their LSOAs being 'most deprived'. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that, while the vast majority of resorts do not have many areas with very low levels of multiple deprivation, only one resort (Clacton-on-Sea) is without an LSOA exhibiting a level of deprivation in the two least deprived quintiles. Another interesting observation is that two resorts (i.e., Southend-on-Sea, Crosby)

have a broadly equal proportion of LSOAs in each deprivation quintile and represent a mirror image of England.

Figure 5.8 shows that distribution of LSOAs by deprivation quintiles differs greatly between mid-sized resorts too. None of the individual 33 mid-sized resorts display a pattern of deprivation similar to England as a whole. Considering the upper quintile, a total of 75 (16.6%) 'medium resort LSOAs' fall within the most deprived 20% nationally, but correspond to 22 (out of 33) resorts, of which every one of the first 10 resorts on the list down as far as Falmouth had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. When viewed against the total number of seaside resorts in each size category, the larger seaside resorts (15/25) had higher levels of multiple deprivation than England, double the proportion of mid-sized seaside resorts (10/33). However, when comparing Figure 5.8 with Figure 5.7, it can be seen that the geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in three of the mid-sized resorts (Skegness, Dover, Heysham) than any of the large resorts. It is necessary to emphasise that five medium-sized seaside resorts (i.e., West Kirby, Swanage, Sidmouth, Formby, Clevedon) had no LSOAs in the two most deprived quintiles. Thus, there are more mid-sized resorts with many areas of very low deprivation. Taken together, these results indicate that there is more variation in the levels of deprivation in mid-sized seaside resorts.



Figure 5.7: Index of Multiple Deprivation quintile distribution for the 'large' seaside resorts and England, 2010

Source: Author's own work



Figure 5.8: Index of Multiple Deprivation quintile distribution for mid-sized seaside resorts and England, 2010

Source: Author's own work

The analysis so far has been based on the quintile distribution of LSOAs for the seaside resorts. Inevitably, this approach provides a difficult pattern to interpret. A single measure to compare the seaside resorts is required to facilitate further investigation. One way to compare the seaside resorts in terms of deprivation is to use the median rank for the Index of Multiple Deprivation and then rank the resorts by this measure. Figure 5.9 summarises the range of LSOA rankings within each resort. The resorts are ranked from lowest to highest on the basis of the median LSOA rank; the median ($\tilde{x}$) is the 'middle' LSOA with half the LSOAs ranked above and below. Ranks range from 1 to 32,482 and the black line running across the centre of the diagram indicates the middle of this range – the dividing line between more and less deprived LSOAs. Median values below the black line indicate that a resort is more deprived than the national average while those above it indicate that a resort is less deprived. It is clear there is considerable variation in the overall level of deprivation between resorts. The least deprived resort, West Kirby ($\tilde{x}$ = 25,168), has almost all of its range lying above the national average ($\tilde{x}$ = 16,242), while the most deprived resort, Skegness ($\tilde{x}$ = 5,175), has most of its range lying below the average. Other resorts fall between these two and the order is interesting in its own right. As can be seen, many seaside resorts (24/58, 41.3%) have a wide spread of rankings and contain LSOAs in the most and least deprived 20% of areas nationally. Moreover, the vast majority of seaside resorts (42/58, 72.4%) have greater overall deprivation than the England average (i.e., a ranking below 16,242). Although an equal number of large and mid-sized resorts fall into this classification, when viewed against the total number of resorts in each size category, the larger resorts score worse than mid-sized ones. 63.4 per cent (21/33) of the mid-sized seaside resorts had higher levels of deprivation than the England average. The corresponding figure for larger seaside resorts is 84 per cent (21/25).



Figure 5.9: Range of LSOA ranks on Index of Multiple Deprivation for seaside resorts, 2010 *Source:* Author's own work

The median rank is a better measure than the average (i.e., arithmetic mean) rank which can be distorted by extreme values. However, the analysis reported in Figure 5.9 does not take account of the difference in population size between LSOAs in each resort. Consequently, it only provides indicative data on resort level deprivation. Thus, the average LSOA rank for each of the seaside resorts was calculated following the methodology used by the DCLG when calculating the ranks for local authorities. The average ranking of each resort is a population-weighted average of the ranking of each constituent LSOA. The derived rankings for the 58 seaside resorts by deprivation measure can be seen in Appendix Table A71. As before, a low rank indicates higher deprivation; a high rank indicates lower deprivation. There are 32,482 LSOAs across England as a whole. Accordingly, an average ranking between 1 and 16,242 indicates that a resort is more deprived than the national average. An average ranking below 8,120 indicates that a resort is among the most deprived in England. Table 5.23 presents the summary statistics for the 58 seaside resorts, 33 mid-sized resorts and 25 large resorts by deprivation domain.

Table 5.23: Number and per cent of seaside resorts with above average levels of deprivation

	Number (and per cent) of resorts that have greater deprivation than the English average			Number of resorts that exhibit a level of deprivation in the most deprived national quartile		
Domain	**Total**	**Large resorts**	**Medium Resorts**	**Total**	**Large resorts**	**Medium Resorts**
Index of Multiple Deprivation	41 (71)	21 (84)	20 (61)	2	1	1
Employment	47 (81)	23 (92)	24 (73)	10	5	5
Health and disability	46 (79)	23 (92)	23 (70)	8	4	4
Income	44 (75)	23 (92)	21 (64)	2	1	1
Education, skills and training	40 (69)	18 (72)	22 (67)	6	3	3
Living environment	37 (64)	19 (76)	18 (55)	7	2	5
Crime and disorder	25 (43)	14 (56)	10 (30)	1	1	0
Barriers to housing and services	25 (43)	12 (48)	13 (39)	2	1	1

Source: Author's own work

However, the intention here is not to evaluate how the resorts fare on the individual deprivation domains and relate to England as a whole. Rather, it is to illuminate the variation in domain rankings with respect to the overall Index of Deprivation between and within the

large and mid-sized seaside resorts. In this analysis, the domains within the Indices of Deprivation are split into two groups. In the first assessing the income, employment, and education, skills and training domains, as these three domains offer a guide to the more 'economic' dimension of exclusion in seaside resorts, and the second analysing the other four domains, which relate to the more 'social' and 'neighbourhood' dimensions of exclusion. This decision to divide the seven deprivation domains into the before mentioned groups both for the large and the mid-sized resorts reflects a pragmatic approach. As can be seen, there is a wealth of data located in Appendix Table A71 that is spread over seven pages. Consequently, when considering 58 seaside resorts and the seven deprivation domains against the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation at once, it is difficult to assess how deprivation varies between and within seaside resorts.

The radar charts on the following pages show relative resort-level deprivation as measured by each of these domains for both the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts within England. In the radar charts, each spoke represents one of the resorts. The resorts are ordered by Index of Multiple deprivation rank, so that the Index of Multiple Deprivation line appears to spiral from the middle (most deprived) outwards (less deprived). If the individual domains follow the pattern for Index of Multiple Deprivation, then they too will spiral out. If the rank for a domain is inside the spiral then the seaside resort is ranked relatively worse for that domain than for overall deprivation, if it is outside the spiral then it is ranked relatively better for that domain than for overall deprivation. It is important to remember that the rankings (i.e., rank of average LSOA rank) are for the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts and show how the resorts in each size category relate to one another and are not representative of how a seaside resort relates to England.

Considering first the 25 large seaside resorts, Blackpool is the most deprived resort on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and Christchurch is the least deprived resort. In terms of the 'economic domains', Figure 5.10 shows that these three domains of deprivation, whilst displaying some variation, were broadly in accordance with the Index of Multiple Deprivation.

Thus, resorts with high levels of overall deprivation tend to have high levels of employment, income and education, skills and training deprivation, while resorts that are relatively well ranked in terms of overall deprivation are generally well ranked across these three domains. This finding occurs in stark contrast to the four deprivation domains that are indicative of social and neighbourhood exclusion. Consider Figure 5.11, on the left of the figure it is noticeable that many larger seaside resorts with relatively good rankings of multiple deprivation have relatively poor rankings across the four domains. The right of the chart shows the reverse situation. Similar findings were found when the analyses were restricted to the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts – the most deprived seaside resort here is Skegness and least deprived is Formby. When comparing Figure 5.12 with Figure 5.13, it can be seen that there is more variation in the domain rankings pertaining to the social and neighbourhood dimensions of exclusion in mid-sized seaside resorts compared to economic aspects of exclusion. In short, these results show that the rankings for the domains do not always follow the Index of Multiple Deprivation. It is clear from the diagrams that some domains of deprivation affect individual seaside resorts more than others. Thus, the evidence indicates that seaside resorts face different types of deprivation and hence different needs that might undermine their performance as tourism destinations.



Figure 5.10: Ranking of the large seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (economic) domains, 2010
Source: Author's own work



Figure 5.11: Ranking of the large seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (social) domains, 2010
Source: Author's own work



Figure 5.12: Ranking of the mid-sized seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (economic) domains, 2010
Source: Author's own work



Figure 5.13: Ranking of the mid-sized seaside resorts for Index of Multiple Deprivation and (social) domains, 2010
Source: Author's own work

5.3.4 Summary of resort-level results

Section 5.3 has used a number of analytical techniques and approaches to shed further light on the occurrence, character, intensity and distribution of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts. It began by investigating the nature and severity of deprivation within the 58 seaside resorts that corresponded to the 1,686 'resort LSOAs'. This investigation found that the vast majority of seaside resorts have at least one LSOA in the upper quartile of most deprived LSOAs of England when tested against seven domains of deprivation at LSOA level. In addition, a number of seaside resorts were identified as experiencing particular problems of multiple deprivation. This outcome was achieved by identifying resorts which had LSOAs in the highest deprivation quartile on at least five of the seven LSOA-level domains. In all, 289 LSOAs fell into this classification and are located within 39 individual resorts scattered around England.

In the second part of the section, attention turned to whether there were true differences in deprivation between large and mid-sized seaside resorts. A chi-square analysis was used to test the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation. The results of this analysis suggest that, although both the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, the highest levels of multiple deprivation are associated with 'large resort LSOAs'. This finding holds true when each domain is looked at separately. However, differences in the extent of deprivation across domains were not of a similar magnitude. The differences between resorts are greater for health and disability deprivation compared to other aspects of deprivation, while barriers to housing and services and income deprivation are much less significant. The section then went on to analyse variation in the nature of deprivation within the large and mid-sized seaside resorts by examining the correspondence of overall multiple deprivation with each of the seven specific aspects of deprivation contained within the Indices of Deprivation. The results of the correlational analysis indicate that strong positive relationships between variables exist in both large and mid-sized resorts, although the relationship between overall deprivation and barriers to housing and services is confined to large resorts. Further analysis of the LSOA-

level indicators of deprivation revealed that, although the overall deprivation pattern for the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts was not consistent across all domains, the geographic extent of deprivation in both the large and the mid-sized seaside resorts was broadly similar for 2004 and 2010.

In the third part of the section, the first set of analyses sought to ascertain whether the levels of multiple deprivation were similar between the resorts. Here, the LSOA data for the 25 large and the 33 mid-sized seaside resorts were looked at in quintile groups, to determine how the levels of deprivation in seaside resorts are distributed compared with those for England. In terms of the proportion of LSOAs in the most deprived quintile, the large seaside resorts (15/25) had higher levels of multiple deprivation than England, double the proportion of mid-sized seaside resorts (10/33). That said the geographic extent of multiple deprivation is greater in three of the mid-sized resorts than any of the large resorts. In addition, there are more mid-sized resorts with many areas of very low deprivation. Taken together, these results suggest that there is greater variation in the levels of deprivation in mid-sized seaside resorts. The second set of analyses sought to illuminate the variation in deprivation levels between and within resorts. This objective was achieved by summarising the range of Index of Multiple Deprivation national rankings for LSOAs in each resort and calculating the population-weighted average rank of deprivation. In terms of the former, 42 of the 58 seaside resorts have greater overall deprivation than the England average in 2010. Although this exercise confirms what is already known in that the large resorts score worse than mid-sized resorts, it has revealed some subtleties with regard to both the order of the resorts and the polarity and variation within resorts. The variation between the resorts was further explored by calculating the average rank of deprivation, which enabled the resorts to be ranked and a series of radar charts to be produced. These charts illustrate that the patterns for the domains differ, particularly the 'social' and neighbourhood' aspects of deprivation, with some of the most deprived large and mid-sized seaside resorts having relatively low levels of deprivation for these domains. Thus, the rankings for the domains do not always follow the Index of Multiple Deprivation.

5.4 Summary

A principal objective of the present research was to shed light on the nature, intensity and distribution of multiple deprivation – or social exclusion – in English seaside resorts. This objective was achieved by using the seaside and non-seaside classification, relevant deprivation measures and small area geography. The analysis of data was conducted in three stages. The first stage of the work investigated whether local authority districts classified in this study as 'seaside with resort' differ from other district types, or from the general situation in England, with regard to a range of measures of deprivation (section 5.1). It was found that, when compared with 'inland', 'coastal' and 'seaside without resort' districts, 'seaside with resort' districts are associated with higher levels of multiple deprivation.

Second, a LSOA-level analysis of the 39 local authority districts classified as being 'seaside with resort' was completed in order to establish the extent to which characteristics associated with social exclusion occurred within seaside resorts and to ascertain the nature and severity of these characteristics (section 5.2). The study findings reveal that within 'seaside with resort' districts, those LSOAs that constitute the seaside resorts are where multiple deprivation is concentrated. Deprivation in employment, income, health, education, living environment and crime are greater problems in resort areas, while deprivation in housing and services is less prevalent. Further analysis showed that resort areas that score highly on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation also tend to score highly on *all* aspects of deprivation simultaneously (with the exception of access to housing and services). These findings suggest that the majority of seaside resort LSOAs are experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple deprivation and as there are obvious links between deprivation types, it also appears that majority are suffering from social exclusion. Furthermore, it is clear from the 2004 to 2010 change analysis that many of the problems of multiple deprivation experienced by those areas have persisted.

The third and final stage of the work provided an account of how multiple deprivation varies between and within seaside resorts (section 5.3). The research found, by calculating the average LSOA rank for each resort, that there were higher levels of multiple deprivation in 2010 than the deprivation measures for England on average. Evidence of a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation was detected. English seaside resorts, albeit of medium or large size, are experiencing similar problems of multiple deprivation, but large resorts tend to have significantly higher levels. However, mid-sized resorts exhibited a wider range of deprivation levels. Many of the commonly experienced deprivation problems are deeply embedded. They have persisted and intensified over the last decade. Taken together, the findings summarised here and the detailed insights within the chapter add to knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, which once thrived on seaside resort tourism.

Chapter 6

Resort Socio-economic Performance and Social Exclusion

Having identified the nature and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, the next objective is to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion. To address this objective, a comparative analysis of the national averages of a set of variables selected as measures of area factors and population composition for the 58 seaside resorts was undertaken, providing both insight into the socio-economic performance of resorts and the differences in performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. The analysis – based on the manipulation of available datasets at LSOA and ward level – sought to establish whether the variables operate as positive or negative influences and whether they have a large or significant effect. This analysis aids the understanding of the causes and consequences of exclusion, but it also enhances comprehension of the way in which place- and population-based factors might influence social exclusion in English seaside resorts. The results of these analyses are set out in Section 6.1.

Further insight may be gained, and the formulation of remedial policies advanced, by investigating the manifestation of social exclusion within local areas. The final objective, therefore, is to identify, classify and map deprived areas in England's seaside resorts. To address this objective, the research employed PCA with forty variables selected as measures of area factors and population composition in the 399 'excluded seaside resort localities'. The PCA produced seven components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 which together accounted for 78.7 per cent of the total variance. The 399 excluded resort localities by seven components matrix of component scores formed the data matrix for an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis. The cluster analysis suggested that the 399 excluded resort localities can be allocated to four clusters. Section 6.2 explores the composition and characteristics of each cluster. This section also presents findings on the variation in multiple deprivation between clusters and the distribution of excluded resort localities across the country. These analyses were undertaken to reveal the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes.

6.1 Assessment of the socio-economic structure and 'health' of resorts

Within this section, analysis is undertaken for the 58 seaside resorts in England split between the 25 most deprived resorts and 33 less deprived resorts. The most deprived resorts had higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected, in terms of the proportion of LSOAs falling within the most deprived national quintile (for details, see Figures 5.7 and 5.8). The aim of the analysis is to determine how the socio-economic performance of seaside resorts differs from that of England as a whole and provide an assessment of whether there are "true" differences in socio-economic performance between deprived and less deprived resorts. In order to assess performance, measures of population composition and measures of area factors were used (for details, see Tables 4.8 and 4.9).

6.1.1 Measures of population composition and dynamics

Table 6.1 presents a comparative analysis of the resorts' position within England in terms of the incidence of the twenty-six indicators related to population composition. For five of these indicators, seaside resorts record lower scores compared to England as whole. The indicators include residents aged 0-15, residents of working age, single-parent households, and educated professionals, with the latter being measured by the percentage of residents with a degree qualification or above and who are employed as managers, professionals or para-professionals. With the exception of the latter two measures, which were respectively 5.1 and 4.1 percentage points below the national average, no difference greater than 4.0 was observed. Likewise, in terms of the twenty-one indicators on which seaside resorts record higher scores, the scale of the disparity between the seaside resort average and the English average is not particularly large. The indicators that showed the largest difference were low education (+7.2), white ethnic composition (+6.5), pensionable-age residents (+4.9) and one-person households above pensionable age (+4.1). Thus, for the most part, across seaside resorts as a whole, the mean values for measures of population composition are not fundamentally different to the English average.

Unrelated *t*-tests were used to explore the composition of the deprived and less deprived resorts in terms of the variables in Table 6.1. A *t*-test allows the mean for each group to be compared to the mean for all 58 seaside resorts. Where the differences between these two means are statistically significant, this result tells that a variable is more important (in either a positive or negative way) to the group than the 58 seaside resorts as a whole. Full results of the *t*-tests performed are available in Appendix Table B1. These results are summarised in Table 6.2, which indicates whether the population composition variables operate as resort advantages or disadvantages and whether they have a large or significant effect. By evaluating the number of significant differences and magnitude of each difference, it is possible to identify the factors that influence multiple deprivation – or social exclusion – in seaside resorts.

Table 6.2 shows that effect sizes were significant for all but two of the twenty-six variables (p = less than 0.05). No significant differences were found between the deprived and less deprived resorts in terms of ethnic composition and one person households. Regarding the twenty-four variables that had statistically significant effect sizes, eighteen variables record effect sizes that are meaningful on a practical level (i.e., Cohen's d = more than 0.5). Effects on all eighteen variables were moderate, with deprived resorts having a higher than average score on sixteen variables. It was found that, in terms of employment, skills and qualifications, deprived seaside resorts have an above-average proportion of people employed in routine and low skill occupations (53.4%) and consequently a below-average proportion of professional and managerial workers (46.6%). Commensurately, the deprived seaside resorts have, on average, a higher proportion of persons with no qualifications (32.9%) and a lower proportion with a degree or higher (14.0%). Regarding worklessness/benefit dependency across deprived seaside resorts as a whole, the share of working age adults claiming the four main benefits for the non-employed (i.e., Jobseeker's Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support paid to lone parents, and Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disablement Allowance) is above average (18.0%). Incapacity claimants are the largest group of non-employed working age claimants. As far as health is concerned, there are more resort residents than the average who receive state-funded welfare because of ill-health or disability problems (IB/SDA, 8%;

DLA/AA, 6.7%; ESA, 2.8%). Claimant unemployment in deprived seaside resorts is also above average (JSA 4.7%), including long-term unemployment (>6 months, 1.8%; >12 months, 0.9%) and youth unemployment (1.3%). Regarding economic security, deprived seaside resorts have higher than average claimant rates in terms of the three main benefits for the economically disadvantaged (i.e., Child Tax-Credit paid to out-of-work families, 24.7%; Income Support paid to people who have low incomes and are not required to be available for employment, 7.6%; Guarantee Credit paid to pensioners living on low incomes, 11.5%). With respect to households within deprived seaside resorts, while the proportion of lone parent households is slightly above the average (10.2%), the proportion of children living in lone parent families is greater (32.7%). There is also an above-average incidence of households without access to a car or van. (33.3%).

Thus, the deprived resorts are differentiated from the less deprived resorts by sixteen measures of population composition (p = less than 0.05; d = more than 0.5). In general, the deprived resorts are characterised by problems in terms of: unemployment and disadvantaged occupational characteristics; lack of qualifications; poor health; poverty and lack of access to material resources; and, family breakdown. However, in relation to the sixteen differentiating variables, it is valuable to identify the extent to which the deprived resorts differ from the national average, in order to provide further insight into the incidence of each problem. This analysis revealed that six of the sixteen differentiating variables recorded a difference greater than 4.0. The variables identified include: no qualifications (+9.9); routine and low skill occupations (+7.1); lack of car/van (+6.5); out-of-work benefits (+5.5); children in lone parent families (+4.8); and, children in out-of-work families (+4.1). It may be the case therefore that these facets of population composition have more of a determining influence on social exclusion in seaside resorts.

Table 6.1: Comparative analysis of mean values for selected population composition variables

	England	**English seaside resorts**		**Most deprived resorts**		**Less deprived resorts**	
		n = 58		**n = 25**		**n = 33**	
Variable	Mean	Mean	Std. D	Mean	Std. D	Mean	Std. D
Average age, 2001	38.6	41.6	5.8	40.5	5.2	42.9	6.2
Children, 2010	18.7	17.1	4.8	17.9	4.8	16.1	4.6
Working age, 2010	61.8	58.3	8.8	59.6	7.3	56.8	10.1
Pensioners, 2010	19.5	24.4	10.0	22.5	8.9	26.6	10.7
Retired, 2001	13.5	16.6	6.7	15.4	5.7	17.9	7.4
White, 2001	90.9	97.4	2.5	97.4	2.7	97.5	2.4
One person household, 2001	30.1	34.1	7.9	34.4	7.7	33.8	8.2
One person household pensionable age, 2001	14.4	18.5	4.3	17.7	3.7	19.4	4.9
One person household lone parent, 2001	9.5	9.3	3.2	10.2	3.4	8.3	2.7
Dependent children in lone parent families, 2010	27.9	29.8	11.2	32.7	11.2	26.5	10.2
IB/SDA claimants, 2010	5.2	7.1	4.0	8.0	4.4	6.2	3.3
ESA claimants, 2010	1.5	2.5	1.5	2.8	1.7	2.1	1.2
DLA/AA claimants, 2010	5.0	6.1	2.7	6.7	2.9	5.3	2.3
No qualification, 2001	23.0	30.2	9.3	32.9	9.8	27.1	7.7
Qualified to degree or higher, 2001	21.2	16.1	8.9	14.0	8.8	18.6	8.2
In managerial occupation, 2001	53.7	49.7	12.6	46.6	12.5	53.3	11.7
In manual occupation, 2001	46.3	50.3	12.6	53.4	12.5	46.7	11.7
Out-of-work benefits claimants, 2010	12.5	15.5	8.8	18.0	9.7	12.7	6.7
JSA claimants, 2010	3.6	4.0	2.7	4.7	3.1	3.1	1.8
JSA 6 months, 2010	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.8	1.5	1.1	0.9
JSA 12 months, 2010	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.5
JSA Youth, 2010	1.0	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.6
Children in workless families, 2010	20.8	21.1	12.2	24.7	13.3	17.1	9.4
Income Support claimants, 2010	4.8	6.4	4.6	7.6	5.1	5.0	3.4
Pension Credit claimants, 2010	8.0	10.0	7.0	11.5	7.5	8.2	6.0
Have no car or van, 2001	26.8	29.9	13.4	33.3	14.1	25.9	11.3

Source: Author's own work

Table 6.2: Factors of population composition influencing deprivation in seaside resorts

Factor	Resort advantage or disadvantage?	Size of effect	Significant?
Average age, 2001	Advantage	Small	Yes
Children, 2010	Disadvantage	Small	Yes
Working age, 2010	Disadvantage	Small	Yes
Pensioners, 2010	Advantage	Small	Yes
Retired, 2001	Advantage	Small	Yes
White, 2001	Advantage	Very small	No
One person household, 2001	Disadvantage	Very small	No
One person household above pensionable age, 2001	Advantage	Small	Yes
One person household lone parent, 2001	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Dependent children in lone parent families, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
IB/SDA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
ESA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
DLA/AA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
No qualification, 2001	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Qualified to degree or higher, 2001	Advantage	Medium	Yes
In managerial occupation, 2001	Advantage	Medium	Yes
In manual occupation, 2001	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Out-of-work benefits claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
JSA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
JSA 6 months, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
JSA 12 months, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
JSA Youth, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Children in workless families, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Income Support claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Pension Credit claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Have no car or van, 2001	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes

Note: In this table as well as in Table 6.5:

- Where a variable is labelled an **advantage**, it indicates that the **less deprived resorts** have, on average, higher scores on this variable than the 58 resorts as a whole.
- Where a variable is labelled a **disadvantage**, it indicates that the **deprived resorts** have, on average, higher scores on this variable than the 58 resorts as a whole.

Source: Author's own work

Another facet of population composition is that of migration. To assess how the 25 deprived seaside resorts as a whole fare in terms of migration exchanges with the rest of the UK, Census 2001 data at the ward level was used. The data were aggregated to produce absolute flow values, from which rates were calculated. The analyses of data begin by focusing on all people and then examining the patterns by age. The figures, as shown in Table 6.3, are restricted

to people moving from known origins within the UK, thus excluding people who had been living outside the UK one year before the census and also those who ticked the box on the census form indicating that they had no usual address then.

It can be seen from the data in Table 6.3 that, in the 12 months before the census, the 25 deprived seaside resorts combined recorded inflows from the rest of the UK totalling just over 140,000 people and outflows totalling nearly 132,000. As a result, deprived seaside resorts recorded an overall net gain of almost 9,000 from the rest of the UK. In terms of their total number of residents, the latter is equivalent to a gain of 0.62% in this one year (that is, an enlargement of 6.2% if this pattern was repeated across a full decade). Another way of portraying this pattern is to say that there were nearly eleven people moving to these 25 resorts for every ten people leaving them, as shown by the in/out ratio of 1.06. Further analysis showed that deprived seaside resorts have a lower net flow rate than England (0.72), all 58 English seaside resorts (0.79) and the 33 less deprived resorts combined (0.99). Therefore, in comparison to less deprived resorts, the gains that have been made in deprived resorts have been relatively marginal. However, these net migration figures disguise the size of the gross flows from which they result. When compared with less deprived resorts, deprived seaside resorts had the largest in and out flows, not only in absolute terms but also in relation to the resident population. Thus, the most striking result to emerge from the data is that there are substantial flows of migrants into and out of the deprived resorts and that, by comparison, net flow is small.

Table 6.3 also provides the same measures by age, based on groups that represent life stages associated with particular migration behaviour. In relation to the 58 seaside resorts combined and the 25 deprived resorts and the 33 less deprived resorts, all age groups recorded a net inflow. Furthermore, the net gains tend to come from the age groups 45 and over. This in-migration of the pre-retired and the retired will come as no surprise. Indeed, this pattern would appear to mirror the pattern of in-migration revealed by Beatty and Fothergill (2004). Further

analysis, however, of net in-migration to deprived and less deprived resorts, detected some subtle differences. It was found that:

- The under-16s account for 15% of migrants in seaside resorts, but for deprived resorts the figure is higher at 16% and for less deprived resorts it is lower at 14%.
- Those aged 16-29 and 30-44 account for 36% of migrants in seaside resorts, but for deprived resorts the figure is higher at 38% and for less deprived resorts it is lower at 35%.
- Those aged 45-59 and 60+ account for 49% of migrants in seaside resorts, though this figure is higher in the less deprived resorts at 51% and lower in deprived resorts at 46%.

So, the net in-migration to seaside resorts, including both deprived and less deprived resorts, is especially strong among those aged 45+. However, the less deprived resorts were found to have a proportionally greater number of migrants aged 45+ than the 58 seaside resorts as a whole. In contrast, the deprived resorts have higher proportions of their migrant population aged up to 15 and aged 16-44 than the 58 seaside resorts as a whole. These migrants will add to the working age population. The 16-44 year old age group is also the main child bearing age group and therefore it is also likely that the net increase of 0-15 year olds is linked to the net increase of 16-44 year olds. Although these differences appear relatively small, the cumulative effect over several years could help explain deprivation levels in seaside resorts. Indeed, although the inflow of older people creates and perpetuates a relatively old age distribution, this in-migration is important as many are drawn from more affluent groups (Shaw and Coles, 2007) and can fuel economic development. Thus, the inflow to resorts of children and young adults may exacerbate deprivation levels. In considering this analysis, it is worth re-iterating that, while above-average proportions of young and working-age residents operate as resort disadvantages (and an above-average proportion of persons of pensionable age a resort advantage), the effect of the population age structure on deprivation is small (p = less than 0.05).

Table 6.3: Migration, total and by age (2000-01)

Migration for England

Measure	0-15	16-29	30-44	45-59	60+	All ages
Residents	9,901,581	8,630,216	11,127,511	9,279,693	10,199,830	49,138,831
Inflows	69,687	225,235	112,304	33,720	15,943	456,889
Outflows	16,439	40,548	23,715	11,549	8,519	100,770
Net flow	53,248	184,687	88,589	22,171	7,424	356,119
Inflow rate	0.70	2.61	1.01	0.36	0.16	0.93
Outflow rate	0.17	0.47	0.21	0.12	0.08	0.21
Net flow rate	0.54	2.14	0.80	0.24	0.07	0.72
In/out ratio	4.24	5.55	4.74	2.92	1.87	4.53

Migration for 58 seaside resorts combined

Measure	0-15	16-29	30-44	45-59	60+	All ages
Residents	469,881	405,243	524,419	476,956	668,937	2,545,436
Inflows	47,184	93,066	58,761	29,639	31,116	259,766
Outflows	44,233	89,393	55,085	25,243	25,699	239,653
Net flow	2,951	3,673	3,676	4,396	5,417	20,113
Inflow rate	10.04	22.97	11.20	6.21	4.65	10.21
Outflow rate	9.41	22.06	10.50	5.29	3.84	9.42
Net flow rate	0.63	0.91	0.70	0.92	0.81	0.79
In/out ratio	1.07	1.04	1.07	1.17	1.21	1.08

Migration for 25 most deprived resorts combined

Measure	0-15	16-29	30-44	45-59	60+	All ages
Residents	265,287	222,994	288,141	256,275	335,430	1,368,127
Inflows	27,884	49,601	31,976	15,833	15,090	140,384
Outflows	26,508	47,667	30,663	14,080	12,972	131,890
Net flow	1,376	1,934	1,313	1,753	2,118	8,494
Inflow rate	10.51	22.24	11.10	6.18	4.50	10.26
Outflow rate	9.99	21.38	10.64	5.49	3.87	9.64
Net flow rate	0.52	0.87	0.46	0.68	0.63	0.62
In/out ratio	1.05	1.04	1.04	1.12	1.16	1.06

Migration for 33 less deprived resorts combined

Measure	0-15	16-29	30-44	45-59	60+	All ages
Residents	204,594	182,249	236,278	220,681	333,507	1,177,309
Inflows	19,300	43,465	26,785	13,806	16,026	119,382
Outflows	17,725	41,726	24,422	11,163	12,727	107,763
Net flow	1,575	1,739	2,363	2,643	3,299	11,619
Inflow rate	9.43	23.85	11.34	6.26	4.81	10.14
Outflow rate	8.66	22.90	10.34	5.06	3.82	9.15
Net flow rate	0.77	0.95	1.00	1.20	0.99	0.99
In/out ratio	1.09	1.04	1.10	1.24	1.26	1.11

Note*:* Rate is the flow count as % of number of residents at the 2001 Census. In/out ratio is calculated by dividing the inflows by the outflows.

Source: Author's own work

6.1.2 Measures of area factors

The analysis presented so far has highlighted a number of detailed insights, particularly in relation to the characteristics of population composition within deprived English seaside resorts. In order to provide further insight into the circumstances of these resorts, the deprived and less deprived were compared to each other in terms of the incidence of the twenty-three indicators related to area condition. Table 6.4 provides the means for each of the variables included in the analysis. Comparing the average data across 58 seaside resorts with the averages for England showed that:

- In terms of economic performance, the employment rate among 16 to 64 year olds in seaside resorts was 68.1%, compared to 74.1% for England. The share of employed residents who are self-employed is relatively similar in seaside resorts (8.9%) and England overall (8.3%). However, residents of seaside resorts are more likely to work part-time (42.3%) than residents of England (32.0%). Those in employment are engaged predominantly in tertiary industries (87.4%). Principal sources of employment are in 'public administration, education and health' (38.7% versus 28.2% in England) and in 'accommodation, distribution and catering' (25.8% versus 22.9% in England). Not surprisingly, jobs in tourism are over-represented in seaside resorts (12.2% versus 7.9% in England). Thus, the economic fortunes of residents are strongly linked to a few major service industries. Differences in income, as distinct from earnings or overall wealth (which is difficult to measure at resort level in the absence of small area level data), are a useful indicator of economic wellbeing. The average annually incomes of seaside resort households are markedly below the English average (£26,540 compared to £31,280).

- In terms of built environment, the housing stock is predominantly owner occupied (71.0% versus 68.7% in England). Levels of privately rented accommodation are also above average (15.9% versus 12.0% in England), with only 13.1% rented from the local authority (versus 19.3% in England). Household overcrowding rates correspond to the English

average. However, the incidence of housing lacking basic facilities and of empty households are both above the average. House price values can be seen as picking up on the condition of the built environment and place attractiveness. In seaside resorts, mean house prices were £187,330 compared to £239,642 in England. Another measure of how attractive an area is to live in is the crime rate. Specifically, crime rates are a measure of community safety and reflect economic circumstances. In terms of the number of crimes recorded as a proportion per 1,000 population, seaside resorts as a whole have a higher-than-average crime rate (152 versus 146 in England).

Overall, the data illustrate that there are differences between the average conditions of areas in seaside resorts and areas in the rest of England. However, as with the measures of population composition, the scale of the disparity between the seaside resort average and the English average is not always large. Of the twenty-three measures of area factors, just under half (n = 10) recorded a difference value greater than 4.0. In general, seaside resorts are markedly different in terms of: house price values (-21.8%); household incomes (-15.2%); public sector employment (+10.6%); part time/full time employment (+/-10.5%); social rented housing (-6.2%); employed persons (-6.1%); crime (+6.0%); tourism-related jobs (+4.3%); and, private rented housing (+4.1%). However, this general picture does not reflect the significant differences between the deprived and less deprived resorts. An analysis of the significant variables and the individual means for each group provides insights into the differences.

Thus, comparisons between the two groups were made using unrelated *t*-tests. Full results of the *t*-tests performed are available in Appendix Table B2. These results are summarised in Table 6.5, which indicates whether the area factors tend to operate as resort advantages or disadvantages and whether they have a large or significant effect on the relationship with deprivation level. Fifteen of the twenty-three variables were found to have a significant effect (p = less than 0.05). For the most part, no significant differences were found between the deprived and less deprived resorts in terms of diversity in the economy and structure of employment. The exception to this generalisation was the rate of public sector

employment. However, although deprived seaside resorts had significantly higher levels of public sector employment compared to less deprived resorts, the effect size was small.

In relation to the fifteen differentiating variables, mean effect sizes were very small to large. Effect sizes were significant but higher (i.e., *d* = more than 0.5) for seven variables. Compared to the seaside resort average, deprived seaside resorts have a lower-than-average employment rate (59.2%), a higher-than-average part-time employment rate (42.9%) and consequently a lower-than-average full-time employment rate (57.0%). Not surprisingly, average household incomes are below the average (£24,930). Apart from these variables, the deprived resorts are also differentiated from less deprived resorts in terms of having below-average house price values (£162,626), an above-average crime rate (181 crimes per 1,000 population) and above-average proportion of empty homes (4.3%). Excepting the latter, the indicators show marked differences when compared with the average for England: average house prices (-32.1%); crime rate (+24.0%); average household income (-23.0%); employment rate (-14.9%); full-time employment rate (-11.1%); part-time employment rate (+10.9%).

Table 6.4: Comparative analysis of mean values for selected area condition variables

	England	**English seaside resorts**		**Most deprived resorts**		**Less deprived resorts**	
		n = 58		**n = 25**		**n = 33**	
Variable	Mean	Mean	Std. D	Mean	Std. D	Mean	Std. D
Emp. in primary industries, 2010	1.8	0.9	4.1	0.9	4.2	0.9	4.1
Emp. in secondary industries, 2010	13.1	11.7	14.4	11.2	14.3	12.3	14.5
Emp. in tertiary industries, 2010	85.1	87.4	15.1	88.0	15.0	86.8	15.1
Emp. in public sector, 2010	28.2	38.7	28.1	40.6	29.0	35.2	27.0
Emp. in hotel, catering, distribution sector, 2010	22.9	25.8	20.4	25.7	20.9	25.9	19.9
Employment in tourism-related jobs, 2010	7.9	12.2	15.4	12.0	15.2	12.5	15.6
LQ for public sector, 2010	1.0	1.2	0.2	1.3	0.2	1.2	0.2
LQ for hotel, catering and distribution sector, 2010	1.0	1.4	0.3	1.3	0.3	1.4	0.3
LQ for tourism, 2010	1.0	1.9	0.9	1.6	0.8	2.0	1.0
Employment rate, 2001	74.1	68.1	11.2	59.2	9.4	71.2	10.1
Full-time, 2010	68.1	57.6	12.8	57.0	13.0	58.4	12.4
Part-time, 2010	32.0	42.3	12.7	42.9	12.9	41.6	12.4
Self-employed, 2001	8.3	8.9	3.2	8.5	3.5	9.5	2.7
Household income, 2010	31,280	26,540	6,884	24,930	6,473	28,383	6,882
House prices, 2010	239,642	187,330	60,717	162,626	52,686	217,780	56,059
Owner-occupied housing, 2001	68.7	71.0	18.5	67.8	19.6	74.7	16.3
Social rented housing, 2001	19.3	13.1	16.0	15.5	18.2	10.4	12.5
Private rented housing, 2001	12.0	15.9	12.4	16.7	12.9	14.8	11.8
Overcrowded households, 2001	7.1	6.9	5.7	7.3	5.6	6.6	5.8
Households without central heating, 2001	8.5	10.7	7.9	11.7	8.8	9.5	6.6
Households lacking bath, shower or toilet, 2001	0.5	0.7	1.3	0.9	1.2	0.6	1.4
Vacant dwellings, 2001	3.4	3.7	2.0	4.3	2.2	3.0	1.4
Crime rate per 1,000, 2010	146	152	133	181	152	115	92

Source: Author's own work

Table 6.5: Factors of area condition influencing deprivation in seaside resorts

Factor	Resort advantage or disadvantage?	Size of effect	Significant?
Emp. in primary industries, 2010	Advantage	Very small	No
Emp. in secondary industries, 2010	Advantage	Very small	No
Emp. in tertiary industries, 2010	Disadvantage	Very small	No
Emp. in public sector, 2010	Disadvantage	Small	Yes
Emp. in hotel, catering, distribution sector, 2010	Advantage	Very small	No
Emp. in tourism-related jobs, 2010	Advantage	Very small	No
LQ for public sector, 2010	Disadvantage	Small	No
LQ for hotel, catering, distribution sector, 2010	Advantage	Small	No
LQ for tourism, 2010	Advantage	Small	No
Employment rate, 2010	Disadvantage	Large	Yes
Full-time, 2010	Advantage	Medium	Yes
Part-time, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Self-employed, 2001	Advantage	Small	Yes
Household income, 2010	Advantage	Medium	Yes
House prices, 2010	Advantage	Large	Yes
Owner-occupied housing, 2001	Advantage	Small	Yes
Social rented housing, 2001	Disadvantage	Small	Yes
Private rented housing, 2001	Disadvantage	Very small	Yes
Overcrowded households, 2001	Disadvantage	Very small	Yes
Households without central heating, 2001	Disadvantage	Small	Yes
Households lacking bath, shower or toilet, 2001	Disadvantage	Small	Yes
Vacant dwellings, 2001	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes
Crime rate per 1,000, 2010	Disadvantage	Medium	Yes

Source: Author's own work

6.1.3 Summary of people and place effects

The outcome of the statistical analyses depicted in Tables 6.2 and 6.5 affords a clear indication of the socio-economic differences between deprived and less deprived seaside resorts in England. Evaluating the number of significant differences and magnitude of each difference enabled the factors influencing area-based deprivation to be identified. While two out of twenty-six (8%) population composition variables recorded an observed significance value above 0.05, eight of the twenty-three (35%) area condition variables fell into this category. Thus, twenty-four measures of population composition and fifteen indicators related to area condition differentiate the deprived and less deprived resorts. While seven out of fifteen (47%) area condition variables recorded an observed effect size above 0.50, eighteen out of the twenty-four (75%) population composition variables fell into this category. Thus, a proportionally greater

number of population composition variables recorded an observed effect size above 0.50. But two measures of area factors (employment rate, house price values) were found to have the largest effect sizes. Furthermore, when viewed against the English average, the deprived resorts registered markedly worse scores on a greater number of indicators related to area condition. Nonetheless, the evidence based on a statistical analysis of mean values for selected variables in deprived and less deprived resorts is pointing towards the relative significance of compositional effects (i.e., the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population that compose the resort) in reinforcing the problems of these urban areas. However, further insight into the causes and consequences of social exclusion within seaside resorts can be obtained by means of multivariate analytical techniques. In this respect, cluster analysis was applied to the data for those resort localities (n = 399) previously identified in the study as experiencing acute levels of multiple deprivation. The statistical results of a four-cluster solution are presented in Section 6.2.

6.2 Social exclusion at the intra-resort level – analysis of clusters

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-tests were used to explore the composition of each cluster in terms of the seven components identified in the PCA. ANOVA is a statistical procedure which compares different sources of variance within a dataset. The purpose of the comparison is to determine if significant differences exist between three or more groups. In SPSS, the one-way ANOVA output consists of three major parts – Descriptives, ANOVA and Multiple Comparisons. The table of means is the most helpful part of the output, because it provides a description of the LSOAs in each individual cluster, in terms of their average score and standard deviation on each of the seven dimensions in the data. Moreover, it allows the mean for each cluster to be compared to the mean for all 399 excluded localities. Table 6.6 provides the means for each of the principal components included in the analysis across each of the four clusters. Where a component is labelled positive for a cluster, it indicates that the LSOAs in the cluster have, on average, higher scores on this component than the excluded localities as a whole. Where a component is labelled negative for a cluster, it indicates that the LSOAs in the cluster have, on average, lower scores on this component than the excluded localities as a whole.

Table 6.6: Overview of clusters – cluster means and standard deviations for principal components

Variable	High score on this component means:	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Component 1	• High proportion of persons with no qualifications and consequently a lower proportion with a degree or higher. • High proportion of jobs held in manual occupations and consequently a lower proportion in professional/managerial and other white collar occupations • Lower than average household income • High proportion of children in out-of-work families • High proportion of white ethnic groups • High proportion of social rented housing	Positive ($\bar{x}$) 0.3633 (σ) 0.9753	Positive ($\bar{x}$) 0.0341 (σ) 0.8033	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.0216 (σ) 1.1399	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -1.4584 (σ) 1.2044
Component 2	• High level of Jobseekers Allowance claimants • High level of youth unemployment • High level of long-term unemployment • High proportion of car-less households • High proportion of household spaces vacant	Positive ($\bar{x}$) 1.2280 (σ) 0.9153	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.3202 (σ) 0.7053	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.3123 (σ) 0.8081	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.6457 (σ) 0.4673
Component 3	• High proportion claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance • High proportion claiming Disability Living Allowance • High proportion claiming Employment and Support Allowance • High proportion claiming Income Support • High proportion of older people claiming Pension Credit • High proportion of children in out-of-work families • High proportion of children in lone parent families • Low proportion of owner-occupied housing	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.2249 (σ) 0.8941	Positive ($\bar{x}$) 0.1047 (σ) 0.9576	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.0004 (σ) 1.1337	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.2090 (σ) 1.3415
Component 4	• High proportion of persons of working age • Low proportion of persons of pensionable age, but many older people that are resident claim Pension Credit • Low average age • Low proportion of owner-occupied housing • High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions • High proportion of car-less households • High proportion of population non-white	Positive ($\bar{x}$) 0.2825 (σ) 0.7232	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -0.1466 (σ) 0.5524	Negative ($\bar{x}$) -1.1404 (σ) 1.4036	Positive ($\bar{x}$) 2.1307 (σ) 0.6693

Component 5	• Low proportion of persons of young age • High proportion of persons of pensionable age • High average age • High proportion of single-person households • High proportion of single-person households with occupants above pensionable age. • Low proportion of lone parent households with dependent children	Positive (x̄) 0.4810 (σ) 0.7985	Negative (x̄) -0.3916 (σ) 0.8279	Positive (x̄) 1.0640 (σ) 1.2091	Positive (x̄) 0.3416 (σ) 0.6478
Component 6	• High level of self-employment • High proportion of jobs held in professional/managerial occupations • High proportion of tourism-related jobs • High proportion of private rented housing • High proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions • High proportion of households without sole use of bath, shower or toilet • High levels of burglary, theft, criminal damage and violence	Negative (x̄) -0.1140 (σ) 0.9775	Negative (x̄) -0.2741 (σ) 0.5438	Positive (x̄) 1.49855 (σ) 1.5661	Positive (x̄) 0.5633 (σ) 0.9828
Component 7	• High proportion of owner-occupied housing • High proportion of private rented accommodation and consequently a lower proportion social rented housing • High proportion of households without central heating	Negative (x̄) -0.0274 (σ) 1.0381	Positive (x̄) 0.0832 (σ) 1.0101	Negative (x̄) -0.0715 (σ) 0.7151	Negative (x̄) -0.5515 (σ) 1.0123
	Number of LSOAs **% of LSOAs**	88 (22%)	243 (61%)	41 (10%)	27 (7%)

Note:

Positive mean values are shaded yellow simply to aid comparison.
Due to standardisation, the overall mean is 0.

Source: Author's own work

The differences between the means of the clusters for each component in Table 6.6 are explored in Appendix Table B3, which offers *F* values and significance levels to show whether any of these mean differences are significant. The 'between groups' means are all significant (p = less than 0.05), indicating each of the seven components distinguish between the four clusters. However, the results from the one-way ANOVA do not indicate which of the four clusters differ from one another. So, to determine specifically which clusters are different from each other, post-hoc tests were performed. Full results of all multiple comparisons using Tukey's post-hoc test are available in Appendix Table B4. This table lists homogeneous subsets (i.e., clusters that did not differ using p = less than 0.05). Thus, within each subgroup the difference in means is statistically insignificant. The results of the post-hoc comparisons indicate that:

- **On component 1** (i.e., white, working-class social housing neighbourhoods with disadvantages), cluster 4 is significantly different from all other clusters as it does not appear in a subset together with any of the clusters. Specifically, cluster 4 LSOAs score significantly lower than LSOAs in clusters 1, 2, and 3.

- **On component 2** (i.e., limited access to employment opportunities), cluster 1 is significantly different from all other clusters as it does not appear in a subset together with any of the clusters. Specifically, cluster 1 LSOAs score significantly higher than LSOAs in clusters 2, 3, and 4.

- **On component 3** (i.e., high levels of benefit claimants, much poor health), all four clusters appear in the same subset or group. Thus, the post-hoc Tukey test determined that there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean scores of the four clusters.

- **On component 4** (i.e., prime age demographic), because all four clusters differ significantly, there are four such subsets or groups, containing the cluster 3 (lowest), cluster 2 (low-mid), cluster 1 (mid-high) and cluster 4 (highest) LSOAs respectively.

- **On component 5** (i.e., older demographic profile), there are three subsets, containing cluster 2 (lowest), clusters 1 and 4 (mid-high) and cluster 3 (highest) LSOAs respectively. The mean of cluster 1 is not significantly different from the mean of cluster 4.

- **On component 6** (i.e., professionals, tourism jobs, private renters and poor housing conditions), there are three subsets. Clusters 1 and 2 do not differ significantly from one another, but score significantly lower than clusters 3 and 4. The mean for cluster 3 is significantly higher than the mean for cluster 4.

- **On component 7** (i.e., mixed private housing neighbourhoods with high levels of home ownership), there are two subsets. The mean for cluster 4 is significantly lower than the means for the other three clusters, which do not differ significantly from one another.

Table 6.7 provides an overview of the main differentiating components. The columns of Table 6.7 reflect the results obtained from the ANOVA where components that differentiate one cluster from others are presented, as well as components that, while not strongly differentiating a particular cluster, are important in understanding the overall differences. It is clear from this table that component 4 (i.e., prime age demographic) is important in determining the composition of all four clusters. Clusters 1 and 4 contain localities which scored highly against this measure, compared to the excluded resort LSOAs as a whole. In contrast, having a lower than average score on this measure helped determine which localities were in clusters 2 and 3. However, the majority of components are only important in determining the composition of one or two of the clusters. The most striking result to emerge from the data comparison relates to component 3 (i.e., high levels of benefit claimants, much poor health). This component is not important in determining which localities are in a cluster.

Table 6.7: Matrix of outcomes, individual components, four clusters

	Differentiating components	**Important components**
Cluster 1	Component 2 (+) Component 4 (+)	Component 1 (+) Component 3 (–) Component 5 (+) Component 6 (–) Component 7 (–)
Cluster 2	Component 4 (–) Component 5 (–)	Component 1 (+) Component 2 (–) Component 3 (+) Component 6 (–) Component 7 (+)
Cluster 3	Component 4 (–) Component 5 (+) Component 6 (+)	Component 1 (–) Component 2 (–) Component 3 (–) Component 7 (–)
Cluster 4	Component 1 (–) Component 4 (+) Component 6 (+) Component 7 (–)	Component 2 (–) Component 3 (–) Component 5 (+)

(+) Mean values for components above average
(–) Mean values for components below average

Source: Author's own work

The significant differences between the components for the clusters suggest the ways in which the clusters differ or on which classifying variables they are essentially based. To further assess the distinctiveness of the clusters, one-way ANOVA *F*-statistics were also calculated between each of the four clusters with respect to the original raw data relating to the forty variables analysed by the PCA. Appendix Table B5 shows that statistically significant differences were recorded among the four clusters for all forty variables. The main differentiating variables are shown in Table 6.8 and the mean values for variables included in the analysis are provided in Table 6.9. Calculation and plotting of *Z*-scores of these individual measures for each cluster enabled both the character of the clusters and the nature of localised problem complexes to be identified. The resulting cluster profiles are provided in Figures 6.1–4. Each profile is a radar chart with each spine representing a different variable. The numbers on the scale represent the difference from the mean value for that variable. The mean is denoted by the red ring at 0, the value of each variable for that cluster can be seen by the amount that

the blue line (showing the difference from the mean for each value) is above or below the red one. To facilitate the visualisation of the cluster profiles, the average points were connected.

This analysis makes it possible to describe each of the clusters. First, however, a word of caution is necessary. It is important to emphasise that the description of each group of LSOAs in terms of the original input variables does not necessarily mean that the resort localities comprising that cluster exhibit *all* of the characteristics that defined that cluster to the same degree, nor that there are not localities in other clusters that have the characteristics described for a cluster. The LSOAs in a cluster are defined by component scores that make them generally more like each other than members of other groups, but the way in which the original ONS census and other administrative data define the group of LSOAs is via a group average which is derived from the values for individual LSOAs comprising that group. When interpreting the character of the clusters it should also be remembered that the basis of comparison is with the sample average (i.e., all 399 excluded resort LSOAs), but the sample average itself is inevitably different from both the resort average (i.e., all 1,686 resort LSOAs in England) and the national average (i.e., all 32,482 LSOAs in England). It follows that the clusters might appear different if the base data were a set of national averages.

Table 6.8: Matrix of outcomes, original input variables, four clusters

	Differentiating variables	**Important variables**
Cluster 1	Average age (+) Residents aged 0-15 (–) Residents of working age (+) Empty households (+) Job Seekers Allowance claimants (+) JSA 6 months or more (+) JSA 12 months or more (+) Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (+)	Residents of pensionable age (–) Age dependency (–) Population white (–) Single person households (+) Single pensioner households (+) Single parent families (–) Employed as managers and professionals (–) Employed as manual workers (+) Employed in tourism (+) Self-employed (–) Average household income (–) Owner-occupied (–) Private-rented (+) Social-rented (+) Lacking/sharing basic amenities (+) No central heating (–) Overcrowded households (+) Children in out-of-work families (+) Income Support claimants (+) Pension Credit claimants (+) Incapacity Benefit claimants (+) Employment/Support claimants (+) Disability Living Allowance claimants (–) Out-of-work benefit claimants (+) No qualifications (+) Level 4/5 qualifications (–) No car (+) Children in lone parent families (+) Crime (+)
Cluster 2	Residents aged 0-15 (+) Residents of working age (–) Single person households (–) Private-rented (–) Lacking/sharing basic amenities (–) Overcrowded households (–) Crime (–)	Average age (–) Residents of pensionable age (–) Age dependency (+) Population white (+) Single pensioner households (+) Single parent families (+) Employed as managers and professionals (–) Employed as manual workers (+) Employed in tourism (–) Self-employed (–) Average household income (–) Owner-occupied (+) Social-rented (+) No central heating (–) Empty households (–) Children in out-of-work families (+) Income Support claimants (+) Pension Credit claimants (–) Job Seekers Allowance claimants (–) Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (–) JSA 6 months or more (–) JSA 12 months or more (–) Incapacity Benefit claimants (–) Employment/Support claimants (–) Disability Living Allowance claimants (+) Out-of-work benefit claimants (–) No qualifications (+) Level 4/5 qualifications (–) No car (–) Children in lone parent families (+)

Cluster 3	Average age (+) Residents of working age (–) Residents of pensionable age (+) Age dependency (+) Single pensioner households (+) Average household income (+) Empty households (–) Pension Credit claimants (–) Level 4/5 qualifications (+) Children in lone parent families (–)	Residents aged 0-15 (–) Population white (+) Single person households (+) Single parent families (–) Employed as managers and professionals (+) Employed as manual workers (–) Employed in tourism (+) Self-employed (+) Owner-occupied (+) Private-rented (+) Social-rented (–) Lacking/sharing basic amenities (+) No central heating (+) Overcrowded households (+) Children in out-of-work families (–) Income Support claimants (–) Job Seekers Allowance claimants (–) Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (–) JSA 6 months or more (–) JSA 12 months or more (–) Incapacity Benefit claimants (+) Employment/Support claimants (+) Disability Living Allowance claimants (+) Out-of-work benefit claimants (+) No qualifications (–) No car (–) Crime (+)
Cluster 4	Residents of working age (+) Residents of pensionable age (–) Age dependency (–) Population white (–) Single person households (+) Average household income (+) Private-rented (+) Lacking/sharing basic amenities (+) Overcrowded households (+) Pension Credit claimants (+) Job Seekers Allowance claimants (–) Disability Living Allowance claimants (–) No qualifications (–) Level 4/5 qualifications (+)	Average age (–) Single pensioner households (+) Single parent families (–) Employed as managers and professionals (+) Employed as manual workers (–) Employed in tourism (+) Self-employed (+) Owner-occupied (–) Social-rented (–) No central heating (+) Empty households (–) Children in out-of-work families (–) Income Support claimants (–) Out-of-work benefit claimants (–) Job Seekers Allowance claimants 18-24 (–) JSA 6 months or more (–) JSA 12 months or more (–) Incapacity Benefit claimants (–) Employment/Support claimants (–) No car (+) Children in lone parent families (–) Crime (+)

(+) Mean values for variables above average
(–) Mean values for variables below average

Source: Author's own work

Table 6.9: Mean values for original input variables in four-cluster solution

Variable	PC*	Clusters				Mean**
		1	2	3	4	
Median age	4,5	**38.8**	36.2	**50.0**	34.0	38.0
Young people	5	**17.3**	**21.3**	11.7	11.0	18.8
Working-age people	4	**63.1**	**60.2**	**55.8**	**76.1**	61.4
Pensionable age	4,5	19.6	18.5	**32.4**	**12.9**	19.8
Age dependency	4	59.7	66.9	**84.4**	**32.2**	64.8
Population 'white'	1,4	96.5	97.6	98.1	**92.6**	97.1
Single person household	5	24.7	**16.3**	25.9	**31.0**	20.1
Single pensioner household	5	10.2	7.7	**12.8**	9.6	8.9
Lone parent household	5	12.9	14.5	7.3	8.3	13.0
Professional/managerial occupation	1,6	18.2	15.4	29.3	27.9	18.3
Other white collar occupation	1	20.1	21.2	20.4	27.9	21.3
Skilled manual occupation	1	12.8	13.6	11.3	8.5	12.9
Other manual occupation	1	48.9	49.7	39.0	35.7	47.5
Distribution, hotels and restaurants	***	29.7	24.1	41.1	36.4	27.9
Public admin	***	36.3	42.1	29.1	29.6	38.7
Tourism	6	15.2	8.5	29.4	22.8	13.1
Full-time work	***	56.6	57.0	54.0	58.3	56.7
Part-time work	***	43.4	42.6	46.0	41.8	43.1
Self-employed	6	6.6	6.5	13.4	8.8	7.4
Average household income	1	19,021	19,840	**21,635**	**23,767**	20,110
Owner-occupied	3,4,7	41.0	50.9	56.2	38.5	48.4
Private-rented	6,7	30.0	**17.8**	31.3	**39.2**	23.1
Social-rented	1,7	29.0	31.4	12.5	22.3	28.5
Lacking/sharing facilities	6	1.6	**0.8**	1.8	**4.0**	1.3
No central heating	7	15.9	15.8	16.5	**17.2**	16.0
Overcrowded conditions	4,6	12.7	**9.7**	13.2	**23.7**	11.7
Empty dwellings	2	**8.6**	5.4	**4.5**	5.6	6.0
Crime rank	6	7275.6	**8464.0**	5769.0	4662.2	7667.7
Children living in out-of-work families	1,3	39.4	37.1	28.1	30.8	36.3
Income Support	3	12.2	12.2	10.1	9.2	11.8
Pension Credit	3,4	19.7	17.9	**13.7**	**24.9**	18.3
Out-of-work benefit claimants	2,3	31.6	26.4	28.5	22.5	27.5
Job Seekers Allowance	2	**10.4**	6.1	6.6	**5.7**	7.0
JSA as proportion of benefit claimants	2	**32.6**	23.0	23.0	26.8	25.4
JSA 6 months or more	2	**4.6**	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.9
JSA 12 months or more	2	**2.3**	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.4
Youth unemployment	2	**2.7**	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.9
Incapacity Benefit	3	12.4	12.3	13.4	10.7	12.3
Employment and Support Allowance	3	3.8	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.4
Disability Living Allowance	3	9.2	9.6	9.7	7.0	9.4
No qualifications	1	40.6	39.7	37.7	**22.9**	38.5
Higher education	1	10.5	9.4	**13.6**	**29.0**	11.4
No car	2,4	54.5	42.4	43.1	53.0	45.8
Children in lone parent families	3	44.8	42.5	**36.2**	40.5	42.2

* Variables related to principal components.

** Mean values of all dataset with regard to the variable.

*** Four variables that were removed from the PCA and not included in the cluster analysis, but included here because of their relevance to resort socio-economic performance.

Cells with text in bold indicate variables which strongly characterise the clusters (see Table 6.8).

Source: Author's own work



Figure 6.1: Cluster profile for cluster 1

Source: Author's own work



Figure 6.2: Cluster profile for cluster 2

Source: Author's own work



Figure 6.3: Cluster profile for cluster 3

Source: Author's own work



Figure 6.4: Cluster profile for cluster 4

Source: Author's own work

Cluster 1 is the second largest cluster group incorporating 88 excluded seaside resort localities or 22% of the total. Significantly, this cluster is differentiated from other groups by a slightly above-average score for component 4 (prime age demographic) and very high score for component 2 (limited access to employment opportunities). The demographic structure is characterised by an above-average proportion of residents of working age and a below-average proportion of young people and persons of pensionable age. However, the differentiating variables with high values correspond to component 2. The cluster is significantly different from others in terms of an above-average proportion of empty dwellings and an above-average proportion of Jobseekers Allowance claimants, including long-term unemployment and youth unemployment. Apart from these variables which strongly differentiate this cluster from the three others, the localities are also characterised by above-average proportions of census measures that have been used to identify social and economic disadvantages of various kinds. These measures include routine and low-skill occupations, lack of qualifications, lack of a car or van, children in lone-parent families, children in out-of-work families, accommodation lacking basic facilities and overcrowded households. Not surprisingly, given the unemployment associated with this cluster, it has the lowest level of household income and highest level of out-of-work benefit claimants.

Problem complex: *Unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages.*

Cluster 2 is by far the largest cluster of excluded seaside resort localities in this study (243 localities, 61%). Characterised by its averageness, this group has few values which are high or low in comparison to the other groups. However, the cluster is significantly different from others in terms of mean values for components 4 and 5. The negative status of both the 'older demographic profile' component and the 'prime age demographic' component suggest there are fewer residents of working-age and older people, and more children and young people than on average. The proportion of children living in out-of-work families is above the mean as is the proportion of children in lone-parent families. In fact, this cluster exhibits the highest incidence of lone-parent households. It also exhibits the highest incidence of social housing

(and lowest incidence of private-rented housing), although the proportion of households lacking/sharing amenities and living in overcrowded conditions is below average. Crime is also less of an issue than in excluded localities as a whole.

Problem complex: *Social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families.*

Cluster 3 consisted of 41 excluded seaside resort localities (or 10% of the total) and is differentiated from others in terms of an extremely low score on component 4, extremely high score on component 5 and extremely high score on component 6. The negative status of the 'prime age demographic' component and positive status of the 'older demographic profile' component indicate this cluster is characterised by an elderly age structure with few persons in the 0-15 age group and a below-average proportion of persons of working age. Indeed, the cluster has the highest average age and demographic dependency rate of any cluster. There is also an above-average incidence of single-person households with occupants above pensionable age. Poorer than average health is associated with an older population. As well as having the highest score for people over pensionable age, the cluster includes both the highest proportion of working age residents claiming Incapacity Benefit and the highest proportion of working age residents claiming Disability Living Allowance. Occupations tend to be in the higher managerial and professional groups and in distribution, hotels and restaurants (including tourism) and of these many part-time. In terms of housing, the incidence of owner-occupied housing is the highest of any cluster. Levels of privately rented accommodation and households living in overcrowded conditions, lacking/sharing amenities and without central heating are also above average, though not as much so as cluster 4.

Problem complex: *Older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems.*

Cluster 4, the smallest of the cluster groups (27 localities, 7%), is differentiated from others in terms of having the highest score on the 'prime age demographic' component. The predominance of working-age residents means that there are few young people and people over pensionable age. Minority ethnic groups (that is, ethnic groups other than white) form a much

larger percentage of the population of the cluster than they do of the population of any other cluster and the excluded resort localities as a whole. Apart from these demographic variables which strongly differentiate this cluster from the three others, the cluster is also differentiated by a number of housing-related variables. Places in this group are particularly characterised by persons living alone, many renting privately, and housing conditions in particular are poor. Indeed, the cluster has the highest proportions of any cluster in terms of people living in rented accommodation (which accounts for the negative status of the 'mixed private housing neighbourhoods with high levels of home ownership' component), one person households but conversely households living in overcrowded accommodation (defined as more than one person per room) and households with no central heating and lacking/sharing basic amenities. Crime is also more of an issue than in any other cluster and in excluded localities as a whole. However, illustrating the cluster's advantaged position, the cluster is differentiated from others in terms of lower levels of benefit claimants/poorer health (although many older people that are resident claim Pension Credit), an above-average level of household income and few working-age residents with no educational qualifications.

Problem complex: *Areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters living in poor housing conditions.*

Thus, a statistical analysis of the composition and characteristics of the clusters has revealed the nature of particular problem complexes. Before proceeding to examine the geographic incidence of each problem, an important question requires attention. The question is whether some clusters are more deprived than others. To assess whether there are true differences in deprivation level between the clusters, the LSOAs comprising each cluster were allocated to a five per cent band (i.e., most deprived 0-5% of all LSOAs, 5-10%, 10-15% and 15-20%) based on their rankings calculated in the IMD 2010 and a cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis was undertaken. This analysis found that there are significant differences between the clusters ($\chi^2 = 16.9$, df = 9, $p = 0.037$) as cluster 1 exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. It can be seen from the data in Table 6.10 that 26.8% of

LSOAs in the sample fell within the worst performing 5% of LSOAs in England on the IMD 2010, but for cluster 1 LSOAs the figure is higher at 40.9% and for each of the other clusters the figure is lower. Furthermore, when viewed against the most deprived 0-10%, cluster 1 emerges as the most deprived cluster (68.2%), followed by cluster 2 (48.5%), cluster 3 (43.9%) and cluster 4 (40.9%). A similar distribution pattern is evident regarding the most deprived 0-15%. Thus, cluster 1 is the worst off in terms of multiple deprivation and cluster 4 is the least deprived of the clusters. In considering this finding, it is worth reiterating that 24% of all resort LSOAs are in the worst performing 20% nationally and have been included in this analysis.

Table 6.10: Distribution of most deprived resort LSOAs by cluster and deprivation level

Deprivation level		**Cluster 1** *n* = 88, 22%	**Cluster 2** *n* = 243, 61%	**Cluster 3** *n* = 41, 10%	**Cluster 4** *n* = 27, 7%	**Total** 399
0-5%	Observed	36	56	10	5	107
	Expected	23.6	65.2	11.0	7.2	
	% within cluster	40.9%	23.0%	24.4%	18.5%	26.8
5-10%	Observed	24	62	8	6	100
	Expected	22.1	60.9	10.3	6.8	
	% within cluster	27.3%	25.5%	19.5%	22.2%	25.1
10-15%	Observed	17	62	11	8	98
	Expected	21.6	59.7	10.1	6.6	
	% within cluster	19.3%	25.5%	26.8%	29.6%	24.6
15-20%	Observed	11	63	12	8	94
	Expected	20.7	57.2	9.7	6.4	
	% within cluster	12.5%	25.9%	29.3%	29.6%	23.6

Source: Author's own work

Mapping at LSOA level enabled the geography of particular problem complexes to be identified (Figure 6.5). This objective was achieved in ArcMap (a geographic information system programme) and by grouping the constituent LSOAs of each affected resort and using the centroid of the group as the location for a pie chart to represent each resort. Thus, to facilitate the visualisation of the classification, each resort has a pie chart and the total value of the pie is equal to the sum of the combined number of LSOAs in each cluster. Table 6.11 provides this information and the breakdown of LSOAs according to cluster for each resort. For example, the resort of Great Yarmouth had 11 LSOAs in cluster 1 and 5 LSOAs in cluster 2, thus giving a total of 16 resort LSOAs (or 44% of the resort total) affected by high levels of multiple deprivation. It follows that the pie chart for Great Yarmouth is comprised of two sectors

representing the values of cluster 1 (i.e., (11 / 16) * 100 = 68.8%) and cluster 2 (i.e., (5 / 16) * 100 = 31.2%). The mapping procedure described represents a necessary but less than satisfactory methodological compromise. The preferred method for illuminating the national pattern of excluded resort locality types is mapping using the geographic extent of all LSOAs. An attempt was made to map the 1,686 resort LSOAs, including the 399 excluded resort localities, but the small number of LSOAs meant that they did not appear visible on a national map in A4 size. Indeed, there are problems with the mapping of LSOAs. As previous typological investigations have reported, 'mapping at such a small scale has inherent scaling problems, problems wrapped up in the design of the LSOAs and problems in adding locational information to aid the identification of places along with the information about the classification membership' (Vickers *et al.,* 2005: 61).



Figure 6.5: The national pattern of excluded resort locality types

Source: Author's own work

Table 6.11: Number of LSOAs in each resort in each cluster

				Cluster					Resort LSOAs	
Resort	**Size**	**District**	**Region**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**Total**	**Total**	**%**
Skegness	M	East Lindsey	EM		2	5		7	12	58.3
Dover	M	Dover	SE		9	1		10	18	55.6
Heysham	M	Lancaster	NW	1	5			6	11	54.5
Margate	L	Thanet	SE	5	9			14	27	51.9
Fleetwood	M	Wyre	NW		9			9	18	50
Blackpool	L	Blackpool	NW	4	34	8		46	94	48.9
Penzance	M	Penwith	SW		6			6	13	46.2
Hastings	L	Hastings	SE	9	14	1		24	53	45.3
Great Yarmouth	L	Great Yarmouth	E	11	5			16	36	44.4
South Shields	L	South Tyneside	NE	23	1			24	55	43.6
Ramsgate	L	Thanet	SE	3	7			10	26	38.5
Ilfracombe	M	North Devon	SW		1	2		3	8	37.5
Folkestone	L	Shepway	SE	3	7	1		11	31	35.5
Scarborough	L	Scarborough	Y&H	4	7	1		12	34	35.3
Clacton-on-Sea	L	Tendring	E	4	6	1		11	32	34.4
Morecambe	M	Lancaster	NW	2	5			7	21	33.3
Brighton	L	Brighton and Hove	SE		15	1	13	29	101	28.7
Lowestoft	L	Waveney	E	6	5	1		12	42	28.6
Weston-s-mare	L	North Somerset	SW		10	3		13	48	27.1
Weymouth	L	Weymouth & Portland	SW		6	2		8	31	25.8
Torquay	L	Torbay	SW	2	7	2		11	43	25.6
Littlehampton	M	Arun	SE		4			4	17	23.5
Whitby	M	Scarborough	Y&H		1	1		2	9	22.2
Southend-on-Sea	L	Southend-on-Sea	E	3	19	1		23	107	21.5
Falmouth	M	Carrick	SW	1	2			3	14	21.4
Bognor Regis	M	Arun	SE		3			3	15	20
New Brighton	M	Wirral	NW		2			2	10	20
Crosby	L	Sefton	NW	2	4			6	32	18.8
Eastbourne	L	Eastbourne	SE		7	1	2	10	59	16.9
Bournemouth	L	Bournemouth	SW		11		6	17	107	15.9
Paignton	L	Torbay	SW		4	1		5	34	14.7
Bexhill-on-Sea	L	Rother	SE			4		4	28	14.3
Herne Bay	M	Canterbury	SE	2	1			3	23	13
Hove	L	Brighton and Hove	SE		6		2	8	63	12.7
Dawlish	M	Teignbridge	SW			1		1	8	12.5
Ryde	M	Isle of Wight	SE	1		1		2	16	12.5
Teignmouth	M	Teignbridge	SW		1			1	9	11.1
Whitstable	M	Canterbury	SE		2			2	21	9.5
Southsea	L	Portsmouth	SE				3	3	32	9.4
Burnham-on-Sea	M	Sedgemoor	SW		1			1	12	8.3
Newquay	M	Restormel	SW			1		1	14	7.1
Lytham St Annes	L	Fylde	NW		1		1	2	30	6.7
Southport	L	Sefton	NW	2	2			4	60	6.7
Exmouth	M	East Devon	SW		1			1	21	4.8
Thornton-Cleveleys	M	Wyre	NW			1		1	21	4.8
Christchurch	L	Christchurch	SW		1			1	30	3.3

Source: Author's own work

This analysis found that the 399 ‘excluded resort localities’ related to 46 (out of 58) seaside resorts and that 40 of these resorts contain excluded localities characterised by ‘social housing neighbourhoods with young population living in unstable families’ (cluster 2). Thus, this group is well-scattered across the seaside resorts of the country but particularly in the Southeast, in the Northwest and the Southwest. Furthermore, when viewed against the total number of ‘excluded resort localities’ located in each English region, the Northwest (62/83, 75%), the Southwest (51/72, 72%), the Southeast (84/137, 61%), Yorkshire and the Humber (8/14, 57%) and the East (35/62, 57%) appear to be suffering more from this form of local area exclusion than the East Midlands (2/7, 29%) and the Northeast (1/24, 4%). Deprived areas characterised by ‘older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems’ (cluster 3) corresponded to 22 seaside resorts and had a locus mainly in the Southwest, the Southeast and the Northwest. Although it may appear at first glance that these regions appear to be suffering more from this form of local area exclusion, this regional pattern may be explained by the fact that there are more resorts and therefore more incidences of this exclusion type. Indeed, when viewed against the total number of ‘excluded resort localities’ located in each English region, a proportionally greater number of localities occurred in the East Midlands (5/7, 71%), followed by the Southwest (12/72, 17%), Yorkshire and the Humber (2/14, 14%), the Northwest (9/83, 11%), the Southeast (10/137, 7%) and the East (3/62, 5%). Households experiencing the most severe social and economic problems were grouped into cluster 1 which manifested itself in 19 resorts, but revealed a particularly strong incidence in resorts located in the East, the Northeast and the Southeast. Again, when viewed against the total number of ‘excluded resort localities’ located in each English region, the Northeast (23/24, 96%) was suffering more from this form of local area exclusion than the East (24//62, 39%), Yorkshire and the Humber (4/14, 29%), the Southeast (23/137, 17%), the Northwest (11/83, 13%) and the Southwest (3/72, 4%). Finally, cluster 4 reflected a grouping of deprived ‘areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters in poor housing’ and was concentrated in 6 resorts located in the Southeast (20/137, 15%), the Southwest (6/72, 8%) and Northwest (1/83, 1%).

Thus, the outcome of the univariate statistical analyses (Table 6.11) and mapping exercise depicted in Figure 6.5 sheds light on the geographic incidence of each problem complex. It shows the extent to which excluded resort localities are scattered across the country, rather than being confined to specific coastal regions. But it also shows a marked geographical variation between the coastal regions. Indeed, some clusters appear to be much more prevalent in some regions than others. Regarding the largest cluster, representing 'social housing neighbourhoods with young population living in unstable families', no coastal region was unaffected by this form of local area exclusion, but a proportionally lower number of such excluded resort localities occurred in the Northeast and East Midlands. With respect to the second largest and most deprived cluster, representing 'unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages', while being widely scattered around England, it revealed a particularly strong incidence in resorts located along the east coast regions, particularly the Northeast. The geography of the localities characterised by 'older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems' is also nationally widespread, but a proportionally greater number of such excluded resort localities occurred in the East Midlands and its resort of Skegness. Finally, 'areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters in poor housing' were confined to resorts in three English regions, namely the Southeast, the Southwest and Northwest. However, most localities in this group were found in resorts located on England's southeast coast.

Further interrogation of the LSOA-level data (in Table 6.11) revealed the complexity of the problems that resorts with higher levels of multiple deprivation appear to be experiencing. Indeed, groupings of factors to do with local area exclusion emerge in the 25 resorts previously identified in the study as most deprived, but in different combinations. It was found that, of the 399 LSOAs classified in this study as 'excluded resort localities', approximately four-fifths (321) of these localities corresponded to the 25 most deprived resorts. None of these resorts had LSOAs in all of the four clusters. But nine resorts have LSOAs in three of the four clusters.

These resorts, which might therefore be seen as experiencing more serious and complex multiple deprivation problems, are (according to their level of deprivation):

1. Blackpool
2. Hastings
3. Folkestone
4. Scarborough
5. Clacton-on-Sea
6. Brighton
7. Lowestoft
8. Torquay
9. Southend-on-Sea

The majority of the nine resorts are located along the east coast of England (4), followed by three in the Southeast and one in the Southwest and Northwest. With a population of above 40,000, all the resorts qualified as 'large' resorts in this study and, with the exception of Brighton, exhibited the following complex localised problems:

- Unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages;
- Social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families; and,
- Older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems.

The latter two area types – together with 'areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters in poor housing' – affected Brighton.

However, the majority of the 25 most deprived resorts were identified as experiencing two problem complexes. A total of thirteen resorts fell into this classification, with seven resorts containing localities characterised by 'social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families' *and* 'unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages'. These resorts are (according to their level of deprivation):

1. Heysham
2. Margate
3. Great Yarmouth
4. South Shields
5. Ramsgate
6. Morecambe
7. Falmouth

Spatially, the seven resorts are scattered around England and, with the exception of Heysham, Morecambe and Falmouth, are 'large' in terms of population size. Regarding the other six resorts, they were characterised by a combination of 'social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families' *and* 'older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems'. These resorts are (according to their level of deprivation):

1. Skegness
2. Dover
3. Ilfracombe
4. Weston-Super-Mare
5. Weymouth
6. Whitby

However, when compared to the previous list, the resorts are nationally less widespread, with three occurring in Southwest, two in the East and one in the Southeast. Furthermore, with the exception of Weston-Super-Mare and Weymouth, most of these resorts are medium-sized towns. That leaves three seaside resorts that were identified as experiencing a singular problem complex. These resorts – Fleetwood, Penzance and Littlehampton – are all medium-sized towns and had deprived areas characterised by 'social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families'.

Overall, there is no clear pattern emerging as to the geographical distribution of multiple deprivation problems. There are deprived seaside resorts in all regions experiencing different combinations of two or more problem complexes, albeit to a greater or lesser extent. What is clear, however, is that the larger seaside resorts are suffering from a wider range of problems. Given the policy and academic focus on concentrated deprivation in urban areas and its presumed pernicious effects, it is also useful to have some understanding of exactly how concentrated excluded localities are and where exactly such areas are in the worst hit resorts. Appendix Figures B1–25 provide maps of the clusters for each of the 25 most deprived resorts. During the final production of the maps using ArcMap, detailed layers of locational information, including the boundaries for resort LSOAs, were supressed for greater clarity.

(However, more detailed resort maps of the clusters cross referenced against the boundaries for Census wards and LSOAs for instance can be obtained from the author.)

Inspection of the maps revealed that, in the majority of resorts, similar excluded localities are spatially clustered and that different excluded localities are, if not neighbouring each other, in close proximity. In relation to the nine large sized resorts that were identified as experiencing three problem complexes, a common pattern, as exemplified by Blackpool (Figure 6.6), includes the localities of cluster 1 (i.e., 'unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages') and cluster 3 (i.e., 'older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems') being mainly located along and behind the central seafront. This pattern is not surprising given that some of the former commercial holiday accommodation has been turned into care homes, hostels, HMOs and small flats. In the middle and outer suburbs of the same resorts, the built environment is more secure and the population appears relatively problem-free, as indicated on the maps by the grey space representing unclassified resort LSOAs. However, the local authority estates in the middle and outer suburban localities provided the principal loci for the 'young working-class households and unstable families' of cluster 2, which is the largest cluster of excluded seaside resort localities in this study. The smallest cluster, representing 'areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters in poor housing' (cluster 4), related to six resorts overall, but only one of these resorts (Brighton) exhibited higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. Nonetheless, as exemplified by Brighton (Figure 6.7), localities in this group spatially tended to be located mainly in near-seafront areas, reflecting the prevalence of cheap rental accommodation. There are, however, examples of these types of localities in some outer areas of the resorts of Brighton, Bournemouth and Eastbourne, owing to the prevalence of low cost student accommodation in these resorts.



Figure 6.6: Area deprivation in Blackpool, Northwest England
(46 clustered LSOAs / 94 resort LSOAs, 49%)

Source: Author's own work



Figure 6.7: Area deprivation in Brighton, Southeast England
(29 clustered LSOAs / 101 resort LSOAs, 29%)

Source: Author's own work

6.3 Summary

The research was set out to ascertain the influence of resort socio-economic performance on social exclusion and, by employing a comparative analysis of socio-economic performance in deprived and less deprived seaside resorts, has revealed some substantial differences between the two groups. In relation to population composition, the deprived resorts are significantly different from less deprived resorts in terms of high levels of worklessness/benefit dependency, disadvantaged occupational characteristics, low levels of skills and education, poor health, family breakdown, poverty and lack of access to material resources. With regards to indicators of decline, the deprived resorts are differentiated by low rates of employment and high proportion of part-time jobs, low levels of household income, high rates of crime, low house prices and a high proportion of vacant dwellings. However, it is also the case that, on many of these measures, the deprived resorts as a group differ to a great degree from England overall, indicating the polarising trends which have characterised English seaside resorts and which have been widely discussed in the literature. The scale of population composition disparities are generally small when compared to the area condition disparities. Nonetheless, while the evidence is not wholly conclusive and it is based on, admittedly, a comparative and simple statistical analysis of mean values for selected variables in deprived and less deprived resorts, it is pointing towards the conclusion that there are compositional effects reinforcing the problems of these urban areas.

The research has also sought to identify, classify and map excluded localities in England's seaside resorts. Four distinct deprived area types are identified that represent different aspects of the socio-spatial structure of resorts. It appears that social exclusion is extensive in these environments as not only are deprived areas geographically concentrated in the near-seafront region, but also located in the middle and outer suburban regions of the resorts. The analysis has confirmed the inaccuracy of the widely-held assumption that urban disadvantage in England is exclusively associated with the location of social housing. At the suburb-scale, such housing is only a major presence in one of the four distinct 'excluded

resort locality' typology categories emerging from the analysis. However, the 'social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families' is by far the largest cluster of excluded resort localities and, moreover, the problems associated with these estates have rarely been mentioned in the academic and policy literature on seaside resorts. It also suggests that socio-spatial disadvantage is a somewhat more complex and multi-faceted phenomenon in seaside resorts than in other urban areas of England.

Chapter 7

Discussion and Conclusion

Academic study of social exclusion in post-mature mass tourism resorts is conspicuously absent and, as a result, little is known about its occurrence, nature and extent, its cause or causes, or whether and to what extent it inhibits resort restructuring. The present research aimed to develop understanding of social exclusion in a post mature resort context and has identified the anatomy, level and extent of multiple deprivation in English seaside resorts, the factors significant for their deprivation and the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Not only are the research findings of paramount importance in understanding both the character of social exclusion and the prospects for socio-economic regeneration, but they also contribute to understanding of the outcomes of post-mature resort development, particularly in relation to the internal dynamics of resort change. Thus, the results presented in this thesis are of both academic and policy relevance. In an attempt to demonstrate the relevance and significance of the research, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section will provide a synthesis of the empirical findings from the study with respect to the research objectives, and relate the findings to previous research. Attention turns in the second section to the contribution of these findings. In the third section, the limitations of the study are highlighted. Finally, consideration is given to areas for further research.

7.1 Empirical findings

The study was set out to investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion in English seaside resorts and has had the following research objectives:

(i) To identify the nature and extent of social exclusion in seaside resorts;

(ii) To describe differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts and the factors that may explain these differences; and,

(iii) To identify, classify and map deprived areas in seaside resorts.

These objectives have been met as follows:

7.1.1 Nature, level and extent of social exclusion in seaside resorts

The study constructed a national seaside resort database, drawing, in the first instance, on the Indices of Deprivation, with the latter comprising a number of key deprivation-related measures for local authority districts and lower layer super output areas (LSOAs). In order to identify the nature, level and extent of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, the study applied the seaside and non-seaside area classification to all local authority districts in England, defined the 58 largest English 'seaside' resorts in terms of resident population, and conducted analysis on them using the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation and the individual deprivation domains published for LSOAs in 2004, 2007 and 2010. Analysis of multiple deprivation in the following types of local authorities – inland, coastal, seaside with resort, seaside without resort – revealed that 'coastal' and 'seaside with resort' districts are experiencing higher levels of multiple deprivation than might be expected. Further analysis showed that not only are 'seaside with resort' districts associated with higher levels of multiple deprivation, but also within them, those LSOAs that constitute the seaside resorts are where it is concentrated. Indeed, there are relatively few deprived LSOAs outside of the resorts. Seaside resort areas that score highly on the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation also tend to score highly on all aspects of deprivation simultaneously (with the exception of access to housing and services). Most aspects of life are affected, including educational attainment and skills, crime and safety, the environment, health, and incomes; benefit dependency is very high, employment is low. The results are unequivocal; the majority of seaside resort LSOAs are experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple deprivation. Due to the linked nature of the problems being experienced, it is clear that residents living in seaside resorts are at risk of, or suffering from, social exclusion.

These findings are consistent with those of Agarwal and Brunt (2006) who also reported that the incidence and level of multiple deprivation differs across types of local authorities. The degree, extent and local concentration of multiple deprivation was found to be significantly lower in 'inland' districts than in 'coastal' and 'seaside' districts. Even though Agarwal and Brunt (2006) used a district classification similar in principle to this study, they only

differentiated between ‘coastal’ and ‘seaside’ districts, thus failing to recognise ‘seaside with resort’ and ‘seaside without resort’ districts. Furthermore, the lowest level of information available was for census wards and the absence of environmental and crime indicators within the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000 meant that Agarwal and Brunt (2006) were unable to draw out more detailed conclusions regarding the manifestations of social exclusion within English seaside resorts. The present study, therefore, provides an important update and methodological improvement.

In addition though, the study has used a number of analytical techniques and approaches to answer several other vital questions within the discourse. It sought to know whether seaside resorts were more susceptible to multiple deprivation than the rest of England, whether there were differences in the level and nature of multiple deprivation between large and medium size resorts and whether the levels of deprivation were similar between the resorts. In doing so, the changes in levels of deprivation were explored with reference to the 2004 and 2010 versions of the Indices of Deprivation. Although a relatively short time frame, it offers an important insight into where positive and negative change is occurring and what trajectories of change might be. The present study, therefore, provides additional evidence in relation to the evolving economic and social fortunes of seaside resorts. Three key research insights emerged.

First, England’s principal seaside resorts are rather more deprived than the rest of the country. The research followed the methodology used by the DCLG when calculating the ranks for local authorities to calculate the average LSOA rank (population-weighted) for each of the seaside resorts. On the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation, the vast majority of seaside resorts display an overall level of deprivation greater than the English average. With the exception of crime and access to housing and services, a similar pattern is evident for the five other domains (income; employment; education, skills and training; health and disability; living environment). Thus, the most striking result to emerge from the data is that the vast majority of seaside resorts in England rank poorly on all aspects of ‘economic’ deprivation (income;

employment; education, skills and training). This consistency may be due to a number of factors, including the physical isolation of many English seaside resorts (which can act as a barrier to economic growth), low diversity in the economy and the large number of low-skill, low wage jobs concentrated in the service sector of the economy. These sectors often also require temporary, part-time, and seasonal workers. The shortcomings in the job markets have four main effects. One consequence of the character of employment is that local people struggle to create wealth and escape from the low wages cycles. Second, the seasonal nature of much of the employment on offer in the seaside tourist sector means that workers are less likely to progress in terms of qualifications or career advancement, as each period of employment may be with a different employer. Third, instability of income and insecure employment reinforce low expectations and aspirations, and provide few incentives for people to engage with formal employment and move off of state benefits. A fourth consequence is the out-migration of large numbers of able and ambitious young people to pursue education and employment opportunities elsewhere. In doing so, they leave behind a poorly qualified working-age population to support an increasing population of elderly residents. Not surprisingly, then, resorts that rank poorly on the 'economic' domains also rank poorly on the overall Index of Multiple deprivation. In contrast, the patterns for the 'social' domains – health, barriers to housing and services, living environment, and crime – differ, albeit *slightly*, with some resorts that rank poorly on the Index of Multiple Deprivation relatively well ranked for these domains. In considering this variation in domain rankings, it is worth reiterating that these particular rankings are for the seaside resorts and how they relate to one another and are not representative of how a seaside resort relates to England. Nonetheless, the importance of the nature of the seaside/resort itself as a cause of social exclusion is becoming clear.

Second, there is a relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation. The relative importance of size has been subject to debate. Initial discussions of the extent to which size affects performance emerged during the 1990s, owing to a report produced by the former English Tourist Board (1991) on 'The Future for England's

small and medium sized seaside resorts' which surmised that these environments were experiencing the most severest socio-economic problems. The differing character, problems and prospects for small, medium and large size seaside resorts are also emphasised in Shaw and Williams' (1997b) conclusion that many of the smaller and medium size resorts face serious difficulties regarding their tourism product. More recently though, the British Resorts and Destination Association giving evidence to the Select Committee on Coastal Towns (CLG, 2007a) sided with Beatty and Fothergill (2004: 475), claiming 'size seems not to be a key factor'. However, the Beatty and Fothergill (2004) study has been criticised on a number of grounds (see Sections 1.2, 3.2 and 3.3). What is relevant here is that, as Shaw and Coles (2007: 50) have pointed out, 'smaller resorts were omitted from Beatty and Fothergill's study and therefore the overall influence of resort size would not be fully measured'. Another relevant issue is that Beatty and Fothergill (2004) conflate a number of seaside resorts within larger administrative and data collection units, thus bypassing individual seaside resorts within some local authority districts. The latter practice also occurred in the benchmarking study of England's larger seaside resorts (Beatty *et al.,* 2008), which was followed by a benchmarking study of smaller seaside resorts (Beatty *et al.,* 2011).

In commenting on these benchmarking studies, Beatty *et al.* (2011: 105) concluded that 'smaller seaside towns appear to be marginally less disadvantaged than their larger counterparts', noting that 'on the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007, and on all the indices for individual domains, the proportion of smaller seaside towns with deprivation above the England average is less than the equivalent proportion of larger seaside towns'. Such expositions are unsatisfactory because information based on local authority boundaries creates difficulties and no statistical measures of association were used. Questions may also be raised about the study by Agrawal and Brunt (2006: 662), who identified 87 seaside resorts and reported 'there appears to be no relationship between the size of the resort and the incidence and level of multiple deprivation; both smaller and large sized resorts appear to suffer from high levels of multiple deprivation'. Agarwal and Brunt (2006) failed to provide evidence of this analysis, not even

specifying how the resorts were split in the analysis. Thus, the generalisability of published research on this issue is problematic. There is a lack of transparency and previous research findings have been inconsistent and contradictory and, for the most part, based on speculation or simple statistical analysis.

While the evidence is not wholly conclusive (this study excludes the very smallest seaside settlements with a population of less than 10,000) and it is based on, admittedly, a sample of 58 seaside resorts, it is pointing towards the conclusion that there is an association between the size of the resort and the degree of multiple deprivation. On the overall Index of Deprivation, and in each of its constituent domains, mid-sized resorts record significantly lower levels of deprivation than larger resorts and a wider range of deprivation levels. Further analysis, however, of the correspondence of overall deprivation with each of the deprivation domains, revealed strong associations, although the relationship between overall deprivation and barriers to housing and services is confined to large resorts. Thus, with the exception of access, there are no significant differences in the patterns of deprivation between large and medium size resorts. Overall these findings demonstrate that English seaside resorts, albeit of medium or large size, are experiencing similar problems of multiple deprivation, but large resorts tend to have higher levels. The latter finding is surprising given that large urban resorts might be expected to attract more employment opportunities, even in times of economic strife.

A third insight is that the commonly experienced problems are deeply embedded. The patterns of deprivation faced by seaside resorts in 2010 were similar to those in 2004, but there were changes in levels of deprivation. Analysis of quartile composition change revealed that the majority of the resort LSOAs experienced a modest change in their national rank but a small number did experience significant change. For all domains, except income, several resort LSOAs improved or worsened by two quartiles and, in some instances, by three quartiles. Even though the indices of deprivation are about relative deprivation not absolute changes, such changes in deprivation levels of resort LSOAs cannot be due to the improvement or worsening

of deprivation rankings of other small areas elsewhere in England alone. Indeed, the erratic changes in deprivation levels, both positive and negative, suggests that resort-level influences in general and population composition and dynamics in particular are instrumental in shaping the fortunes of many resort LSOAs. That said it should be emphasised that the majority of resort LSOAs experienced a modest change in their national rank. This pattern holds true when the most deprived quartiles are considered separately. Overall these results match those observed in previous longitudinal studies of urban deprivation (e.g., Brennan *et al.*, 1998, 2000; Burchardt *et al.*, 1999; Lupton, 2001; Orford, 2004), which showed that there is typically little significant change through time in the characteristics and performance of the most deprived areas.

Consequently, at an aggregate level, the changes in levels of deprivation were not particularly dramatic. Overall LSOA movement from 2004 was negative for five out of the seven deprivation domains (education and skills, health, housing and services, living environment, and crime). In terms of the employment and income indicators of multiple deprivation, from 2004 to 2010, the English seaside has reduced its percentage of LSOAs that are considered to be in the most deprived national quartiles, but the improvements were very small. Indeed, the domains which had the highest proportion of resort LSOAs in the most deprived quartiles in both 2004 and 2010 were the 'economic' domains (employment, income, and education and skills), the 'health deprivation and disability' domain and 'living environment deprivation'. That leaves the 'crime' and 'barriers to housing and services' domains, which had the highest proportion of LSOAs in the least deprived quartiles in both 2004 and 2010. These domains became more evenly distributed when comparing 2004 with 2010, with the percentage of LSOAs falling within the upper quartiles increasing in size. Taken together, these findings highlight the increasing economic, social and environmental pressures that contribute to, and are indicators of a continued process of decline. The cumulative effects of these key socio-economic indicators are shown in the levels of multiple deprivation. In relation to national quartiles, quintiles and deciles, the latest evidence reveals that there is a

skew in resort LSOAs towards the very deprived. This skew is slightly more pronounced than in 2004. Since then, there has been a slight contraction in the proportion of LSOAs classed nationally as less deprived and a slight expansion in the proportion classed nationally as more deprived. Thus, multiple deprivation at the English seaside has increased both in extent (number of LSOAs) and concentration (severity).

In summary, the initial part of the study provided a descriptive analysis of the nature, intensity and scale of social exclusion in English seaside resorts. Research was undertaken because 'seaside resorts are the least understood of Britain's "problem" areas' (CLG, 2007a: 42) and the existing evidence base is patchy. Indeed, as earlier chapters highlighted, seaside resorts have until now received very little attention either from policy-makers or the academic community, particularly in comparison with inland urban and rural areas and declining industrial areas. The research found English seaside resorts generally had greater levels of deprivation than the rest of England. Higher deprivation levels than might be expected by the size of the resort were also found. Larger seaside resorts generally had higher levels of deprivation than the mid-sized resorts. As with the larger seaside resorts, there was variation in the levels of deprivation in the mid-sized seaside resorts. The most deprived resorts and areas have multiple problems, including low income and employment, poor skills, education and training, bad health, deprivation in the living environment, and high crime and disorder. Many of these commonly experienced problems are deeply embedded. They have persisted and intensified over the last decade. Thus, there is deprivation and social exclusion in English seaside resorts; individuals and households exist with a poorer standard of living in comparison to the majority of the population and with an inability to participate in everyday activities that most take for granted, and substantially more than is widely recognised.

As well as highlighting the occurrence, nature and extent of characteristics associated with social exclusion, the initial part of the study has:

- Charted the quintile distribution of LSOAs for each seaside resort to show the overall pattern of deprivation;
- Established a detailed understanding of their current position, as a baseline for monitoring future change;
- Established a national seaside resort database to monitor change and mechanisms for collating and analysing the Indices of Deprivation data;
- Identified deprived resorts and localities for more detailed study, using the upper quintile threshold as recommended by DCLG (McLennan *et al.*, 2011); and,
- Begun to understand and explain the contribution that tourism makes to the circumstances of seaside resort residents.

7.1.2 Differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts and the factors that may explain these differences

In seeking to understand the influence of resort decline on social exclusion, a statistical analysis was used to ascertain whether there were differences in socio-economic performance between deprived and non-deprived resorts identified in stage one, and if so, the scale and the extent of the differences. This objective was achieved by drawing on the newly created seaside resort database consisting also of a range of social, economic and demographic measures derived from multiple sources including the 2001 Census of Population, Labour Force Survey, Annual Business Inquiry, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and Customs, Experian, Land Registry, Home Office, Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix and ONS. The results reveal that a range of facets of population composition (worklessness, education and skills, health, family stability, connectivity, and poverty) and place factors (employment base, economic prosperity, housing, and community safety) are significant for deprivation in seaside resorts. The second element of the research therefore provides a better understanding of some of the causes and consequences of social exclusion within English seaside resorts. However, in considering the influence of resort decline on social exclusion, a fundamental issue is the identification of similarities in the economic characteristics of deprived resorts which

significantly differentiate them from non-deprived resorts, and which consequently shape their development paths.

In comparison to the economic structure of more prosperous resorts, a general feature of deprived resorts is the relative weakness of the private sector in terms of employment (and by extension, investment and service provision). This finding is exemplified by the prevalence of public sector employment in deprived resorts, which is significant. However, although the public sector is particularly important as a source of semi-skilled service employment, a reliance on the public sector 'is not necessarily advantageous to productivity as it focuses on non-traded goods, thereby limiting the supply chain' (Agarwal *et al.,* 2009: 317). In addition, the lack of dynamism of the private sector also negatively impacts upon the public sector, 'as patterns of public sector investment are themselves strongly influenced by those of the private sector' (North and Syrett, 2008: 82). Whilst employment in the sectors most dependent on the tourist trade was not identified as being significant for deprivation, which serves to demonstrate that tourism is still a key industry in seaside resorts, the deprived resorts are distinguished economically in terms of their labour market characteristics. Significantly, deprived resorts are characterised by high levels of unemployment (and youth; long-term unemployment) and worklessness, low rates of employment, high levels of part-time employment, many low-wage manual jobs, low levels of skills and education, and of household income. Furthermore, levels of formal entrepreneurship and small business formation are significantly lower, as measured by the proportion of population that are self-employed, employers in small organisations and own account workers.

Some of these disadvantaged labour market characteristics (unemployment, low income) have been documented in the academic and policy literature (English Tourist Board, 1991; Cooper, 1997; British Resorts Association, 2000; Beatty and Fothergill, 2004). Moreover, such economic problems may be interpreted as 'consequences of decline' (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006: 667) and are highlighted by DCLG-funded qualitative research of ten

'deprived' resorts, which were identified on the basis of the local employment rate (Shared Intelligence, 2008). Thus, the present research confirms previous findings and contributes additional evidence that suggests the long-term structural decline of tourism has produced *many resort economies with a number of common weaknesses* in terms of low levels of productivity, economic activity, income, wages, skills and education.

A degraded physical environment also reflects a lack of ongoing investment from both private and public sector sources, over long periods of time (Shaw and Coles, 2007). This point is borne out by the record on two of the major sources of government regeneration funding, Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and Neighbourhood Regeneration Fund (NRF) funding. These funding programmes were central to the New Labour social exclusion agenda, but seaside resorts were not recognised as a regeneration problem requiring specific action. However, owing to the publication of the DCLG Select Committee Inquiry on Coastal Towns in 2007, there is now a growing awareness that the decline in tourism has had serious consequences for the physical state of resorts. The situation is neatly summarised by Seeda (2005: 16):

> 'The decline in tourism income for B&Bs has led to a cycle of decline with the first closure of a B&B in a street being swiftly followed by the closure of other neighbouring establishments. These premises then either remain vacant or are converted into unlicensed 'Housing of Multiple Occupation' providing low-quality rentals. The properties are poorly maintained and whole streets and neighbourhoods begin to take on the characteristics of slums, affecting property values and making the resorts less attractive to visitors'.

Thus, contrary to earlier documents which highlight unemployment and low income as decline indicators (English Tourist Board, 1991), a broader range of problems including poor environmental quality, housing and increased crime are now recognised (British Resorts Association, 2000; English Heritage, 2003, 2007; British Urban Regeneration Association, 2007; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010). Accordingly, the influence of resort decline on social exclusion was further examined through measures of physical distress.

The research found significant differences between the deprived and non-deprived resorts for measures such as housing tenure and condition, vacant dwellings, crime, and residential property prices. House values can be seen as picking up on the condition of the built environment, where high prices equal better quality and decent transport links, schools, greenspace, community safety etc. Non-deprived resorts have higher than average values of property than seaside resorts as a whole, whilst deprived resorts exhibited lower than average values. A similar pattern is evident for owner-occupied housing. This finding may be explained by the fact that, in the non-deprived resorts, the number of retired persons is significantly higher and the net in-migration is especially strong among those aged 45 and over. Although the inflow of older people creates and perpetuates a relatively old age distribution, this in-migration is important as many are drawn from more affluent groups (Shaw and Williams, 2003) and can 'fuel economic development (most are not looking to give up work and may be keen to take local jobs or commute elsewhere, at least initially), employment growth in consumer and public services such as health (which is driven by population-driven formulae), and generate extra spending' (Atterton, 2006: 29). Indeed, as Shaw and Williams (2003) have pointed out, members of affluent groups have relocated to resort towns for environmental and lifestyle reasons and not just simply to retire. Many become self-employed, establish a tourism business or pursue investment opportunities. It therefore appears that the deprived resorts generally provide few attractions to the entrepreneurial class, property developers and to business investment, owing to low levels of market demand and competition, and the adverse quality of the environment.

Significantly, the housing market in deprived resorts has higher proportions of social housing and private rented properties than more prosperous resorts. Moreover, unlike the rest of England, there is a higher proportion of private dwellings. The unbalanced housing stock is due to the remnants of former tourism accommodation being converted into small-flats, bedsits and other Housing of Multiple Occupation. This finding perhaps may best be exemplified by the prevalence of housing lacking/sharing basic facilities and of overcrowding, rates of which

are significantly higher in the deprived resorts. Such low quality housing provides a useful source of income for proprietors facing declining revenues from tourism, but Beatty *et al.* (2004) reveal it has attracted young, low skilled individuals and households often reliant on state benefits. What this particular housing study also noted is that many then move on to accommodation in the social housing sector (council or housing association) in the same seaside resort. Social housing is allocated according to need. The criteria is different for every local authority but can include homelessness, overcrowding, medical or welfare issues, financial circumstances and number of dependents (Hills, 2007). Thus, in many cases these residents have complex and multiple needs that place significant financial and managerial pressures on a range of public services.

Significantly, deprived resorts are differentiated in terms of higher proportions of young age-groups, as well as working-age residents. Furthermore, the net in-migration is greatest among the under-45s, although not markedly so. The cumulative effect over several years could help explain deprivation levels in these resorts. If, as Beatty *et al.* (2004) have pointed out, the latter group is largely characterised by disadvantaged socio-economic characteristics, the steady inflow over time may partly account for the inertia (documented in the previous section). Another explanation for inertia might be reduced expectations and aspirations resulting from no or little experience of employment extending across generations. The latter point perhaps may best be exemplified by the incidence of children in out-of-out work families and of children in lone parent families, rates of both in the deprived resorts are significantly higher than in non-deprived resorts.

The importance of housing market change as a factor for deprivation in seaside resorts is well summarised by Shared Intelligence (2008: 10) drawing upon the results of interviews with housing managers in ten deprived resorts:

> ‘the prevalence of cheap rental accommodation has served to attract in vulnerable individuals. The poor quality of the stock and the out-migration of younger households further creates a cycle of low demand and low prices. The low demand for “typical”

> family accommodation depresses prices and acts as an incentive to meet the demand for low-quality, low rent flats and bedsits, which in turn encourages more affluent families to look elsewhere'.

Put differently, with lower-income residents moving into an area, demand for higher rental properties decreases which makes it less profitable to invest in maintenance and improvements. Such a process can create a downward spiral, resulting in further degradation of the built environment (in terms of quality of buildings, litter, graffiti, vandalism etc.) and encouraging higher levels of crime, thus making such areas less attractive to existing and potential residents. The latter point is supported by evidence that levels of empty housing, which is an indicator of low demand and the decline of particular neighbourhoods, are significantly higher in the deprived resorts. A similar pattern is evident with respect to crime rates, which are not only an indicator of community safety but also reflect economic circumstances. Furthermore, the research found a very high turnover of population in the deprived resorts, which corroborates the observations of those housing managers, and which has important implications for public policy on regeneration.

Overall, the results do confirm expectations from the extant literature reviewed in Chapter Three (section 3.3.1). For the first time quantitative research demonstrated that indicators associated with negative labour-market outcomes, together with disadvantaged environmental and housing market characteristics are distinguishing features of deprived seaside resorts in England. In this respect, the research built on the qualitative work of Shared Intelligence (2008), which interviewed regeneration and housing managers in ten employment deprived resorts and commented that evidence on all of these characteristics is fairly scant, and that more detailed quantitative analysis is needed. Although it is possible to identify certain common economic and physical characteristics of deprived resorts, two points need to be recognised. First, the analysis identifies differences in conditions between deprived and non-deprived resorts. The basis of comparison is with the seaside average in the measures used, but the scale of the differences are not always large. Nonetheless, they are statistically significant. Second, it is also the case that, on many of these measures, the 58 seaside resorts as a group

differ to a great degree from the figures for England overall. So, there are areas of convergence that in many cases result from the seaside resort characteristics of these urban areas. By undertaking a comparative analysis of the national averages of a range of socio-economic indicators (nearly 70) for England and for the 58 seaside resorts, the research also helped to fill the evidence gap that existed on seaside resorts. It built on the work of Beatty *et al.* (2008), their benchmarking study of the 37 largest seaside resorts used short of 30 measures of seaside socio-economic performance, but they also group several seaside resorts and do so using district-level data.

The outcome of the analysis prompts two broad conclusions. The first point concerns the main explanatory factors for seaside deprivation and the characteristics of deprived resorts. The second point relates to the potential of 'area based' effects in reinforcing the problems of these resorts. Both points are discussed in turn. To begin, no-one seriously doubts that 'English seaside resort decline has been endemic since the late 1970s' (Agarwal, 2005: 353) and that it generally takes many years for areas and their populations to become deprived or 'detached from the conventional labour market' (McGregor and McConnachie, 1995: 32). However, although a central feature of resort decline is the production and persistence of disadvantaged labour market characteristics as this study demonstrates, it appears that the subsequent evolution of seaside resorts has been driven by processes of residential sorting associated with the allocation of social housing, but particularly the availability of low cost rented property. Before proceeding to summarise the importance of the private housing market as a factor for seaside deprivation, however, it is necessary to touch on social housing policy, which is often the primary factor in the emergence of concentrations of deprivation in Britain (North and Syrett, 2008).

Indeed, such policy has brought about residential sorting. Throughout the 1930s and 1970s, government sought to address urban overcrowding by uprooting inner-city communities and relocating them to especially constructed 'mono-functional estates built as dormitories for

the families of mainly male workers' (Power and Mumford, 1999: 81). The effect of this policy was the destruction of established social networks and the concentration of similar socio-economic characteristics to new, social housing estates which were often on the periphery of towns and cities in Britain. Later, in the 1980s, government introduced the Right-to-Buy scheme which led to growth in private ownership but, at the same time, a distinction being made between the purchasing of the better social housing stock (whether on account of its quality of build or its location) and the non-purchase of the least desirable housing stock (Power and Mumford, 1999). More recently, the criteria employed by local authorities to allocate social housing has served to exacerbate the trends above by placing vulnerable individuals and families into such stock, 'much of which is in low demand areas with concentrations of worklessness' (Hills, 2007: 18).

Paralleling these housing policy impacts has been the residential sorting effects that the private housing market has had. The situation is neatly summarised by Sutherland *et al.* (2010: 6):

> '[First] The societal preference for private, owner-occupied housing has led to low demand for properties in areas of high social housing. [Second] New private sector housing has become increasingly accessible and affordable enabling most income groups to have greater choice in where they wish to live and can afford to buy. Consequently, individuals with the lowest incomes have the least housing choice and are 'forced' to live in areas of least demand'.

It follows that urban disadvantage in Britain is invariably associated with the location of social housing. Indeed, in his foreword to the Social Exclusion Unit's report on deprived areas, Tony Blair suggested that: 'We all know the problems of our poorest social housing neighbourhoods - decaying housing, unemployment, street crime and drugs. People who can, move out. Nightmare neighbours move in. Shops, banks and other vital services close' (SEU, 1998c: 7). Excepting Beatty *et al.* (2004), no mention has been made to the incidence of social housing in English seaside resorts, as attention has focused on the 'new' housing that was formerly tourist accommodation.

Thus, such housing has become available in both the deprived and non-deprived resorts due to the decline in tourism. However, the prevalence of the public sector as a source of employment in the deprived resorts suggests that these resorts have experienced relatively significant decline in recent decades (compared to the more prosperous resorts), resulting in a *more* unbalanced housing market and impacting *more* on existing residents and changing population composition. The present research did not set out to cover population transience and migration in any depth as the ward-level data was limited to age, thus making it impossible to draw out more detailed conclusions regarding the nature of migrancy (e.g., short term vs. long term) and what skills, qualifications and expertise migrants are bringing to seaside resorts. But the research produced overall findings that are consistent with previous empirical work (Beatty *et al.,* 2003, 2004; Atterton, 2006) and discussions (Shaw and Coles, 2007) and furthermore demonstrated that, in the deprived resorts, the net in-migration is greatest among the under-45s, whereas in the non-deprived resorts, net in-migration is especially strong among those aged 45 and over. If, as the previous writers argue, the former group is less affluent (i.e., young, low-income, low-skilled), then this pattern of in-migration is clearly a factor for seaside deprivation, not least if members of the group remain in the resort long-term and move from private rented accommodation to the social sector (with the private rented housing then being repopulated again with more vulnerable individuals and households). In the case of the more prosperous resorts, then, it might be that the decline of traditional seaside holidaymaking has sometimes been counterbalanced with the in-migration of affluent groups, resulting in investment flowing into business and residential developments and, perhaps, resulting in slightly more diversified economies.

Of course the relative importance of both migration and housing market change will vary from resort to resort, but doubtless the long-term structural decline of traditional seaside holidaymaking has led to economic deprivation in seaside resorts, with the continuing reliance on tourism and the shortcomings in the job market accounting for the stubborn levels of deprivation documented in the previous section. Arguably, while resort decline, housing market

change and migration are the underlying causes of seaside deprivation, they have largely had their direct impact. The persistence of deprivation might (in addition to the shortcomings in the job market) also be due to processes that are operating relating to people and place, which have been collectively termed as 'area based' effects in the social exclusion literature (e.g., Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Buck, 2001; Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). So what are 'area based' effects, how can they be identified and what area effects might be operating in seaside resorts?

The literature on area based effects is more developed in the US than in UK, and its findings and theoretical propositions have been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Buck, 2001; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002; North and Syrett, 2008). In brief, area effects refer to the notion that deprivation can have a compounding effect upon residents of deprived areas, above and beyond those experienced at an individual level. Studies from the US (see Jargowsky, 1996) have shown that the size of area effects in deprived towns and cities are generally small when compared to national macroeconomic conditions, structural factors at the regional level (such as skills, innovation, competition, enterprise, investment) and non-spatial explanatory variables (such as age, gender, ethnicity, social class). However, they are statistically significant. Area effects therefore shed some light on the question of why after years of tackling deprivation and social exclusion mainly through individually targeted responses (see section 2.3) there is, as the previous section highlighted, little significant change through time in the characteristics and performance of the most deprived areas in Britain.

A wide range of potential area effects can be identified with respect to deprived areas (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Buck, 2001; North and Syrett, 2008). As already indicated, there are effects that flow from the characteristics of the population (the principal focus of academic debate) and those that flow from the characteristics of the place itself. Examples of population rooted area effects include socialisation processes, restricted social networks, stigmatisation of residents, high burden on local service provision etc. Some examples of place based effects are poor-quality and/or absence of private services, lower standards of public service provision,

features of the built environment, the physical isolation of the area, and high levels of environmental pollution. In an overview of the available evidence, North and Syrett (2008: 85) find the body of evidence inconclusive about area effects, noting 'the major reason for the lack of clarity and agreement with regard to area effects is the difficulty in demonstrating them empirically given the complexity of disentangling an individual from the context in which they reside, socialise and grow up'. There are also enormous methodological difficulties for quantitative researchers in investigating area effects (see Buck, 2001 for a fuller discussion). The problems identified include: the fact that individual characteristics will influence choice and outcomes which may over/under play area effects; statistical data are of poor quality and limited relevance in measuring many area effects; effects may come into operation at particular thresholds; and, effects will operate at different levels. Furthermore, 'the combination of interrelated factors within any given area ensures that there are multiple pathways of cause and effect' (North and Syrett, 2008: 85). Perhaps these difficulties are why British research evidence is scant.

Studies from the US have used econometric multi-level modelling and large-scale household surveys in investigating effects of area deprivation on social exclusion measures (see Jargowsky, 1996), but the findings are 'contradictory and inconsistent' and 'in some cases almost meaningless and possibly misleading' (Lupton, 2004: 12). In asking 'can we measure area effects and does it matter', Lupton (2004: 4), a leading theorist of the relationship between spatial location and social exclusion, suggested that British studies need not necessarily rest on sophisticated modelling techniques, 'as the more complex study design can "get lost" while much attention and debate is given to the weaker one'. The 'weaker one' refers to approaches that seek to identify whether there are differences between deprived and non-deprived areas (e.g., Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002), or to identify associations between indicators related to social exclusion in such areas (e.g., Buck, 2001). If there are, then specific area effects can be deduced. Although a 'crude' approach to investigating area effects, Lupton (2004: 3) commented that 'area-based policies are not dependent on the existence of area effects, and that

most would be implemented anyway, even if no area effects were found'. Such policies are, for the most part, designed to address negative characteristics of the areas themselves.

Thus, following Lupton (2004), area effects can (to an extent) be 'read off' from the characteristics that differentiate deprived resorts from others. Since the primary concern of the investigation was to investigate the influence of resort decline on social exclusion, the differentiating economic and environmental characteristics previously identified are of interest here. In terms of people effects, the large group of people who are divorced from the resort economy is a concern, because the high degree of unemployed and economically inactive individuals inevitably limits the contact or relationships that residents of deprived resorts have with those in work. One ramification is that residents may be less aware of employment opportunities. It is estimated that only a third of job vacancies are notified to Jobcentre Plus (ONS, 2005), meaning that the majority of employment opportunities are filled through other formal methods and informal channels such as word of mouth, social networks etc. Consequently, people who are out of work or not in frequent contact with those in work are less likely to hear of potential opportunities. Another ramification of living in an area with high unemployment and economic inactivity is that there are fewer positive local role models (North and Syrett, 2008). As a result, some residents living in the deprived resorts may develop particular attitudes and perceptions towards education, training and employment. Specifically, a poverty of ambition and reduced expectations may affect some people and extend across generations. There might also be an acceptance of 'getting by' via benefits, informal work and illegal activity. Young people (due to socialisation processes) are particularly affected or at risk here, especially if they are from a lone-parent family or if parents have had long spells of unemployment/being in prison etc. (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). A lack of participation in employment or education is also linked to 'network poverty' (Bailey and Livingston, 2007), whereby the quality and quantity of social capital and networks are compromised, resulting in disaffection and social isolation.

Serious place effects may arise from the poor quality of the environment and housing in deprived seaside resorts. House prices are low and it was found that, the housing stock is not well provided with basic amenities, overcrowding is high. In terms of housing lacking basic facilities, the conditions in which people live affect their health, relations between household members, and the development of children, whereas overcrowding is associated with a higher rate of child accidents and the resulting lack of privacy can be a considerable cause of mental stress (Shelter, 2005, 2006). Poor quality housing is also linked to high resident turnover, which leads to instability in school rolls, disrupting social networks and by eroding feelings of trust, safety and security contributes to local area dissatisfaction (Bailey and Livingston 2007). Studies have also found 'a poor quality residential environment is linked to fear of crime, problems of antisocial behaviour, drugs, violence and a "generally threatening youth culture"' (Bashir and Flint, 2010: 5). In such areas, a reduction in local private sector activity can raise prices for residents (North and Syrett, 2008). It can also create a shortage of local jobs, and low incomes and low levels of car ownership reduces accessibility to jobs (and services) in other locations, thus creating a 'spatial mismatch' between the local workforce and centres of employment (McGregor and McConnachie, 1995). So, in seaside resorts, living in a deprived area and living alongside disadvantaged residents may have several damaging effects on an individual's life chances. The effects suggested above may well be small when compared to the special contribution tourism makes to the residents' circumstances, but they are of interest because they add a new depth to understanding the internal dynamics of resort change.

7.1.3 The diversity of deprived seaside resort localities

While this study illuminates the common problems of deprived resort localities (section 7.1.1), it also illustrates the diversity of their physical characteristics, population composition, and problems. Indeed, cluster analysis of a range of social, economic and demographic measures for 399 resort LSOAs was undertaken to reveal the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. This analysis has resulted in a typology of four clusters:

- Unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages;
- Social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families;
- Older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems; and,
- Areas in flux with ethnic minorities, solo living and private renters living in poor housing.

The outcome of the analysis points to several broad conclusions. First, as already indicated, deprived resort areas exhibit differences, and generalising across them may obscure more than it reveals. For example, the use of the '20% most deprived' indicator can be helpful in understanding the levels of deprivation in seaside resorts and identifying the most deprived areas, not least because DCLG and other organisations use this threshold when assessing applications to access regeneration funds (McLennan *et al.*, 2011). However, the Index of Multiple Deprivation is a composite measure and the domains are standardised (with different weights applied) and, moreover, it does not reveal anything about the local setting of individual areas or whether they are located within larger concentrations of disadvantage; both factors could have an important impact on any policy intervention in such areas.

Second, deprived areas in many seaside resorts are nearly all surrounded by similar areas. That similar deprived areas tend to cluster spatially is important since arguments relating to the negative impacts of area based effects may have greater significance in seaside resorts. Third, although a plethora of labour market difficulties beset English seaside resorts, such economic characteristics are much less important in terms of understanding why concentrations of deprivation exist where they do, in comparison to housing market characteristics. The spatial location of deprivation in England's seaside resorts appears to reflect the physical legacy of the tourist trade and the outcomes of recent processes of residential sorting, as well as social housing allocation policies. Private rented housing is a major presence in three of the four distinct deprived area typology categories emerging from the analysis. Spatially, the three clusters are found predominantly in inner-resort localities, thus implicating the differing roles of the former commercial holiday accommodation, which is increasingly being turned into care homes, hostels, HMOs and small flats. Thus, the analysis has confirmed the inaccuracy of the widely-held assumption that urban deprivation in England is confined to the location of social

housing. It therefore appears that social exclusion is a somewhat more complex and multi-faceted phenomenon in seaside resorts than in other English towns and cities

Fourth, some clusters are more deprived than others. Although the local authority housing estates in the middle and outer suburbs of the resorts emerged as the largest cluster of deprived areas, the highest levels of multiple deprivation are associated with areas grouped into cluster 1 (the second largest cluster). It displayed a range of problems, most notably unemployment (and youth; long-term unemployment), worklessness/dependency on benefits, and poverty (including child poverty). A review of the cluster profile suggests that individuals may be claiming 'out of work' benefits for a number of reasons including sickness and disability, looking after children (in the case of lone parents) or other caring responsibilities. Accordingly, interventions to improve connection to the labour market will be vitally important in these areas. However, although this typology of deprived resort areas can be used to develop targeted interventions aimed at addressing important local problems, one type of activity alone (e.g., skills and learning activities) will not transform the deprived areas. Given that the causes of deprivation and social exclusion are multiple, often long-term and deeply entrenched in nature, a genuine comprehensive approach is required. The approach needs to incorporate all factors promoting local area exclusion so that there is action in relation to housing, education, skills, health, employability, monetary advice, childcare, transport, crime etc.

Thus, for the first time research demonstrated that not all deprived seaside resort areas are the same (and some are more deprived than others), deprived areas in many seaside resorts are nearly all surrounded by similar areas, and seaside resorts are very obviously split in a socio-spatial sense which owes much to the decline in tourism and the impact of the private and social housing markets. By producing a bespoke typology of highly deprived resort areas, the research offers a valuable summary of the diversity of deprived resort areas, a basis for benchmarking change and evidence for policy. Comparison of the previous seaside socio-economic typology (Agarwal and Brunt, 2006) and bespoke groups for the most deprived resort areas shows some

correspondences. It is important, however, to realise that Agarwal and Brunt (2006) *suggest a typology* based on profiling selected Census (2001) variables, so they suggest a typology *of resort types* and associated socio-economic characteristics (see Table 1.4). However, the typology developed in this thesis is not at the resort level, but the small area (or LSOA) level. Agarwal and Brunt (2006) suggested three resort types – 'young', 'old', and 'wealthy'. On this basis, and looking no further than the demographic structure, the former two categories correspond to the groups identified in the cluster analysis. Clearly, the 'old' category relates to 'older population, lower unemployment but higher health-related problems'. The 'young' category may be seen to cover both the 'unemployed households with low incomes and social disadvantages' of cluster 1 and the 'social housing neighbourhoods with young population in unstable families' of cluster 2. It is interesting to note that the present research found young people (i.e., children and working-age residents) as a strong feature of clusters 1 and 2, whereas residents of working-age are over-represented in cluster 4. Thus, social exclusion is affecting sections of the working-age population differently. Exactly how can be seen by reviewing the cluster profiles, which provide an important insight into some of the causes and consequences of social exclusion.

7.2 Key contributions

Evidently, there are three key contributions which can be drawn from this investigation. First, this study enhances understanding and conceptualisations of resort decline and the internal dynamics of change in a number of ways. Up until now these conceptualisations have been simplistic and primarily tourism centric, focusing on what Agarwal (2002: 33) terms as the 'symptoms of decline'. Indeed, as Chapter Three demonstrated, resort change has, for the most part, been framed as a lifecycle process and 'symptoms of decline' refer to decline in tourist volumes and expenditure, tourism-related employment and income, resorts' market share, environmental quality of destination, quality of visitor experience, and appeal and investment. Thus, instead of studying a resort's changing qualities, research has studied the changing quality of tourism within a resort. Therefore, there is no clear understanding of the consequences of this decline process for the quality of resorts.

This study has attempted to develop understanding of post-mature resort development by investigating the occurrence of a range of characteristics of area condition and population composition in English seaside resorts. In doing so, the research built on the work of Agarwal (2005), whose conceptual paper highlighted the importance of place-specific factors in a study of English seaside resort restructuring. By focusing explicitly on the particularities of 'place' using measures of area factors and measures of population composition and dynamics, the research has advanced understanding of the character, problems and prospects for English seaside resorts. Although providing only a snapshot of seaside socio-economic performance at one point in time, this study reveals complexity and that resort decline is multi-dimensional with differing causes and consequences. The situation is complex because, on almost all indicators of socio-economic performance, the average for the seaside resorts is worse than for England as a whole, but the scale of the disparity between the seaside resort average and the English average is not always large. It can therefore be assumed that the difficulties faced by

seaside resorts are by no means unique, but what sets them apart is the complex combination of factors that exist in seaside resorts.

Indeed, as well as comparatively analysing socio-economic characteristics of seaside resorts against national averages, the research provided an indication of the chief economic and physical differences between deprived and non-deprived resorts. By demonstrating that there are differences in terms of their economic characteristics, the research has produced empirical findings that lend support to claims of differing dynamics of change, particularly with regard to the operation of spirals of decline (Shared Intelligence, 2008). Thus, the importance of area factors/condition as a cause and component of decline is clear. What is also clear is the need to further understand these interactions (by studying specific resorts in detail and over time) to identify patterns and combinations of circumstances that repeatedly occur, by quantitative research incorporating all of these factors. The present research has isolated/identified factors as being significant for deprivation in seaside resorts, but better understanding of the nature of their interactions has potentially important implications for policy development. Thus, there is a need to model more formally the factors associated with spirals of decline, in order to fully understand within-resort processes of change and their undesired consequences.

Second, this study enhances understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in seaside resorts. The scale, nature and extent of social exclusion was investigated using the Index of Multiple Deprivation and its constituent domains – the study findings reveal that the majority of seaside resorts are experiencing similar types and high levels of multiple deprivation. Most aspects of life are affected and the problems are deeply embedded. The research built on the work of Agarwal and Brunt (2006) in a number of ways. First, the indices used included environmental and crime indicators and were available for small areas, and the changes in levels of deprivation were explored. Second, differences in socio-economic performance between deprived and non-deprived resorts were investigated, revealing potential ‘area based’ effects in terms of people and place. Third, the research produced a typology of highly deprived resort

areas, thus revealing the nature and incidence of localised problem complexes. Thus, this combination of findings enhances understanding of deprivation and social exclusion in English seaside resorts. Moreover, by highlighting the occurrence, nature and extent of characteristics associated with social exclusion, this study makes a theoretical contribution to existing theories of resort evolution. It does so by focussing explicitly on the consequences of decline instead of symptoms. By considering potential 'area based' effects the research has also developed understanding of the second-order effects emanating from consequences of decline, thereby enhancing understanding of the internal dynamics of post-mature resorts.

Third, this study develops and proposes a typology of highly deprived resort areas – which may be evaluated for its usefulness, and tested elsewhere. In the absence of a pre-existing theoretical framework for understanding resort socioeconomic change, the research opted for an inductive model – assembling socio-economic data (representing measures of population composition and measures of area condition) at the LSOA level and subjecting this data to principal components analysis and then cluster analysis in the expectation that this analysis would reveal distinct 'clusters' or areas with common combinations of values on specific variables. Thus this approach may be termed as 'letting the data speak'. Admittedly, the results of the analysis of clusters in terms of the seven components identified in the principal components analysis are, depending on perspective, disappointing. On the one hand, although seven underlying 'components' summarise a great degree of the total variation in the original data, some of these components, depending on interpretation, do not amount to a clear dimension. Of course the fuzziness can be explained by the many different ways in which the data correlated during the PCA itself, and subsequent decisions on the number of components to retain and on the handling of 'complex' variables (i.e., variables that cross-load on numerous components). On the other hand, when analysing each cluster by original input variables, the groups and problems identified appear to have a good degree of conceptual and geographic coherence, in terms of the clustering of deprived areas near seafront and central resort regions.

That is not to say the typology is, in any sense, a definitive classification of highly deprived resort areas. Other data, other clustering methods and different choices about the number of groups into which to place individual areas are likely to result in a different type of grouping of areas. Nonetheless, for the first time research developed a typology to be used as the basis for understanding of how types of deprived resort area are changing in different ways. The work described here, however, is the first stage in a process of research directed towards understanding area-based deprivation in English seaside resorts. Although providing an important empirical description of England's highly deprived resort areas, there is a need to develop a typology of advantage and disadvantage across England's seaside resorts (thus including all 1,686 resort LSOAs) in order to fully appreciate the socio-spatial structure of resorts and thereby the outcomes of post-mature resort development. The present research also suggests a degree of spatial clustering (which has serious implications in terms of area based effects), therefore, the extent to which individual resort LSOAs are located within deeply entrenched pockets of deprivation or affluence requires urgent investigation. Thus, two additional typologies will flow from this thesis: a typology of advantage and disadvantage (to fully understand the socio-spatial structure of resorts), and a spatial context typology (to fully understand exactly how concentrated deprived and non-deprived areas are, as well as gauge inequality in seaside resorts). Both typologies can be easily produced, owing to the production of the national seaside resort database. Of course, the former typology will require more thinking, possibly informed by survey research and/or peer review panel, about which indicators should be included. The survey and/or peer review additionally will help to ensure the typology's acceptance by policymakers and the academic community, and it will generate a paper with a title akin to Cooper's (1997) 'parameters and indicators of decline of the British seaside resort', with the emphasis being on seaside socio-economic performance.

7.3 Study limitations

Three important limitations need to be recognised. One is that the study employed an ecological study design and so is potentially liable to the ecological fallacy whereby associations at the area level do not necessarily mean associations at the individual level. Deprivation measures are area-based (see pages 128-9 for specific limitations of such measures) and do not correspond to individuals. Findings from this type of study cannot be related to individuals but give indications of average outcomes for individuals within small areas. However, in the absence of individual-level data, the use of the small area LSOA geography in this study is a significant improvement on previous work at census ward level (i.e., Agarwal and Brunt, 2006).

Second, it was not possible to link the Indices of Deprivation, census and administrative data with tourism statistics for English seaside resorts in order to demonstrate a stronger association between resort decline and social exclusion. The reason being the dearth of tourism data relating specifically to seaside resorts, and the non-standard way in which tourism information is collated. Tourism data are often collected on a district basis and that which is available for seaside resorts are often not directly comparable either over a period of time or between individual resorts as the parameters of the information collection vary greatly even between local authorities (see Agarwal, 1997a for a fuller discussion of tourism data problems). Thus, in the absence of such tourism data, relevant socioeconomic data (e.g., unemployment, household income, high crime rates, house prices etc.) combined with the Indices of Deprivation data, which relate to previously identified consequences of decline (English Tourist Board, 1991; British Resorts Association, 2000; English Heritage, 2003, 2007; British Urban Regeneration Association, 2007; Coastal Communities Alliance, 2010), provided a crude indication of resort decline.

Third, the quantitative approach of this study is limited in its explanations of resort decline, area change and social exclusion. The study produced a national seaside resort database

– a wide range of data representing economic, social, demographic and environmental characteristics of seaside LSOAs, wards, resorts and districts was assembled from a range of data sources – including time-series absolute and relative variables. But consistent data for LSOAs and wards is lacking, meaning that any analysis can only offer strong explanations of local authority level differences (see pages 99-101 for a fuller +discussion of the data problems relating to seaside resorts). For seaside LSOAs and wards, there are not an equal number of years for each variable, yet most of the programmes running panel data is set for what is termed 'balanced panel', whereby each resort have the same number of years data for each variable. The high frequency of missing data relating to wards and (especially) LSOAs across 2001-2010 meant it would had been hard to justify converting an unbalanced panel into a balanced panel, as the efficiency loss might be considerable and because converting into a panel may result in biased sample, thus the decision was made not to pursue panel data analysis. The quantitative approach of this study is prima facie descriptive, as the analysis tends to identify differences and isolate variables, rather than to illuminate their interaction, and is limited in the extent to which it can shed light on the factors of resort change and exclusion, rather than their outcomes.

7.4 Future research priorities

Traditionally seaside resorts have been one of the least understood of Britain's 'problem areas'. This thesis has broken new ground by reporting on an exploratory data analysis to probe the influence of resort decline on social exclusion in England's seaside resorts. In particular, the research has produced a comprehensive and detailed comparative study of social exclusion in English seaside resorts through the manipulation and application of an existing dataset, namely the Indices of Deprivation. It has also drawn attention to differences in socio-economic structure between deprived and non-deprived resorts, and the factors that may explain these differences. In addition, the research developed a typology of disadvantage across localities within England's seaside resorts, thus providing an indication of some of the causes and

consequences of local area exclusion, and of the variations in need between different groups of deprived seaside neighbourhoods.

The work described above is however the first stage in a process of research directed towards understanding economic change, spatial development and social exclusion in English seaside resorts. Indeed, for the first time research generated a national seaside resort database, which given the dearth of available specific resort data, constitutes a significant and valuable academic resource. Future analyses will increasingly draw upon data from the seaside resort database, which consists of a wide range of variables relating to their demographic, social and economic ecologies. These data will be used to develop further five important aspects of the study:

- In relation to resort decline, the present research identified, at times, considerable variation in economic performance between geographically proximate resorts. In light of the lack of knowledge of the underlying factors which explain the uneven geography of economic performance across England's seaside resorts, future analyses will explore in greater depth differences in economic performance between seaside resorts of England and the factors that may explain these differences. Drawing on data from the national seaside resort database, the determinants of relative economic performance of seaside resorts will be investigated using methods that can account for the complexity of the issue. In particular, an econometric modelling approach will be employed to determine the influence of a wide range of indicators representing economic, human, cultural and environmental capital on three distinct components of economic performance, namely productivity, employment and labour market participation. Taking into account the different dimensions of economic performance identified in this analysis, a typology of seaside resorts will be constructed, reflecting relatively good (upper quartile) and poor (lower quartile) performance based on the observed dimensions. This work will aid understanding of the resort economy and of its internal

dynamics. In addition though, significant policy implications are likely to emerge from the study's findings which will inform the development of policy on seaside resort regeneration.

- The influence of resort decline on social exclusion will be further investigated through in-depth study of six seaside resorts, two resorts will be in the upper quartile ('well performing') and two in the lower quartile ('under-performing'). The fifth and sixth resorts will neither rank among the strongest or weakest seaside economies. Thus, case study selection will be informed by the results of the previous classification. Within each case study, primary data will be collected in the form of face-to-face semi structured interviews with key informants of organisations who are responsible for providing support and advice to local groups of people who are most likely to experience social exclusion. A purposeful and theoretical sampling strategy will be employed to ensure that the wide spectrum of groups of people who may be 'at risk' to social exclusion – including lone parents, the elderly, those with chronic illnesses, the disabled, the unemployed, young people and victims of crime – are represented. Examples of such organisation which are likely to be contacted and which have presence within English seaside resorts include Age Concern, the Prince's Trust, relevant local authority departments, Victim Support, Housing Associations, Housing Action Groups and the YMCA. The interviews will contain a mix of closed and open-ended question and allow the researcher to examine, first, the way in which these groups are socially excluded and, second, the influence of resort decline on their circumstances.

- While little is known about the main cause(s) of social exclusion, the present research has identified in-migration as a potential underlying driver. Thus, future analyses will explore the composition, level and extent of in-migration in a range of resorts experiencing differing levels of social exclusion and examine the impact of migrants on their socio-economic structures, including property markets. The influence of in-

migration on social exclusion will be assessed in two different ways. First, by reviewing and processing the extensive secondary data gathered for seaside neighbourhoods, wards, resorts and districts to determine the composition, volume and distribution of in-migration, as well as the degree to which in-migration has changed the socio-economic structure of deprived and non-deprived resorts. Second, through in-depth study of six seaside resorts – four chosen to represent the typology of deprived seaside areas identified in this study, whereas the fifth and sixth resorts will be non-deprived, with one exhibiting low in-migration and the other high in-migration. Within each case study, a life-course analysis using semi-structured interviews of different groups of migrants will be undertaken. The interviews will provide information on individuals' motivation, as well as on items such as skills, work experience, welfare benefits and aspirations.

- Taken together, the three studies above will provide a basis for subsequent research to ascertain the interplay and relative importance of a variety of tourism, social and economic factors within spirals of decline in deprived seaside resorts and their neighbourhoods. Indeed, by analysing the determinants of relative economic performance of seaside resorts, investigating the influence of resort decline on social exclusion through in-depth study of resorts and assessing the influence of in-migration on social exclusion, it will be possible to develop a theoretical model for resort change designed to be tested quantitatively, though structural equation modelling.

- In relation to the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, the research produced a typology of deprived seaside localities. Inspection of the maps revealed that, in the majority of resorts, similar deprived localities are spatially clustered and that different deprived localities are, if not neighbouring each other, in close proximity. Future analyses will explore spatial patterns of deprivation in a more sophisticated manner by means of some in-depth spatial analysis. In particular, spatial autocorrelation analysis and nearest neighbour analysis will be used to investigate the

extent to which some deprived localities are located within much larger concentrations of deprivation, and which are more isolated. This information will then enable the development of a spatial context typology, which, given the emerging policy and academic focus on concentrated deprivation in urban areas and its presumed pernicious effects, is of significant value.

Thus, this study highlights several avenues for further research. Only by addressing these research shortcomings, can there be in-depth knowledge and understanding of the manifestation of social exclusion in English seaside resorts, and of its relationship with resort decline.

References

Agarwal, S. (1994) 'The resort cycle revisited: implications for resorts'. In Cooper, C. & Lockwood, A. (eds.) **Progress in Tourism, Recreation and Hospitality Management.** London: Belhaven.

Agarwal, S. (1997a) 'The resort cycle and seaside tourism: an assessment of its applicability and validity'. **Tourism Management**. 18 (2): 65-73.

Agarwal, S. (1997b) 'The public sector: Planning for renewal?' In Shaw, G. and Williams, A. (eds.) **The Rise and Fall of British Coastal Resorts**. London: Pinter.

Agarwal, S. (1999) 'Restructuring and local economic development: implications for seaside resort regeneration in Southwest Britain'. **Tourism Management.** 20: 511–522.

Agarwal, S. (2002) 'Restructuring seaside tourism. The resort lifecycle'. **Annals of Tourism Research**. 29: 5–55.

Agarwal, S. (2005) 'Global-local interactions in English coastal resorts: theoretical perspectives'. **Tourism Geographies**. 7 (4): 351-372

Agarwal, S. (2007) 'Institutional change and resort capacity: the case of Southwest English coastal resorts' In Agarwal, S. & Shaw, G. (eds.) **Managing Coastal Tourism Resorts: A Global Perspective**. Clevedon: Channel View.

Agarwal, S. (2012) 'Resort economy and direct economic linkages'. **Annals of Tourism Research.** 39 (3): 1470-1494.

Agarwal, S. & Brunt, P. (2005) 'Social exclusion and crime in English seaside resorts'. **Tourism, Culture and Communication.** 6: 1-17

Agarwal, S. & Brunt, P. (2006) 'Social exclusion in English seaside resorts'. **Tourism Management**. 27 (4): 654-670

Agarwal, S. Rahman, S. & Errington, A. (2009) 'Measuring the determinants of relative economic performance of rural areas'. **Journal of Rural Studies.** 25: 309-321

Aldridge, H. Parekh, A. MacInnes, T. & Kenway, P. (2011) **Measuring Poverty and Social Exclusion in the UK**. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Anderson, I. & Sims, D. (eds.) (2000) **Social Exclusion and Housing: Context and Challenges.** Coventry: CIH.

Atkinson, A. (1998) 'Social Exclusion, Poverty and Unemployment'. In: Hills, J. (ed.) **Exclusion, Employment and Opportunity**. London: London School of Economics.

Atkinson, R. & Davoudi, S. (2000) 'The concept of social exclusion in the European Union: context, development and possibilities'. **Journal of Common Market Studies**. 38 (3): 427-48.

Atkinson, R. & Kintrea, K. (2001) 'Disentangling area effects: evidence from deprived and non-deprived neighbourhoods'. **Urban Studies.** 38 (12): 2277-2298.

Atterton, J. (2006) **Ageing and Coastal Communities**. Newcastle University: Centre for Rural Economy.

Bailey, N. and Livingston, M. (2007) **Population Turnover and Area Deprivation.** York: The Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Barientos, A. & Powell, M. (2004) 'The route map of the Third Way'. In: Hale, S. Leggett, W. & Martell, L. (eds.) **The Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures, Alternatives.** Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Barnes, M. (2005) **Social Exclusion in Great Britain. An Empirical Investigation and Comparison with the EU.** Aldershot: Ashgate.

Barrett, J. (1958) **The Seaside Resort Towns of England and Wales**. Ph.D. Thesis. London: The University of London.

Bashir, N. and Flint, J. (2010) **Residents' Perceptions of Neighbourhood Change and Its Impacts**. Sheffield Hallam University: Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research.

Beatty, C. & Fothergill, S. (2003) **The Seaside Economy: Final Report of the Seaside Towns Research Project**. Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research: Sheffield Hallam University.
Beatty, C. & Fothergill, S. (2004) 'Economic change and the labour market in Britain's seaside towns'. **Regional Studies.** 38 (5): 459-478.
Beatty, C. Fothergill, S. & Barraclough, N. (2004) **Labour Market Flows and the Demand for Social Housing: a case study of seaside towns and comparisons with other areas**. Sheffield Hallam University.
Beatty, C. Fothergill, S. & Wilson, I. (2008) **England's Seaside Towns: A 'benchmarking' study**. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
Beatty, C. Fothergill, S. & Wilson, I. (2011) **England's Smaller Seaside Towns: A 'benchmarking' study**. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
Berghman, J. (1995) 'Social exclusion in Europe: policy context and analytical framework'. In Room, G. (ed.) **Beyond the Threshold. The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion.** Bristol: Policy Press.
Bhalla, A. & Lapeyre, F. (1997) 'Social exclusion: towards an analytical and operational framework'. **Development and Change**. 28: 413-433.
Bhalla, A. & Lapeyre, F. (2004) **Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World.** Hampshire: Macmillan.
Blair, T. (1997) **The Will to Win**. (Speech given by the Prime Minister on Monday 2 June 1997, at the Aylesbury estate, Southwark). [online] Available from http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/seu/index/more.html.
Blair, T. (2006) **Our Nation's Future - Social Exclusion**. (Speech to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation) [online] Available from: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page10037 .asp
Bradshaw, J. & Mayhew, E. (2010) **The Measurement of Extreme Poverty in the European Union**. Brussels: European Commission.
Brennan, A. Rhodes, J. & Tyler, P. (1998) **New Findings on the Nature of Economic and Social Exclusion in England: Implications for New Policy Initiatives**. Discussion Paper No. 101. Cambridge: Department of Land Economy.
Brennan, A. Rhodes, J. and Tyler, P. (2000) 'The nature of local area social exclusion in England and the role of the labour market'. **Oxford Review of Economic Policy**. 16 (1): 129-146
Brewer, M. Clark, T. & Wakefield, M. (2002) **Five Years of Social Security Reform in the UK**. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
British Resorts Association (2000) **UK Seaside Resorts – Behind the Façade**. Southport: British Resorts Association.
British Urban Regeneration Association (2007) **The Social Challenges of the Seaside**. London: BURA.
Britton, S. (1991) 'Tourism, capital and place: towards a critical geography of tourism'. **Society and Space.** 9: 451-478.
Brown, G. (2009) **Check Against Delivery.** (Speech to Labour Conference, 29 September 2009). [online] Available from: http://www2.labour.org.uk/gordon-brown-speech-conference
Buck, N. (2001) 'Identifying neighbourhood effects on social exclusion'. **Urban Studies**. 38 (12): 2251-2275.
Buck, N. & Gordon, I. (2004) 'Does spatial concentration of disadvantage contribute to social exclusion?' In Boddy, M. & Parkinson, M. (eds.) **City Matters: Competitiveness, Cohesion and Urban Governance**. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Burchardt, T. Le Grand, J. & Piachaud, D. (1999) 'Social Exclusion in Britain 1991-1995'. **Social Policy and Administration**. 33 (3): 227-244.

Burns, R. & Burns, R. (2008) 'Cluster analysis' In **Business Research Methods and Statistics using SPSS**. [online] Available from: http://studysites.uk.sagepub.com/burns/chapters.htm
Butler, R. (1980) 'The concept of a tourist area cycle of evolution: implications for management of resources'. **Canadian Geographer**. 24: 5-12.
Butler, R. (2004) 'The tourism area life cycle in the twenty-first century'. In Lew, A. Hall, C. & Williams, A. (eds.) **A Companion to Tourism**. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cabinet Office (2010) **Office for Civil Society structure finalised**. [online] Available from: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/office-civil-society-structure-finalised.
Cameron, D. (2011) **Troubled Families**. (Speech) [online] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/troubled-families-speech
Centre for Social Justice (2013) **Turning the Tide - Social Justice in Five Seaside Towns**. London: Centre for Social Justice.
Chapman, P. Phimister, E. Shucksmith, M. Upward, R & Vera-Toscano, E. (1998) **Poverty and Exclusion in Rural Britain: The Dynamics of Low Income and Employment**. York: York Publishing Services.
Christaller, W. (1963) 'Some considerations of tourism location in Europe'. **Regional Science Association Papers.** 12 (1): 95-105.
Clegg, A. and Essex, S. (2000) 'Restructuring in tourism: the accommodation sector in a major British coastal resort'. **International Journal of Tourism Research** 2 (2):77- 95.
Coastal Communities Alliance (2010) **Coastal Regeneration Handbook**. [online] Available from: http://www.coastalcommunities.co.uk/
Cohen, E. (1972) 'Toward a sociology of international tourism'. **Social Research**. 39 (1): 164-182.
Coles, T. & Shaw, G. (2006) 'Tourism, property and the management of changes in coastal resorts: perspectives from South West England'. **Current Issues in Tourism.** 9 (1): 46-68.
Commins, P. (2004) 'Poverty and social exclusion in rural areas: characteristics, processes and research issues'. **Sociologia Ruralis.** 44 (1): 60-75.
Commission on Social Justice. (1994) **Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal.** London: Vintage.
Communities and Local Government (2007a) **House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, Coastal Towns**. [online] Available from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmcomloc/351/351.pdf
Communities and Local Government (2007b) **House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, Coastal Towns: the Government's Second Response**. [online] Available from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmcomloc/cmcomloc.htm
Communities and Local Government (2008) **Transforming Places; Changing Lives: A Framework for Regeneration**. London: DCLG.
Comrey, A. & Lee, H. (1992) **A First Course in Factor Analysis.** Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cooper, C. (1997) 'Parameters and indicators of decline of the British seaside resort' In Shaw G. & Williams, A. (eds.) **The Rise and Fall of British Coastal Resorts**. London:Cassell.
Cooper, C. & Jackson, S. (1989) 'Destination life cycle: the Isle of Man case study'. **Annals of Tourism Research.** 16 (3): 377-383.
Council of the European Communities. (1989) **Resolution of the Council of Ministers for Social Affairs on Combating Social Exclusion** (89/C277/01). Luxembourg: Official Journal, C277.
Countryside Agency (2000) **Not Seen, Not Heard? Social Exclusion in Rural Areas**. London: The Countryside Agency.

Creswell, J. (1994) **Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches**. London: Sage.
Daly, M. (2006) **Social Exclusion as Concept and Policy Template in the EU**. Working paper 135. Centre for European Studies.
Davidson, K. Daly, T. Arber, S. (2003) 'Older men, social integration and organisational activities'. **Social Policy and Society**. 2 (2):81-89
Department for Work and Pensions. (2005) **Opportunity for All - seventh annual report.** London: Department for Work and Pensions.
Department for Work and Pensions. (2006) **Opportunity for All - eighth annual report.** London: Department for Work and Pensions.
Department for Work and Pensions (2012) **Social Justice: Transforming lives.** [online] Available from: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/social-justice-transforming-lives.pdf
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (1999) **Tomorrow's Tourism: a Growth Industry for the New Millennium**. London: Department of Culture, Media and Sport.
Department of Trade and Industry (1999) **Competitiveness White Paper.** London: Department of Trade and Industry.
Department of Social Security. (1999) **Opportunity for All: Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion**. London: The Stationery Office.
Diaz, H. Widdis, R. & Gauthier, D. (2001) **Social Cohesion and the Rural Community. Conference paper presented at Rural Canada: Moving forward or left behind?** Regina, SK, November 22-24.
Dicken, P. (1998) **Global Shift.** (3rd edition). London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd.
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D. & Vlaev, I. (2010). **MINDSPACE: Influencing behaviour through public policy**. London: Cabinet Office.
Driver, S. & Martell, L. (1998) **New Labour - politics after Thatcherism**. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Duffy, K. (1998) 'Combating social exclusion and promoting social integration in the European Union'. In Oppenheim, C. (ed.) **An Inclusive Society? Strategies for Tackling Poverty**. London: IPPR.
Ellen, I. & Turner, M. (1997) 'Does neighbourhood matter? Assessing recent evidence'. **Housing Policy Debate**. 8: 833-866.
Emmerson, C. Frayne, C. & Tellow, G. (2005) 'The tax burden under Labour'. **The IFS Green Budget 2005**. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
English Heritage and CABE (2003) **Shifting Sands: Design and the Changing Image of English Seaside Resorts**. London: English Heritage.
English Heritage (2007) **An Asset and a Challenge; Heritage and Regeneration in Coastal Towns in England.** English Heritage
English Tourist Board. (1991). **The Future for England's smaller seaside resorts: Summary report.** London: English Tourist Board.
English Tourism Council (2001) **Sea Changes. Creating World Class Resorts in England**. **A Strategy for Regenerating England's Resorts**. London: English Tourism Council.
Estivill, J. (2003). **Concepts and Strategies for Combating Social Exclusion: an overview.** Geneva: International Labour Organisation
European Commission. (1994) **European Social Policy - the way forward for the Union.** COM(94)333, Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (1999) **Reform of the Structural Funds 2000-2006**. Brussels: European Commission.
Farrant, S. (1987) 'London by the sea: resort development on the south coast of England 1880-1939'. **Journal of Contemporary History**. 22 (1): 137-162.
Ferrara, M. Matsaganis, M. & Sacchi, S. (2002) 'Open coordination against poverty: the new EU social inclusion process'. **Journal of European Social Policy**. 12 (3): 223-239

Fletcher, A. (1993) 'The role of landowners, entrepreneurs and railways in the urban development of the North Wales coast during the nineteenth century'. **Welsh History Review**. l6 (4): 515-541.
Foley, K. (1999) **Getting the Measure of Social Exclusion**. London: London Research Centre.
Forrest, R. & Kearns, A. (2001) 'Social cohesion, social capital and the neighbourhood'. **Urban Studies**. 38 (12): 2125-2145.
Fothergill, S. (2008) **England's Coastal Towns: a short review of the issues, evidence base and research needs.** Sheffield Hallam University: Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research. [online] Available from: www.ljmu.ac.uk/EIUA/EIUA_Docs/6_Fot Hergill.pdf
Gale, T. (2005) 'Modernism, post-modernism and the decline of British seaside resort as long-haul holiday destinations: a case study of Rhyl, North Wales'. **Tourism Geographies.** 7 (1): 86-112.
Gale, T. (2007) 'The problems and dilemmas of northern European post-mature coastal tourism resorts'. In Agarwal, S. & Shaw, G. (eds.) **Managing Coastal Tourism Resorts**. Clevedon: Channel View.
Galster, G. (2001) 'On the nature of neighbourhood'. **Urban Studies**. 38 (12): 2111-2124.
Getz, D. (1992) 'Tourism planning and destination lifecycle'. **Annals of Tourism Research**. 19: 752–770.
Gibson, C. (2008) 'Locating geographies of tourism'. **Progress in Human Geography**. 32 (3): 407-422.
Giddens, A. (1994) **Beyond Left and Right: the future of radical politics.** Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (2000) **The Third Way and Its Critics.** Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gilbert, E. (1939) 'The growth of inland and seaside health resorts in England'. **Scottish Geographical Magazine**. 55: 16-35.
Gilbert, E. (1949) 'The growth of Brighton'. **Geographical Journal**. 114 (1-3): 30-52.
Glennerster, H., Lupton, R., Noden, P. & Power, A. (1999) **Poverty, Social Exclusion and Neighbourhood: Studying the Area Bases**. CASE paper 22, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London: London School of Economics.
Gordon, I. (1996) 'Family structure, educational achievement and the inner city' **Urban Studies**. 33 (3): 407-423.
Gordon, I. & Goodall, B. (2000) 'Localities and tourism'. **Tourism Geographies** 2 (3): 290 311.
Gordon, D. Levitas, R. Pantazis, C. Patsois, D. Payne, J. Townsend, P. Adelman, C. Ashworth, K. Middleton, S. Bradshaw, J. & Williams, W. (2000) **Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain.** York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Gormsen, E. (1981) 'The spatio-temporal development of international tourism: attempt at a centre-periphery model'. In **La Consommation d'Espace par le Tourisme et sa Préservation**. Aix-en-Provence: CHET.
Gore, C. (1995) 'Introduction: markets, citizenship and social exclusion'. In Rodgers, G. Gore, C. & Figueiredo, J. (eds.) **Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses**. Geneva: ILO.
Gorsuch, R. (1983) **Factor Analysis.** Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Grieve, J. & Howard, R. (2004) **Communities, Social Exclusion and Crime.** London: The Smith Institute.
Griggs, J. Whitworth, A. Walker, R. McLennan, D. & Noble, M. (2008) **Person or Place-based Policies to Tackle Disadvantage? Not knowing what works.** York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Guba, E. (1990). **The Paradigm Dialogue.** Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hair, J. Anderson, R. Tatham, R. & Black, W. (1995) **Multivariate Data Analysis.** New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Hakim, C. (1982) **Secondary Analysis in Social Research.** London: Allen-Unwin.
Hale, C. (2005) 'Economic marginalisation, social exclusion and crime'. In Hale, C. Hayward, K. Wahidin, A. & Wincup, E. (eds.) **Criminology.** Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, C. (2006) 'The impact of tourism knowledge: google scholar, citations and the opening up of academic space'. **e-Review of Tourism Research**. 4 (5): 119-136.
Hay, C. (1999) **The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under false pretences.** Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Haywood, K. (1986) 'Can the tourist area life cycle be made operational?' **Tourism Management.** 7: 154-167.
Hills, J. (2007) **Ends and Means: the Future Roles of Social Housing in England**. CASE
Hills, J. Le Grand, J. & Piachaud, D. (2002) **Understanding Social Exclusion.** Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HM Government. (2007) **Government Response to the Communities and Local Government Committee Report on Coastal Towns**. [online] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243262/7126.pdf
HM Government. (2010a) **State of the Nation Report: Poverty, Worklessness and Welfare Dependency in the UK**. London: Cabinet Office.
HM Government. (2010b) **What is a Family Intervention Project?.** [online] Available from:http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100405140447/asb.homeoffice.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=867
Hovinen, G. (2002) 'Revisiting the destination lifecycle model'. **Annals of Tourism Research.** 29 (1): 209–230.
Huffadine, M. (2000) **Resort Design: Planning, Architecture, and Interiors**. New York: McGraw Hill.
Huggins, M. (1984) 'Social tone and resort development in North East England: Victorian seaside resorts around the mouth of the Tees'. **Northern History**. 20: l87-206
Institute of Fiscal Studies. (2012) **Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in the UK**. London IFS.
Jagowsky, P. (1996) **Poverty and Place.** New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. (2000) **Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain**. [online] Available from: http://www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/socialpolicy/930.asp
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. (2013) **Reporting Poverty – Facts and Figures.** [online] Available from: http://www.jrf.org.uk/reporting-poverty/facts-figures
Kaiser, H. (1974) 'An index of factorial simplicity'. **Psychometrika**. 39: 31-36.
Kleinman, M. (1998) **Include Me Out? The New Politics of Place and Poverty**. CASE Paper No.11. London: London School of Economics.
Knowles, T. & Curtis, S. (1999) 'The market viability of European mass tourist destinations - a post-stagnation life cycle analysis'. **International Journal of Tourism Research**. 1: 87-96.
Labour Party. (1997) **Britain Deserves Better, Labour Party election manifesto**. London: Labour Party.
Labour Party. (2001) **Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party election manifesto**. London: Labour Party.
Lagiewski, R. (2006) 'The application of the TALC model: a literature survey'. In Butler, R. (ed.) **The Tourism Area Life Cycle: Applications and Modifications**. Clevedon: Channel View Publications

Larkin, P. (2001) 'New Labour in Perspective: A Comment on Rubinstein'. **Politics**. 21 (1): 51-55.
Levitas, R. (1998) The Inclusive Society? **Social Exclusion and New Labour**. London, Macmillan.
Levitas, R. (2005) The Inclusive Society? **Social Exclusion and New Labour** (2nd Edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Levitas, R. Pantazis, C. Fahmy, E. Gordon, D. Lloyd, E. & Patsios, D. (2007) **The Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Social Exclusion**. Cabinet Office Social Exclusion Task Force / University of Bristol.
Lister, R. (1997) **Citizen or Stakeholder? Policies to Combat Social Exclusion and promote Social Justice in the UK**. Aalborg: Department of History, International and Social Studies.
Lister, R. (2001) 'New Labour: a study in ambiguity from a position of ambivalence'. **Critical Social Policy**. 21 (4): 425-447.
Liu, J. & Wall, G. (2009) '**Resort morphology** research: history and future perspectives. **Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research**. 14 (4): 339-350.
Local Futures (2007) 'North/south divide by the seaside'. **The Guardian.** (12th September 2007). [online] Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/sep/12/communities
Lupton, R. (2001) **Places Apart? The Initial Report of CASE's Areas Study**. CASE report 14, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London: London School of Economics.
Lupton, R. (2003) **Poverty Street: The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Decline and Renewal.** Bristol: The Policy Press.
Lupton, R. (2004) **Can We Measure Area Effects and Does It Matter?** London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
Lupton, R. & Power, A. (2002) 'Social exclusion and neighbourhoods'. In Hills, J. Legrand, J and Piachaud, D. (eds) **Understanding Social Exclusion**. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lupton, R. & Power, A. (2004) **What We Know About Neighbourhood Change: A literature review.** Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London: London School of Economics.
Madanipour, A. (1998) 'Social exclusion and space'. In Madanipour, A. Cars, G. & Allen, J. (eds.) **Social Exclusion in European Cities**. London: Jessica Kingsley.
Mandelson, P. (1997) **Labour's Next Steps: Tackling Social Exclusion**. (Speech to the Fabian Society). [online] Available from: http://lib 161.lse.ac.uk/archives/fabian_tracts/581.pdf
Marcuse, P. (1997) 'The enclave, the citadel and the ghetto: what has changed in the post-Fordist U.S. city?' **Urban Affairs Review.** 33 (2): 228-264.
Marsh, A. & Mullins, D. (1998) 'The social exclusion perspective and housing studies: origins, applications and limitations'. **Housing Studies**. 13 (4): 749-760.
Martin, D. Dorling, D. & Mitchell, R. (2002) 'Linking Censuses through time: problems and solutions'. **Area**. 34 (1): 82-91.
Mathieson, J. Popay, J. Escorel, S. Hernandez, M. Johnston, H. & Rispel, L. (2008) **Social Exclusion: Meaning, Measurement and Experience.** (WHO Social Exclusion Knowledge Network Background Paper 1) University of Lancaster.
McAnulla, S. (2006) **British Politics: A Critical Introduction**. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
McGregor, A. & McConnachie, M. (1995).'Social Exclusion, Urban Regeneration and Economic Reintegration'. **Urban Studies.** 32 (10): 1587-1600.

McLennan, D. Barnes, H. Noble, M., Davies, J. Garratt, E. & Dibben, C. (2011) **The English Indices of Deprivation 2010.** London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
McNeil, C. (2012) **New Labour, Social Exclusion and post-crash Britain**. London: Lankelly Chase Foundation.
Middleton, V. (2001) 'English seaside resorts: tomorrow's tourism or all our yesterdays?' **Insights**. (English Tourism Council) 12 (B): 83-97.
Mikelbank, B. (2004) 'A typology of U.S. suburban places'. Housing Policy Debate. 15 (4): 935-964.
Miliband, D. (2005) **Social Exclusion: The next steps forward**. (Speech) [online] Available from: http://www.lgcplus.com/11m-fewer-people-socially-excluded/524544.article
Miliband, D. (2006) **Social Exclusion: The next steps forward**. London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
Millar, J. (2007) 'Social Exclusion and Social Policy Research: Defining Exclusion'. In Abrams, D. Christian, J. & Gordon, D. (eds.) **Multidisciplinary Handbook of Social Exclusion Research**. Bath: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Miossec, J. (1977) 'Un Mode`le de L'Espace Touristique'. **L'Espace Ge´ographique**. 6 (1): 41-48.
Morgan, N. & Pritchard, A. (1999) **Power and Politics at the Seaside: The Development of Devon's Resorts in the Twentieth Century**. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
Munck, R. (2004) **Globalization and Social Exclusion: A Transformative Perspective.** Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
Murray, C. (1984) **Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980.** New York: Basic Books.
Murray, C. (1990) **The Emerging British Underclass.** London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit.
North, D. & Syrett, S. (2006) **The Dynamics of Local Economies and Deprived Neighbourhoods.** London: DCLG.
O'Brien, D. (2002) 'Reconstructing social democracy: New Labour and the welfare state'. **British Journal of Politics and International Relations.** 2 (1): 403-413.
Office for National Statistics (2001) **2001 Rural-urban classification.** [online] Available from: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/products/area-classifications/rural-urban-definition-and-la/index.html
Office for National Statistics (2005) 'Jobcentre Plus vacancy statistics'. **Labour Market Trends**. (June 2005): 253-260
Office for National Statistics (2009) 'Understanding patterns of deprivation'. **Regional Trends**. 41: 93-114.
Orford, S. (2004) 'Identifying and comparing changes in the spatial concentrations of urban poverty and affluence: a case study of inner London'. **Computers, Environment and Urban Systems.** 28: 701-717.
Page, D. (2000) **Communities in Balance. The Reality of Social on Housing Estates**. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Parkinson, M. (1998) **Combating Social Exclusion: Lessons from Area-based Programmes in Europe.** Bristol: The Policy Press.
Pearce, D. (1987) **Tourism Today: A Geographical Analysis.** Harlow: Longman.
Peace, R. (2001) 'Social exclusion: a concept in need of definition'. **Social Policy Journal of New Zealand.** 16: 17-35.
Percy-Smith, J. (2000) 'Introduction - the contours of social exclusion'. In Percy-Smith, J. (ed.) **Policy Responses to Social Exclusion: Towards Inclusion**? Buckingham: Open University Press.

Pleace, N. (1998) 'Single homelessness as social exclusion: the unique and the extreme'. **Social Policy and Administration**. 32 (1): 46-59
Plog, S. (1974) 'Why destination areas rise and fall in popularity'. **Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly**. 14 (4): 55-58.
Powell, D. & Gray, F. (2009) **South East Coastal Towns: Economic Challenges and Cultural Regeneration**. London: David Powell Associates.
Powell, M. (1999) (ed.) **New Labour, New Welfare state? The third way in British social policy.** Bristol: The Policy Press.
Power, A. and Mumford, K. (1999) **The Slow Death of Great Cities.** London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Power, A. and Wilson, W. (2000) **Social Exclusion and the Future of Cities**. CASE paper 35, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London: London School of Economics.
Prideaux, B. (2009) **Resort Destinations: Evolution, Management and Development**. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann
Priestley, G. & Mundet, L. (1998) 'The post-stagnation phase of the resort cycle'. **Annals of Tourism Research**. 25 (1): 85-111.
Purdy, D. (2000) 'New Labour and Welfare Reform'. In Coates, D. & Lawler, P. (eds.) **New Labour in Power**. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Quark, A. (2008) 'Social exclusion in the new economy: beyond the digital divide'. **Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services.** 7 (2): 1-16.
Ratcliffe, P. (1998) 'Race, housing and social exclusion'. **Housing Studies.** 13 (6): 807-818
Rickey, B. & Houghton, J. (2009) 'Solving the riddle of the sands: Regenerating England's seaside towns'. **Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal**. 3 (1): 46–55.
Robinson, H. (1976) **A Geography of Tourism.** London: Macdonald and Evans.
Room, G. (1993) **Agencies, Institutions and Programmes: Their Interrelationships and Coordination in Efforts to Combat Social Exclusion**. Luxembourg: European Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion.
Room, G. (ed.) (1995a) **Beyond the Threshold: The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion.** Bristol: The Policy Press.
Room, G. (1995b) 'Poverty in Europe: competing paradigms of analysis'. **Policy & Politics**. 23 (2): 103-113.
Room, G. (1995c) 'Poverty and social exclusion: the new European agenda for policy and research'. In Room, G. (ed.) **Beyond the Threshold. The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion.** Bristol: Policy Press.
Room, G. (1999) 'Social exclusion, solidarity and the challenge of globalization' **International Journal of Social Welfare.** 8: 166–174.
Rourke, N., & Hatcher, L. (2013) **A Step-by-Step Approach to Using SAS for Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling**. Cary, NC: SAS Press.
Rowntree, S. (1901) **Poverty.** London: Macmillan.
Scharf, T. Phillipson, C. Kingston, P. and Smith, A. (2002) 'Social exclusion and older people: exploring the connections'. **Education and Ageing**. 16 (3): 303-320.
Sealey, C. (2009) **Social Exclusion and Young People: A Critical Realist Strong Late Modern Analytic**. PhD Thesis. Birmingham: The University of Birmingham.
Shared Intelligence (c.2008) **What Future for England's Struggling Seaside Towns?** London: Si Policy Roundtable Briefing Paper.
Shaw, G. & Agarwal, S. (2007) 'Introduction: the development and management of coastal resorts'. In Agarwal, S. & Shaw, G. (eds.) **Managing Coastal Tourism Resorts: A Global Perspective**. Clevedon: Channel View
Shaw, G. & Coles, T. (2007) 'The resort economy: changing structures and management issues in British resorts'. In Agarwal, S. & Shaw, G. (eds.) **Managing Coastal Tourism Resorts: A Global Perspective**. Clevedon: Channel View

Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (1994) 'Individual consumption of tourism'. In **Critical Issues in Tourism: A Geographical Perspective**. Oxford: Blackwell.
Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (1997a) 'Riding the big dipper: the rise and decline of the British seaside resort in the twentieth century'. In Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (eds.) **The Rise and Fall of British Coastal Resorts.** London: Pinter.
Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (1997b) 'The private sector: tourism entrepreneurship – a constraint or resource?' In Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (eds.) **The Rise and Fall of British Coastal Resorts.** London: Pinter.
Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (2003) 'From lifestyle consumption to lifestyle production: Changing patterns of tourism entrepreneurship'. In Thomas, R. (ed.) **Small Firms in Tourism: International Perspectives.** Oxford: Elsevier.
Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (2004) **Tourism and Tourism Spaces.** London: Sage.
Shelter (2005) **Full House? How overcrowded housing affects families**. London: Shelter.
Shelter (2006) **Chance of a Lifetime. The impact of bad housing on children's lives**. London: Shelter.
Shucksmith, M. & Chapman, P. (1998) 'Rural development and social exclusion'. **Sociologia Ruralis.** 38 (2): 225-242.
Silver, H. & Miller, S. (2003) 'Social exclusion: the European approach to social disadvantage'. **Indicators.** 2: 1-17.
Silver, H. (1994) 'Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradigms'. **International Labour Review.** 133 (5/6): 531-578.
Smith, M. (2004) 'Seeing a new side to seasides: culturally regenerating the English seaside town'. **International Journal of Tourism Research.** 6: 17-28.
Soane, J. (1992) 'The origins, growth and transformation of maritime resorts since 1840'. **Built Environment**. 18 (1): 12-26.
Social Exclusion Taskforce. (2006) **Reaching Out: An Action Plan on Social Exclusion**. London: Cabinet Office.
Social Exclusion Taskforce. (2007a) **Reaching Out: Think Family**. London: Cabinet Office.
Social Exclusion Taskforce. (2007b) **Adults Facing Chronic Exclusion: 12 Approaches to Tackle the Country's Most Chronically Excluded Adults.** [online] Available from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/cabinetoffice.gov.uk/social_exclusion_task_force/news/2007/070618_steps.aspx
Social Exclusion Unit. (1997) **Social Exclusion Unit: Purpose, Work Priorities and Working Methods.** London: The Stationery Office.
Social Exclusion Unit. (1998a) **Truancy and School Exclusion.** London: The Stationery Office.
Social Exclusion Unit. (1998b) **Rough Sleeping**. London: The Stationery Office.
Social Exclusion Unit. (1998c) **Bringing Britain Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal.** London: HMSO
Social Exclusion Unit. (1999a) **Teenage Pregnancy.** London: The Stationery Office.
Social Exclusion Unit. (1999b) **Bridging the Gap – New Opportunities for 16–18 year olds not in Education, Employment or Training.** London: The Stationery Office.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2001a) **Preventing Social Exclusion: Report by the Social Exclusion Unit.** London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2001b) **A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal.** London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Social Exclusion Unit.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2002a) **Reducing Re-Offending by Ex-Prisoners.** London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2002b) **Young Runaways**. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.

Social Exclusion Unit. (2003) **A Better Education for Children in Care.** London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2004) **Breaking the Cycle: Taking Stock of Progress and Priorities for the Future.** London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2005) **Excluded Older People: Social Exclusion Unit Interim Report.** London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
Social Exclusion Unit. (2006) **A Sure Start to Later Life: Ending Inequalities for Older People**. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
SEEDA (2005) **Coasting Along: A Study of Business Impacts and Regeneration in South East Coastal Towns.** New Economics Foundation/South East England Development Agency.
Spicker, P. (2014) **An Introduction to Social Policy**. [online] Available from: http://www2.rgu.ac.uk/publicpolicy/introduction/socialsecurity.htm
Stevens, J. (1986) **Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences.** Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stewart, K. & Hills, J. (2005) 'Introduction'. In Hills, J. & Stewart, K. (eds.) **A More Equal Society?** Bristol: The Policy Press.
Sunley, P. Martin, R. & Nativel, C. (2006) **Putting Welfare in Place: Local Labour Markets and the New Deal.** Oxford: Blackwell.
Sutherland, V. McTier, A. Macdougall, L. and McGregor, A. (2010) **Factors Influencing Deprivation in North East England: Final Report**. Project Report. NERIP / University of Glasgow.
Tabachnick, B. & Fidell, L. (2001) **Using Multivariate Statistics.** Boston: Pearson Education Inc.
Taylor, R. (2005) 'Mr Blair's British Business Model – capital and labour in flexible markets'. In Seldon, A. & Kavanagh, D. (eds.) **The Blair Effect.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thornton, P. (1997) 'Coastal tourism in Cornwall since 1900'. In Fisher, S. (ed.) **Recreation and the Sea**. Exeter: Exeter University Press.
Townsend, P. (1979) **Poverty in the United Kingdom.** Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Turner, L. & Ash, J. (1975) **The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery**. London: Constable.
Urry, J. (1990) **The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies**. London: Sage.
Urry, J. (1997) 'Cultural change and the seaside resort'. In Shaw, G. & Williams, A. (eds.) **The Rise and Fall of British Coastal Resorts**. London: Pinter.
Veit-Wilson, J. (1998) **Setting Adequacy Standards**. Bristol: Policy Press.
Vickers, D. Rees, P. & Birkin, M. (2005) **Creating the National Classification of Census Output Areas: Data, Methods and Results.** [online] Available from: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/5003/1/05-2pdf
Vidal, M. (2012) 'On the persistence of labour market insecurity and slow growth in the US: reckoning with the Waltonist Growth Regime'. **New Political Economy**. 17 (5): 543-564.
Voas, D. & Williamson, P. (2001) 'The diversity of diversity: a critique of geodemographic Classification'. **Area.** 33 (1): 63-76.
Walker, A. (1990) 'Poverty and the underclass'. In Haralambos, M. (ed.) **Developments in Sociology Volume 7**. Ormskirk: Causeway Press.
Walker, R. (1995) 'The dynamics of poverty and social exclusion'. In Room, G. (ed.) **Beyond the Threshold: Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion.** Bristol: Policy Press.
Walker, R. (1997) 'Poverty and social exclusion in Europe'. In A.Walker, & C. Walker (eds.) Britain Divided. **The Growth of Social Exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s.** London: Child Poverty Action Group.

Walton, J. (1983) **The English Seaside Resort: A Social History, 1750-1914.** Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Walton, J. (2000) **The British Seaside: Holidays and Resorts in the Twentieth Century**. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Walvin, J. (1978) **Beside the Seaside**. London: Allen Lane.
Wolfe, R. (1983) 'Recreational travel, the new migration revisited'. **Ontario Geography**. 19: 103-124.
Young, B. (1983) 'Touristisation of traditional Maltese fishing-farming villages. a general model'. **Tourism Management**. 4 (1): 35-41.

Appendix A: Tables of Results (Chapter 5)

All tables and figures are the work of the author.

Table A1: Inland v Coastal, 2004

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			**χ^2, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 270, 92%	Coastal n = 24, 8%	Total 294	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	66	10	76	8.1	3	0.043*
		Expected	69.8	6.2		.167		
		% within district	24.4%	41.7%	25.9			
	AA	Observed	57	6	63			
		Expected	57.9	5.1				
		% within district	21.1%	25.0%	21.4			
	BA	Observed	66	7	73			
		Expected	67.0	6.0				
		% within district	24.4%	29.2%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	81	1	82			
		Expected	75.3	6.7				
		% within district	30.0%	4.2%	27.9			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	65	8	73	8.83	3	0.032*
		Expected	67.0	6.0		.173		
		% within district	24.1%	33.3%	24.8			
	AA	Observed	56	9	65			
		Expected	59.7	5.3				
		% within district	20.7%	37.5%	22.1			
	BA	Observed	68	6	74			
		Expected	68.0	6.0				
		% within district	25.2%	25.0%	25.2			
	LD	Observed	81	1	82			
		Expected	75.3	6.7				
		% within district	30.0%	4.2%	27.9			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	67	10	77	5.6	3	0.128
		Expected	70.7	6.3		n/a		
		% within district	24.8%	41.7%	26.2			
	AA	Observed	58	7	65			
		Expected	59.7	5.3				
		% within district	21.5%	29.2%	22.1			
	BA	Observed	69	4	73			
		Expected	67.0	6.0				
		% within district	25.6%	16.7%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	76	3	79			
		Expected	72.6	6.4				
		% within district	28.1%	12.5%	26.9			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	64	11	75	9.3	3	0.026*
		Expected	68.9	6.1		.178		
		% within district	23.7%	45.8%	25.5			
	AA	Observed	61	6	67			
		Expected	61.5	5.5				
		% within district	22.6%	25.0%	22.8			
	BA	Observed	67	6	73			
		Expected	67.0	6.0				
		% within district	24.8%	25.0%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	78	1	79			
		Expected	72.6	6.4				
		% within district	28.9%	4.2%	26.9			
Income rank	MD	Observed	73	7	80	3.3	3	0.337
		Expected	73.5	6.5		n/a		
		% within district	27.0%	29.2%	27.2			
	AA	Observed	56	8	64			
		Expected	58.8	5.2				
		% within district	20.7%	33.3%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	69	6	75			
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	25.6%	25.0%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	72	3	75			

		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	26.7%	12.5%	25.5			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	72	8	80	5.4	3	0.140
		Expected	73.5	6.5		n/a		
		% within district	26.7%	33.3%	27.2			
	AA	Observed	57	9	66			
		Expected	60.6	5.4				
		% within district	21.1%	37.5%	22.4			
	BA	Observed	67	4	71			
		Expected	65.2	5.8				
		% within district	24.8%	16.7%	24.1			
	LD	Observed	74	3	77			
		Expected	70.7	6.3				
		% within district	27.4%	12.5%	26.2			

Table A2: Inland v Coastal, 2007

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 270, 92%	Coastal n = 24, 8%	Total 294	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	66	9	75	10.5 .190	3	0.014**
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	24.4%	37.5%	25.5			
	AA	Observed	52	9	61			
		Expected	56.0	5.0				
		% within district	19.3%	37.5%	20.7			
	BA	Observed	70	5	75			
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	25.9%	20.8%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	82	1	83			
		Expected	76.2	6.8				
		% within district	30.4%	4.2%	28.2			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	65	8	73	14.2 .220	3	0.003**
		Expected	67.0	6.0				
		% within district	24.1%	33.3%	24.8			
	AA	Observed	52	11	63			
		Expected	57.9	5.1				
		% within district	19.3%	45.8%	21.4			
	BA	Observed	70	4	74			
		Expected	68.0	6.0				
		% within district	25.9%	16.7%	25.2			
	LD	Observed	83	1	84			
		Expected	77.1	6.9				
		% within district	30.7%	4.2%	28.6			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	69	10	79	7.6 .162	3	0.053*
		Expected	72.6	6.4				
		% within district	25.6%	41.7%	26.9			
	AA	Observed	56	8	64			
		Expected	58.8	5.2				
		% within district	20.7%	33.3%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	69	4	73			
		Expected	67.0	6.0				
		% within district	25.6%	16.7%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	76	2	78			
		Expected	71.6	6.4				
		% within district	28.1%	8.3%	26.5			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	61	11	72	10.2 .187	3	0.016*
		Expected	66.1	5.9				
		% within district	22.6%	45.8%	24.5			
	AA	Observed	63	7	70			
		Expected	64.3	5.7				
		% within district	23.3%	29.2%	23.8			
	BA	Observed	69	5	74			
		Expected	68.0	6.0				
			25.6%	20.8%	25.2			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed	77	1	78			
		Expected	71.6	6.4				
		% within district	28.5%	4.2%	26.5			
Income rank	MD	Observed	73	7	80	4.3	3	0.227
		Expected	73.5	6.5		n/a		
		% within district	27.0%	29.2%	27.2			
	AA	Observed	57	7	64			
		Expected	58.8	5.2				
		% within district	21.1%	29.2%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	67	8	75			
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	24.8%	33.3%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	73	2	75			
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	27.0%	8.3%	25.5			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	72	8	80	6.5	3	0.087
		Expected	73.5	6.5		n/a		
		% within district	26.7%	33.3%	27.2			
	AA	Observed	55	9	64			
		Expected	58.8	5.2				
		% within district	20.4%	37.5%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	70	5	75			
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	25.9%	20.8%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	73	2	75			
		Expected	68.9	6.1				
		% within district	27.0%	8.3%	25.5			

Table A3: Inland v Coastal, 2010

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 251, 92%	Coastal n = 22, 8%	Total 273	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	63	7	70	10.0	3	0.018*
		Expected	64.4	5.6		.192		
		% within district	25.1%	31.8%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	47	9	56			
		Expected	51.5	4.5				
		% within district	18.7%	40.9%	20.5			
	BA	Observed	65	5	70			
		Expected	64.4	5.6				
		% within district	25.9%	22.7%	25.6			
	LD	Observed	76	1	77			
		Expected	70.8	6.2				
		% within district	30.3%	4.5%	28.2			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	60	8	68	10.8	3	0.012**
		Expected	62.5	5.5		.200		
		% within district	23.9%	36.4%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	49	9	58			
		Expected	53.3	4.7				
		% within district	19.5%	40.9%	21.2			
	BA	Observed	66	4	70			
		Expected	64.4	5.6				
		% within district	26.3%	18.2%	25.6			
	LD	Observed	76	1	77			
		Expected	70.8	6.2				
		% within district	30.3%	4.5%	28.2			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	66	7	73	5.7	3	0.125
		Expected	67.1	5.9		n/a		
		% within district	26.3%	31.8%	26.7			
	AA	Observed	49	8	57			
		Expected	52.4	4.6				
		% within district	19.5%	36.4%	20.9			
	BA	Observed	67	5	72			
		Expected	66.2	5.8				
		% within district	26.7%	22.7%	26.4			
	LD	Observed	69	2	71			
		Expected	65.3	5.7				
		% within district	27.5%	9.1%	26.0			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	56	9	65	7.3	3	0.063
		Expected	59.8	5.2		n/a		
		% within district	22.3%	40.9%	23.8			
	AA	Observed	59	6	65			
		Expected	59.8	5.2				
		% within district	23.5%	27.3%	23.8			
	BA	Observed	66	6	72			
		Expected	66.2	5.8				
		% within district	26.3%	27.3%	26.4			
	LD	Observed	70	1	71			
		Expected	65.3	5.7				
		% within district	27.9%	4.5%	26.0			
Income rank	MD	Observed	68	6	74	2.5	3	0.471
		Expected	68.0	6.0		n/a		
		% within district	27.1%	27.3%	27.1			
	AA	Observed	52	7	59			
		Expected	54.2	4.8				
		% within district	20.7%	31.8%	21.6			
	BA	Observed	64	6	70			
		Expected	64.4	5.6				
		% within district	25.5%	27.3%	25.6			
	LD	Observed	67	3	70			
		Expected	64.4	5.6				

		% within district	26.7%	13.6%	25.6			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	67	7	74	3.7	3	0.289
		Expected	68.0	6.0		n/a		
		% within district	26.7%	31.8%	27.1			
	AA	Observed	52	7	59			
		Expected	54.2	4.8				
		% within district	20.7%	31.8%	21.6			
	BA	Observed	66	6	72			
		Expected	66.2	5.8				
		% within district	26.3%	27.3%	26.4			
	LD	Observed	66	2	68			
		Expected	62.5	5.5				
		% within district	26.3%	9.1%	24.9			

Table A4: Inland v Seaside, 2004

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			χ^2, **Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 270, 82%	Seaside n = 60, 18%	Total 330	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	66	12	78	17.5	3	0.001***
		Expected	63.8	14.2		.231		
		% within district	24.4%	20.0%	23.6			
	AA	Observed	57	26	83			
		Expected	67.9	15.1				
		% within district	21.1%	43.3%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	66	16	82			
		Expected	67.1	14.9				
		% within district	24.4%	26.7%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	81	6	87			
		Expected	71.2	15.8				
		% within district	30.0%	10.0%	26.4			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	65	15	80	14.9	3	0.002**
		Expected	65.5	14.5		.213		
		% within district	24.1%	25.0%	24.2			
	AA	Observed	56	24	80			
		Expected	65.5	14.5				
		% within district	20.7%	40.0%	24.2			
	BA	Observed	68	15	83			
		Expected	67.9	15.1				
		% within district	25.2%	25.0%	25.2			
	LD	Observed	81	6	87			
		Expected	71.2	15.8				
		% within district	30.0%	10.0%	26.4			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	68	10	78	10.6	3	0.014**
		Expected	63.8	14.2		.180		
		% within district	25.2%	16.7%	23.6			
	AA	Observed	58	24	82			
		Expected	67.1	14.9				
		% within district	21.5%	40.0%	24.8			
	BA	Observed	69	16	85			
		Expected	69.5	15.5				
		% within district	25.6%	26.7%	25.8			
	LD	Observed	75	10	85			
		Expected	69.5	15.5				
		% within district	27.8%	16.7%	25.8			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	64	13	77	6.8	3	0.077
		Expected	63.0	14.0		n/a		
		% within district	23.7%	21.7%	23.3			
	AA	Observed	60	22	83			
		Expected	67.1	14.9				
		% within district	22.2%	36.7%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	69	15	83			
		Expected	68.7	15.3				
			25.6%	25.0%	25.2			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	77 71.2 28.5%	10 15.8 16.7%	87 26.4			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	73 66.3 27.0%	8 14.7 13.3%	81 24.5	13.0 .199	3	0.004**
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	56 66.3 20.7%	25 14.7 41.7%	81 24.5			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	69 67.9 25.6%	14 15.1 23.3%	83 25.2			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	72 69.5 26.7%	13 15.5 21.7%	85 25.8			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	72 65.5 26.7%	8 14.5 13.3%	80 24.2	11.6 .188	3	0.009**
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	57 65.5 21.1%	23 14.5 38.3%	80 24.2			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	67 69.5 24.8%	18 15.5 30.0%	85 25.8			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	74 69.5 27.4%	11 15.5 18.3%	85 25.8			

Table A5: Inland v Seaside, 2007

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 270, 82%	Seaside n = 60, 18%	Total 370	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	66	13	79	24.5	3	0.000***
		Expected	64.6	14.4		.273		
		% within district	24.4%	21.7%	23.9			
	AA	Observed	52	28	80			
		Expected	65.5	14.5				
		% within district	19.3%	46.7%	24.2			
	BA	Observed	70	14	84			
		Expected	68.7	15.3				
		% within district	25.9%	23.3%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	82	5	87			
		Expected	71.2	15.8				
		% within district	30.4%	8.3%	26.4			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	65	15	80	22.8	3	0.000***
		Expected	65.5	14.5		.263		
		% within district	24.1%	25.0%	24.2			
	AA	Observed	52	26	78			
		Expected	63.8	14.2				
		% within district	19.3%	43.3%	23.6			
	BA	Observed	70	15	85			
		Expected	69.5	15.5				
		% within district	25.9%	25.0%	25.8			
	LD	Observed	83	4	87			
		Expected	71.2	15.8				
		% within district	30.7%	6.7%	26.4			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	69	9	78	13.5	3	0.004**
		Expected	63.8	14.2		.203		
		% within district	25.6%	15.0%	23.6			
	AA	Observed	56	25	81			
		Expected	66.3	14.7				
		% within district	20.7%	41.7%	24.5			
	BA	Observed	69	16	85			
		Expected	69.5	15.5				
		% within district	25.6%	26.7%	25.8			
	LD	Observed	76	10	86			
		Expected	70.4	15.6				
		% within district	28.1%	16.7%	26.1			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	61	16	77	4.3	3	0.227
		Expected	63.0	14.0		n/a		
		% within district	22.6%	26.7%	23.3			
	AA	Observed	63	19	82			
		Expected	67.1	14.9				
		% within district	23.3%	31.7%	24.8			
	BA	Observed	69	15	84			
		Expected	68.7	15.3				
		% within district	25.6%	25.0%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	77	10	87			
		Expected	71.2	15.8				
		% within district	28.5%	16.7%	26.4			
Income rank	MD	Observed	73	8	81	12.6	3	0.005**
		Expected	66.3	14.7		.196		
		% within district	27.0%	13.3%	24.5			
	AA	Observed	57	25	82			
		Expected	67.1	14.9				
		% within district	21.1%	41.7%	24.8			
	BA	Observed	67	14	81			
		Expected	66.3	14.7				
		% within district	24.8%	23.3%	24.5			
	LD	Observed	73	13	86			
		Expected	70.4	15.6				

		% within district	27.0%	21.7%	26.1			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	72	8	80	13.4	3	0.004**
		Expected	65.5	14.5		.202		
		% within district	26.7%	13.3%	24.2			
	AA	Observed	55	25	80			
		Expected	65.5	14.5				
		% within district	20.4%	41.7%	24.2			
	BA	Observed	70	14	84			
		Expected	68.7	15.3				
		% within district	25.9%	23.3%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	73	13	86			
		Expected	70.4	15.6				
		% within district	27.0%	21.7%	26.1			

Table A6: Inland v Seaside, 2010

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			$\chi 2$, **Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 251, 83%	Seaside n = 53, 17%	Total 304	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*P*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	63	11	74	25.8 .292	3	0.000***
		Expected	61.1	12.9				
		% within district	25.1%	20.8%	24.3			
	AA	Observed	47	26	73			
		Expected	60.3	12.7				
		% within district	18.7%	49.1%	24.0			
	BA	Observed	65	12	77			
		Expected	63.6	13.4				
		% within district	25.9%	22.6%	25.3			
	LD	Observed	76	4	80			
		Expected	66.1	13.9				
		% within district	30.3%	7.5%	26.3			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	60	13	73	20.9 .262	3	0.000***
		Expected	60.3	12.7				
		% within district	23.9%	24.5%	24.0			
	AA	Observed	49	24	73			
		Expected	60.3	12.7				
		% within district	19.5%	45.3%	24.0			
	BA	Observed	66	12	78			
		Expected	64.4	13.6				
		% within district	26.3%	22.6%	25.7			
	LD	Observed	76	4	80			
		Expected	66.1	13.9				
		% within district	30.3%	7.5%	26.3			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	66	8	74	18.3 .245	3	0.000***
		Expected	61.1	12.9				
		% within district	26.3%	15.1%	24.3			
	AA	Observed	49	25	74			
		Expected	61.1	12.9				
		% within district	19.5%	47.2%	24.3			
	BA	Observed	67	10	77			
		Expected	63.6	13.4				
		% within district	26.7%	18.9%	25.3			
	LD	Observed	69	10	79			
		Expected	65.2	13.8				
		% within district	27.5%	18.9%	26.0			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	56	16	72	4.7 n/a	3	0.191
		Expected	59.4	12.6				
		% within district	22.3%	30.2%	23.7			
	AA	Observed	59	17	76			
		Expected	62.8	13.3				
		% within district	23.5%	32.1%	25.0			
	BA	Observed	66	10	76			
		Expected	62.8	13.3				
			26.3%	18.9%	25.0			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	70 66.1 27.9%	10 13.9 18.9%	80 26.3			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	68 61.9 27.1%	7 13.1 13.2%	75 24.7	13.2 .209	3	0.004**
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	52 61.9 20.7%	23 13.1 43.4%	75 24.7			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	64 62.8 25.5%	12 13.3 22.6%	76 25.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	67 64.4 26.7%	11 13.6 20.8%	78 25.7			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	67 61.1 26.7%	7 12.9 13.2%	74 24.3	13.4 .210	3	0.004**
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	52 61.9 20.7%	23 13.1 43.4%	75 24.7			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	66 62.8 26.3%	10 13.3 18.9%	76 25.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	66 65.2 26.3%	13 13.8 24.5%	79 26.0			

Table A7: Coastal v Seaside, 2004

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 24, 29%	Seaside n = 60, 71%	Total 84	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	10	12	22	5.3	3	0.150
		Expected	6.3	15.7		n/a		
		% within district	41.7%	20.0%	26.2			
	AA	Observed	6	26	32			
		Expected	9.1	22.9				
		% within district	25.0%	43.3%	38.1			
	BA	Observed	7	16	23			
		Expected	6.6	16.4				
		% within district	29.2%	26.7%	27.4			
	LD	Observed	1	6	7			
		Expected	2.0	5.0				
		% within district	4.2%	10.0%	8.3			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	8	15	23	1.2	3	0.762
		Expected	6.6	16.4		n/a		
		% within district	33.3%	25.0%	27.4			
	AA	Observed	9	24	33			
		Expected	9.4	23.6				
		% within district	37.5%	40.0%	39.3			
	BA	Observed	6	15	21			
		Expected	6.0	15.0				
		% within district	25.0%	25.0%	25.0			
	LD	Observed	1	6	7			
		Expected	2.0	5.0				
		% within district	4.2%	10.0%	8.3			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	10	10	20	5.9	3	0.114
		Expected	5.7	14.3		n/a		
		% within district	41.7%	16.7%	23.8			
	AA	Observed	7	24	31			
		Expected	8.9	22.1				
		% within district	29.2%	40.0%	36.9			
	BA	Observed	4	16	20			
		Expected	5..7	14.3				
		% within district	16.7%	26.7%	23.8			
	LD	Observed	3	10	13			
		Expected	3.7	9.3				
		% within district	12.5%	16.7%	15.5			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	11	13	24	6.2	3	0.100
		Expected	6.9	17.1		n/a		
		% within district	45.8%	21.7%	28.6			
	AA	Observed	6	22	28			
		Expected	8.0	20.0				
		% within district	25.0%	36.7%	33.3			
	BA	Observed	6	15	21			
		Expected	6.0	15.0				
		% within district	25.0%	25.0%	25.0			
	LD	Observed	1	10	11			
		Expected	3.1	7.9				
		% within district	4.2%	16.7%	13.1			
Income rank	MD	Observed	7	8	15	Inv.		
		Expected	4.3	10.7				
		% within district	29.2%	13.3%	17.9			
	AA	Observed	8	25	33			
		Expected	9.4	23.6				
		% within district	33.3%	41.7%	39.3			
	BA	Observed	6	14	20			
		Expected	5.7	14.3				
		% within district	25.0%	23.3%	23.8			
	LD	Observed	3	13	16			
		Expected	4.6	11.4				

		% within district	12.5%	21.7%	19.0			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	8	8	16	Inv.		
		Expected	4.6	11.4				
		% within district	33.3%	13.3%	19.0			
	AA	Observed	9	23	32			
		Expected	9.1	22.9				
		% within district	37.5%	38.3%	38.1			
	BA	Observed	4	18	22			
		Expected	6.3	15.7				
		% within district	16.7%	30.0%	26.2			
	LD	Observed	3	11	14			
		Expected	4.0	10.0				
		% within district	12.5%	18.3%	16.7			

Table A8: Coastal v Seaside, 2007

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			$\chi 2$, **Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 24, 29%	Seaside n = 60, 71%	Total 84	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	9	13	22	Inv.		
		Expected	6.3	15.7				
		% within district	37.5%	21.7%	26.2			
	AA	Observed	9	28	37			
		Expected	10.6	26.4				
		% within district	37.5%	46.7%	44.0			
	BA	Observed	5	14	19			
		Expected	5.4	13.6				
		% within district	20.8%	23.3%	22.6			
	LD	Observed	1	5	6			
		Expected	1.7	4.3				
		% within district	4.2%	8.3%	7.1			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	8	15	23	Inv.		
		Expected	6.6	16.4				
		% within district	33.3%	25.0%	27.4			
	AA	Observed	11	26	37			
		Expected	10.6	26.4				
		% within district	45.8%	43.3%	44.0			
	BA	Observed	4	15	19			
		Expected	5.4	13.6				
		% within district	16.7%	25.0%	22.6			
	LD	Observed	1	4	5			
		Expected	1.4	3.6				
		% within district	4.2%	6.7%	6.0			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	10	9	19	7.2	3	0.064
		Expected	5.4	13.6		n/a		
		% within district	41.7%	15.0%	22.6			
	AA	Observed	8	25	33			
		Expected	9.4	23.6				
		% within district	33.3%	41.7%	39.3			
	BA	Observed	4	16	20			
		Expected	5.7	14.3				
		% within district	16.7%	26.7%	23.8			
	LD	Observed	2	10	12			
		Expected	3.4	8.6				
		% within district	8.3%	16.7%	14.3			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	11	16	27	4.1	3	0.244
		Expected	7.7	19.3		n/a		
		% within district	45.8%	26.7%	32.1			
	AA	Observed	7	19	26			
		Expected	7.4	18.6				
		% within district	29.2%	31.7%	31.0			
	BA	Observed	5	15	20			
		Expected	5.7	14.3				
		% within district	20.8%	25.0%	23.8			
	LD	Observed	1	10	11			
		Expected	3.1	7.9				
		% within district	4.2%	16.7%	13.1			
Income rank	MD	Observed	7	8	15	Inv.		
		Expected	4.3	10.7				
		% within district	29.2%	13.3%	17.9			
	AA	Observed	7	25	32			
		Expected	9.1	22.9				
		% within district	29.2%	41.7%	38.1			
	BA	Observed	8	14	22			
		Expected	6.3	15.7				
		% within district	33.3%	23.3%	26.2			
	LD	Observed	2	13	15			
		Expected	4.3	10.7				

		% within district	8.3%	21.7%	17.9			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	8	8	16	Inv.		
		Expected	4.6	11.4				
		% within district	33.3%	13.3%	19.0			
	AA	Observed	9	25	34			
		Expected	9.7	24.3				
		% within district	37.5%	41.7%	40.5			
	BA	Observed	5	14	19			
		Expected	5.4	13.6				
		% within district	20.8%	23.3%	22.6			
	LD	Observed	2	13	15			
		Expected	4.3	10.7				
		% within district	8.3%	21.7%	17.9			

Table A9: Coastal v Seaside, 2010

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			χ^2, Cramer's V		
			Coastal n = 22, 29%	Seaside n = 53, 71%	Total 75	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	7	11	18	Inv.		
		Expected	5.3	12.7				
		% within district	31.8%	20.8%	24.0			
	AA	Observed	9	26	35			
		Expected	10.3	24.7				
		% within district	40.9%	49.1%	46.7			
	BA	Observed	5	12	17			
		Expected	5.0	12.0				
		% within district	22.7%	22.6%	22.7			
	LD	Observed	1	4	5			
		Expected	1.5	3.5				
		% within district	4.5%	7.5%	6.7			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	8	13	21	Inv.		
		Expected	6.2	14.8				
		% within district	36.4%	24.5%	28.0			
	AA	Observed	9	24	33			
		Expected	9.7	23.3				
		% within district	40.9%	45.3%	44.0			
	BA	Observed	4	12	16			
		Expected	4.7	11.3				
		% within district	18.2%	22.6%	21.3			
	LD	Observed	1	4	5			
		Expected	1.5	3.5				
		% within district	4.5%	7.5%	6.7			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	7	8	15	Inv.		
		Expected	4.4	10.6				
		% within district	31.8%	15.1%	20.0			
	AA	Observed	8	25	33			
		Expected	9.7	23.3				
		% within district	36.4%	47.2%	44.0			
	BA	Observed	5	10	15			
		Expected	4.4	10.6				
		% within district	22.7%	18.9%	20.0			
	LD	Observed	2	10	12			
		Expected	3.5	8.5				
		% within district	9.1%	18.9%	16.0			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	9	16	25	Inv.		
		Expected	7.3	17.7				
		% within district	40.9%	30.2%	33.3			
	AA	Observed	6	17	23			
		Expected	6.7	16.3				
		% within district	27.3%	32.1%	30.7			
	BA	Observed	6	10	16			
		Expected	4.7	11.3				
		% within district	27.3%	18.9%	21.3			
	LD	Observed	1	10	11			
		Expected	3.2	7.8				
		% within district	4.5%	18.9%	14.7			
Income rank	MD	Observed	6	7	13	Inv.		
		Expected	3.8	9.2				
		% within district	27.3%	13.2%	17.3			
	AA	Observed	7	23	30			
		Expected	8.8	21.2				
		% within district	31.8%	43.4%	40.0			
	BA	Observed	6	12	18			
		Expected	5.3	12.7				
		% within district	27.3%	22.6%	24.0			
	LD	Observed	3	11	14			
		Expected	4.1	9.9				

		% within district	13.6%	20.8%	18.7			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	7	7	14	Inv.		
		Expected	4.1	9.9				
		% within district	31.8%	13.2%	18.7			
	AA	Observed	7	23	30			
		Expected	8.8	21.2				
		% within district	31.8%	43.4%	40.6			
	BA	Observed	6	10	16			
		Expected	4.7	11.3				
		% within district	27.3%	18.9%	21.3			
	LD	Observed	2	13	15			
		Expected	4.4	10.6				
		% within district	9.1%	24.5%	20.0			

Table A10: Seaside (+R) v Inland, 2004

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			χ^2, Cramer's V		
			Inland n = 270, 87%	Seaside (+R) n = 39, 13%	Total 309	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	66	10	76	26.4	3	0.000***
		Expected	66.4	9.6		.292		
		% within district	24.4%	25.6%	24.6			
	AA	Observed	57	21	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	21.1%	53.8%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	66	8	74			
		Expected	64.7	9.3				
		% within district	24.4%	20.5%	23.9			
	LD	Observed	81	0	81			
		Expected	70.8	10.2				
		% within district	30.0%	0.0%	26.2			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	65	12	77	21.5	3	0.000***
		Expected	67.3	9.7		.264		
		% within district	24.1%	30.8%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	56	18	74			
		Expected	64.7	9.3				
		% within district	20.7%	46.2%	23.9			
	BA	Observed	68	9	77			
		Expected	67.3	9.7				
		% within district	25.2%	23.1%	24.9			
	LD	Observed	81	0	81			
		Expected	70.8	10.2				
		% within district	30.0%	0.0%	26.2			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	67	9	77	19.5	3	0.000***
		Expected	66.4	9.6		.251		
		% within district	24.8%	23.1%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	58	20	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	21.5%	51.3%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	69	8	77			
		Expected	67.3	9.7				
		% within district	25.6%	20.5%	24.9			
	LD	Observed	76	2	77			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	28.1%	5.1%	24.9			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	64	11	75	16.9	3	0.001***
		Expected	65.5	9.5		.234		
		% within district	23.7%	28.2%	24.3			
	AA	Observed	61	18	79			
		Expected	69.0	10.0				
		% within district	22.6%	46.2%	25.6			
	BA	Observed	67	9	77			
		Expected	66.4	9.6				
			24.8%	23.1%	24.9			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	78 69.0 28.9%	1 10.0 2.6%	78 25.2			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	73 70.8 27.0%	8 10.2 20.5%	81 26.2	17.5 .238	3	0.001***
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	56 66.4 20.7%	20 9.6 51.3%	76 24.6			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	69 65.5 25.6%	6 9.5 15.4%	75 24.3			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	72 67.3 26.7%	5 9.7 12.8%	77 24.9			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	72 69.0 26.7%	7 10.0 17.9%	79 25.6	17.6 .239	3	0.001***
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	57 67.3 21.1%	20 9.7 51.3%	77 24.9			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	67 65.5 24.8%	8 9.5 20.5%	75 24.3			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	74 68.2 27.4%	4 9.8 10.3%	78 25.2			

Table A11: Seaside (+R) v Inland, 2007

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			$\chi 2$, Cramer's V		
			Inland n = 270, 87%	Seaside (+R) n = 39, 13%	Total 309	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	66	11	77	27.4	3	0.000***
		Expected	67.3	9.7		.298		
		% within district	24.4%	28.2%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	52	20	72			
		Expected	62.9	9.1				
		% within district	19.3%	51.3%	23.3			
	BA	Observed	70	8	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	25.9%	20.5%	25.2			
	LD	Observed	82	0	82			
		Expected	71.7	10.3				
		% within district	30.4%	0.0%	26.5			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	65	12	77	25.8	3	0.000***
		Expected	67.3	9.7		.289		
		% within district	24.1%	30.8%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	52	19	71			
		Expected	62.0	9.0				
		% within district	19.3%	48.7%	23.0			
	BA	Observed	70	8	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	25.9%	20.5%	25.2			
	LD	Observed	83	0	83			
		Expected	72.5	10.5				
		% within district	30.7%	0.0%	26.9			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	69	8	77	22.2	3	0.000***
		Expected	67.3	9.7		.268		
		% within district	25.6%	20.5%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	56	20	76			
		Expected	66.4	9.6				
		% within district	20.7%	51.3%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	69	10	79			
		Expected	69.0	10.0				
		% within district	25.6%	25.6%	25.6			
	LD	Observed	76	1	77			
		Expected	67.3	9.7				
		% within district	28.1%	2.6%	24.9			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	61	14	75	14.7	3	0.002**
		Expected	65.5	9.5		.218		
		% within district	22.6%	35.9%	24.3			
	AA	Observed	63	15	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	23.3%	38.5%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	69	9	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	25.6%	23.1%	25.2			
	LD	Observed	77	1	78			
		Expected	68.2	9.8				
		% within district	28.5%	2.6%	25.2			
Income rank	MD	Observed	73	8	81	16.9	3	0.001***
		Expected	70.8	10.2		.234		
		% within district	27.0%	20.5%	26.2			
	AA	Observed	57	20	77			
		Expected	67.3	9.7				
		% within district	21.1%	51.3%	24.9			
	BA	Observed	67	5	72			
		Expected	62.9	9.1				
		% within district	24.8%	12.8%	23.3			
	LD	Observed	73	6	79			
		Expected	69.0	10.0				

		% within district	27.0%	15.4%	25.6			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	72	8	80	18.6	3	0.000***
		Expected	69.9	10.1		.246		
		% within district	26.7%	20.5%	25.9			
	AA	Observed	55	20	75			
		Expected	65.5	9.5				
		% within district	20.4%	51.3%	24.3			
	BA	Observed	70	7	77			
		Expected	67.3	9.7				
		% within district	25.9%	17.9%	24.9			
	LD	Observed	73	4	77			
		Expected	67.3	9.7				
		% within district	27.0%	10.3%	24.9			

Table A12: Seaside (+R) v Inland, 2010

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			$\chi 2$, Cramer's V		
			Inland n = 251, 87%	Seaside (+R) n = 37, 13%	Total 288	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*P*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	63	10	73	29.1	3	0.000***
		Expected	63.6	9.4		.318		
		% within district	25.1%	27.0%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	47	20	67			
		Expected	58.4	8.6				
		% within district	18.7%	54.1%	23.3			
	BA	Observed	65	7	72			
		Expected	62.8	9.3				
		% within district	25.9%	18.9%	25.0			
	LD	Observed	76	0	76			
		Expected	66.2	9.8				
		% within district	30.3%	0.0%	26.4			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	60	12	72	24.5	3	0.000***
		Expected	62.8	9.3		.292		
		% within district	23.9%	32.4%	25.0			
	AA	Observed	49	18	67			
		Expected	58.4	8.6				
		% within district	19.5%	48.6%	23.3			
	BA	Observed	66	7	73			
		Expected	63.6	9.4				
		% within district	26.3%	18.9%	25.3			
	LD	Observed	76	0	76			
		Expected	66.2	9.8				
		% within district	30.3%	0.0%	26.4			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	66	7	73	29.3	3	0.000***
		Expected	63.6	9.4		.319		
		% within district	26.3%	18.9%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	49	22	71			
		Expected	61.9	9.1				
		% within district	19.5%	59.5%	24.7			
	BA	Observed	67	6	73			
		Expected	63.6	9.4				
		% within district	26.7%	16.2%	25.3			
	LD	Observed	69	2	71			
		Expected	61.9	9.1				
		% within district	27.5%	5.4%	24.7			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	56	14	70	14.6	3	0.002**
		Expected	61.0	9.0		.226		
		% within district	22.3%	37.8%	24.3			
	AA	Observed	59	15	74			
		Expected	64.5	9.5				
		% within district	23.5%	40.5%	25.7			
	BA	Observed	66	6	72			
		Expected	62.8	9.3				
			26.3%	16.2%	25.0			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	70 62.8 27.9%	2 9.3 5.4%	72 25.0			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	68 65.4 27.1%	7 9.6 18.9%	75 26.0	19.3 .259	3	0.000***
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	52 62.8 20.7%	20 9.3 54.1%	72 25.0			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	64 60.1 25.5%	5 8.9 13.5%	69 24.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	67 62.8 26.7%	5 9.3 13.5%	72 25.0			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	67 64.5 26.7%	7 9.5 18.9%	74 25.7	19.5 .261	3	0.000***
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	52 62.8 20.7%	20 9.3 54.1%	72 25.0			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	66 62.8 26.3%	6 9.3 16.2%	72 25.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	66 61.0 26.3%	4 9.0 10.8%	70 24.3			

Table A13: Seaside (+R) v Coastal, 2004

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			χ^2, Cramer's V		
			Coastal n = 24, 38%	Seaside (+R) n = 39, 62%	Total 63	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed Expected % within district	10 7.6 41.7%	10 12.4 25.6%	20 31.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	6 10.3 25.0%	21 16.7 53.8%	27 42.9			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	7 5.7 29.2%	8 9.3 20.5%	15 23.8			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.4 4.2%	0 0.6 0.0%	1 1.6			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed Expected % within district	8 7.6 33.3%	12 12.4 30.8%	20 31.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	9 10.3 37.5%	18 16.7 46.2%	27 42.9			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	6 5.7 25.0%	9 9.3 23.1%	15 23.8			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.4 4.2%	0 0.6 0.0%	1 1.6			
Extent rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	10 7.2 41.7%	9 11.8 23.1%	19 30.2	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	7 10.3 29.2%	20 16.7 51.3%	27 42.9			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	4 4.6 16.7%	8 7.4 20.5%	12 19.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	13 1.9 12.5%	2 3.1 5.1%	5 7.9			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	11 8.4 45.8%	11 13.6 28.2%	22 34.9	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	6 9.1 25.0%	18 14.9 46.2%	24 38.1			
	BA	Observed Expected	6 5.7 25.0%	9 9.3 23.1%	15 23.8			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.8 4.2%	1 1.2 2.6%	2 3.2			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 5.7 29.2%	8 9.3 20.5%	15 23.8	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	8 10.7 33.3%	20 17.3 51.3%	28 44.4			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	6 4.6 25.0%	6 7.4 15.4%	12 19.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	3 3.0 12.5%	5 5.0 12.8%	8 12.7			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	8 5.7 33.3%	7 9.3 17.9%	15 23.8	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	9 11.0 37.5%	20 18.0 51.3%	29 46.0			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	4 4.6 16.7%	8 7.4 20.5%	12 19.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	3 2.7 12.5%	4 4.3 10.3%	7 11.1			

Table A14: Seaside (+R) v Coastal, 2007

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			χ^2, **Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 24, 38%	Seaside (+R) n = 39, 62%	Total 63	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed Expected % within district	9 7.6 37.5%	11 12.4 28.2%	20 31.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	9 11.0 37.5%	20 18.0 51.3%	29 46.0			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	5 5.0 20.8%	8 8.0 20.5%	13 20.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.4 4.2%	0 0.6 0.0%	1 1.6			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed Expected % within district	8 7.6 33.3%	12 12.4 30.8%	20 31.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	11 11.4 45.8%	19 18.6 48.7%	30 47.6			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	4 4.6 16.7%	8 7.4 20.5%	12 19.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.4 4.2%	0 0.6 0.0%	1 1.6			
Extent rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	10 6.9 41..7%	8 11.1 20.5%	18 28.6	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	8 10.7 33.3%	20 17.3 51.3%	28 44.4			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	4 5.3 16.7%	10 8.7 25.6%	14 22.2			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 1.1 8.3%	1 1.9 2.6%	3 4.8			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	11 9.5 45.8%	14 15.5 35.9%	25 39.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	7 8.4 29.2%	15 13.6 38.5%	22 34.9			
	BA	Observed Expected	5 5.3 20.8%	9 8.7 23.1%	14 22.2			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.8 4.2%	1 1.2 2.6%	2 3.2			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 5.7 29.2%	8 9.3 20.5%	15 23.8	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	7 10.3 29.2%	20 16.7 51.3%	27 42.9			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	8 5.0 33.3%	5 8.0 12.8%	13 20.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 3.0 8.3%	6 5.0 15.4%	8 12.7			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	8 6.1 33.3%	8 9.9 20.5%	16 25.4	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	9 11.0 37.5%	20 18.0 51.3%	29 46.0			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	5 4.6 20.8%	7 7.4 17.9%	12 19.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 2.3 8.3%	4 3.7 10.3%	6 9.5			

Table A15: Seaside (+R) v Coastal, 2010

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			χ^2, Cramer's V		
			Coastal n = 22, 37%	Seaside (+R) n = 37, 63%	Total 59	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 6.3 31.8%	10 10.7 27.0%	17 28.8	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	9 10.8 40.9%	20 18.2 54.1%	29 49.2			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	5 4.5 22.7%	7 7.5 18.9%	12 20.3			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.4 4.5%	0 0.6 0.0%	1 1.7			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed Expected % within district	8 7.5 36.4%	12 12.5 32.4%	20 33.9	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	9 10.1 40.9%	18 16.9 48.6%	27 45.8			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	4 4.1 18.2%	7 6.9 18.9%	11 18.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 0.4 4.5%	0 0.6 0.0%	1 1.7			
Extent rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 5.2 31.8%	7 8.8 18.9%	14 23.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	8 11.2 36.4%	22 18.8 59.5%	30 50.8			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	5 4.1 22.7%	6 6.9 16.2%	11 18.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 1.5 9.1%	2 2.5 5.4%	4 6.8			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	9 8.6 40.9%	14 14.4 37.8%	23 39.0	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	6 7.8 27.3%	15 13.2 40.5%	21 35.6			
	BA	Observed Expected	6 4.5 27.3%	6 7.5 16.2%	12 20.3			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 1.1 4.5%	2 1.9 5.4%	3 5.1			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	6 4.8 27.3%	7 8.2 18.9%	13 22.0	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	7 10.1 31.8%	20 16.9 54.1%	27 45.8			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	6 4.1 27.3%	5 6.9 13.5%	11 18.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	3 3.0 13.6%	5 5.0 13.5%	8 13.6			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 5.2 31.8%	7 8.8 18.9%	14 23.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	7 10.1 31.8%	20 16.9 54.1%	27 45.8			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	6 4.5 27.3%	6 7.5 16.2%	12 20.3			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 2.2 9.1%	4 3.8 10.8%	6 10.2			

Table A16: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R), 2004

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			χ^2, Cramer's V		
			Seaside (+R) n = 39, 65%	Seaside (-R) n = 21, 35%	Total 60	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed	10	2	12	Inv.		
		Expected	7.8	4.2				
		% within district	25.6%	9.5%	20.0			
	AA	Observed	21	5	26			
		Expected	16.9	9.1				
		% within district	53.8%	23.8%	43.3			
	BA	Observed	8	8	16			
		Expected	10.4	5.6				
		% within district	20.5%	38.1%	26.7			
	LD	Observed	0	6	6			
		Expected	3.9	2.1				
		% within district	0.0%	28.6%	10.0			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed	12	3	15	Inv.		
		Expected	9.8	5.3				
		% within district	30.8%	14.3%	25.0			
	AA	Observed	18	6	24			
		Expected	15.6	8.4				
		% within district	46.2%	28.6%	40.0			
	BA	Observed	9	6	15			
		Expected	9.8	5.3				
		% within district	23.1%	28.6%	25.0			
	LD	Observed	0	6	6			
		Expected	3.9	2.1				
		% within district	0.0%	28.6%	10.0			
Extent rank	MD	Observed	9	1	10	Inv.		
		Expected	6.5	3.5				
		% within district	23.1%	4.8%	16.7			
	AA	Observed	20	4	24			
		Expected	15.6	8.4				
		% within district	51.3%	19.0%	40.0			
	BA	Observed	8	8	16			
		Expected	10.4	5.6				
		% within district	20.5%	38.1%	26.7			
	LD	Observed	2	8	10			
		Expected	6.5	3.5				
		% within district	5.1%	38.1%	16.7			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed	11	2	13	Inv.		
		Expected	8.5	4.6				
		% within district	28.2%	9.5%	21.7%			
	AA	Observed	18	4	22			
		Expected	14.3	7.7				
		% within district	46.2%	19.0%	36.7%			
	BA	Observed	9	6	15			
		Expected	9.8	5.3				
		% within district	23.1%	28.6%	25.0%			
	LD	Observed	1	9	10			
		Expected	6.5	3.5				
		% within district	2.6%	42.9%	16.7%			
Income rank	MD	Observed	8	0	8	Inv.		
		Expected	5.2	2.8				
		% within district	20.5%	0.0%	13.3			
	AA	Observed	20	5	25			
		Expected	16.3	8.8				
		% within district	51.3%	23.8%	41.7			
	BA	Observed	6	8	14			
		Expected	9.1	4.9				
		% within district	15.4%	38.1%	23.3			
	LD	Observed	5	8	13			
		Expected	8.5	4.6				

		% within district	12.8%	38.1%	21.7			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	7	1	8	Inv.		
		Expected	5.2	2.8				
		% within district	17.9%	4.8%	13.3			
	AA	Observed	20	3	23			
		Expected	15.0	8.1				
		% within district	51.3%	14.3%	38.3			
	BA	Observed	8	10	18			
		Expected	11.7	6.3				
		% within district	20.5%	47.6%	30.0			
	LD	Observed	4	7	11			
		Expected	7.2	3.9				
		% within district	10.3%	33.3%	18.3			

Table A17: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R), 2007

Deprivation measure	Deprivation level		District type			χ^2, Cramer's V		
			Seaside (+R) n = 39, 65%	Seaside (-R) n = 21, 35%	Total 60	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed Expected % within district	11 8.5 28.2%	2 4.6 9.5%	13 21.7	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	20 18.2 51.3%	8 9.8 38.1%	28 46.7			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	8 9.1 20.5%	6 4.9 28.6%	14 23.3			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	0 3.3 0.0%	5 1.8 23.8%	5 8.3			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed Expected % within district	12 9.8 30.8%	3 5.3 14.3%	15 25.0	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	19 16.9 48.7%	7 9.1 33.3%	26 43.3			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	8 9.8 20.5%	7 5.3 33.3%	15 25.0			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	0 2.6 0.0%	4 1.4 19.0%	4 6.7			
Extent rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	8 5.9 20.5%	1 3.2 4.8%	9 15.0	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	20 16.3 51.3%	5 8.8 23.8%	25 41,7			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	10 10.4 25.6%	6 5.6 28.6%	16 26.7			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	1 6.5 2.6%	9 3.5 42.9%	10 16.7			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	14 10.4 35.9%	2 5.6 9.5%	16 26.7	18.6 .557	3	0.000***
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	15 12.4 38.5%	4 6.7 19.0%	19 31.7			
	BA	Observed Expected	9 9.8 23.1%	6 5.3 28.6%	15 25.0			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed	1	9	10			
		Expected	6.5	3.5				
		% within district	2.6%	42.9%	16.7			
Income rank	MD	Observed	8	0	8	Inv.		
		Expected	5.2	2.8				
		% within district	20.5%	0.0%	13.3			
	AA	Observed	20	5	25			
		Expected	16.3	8.8				
		% within district	51.3%	23.8%	41.7			
	BA	Observed	5	9	14			
		Expected	9.1	4.9				
		% within district	12.8%	42.9%	23.3			
	LD	Observed	6	7	13			
		Expected	8.5	4.6				
		% within district	15.4%	33.3%	21.7			
Employment rank	MD	Observed	8	0	8	Inv.		
		Expected	5.2	2.8				
		% within district	20.5%	0.0%	13.3			
	AA	Observed	20	5	25			
		Expected	16.3	8.8				
		% within district	51.3%	23.8%	41.7			
	BA	Observed	7	7	14			
		Expected	9.1	4.9				
		% within district	17.9%	33.3%	23.3			
	LD	Observed	4	9	13			
		Expected	8.5	4.6				
		% within district	10.3%	42.9%	21.7			

Table A18: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R), 2010

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**District type**			**χ^2, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (+R) n = 37, 70%	Seaside (-R) n = 16, 30%	Total 53	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Average rank of LSOA scores	MD	Observed Expected % within district	10 7.7 27.0%	1 3.3 6.3%	11 20.8	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	20 18.2 54.1%	6 7.8 37.5%	26 49.1			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	7 8.4 18.9%	5 3.6 31.3%	12 22.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	0 2.8 0.0%	4 1.2 25.0%	4 7.5			
Average rank of LSOA ranks	MD	Observed Expected % within district	12 9.1 32.4%	1 3.9 6.3%	13 24.5	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	18 16.8 48.6%	6 7.2 37.5%	24 45.3			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	7 8.4 18.9%	5 3.6 31.3%	12 22.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	0 2.8 0.0%	4 1.2 25.0%	4 7.5			
Extent rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 5.6 18.9%	1 2.4 6.3%	8 15.1	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	22 17.5 59.5%	3 7.5 18.8%	25 47.2			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	6 7.0 16,2%	4 3.0 25.0%	10 18.9			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 7.0 5.4%	8 3.0 50.0%	10 18.9			
Local concentration rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	14 11.2 37.8%	2 4.8 12.5%	16 30.2	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	15 11.9 40.5%	2 5.1 12.5%	17 32.1			
	BA	Observed Expected	6 7.0 16.2%	4 3.0 25.0%	10 18.9			

		% within district						
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	2 7.0 5.4%	8 3.0 50.0%	10 18.9			
Income rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 4.9 18.9%	0 2.1 0.0%	7 13.2	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	20 16.1 54.1%	3 6.9 18.8%	23 43.4			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	5 8.4 13.5%	7 3.6 43.8%	12 22.6			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	5 7.7 13.5%	6 3.3 37.5%	11 20.8			
Employment rank	MD	Observed Expected % within district	7 4.9 18.9%	0 2.1 0.0%	7 13.2	Inv.		
	AA	Observed Expected % within district	20 16.1 54.1%	3 6.9 18.8%	23 43.4			
	BA	Observed Expected % within district	6 7.0 16.2%	4 3.0 25.0%	10 18.9			
	LD	Observed Expected % within district	4 9.1 10.8%	9 3.9 56.3%	13 24.5			

Table A19: Average rank of LSOA scores

	ID2004			ID2007			ID2010		
MD	Blackpool	24	NW	Blackpool	12	NW	Blackpool	6	NW
	South Tyneside	27	NE	Hastings	31	SE	Hastings	19	SE
	Hastings	38	SE	Penwith	36	SW	Thanet	49	SE
	Wirral	48	NW	South Tyneside	38	NE	South Tyneside	52	NE
	Penwith	56	SW	Great Yarmouth	58	E	Great Yarmouth	54	E
	Great Yarmouth	70	E	Wirral	60	NW	Wirral	60	NW
	Sefton	78	NW	Thanet	65	SE	Torbay	61	SW
	Brighton and Hove	83	SE	Torbay	71	SW	Brighton and Hove	66	SE
	Thanet	85	SE	Brighton and Hove	79	SE	East Lindsey	73	EM
	Portsmouth	88	SE	Sefton	83	NW	Portsmouth	76	SE
				East Lindsey	88	EM			
AA	East Lindsey	89	EM	Restormel	89	SW	Eastbourne	84	SE
	Scarborough	91	Y&H	Portsmouth	93	SE	Scarborough	85	Y&H
	Restormel	93	SW	Scarborough	97	Y&H	Tendring	86	E
	Torbay	94	SW	Tendring	103	E	West Somerset	90	SW
	Bournemouth	95	SW	Eastbourne	104	SE	Sefton	92	NW
	Tendring	103	E	West Somerset	106	SW	Weymouth & Port.	94	SW
	Lancaster	107	NW	Bournemouth	108	SW	Shepway	97	SE
	West Somerset	110	SW	Southend-on-Sea	111	E	Bournemouth	102	SW
	Waveney	113	E	Waveney	114	E	Southend-on-Sea	106	E
	Southend-on-Sea	114	E	Lancaster	117	NW	Cornwall	110	SW
	Eastbourne	117	SE	Carrick	120	SW	Waveney	115	E
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	124	NE	Shepway	123	SE	Lancaster	116	NW
	Weymouth & Port.	125	SW	Weymouth & Port.	127	SW	Isle of Wight	126	SE
	Isle of Wight	126	SE	Berwick-upon-Tweed	133	NE	Dover	127	SE
	Shepway	131	SE	Isle of Wight	134	SE	Northumberland	135	NE
	North Devon	133	SW	North Devon	146	SW	North Devon	137	SW
	Carrick	149	SW	Dover	153	SE	Rother	139	SE
	Dover	154	SE	Rother	166	SE	Sedgemoor	152	SW
	Wyre	161	NW	Sedgemoor	169	SW	Arun	154	SE
	Sedgemoor	169	SW	Wyre	170	NW	Wyre	163	NW
	Teignbridge	177	SW						
BA	Canterbury	190	SE	Teignbridge	179	SW	Canterbury	166	SE
	Rother	191	SE	Arun	187	SE	Teignbridge	184	SW
	Arun	205	SE	Canterbury	198	SE	North Somerset	201	SW
	North Somerset	228	SW	North Somerset	215	SW	East Devon	215	SW
	Fylde	240	NW	Christchurch	220	SW	Purbeck	218	SW
	East Devon	246	SW	East Devon	238	SW	Christchurch	230	SW
	Christchurch	247	SW	Purbeck	241	SW	Fylde	236	NW
	Purbeck	248	SW	Fylde	251	NW			
LD									

Table A20: Average rank of LSOA ranks

	ID2004			ID2007			ID2010		
MD	Blackpool	26	NW	Blackpool	18	NW	Blackpool	10	NW
	South Tyneside	28	NE	Penwith	21	SW	Hastings	23	SE
	Penwith	34	SW	Hastings	29	SE	West Somerset	45	SW
	Hastings	39	SE	South Tyneside	37	NE	South Tyneside	47	NE
	Great Yarmouth	71	E	Great Yarmouth	55	E	Torbay	49	SW
	Restormel	72	SW	Torbay	57	SW	Thanet	50	SE
	Brighton and Hove	74	SE	Restormel	60	SW	Great Yarmouth	57	E
	Wirral	75	NW	Thanet	62	SE	East Lindsey	58	EM
	East Lindsey	78	EM	West Somerset	64	SW	Brighton and Hove	67	SE
	West Somerset	79	SW	Brighton and Hove	77	SE	Eastbourne	68	SE
	Thanet	83	SE	East Lindsey	82	EM	Portsmouth	76	SE
	Portsmouth	88	SE	Eastbourne	88	SE	Tendring	81	E
AA	Torbay	89	SW	Tendring	91	E	Cornwall	82	SW
	Bournemouth	96	SW	Portsmouth	92	SE	Scarborough	83	Y&H
	Tendring	98	E	Wirral	95	NW	Weymouth & Port.	88	SW
	Sefton	99	NW	Carrick	100	SW	Shepway	89	SE
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	100	NE	Scarborough	103	Y&H	Bournemouth	96	SW
	Scarborough	102	Y&H	Berwick-upon-Tweed	104	NE	Wirral	103	NW
	Isle of Wight	108	SE	Sefton	107	NW	Isle of Wight	106	SE
	Eastbourne	113	SE	Bournemouth	108	SW	Waveney	112	E
	Waveney	118	E	Isle of Wight	110	SE	Sefton	114	NW
	Weymouth and Port.	119	SW	Waveney	116	E	Southend-on-Sea	117	E
	North Devon	120	SW	Southend-on-Sea	124	E	Dover	122	SE
	Shepway	124	SE	Shepway	126	SE	North Devon	126	SW
	Lancaster	129	NW	Weymouth & Port.	130	SW	Rother	132	SE
	Southend-on-Sea	130	E	North Devon	133	SW	Lancaster	133	NW
	Carrick	132	SW	Lancaster	135	NW	Northumberland	144	NE
	Dover	141	SE	Dover	148	SE	Arun	151	SE
	Teignbridge	163	SW	Rother	163	SE	Sedgemoor	154	SW
	Sedgemoor	172	SW	Teignbridge	165	SW	Canterbury	163	SE
				Sedgemoor	169	SW			
BA	Wyre	179	NW	Wyre	182	NW	Teignbridge	175	SW
	Rother	181	SE	Arun	186	SE	Wyre	185	NW
	Canterbury	188	SE	Canterbury	187	SE	Purbeck	199	SW
	Arun	203	SE	Christchurch	216	SW	East Devon	209	SW
	Purbeck	236	SW	Purbeck	222	SW	North Somerset	224	SW
	Fylde	240	NW	East Devon	228	SW	Christchurch	228	SW
	East Devon	242	SW	North Somerset	242	SW	Fylde	235	NW
	North Somerset	244	SW	Fylde	249	NW			
	Christchurch	249	SW						
LD									

Table A21: Extent rank

	ID2004			ID2007			ID2010		
MD	South Tyneside	20	NE	Blackpool	24	NW	Blackpool	16	NW
	Blackpool	35	NW	South Tyneside	29	NE	Hastings	24	SE
	Hastings	38	SE	Hastings	38	SE	South Tyneside	39	NE
	Wirral	49	NW	Penwith	53	SW	Wirral	54	NW
	Great Yarmouth	72	E	Wirral	59	NW	Thanet	57	SE
	Sefton	78	NW	Great Yarmouth	66	E	Great Yarmouth	64	E
	Penwith	81	SW	Thanet	71	SE	Sefton	80	NW
	Thanet	84	SE	Sefton	80	NW			
	Brighton and Hove	87	SE						
AA	Scarborough	89	Y&H	Torbay	89	SW	Torbay	82	SW
	Portsmouth	90	SE	Brighton and Hove	95	SE	Brighton and Hove	84	SE
	East Lindsey	91	EM	Scarborough	101	Y&H	Weymouth & Port.	90	SW
	Bournemouth	101	SW	East Lindsey	103	EM	East Lindsey	91	EM
	Lancaster	104	NW	Portsmouth	105	SE	Portsmouth	93	SE
	Southend-on-Sea	111	E	Southend-on-Sea	107	E	Southend-on-Sea	97	E
	Torbay	113	SW	Lancaster	109	NW	Scarborough	99	Y&H
	Waveney	122	E	Bournemouth	111	SW	Eastbourne	101	SE
	Weymouth & Port.	126	SW	Weymouth & Port.	115	SW	Lancaster	104	NW
	Tendring	127	E	Waveney	118	E	Bournemouth	105	SW
	Wyre	134	NW	Eastbourne	121	SE	Tendring	112	E
	Restormel	137	SW	Tendring	126	E	Shepway	120	SE
	Eastbourne	142	SE	Restormel	135	SW	Waveney	123	E
	Shepway	143	SE	Wyre	139	NW	Northumberland	124	NE
	North Devon	148	SW	Shepway	140	SE	Dover	131	SE
	Sedgemoor	163	SW	Sedgemoor	160	SW	Wyre	135	NW
	Isle of Wight	165	SE	North Devon	164	SW	Sedgemoor	148	SW
	North Somerset	167	SW	Dover	166	SE	Rother	153	SE
	Dover	168	SE	North Somerset	167	SW	Cornwall	154	SW
	Carrick	174	SW	Carrick	171	SW	North Devon	157	SW
							Arun	158	SE
							North Somerset	159	SW
BA	Canterbury	187	SE	Isle of Wight	178	SE	Isle of Wight	165	SE
	Arun	189	SE	Arun	181	SE	Canterbury	170	SE
	Rother	194	SE	Rother	184	SE	West Somerset	173	SW
	Teignbridge	198	SW	West Somerset	191	SW	Teignbridge	192	SW
	West Somerset	212	SW	Canterbury	197	SE	Christchurch	197	SW
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	221	NE	Teignbridge	200	SW	Fylde	218	NW
	Christchurch	223	SW	Christchurch	201	SW			
	Fylde	236	NW	Fylde	227	NW			
				Berwick-upon-Tweed	232	NE			
				East Devon	266	SW			
LD	East Devon	268	SW	Purbeck	309	SW	East Devon	250	SW
	Purbeck	298	SW				Purbeck	294	SW

Table A22: Local concentration rank

	ID2004			ID2007			ID2010		
MD	Wirral	8	NW	Blackpool	3	NW	Blackpool	1	NW
	Blackpool	10	NW	Wirral	14	NW	Wirral	14	NW
	Great Yarmouth	35	E	Hastings	31	SE	Hastings	19	SE
	Hastings	39	SE	Great Yarmouth	32	E	Thanet	26	SE
	Sefton	42	NW	Thanet	37	SE	Great Yarmouth	30	E
	South Tyneside	58	NE	Sefton	46	NW	Sefton	43	NW
	Lancaster	62	NW	Lancaster	62	NW	Portsmouth	52	SE
	Thanet	63	SE	South Tyneside	64	NE	Brighton and Hove	54	SE
	Scarborough	67	Y&H	Portsmouth	66	SE	Scarborough	56	Y&H
	Portsmouth	69	SE	Scarborough	67	Y&H	Lancaster	59	NW
	Brighton and Hove	74	SE	Brighton and Hove	70	SE	Torbay	61	SW
				Torbay	75	SW	Southend-on-Sea	73	E
				Southend-on-Sea	83	E	Tendring	74	E
				Waveney	86	E	South Tyneside	77	NE
AA	Penwith	89	SW	Bournemouth	91	SW	Northumberland	87	NE
	Waveney	92	E	Penwith	94	SW	Waveney	92	E
	Southend-on-Sea	97	E	East Lindsey	102	EM	East Lindsey	94	EM
	East Lindsey	101	EM	Tendring	109	E	Bournemouth	96	SW
	Bournemouth	103	SW	Wyre	117	NW	Weymouth & Port.	99	SW
	Tendring	111	E	North Somerset	123	SW	Wyre	101	NW
	Wyre	117	NW	Weymouth & Port.	125	SW	Shepway	102	SE
	Torbay	119	SW	Shepway	128	SE	North Somerset	115	SW
	Shepway	127	SE	Eastbourne	139	SE	Eastbourne	116	SE
	North Somerset	132	SW	North Devon	152	SW	North Devon	146	SW
	Weymouth & Port.	139	SW	Restormel	156	SW	Dover	147	SE
	North Devon	140	SW	Carrick	160	SW	Arun	148	SE
	Restormel	144	SW	Sedgemoor	164	SW	Cornwall	152	SW
	Eastbourne	150	SE	Dover	176	SE	Sedgemoor	153	SW
	Sedgemoor	165	SW	Arun	177	SE	Rother	155	SE
	Dover	171	SE						
	Carrick	172	SW						
	Isle of Wight	175	SE						
BA	Arun	185	SE	Rother	182	SE	Canterbury	170	SE
	Canterbury	190	SE	Isle of Wight	184	SE	Isle of Wight	178	SE
	Rother	193	SE	Teignbridge	195	SW	West Somerset	183	SW
	Teignbridge	199	SW	Canterbury	199	SE	Teignbridge	192	SW
	West Somerset	216	SW	Christchurch	202	SW	Christchurch	201	SW
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	217	NE	West Somerset	203	SW	Fylde	220	NW
	Christchurch	233	SW	Berwick-upon-Tweed	227	NE			
	Fylde	235	NW	Fylde	236	NW			
	East Devon	259	SW	East Devon	266	SW			
LD	Purbeck	322	SW	Purbeck	321	SW	East Devon	246	SW
							Purbeck	294	SW

Table A23: Income rank

	ID2004			ID2007			ID2010		
MD	Wirral	13	NW	Wirral	21	NW	Cornwall	9	SW
	Sefton	33	NW	Sefton	43	NW	Wirral	22	NW
	Brighton and Hove	50	SE	Brighton and Hove	51	SE	Sefton	45	NW
	South Tyneside	56	NE	South Tyneside	68	NE	Northumberland	53	NE
	Blackpool	73	NW	Blackpool	72	NW	Brighton and Hove	57	SE
	Portsmouth	76	SE	Portsmouth	77	SE	Blackpool	74	NW
	Southend-on-Sea	79	E	Southend-on-Sea	81	E	South Tyneside	77	NE
	Thanet	88	SE	Thanet	88	SE			
AA	Bournemouth	91	SW	Bournemouth	91	SW	Portsmouth	84	SE
	Torbay	95	SW	Torbay	93	SW	Southend-on-Sea	88	E
	Isle of Wight	101	SE	Tendring	99	E	Thanet	95	SE
	Lancaster	102	NW	North Somerset	101	SW	Bournemouth	96	SW
	Tendring	103	E	East Lindsey	104	EM	Torbay	97	SW
	Hastings	107	SE	Isle of Wight	105	SE	Tendring	99	E
	North Somerset	109	SW	Lancaster	114	NW	East Lindsey	107	EM
	East Lindsey	111	EM	Great Yarmouth	119	E	North Somerset	109	SW
	Great Yarmouth	117	E	Waveney	120	E	Isle of Wight	116	SE
	Waveney	118	E	Hastings	121	SE	Hastings	124	SE
	Scarborough	123	Y&H	Canterbury	125	SE	Great Yarmouth	126	E
	Canterbury	129	SE	Scarborough	126	Y&H	Lancaster	127	NW
	Shepway	140	SE	Arun	134	SE	Waveney	128	E
	Dover	141	SE	Shepway	147	SE	Arun	131	SE
	Arun	143	SE	Dover	151	SE	Scarborough	133	Y&H
	Restormel	150	SW	Teignbridge	152	SW	Canterbury	137	SE
	Teignbridge	157	SW	Restormel	153	SW	Shepway	144	SE
	Eastbourne	168	SE	Eastbourne	158	SE	Dover	153	SE
	Wyre	170	NW	Sedgemoor	162	SW	Eastbourne	158	SE
	Sedgemoor	171	SW	Wyre	167	NW	Teignbridge	162	SW
BA	Penwith	178	SW	North Devon	181	SW	Sedgemoor	165	SW
	North Devon	179	SW	East Devon	185	SW	Wyre	174	NW
	Carrick	181	SW	Penwith	198	SW	North Devon	190	SW
	East Devon	196	SW	Carrick	199	SW	East Devon	192	SW
	Rother	225	SE	Rother	219	SE	Rother	202	SE
	Weymouth & Port.	253	SW						
LD	Fylde	288	NW	Weymouth & Port.	269	SW	Weymouth & Port.	255	SW
	West Somerset	331	SW	Fylde	296	NW	Fylde	280	NW
	Christchurch	332	SW	Christchurch	329	SW	Christchurch	308	SW
	Purbeck	340	SW	West Somerset	330	SW	West Somerset	311	SW
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	347	NE	Purbeck	341	SW	Purbeck	318	SW
				Berwick-upon-Tweed	348	NE			

Table A24: Employment rank

	ID2004			ID2007			ID2010		
MD	Wirral	8	NW	Wirral	8	NW	Cornwall	8	SW
	Sefton	15	NW	Sefton	23	NW	Wirral	10	NW
	Brighton and Hove	43	SE	Brighton and Hove	46	SE	Sefton	26	NW
	South Tyneside	48	NE	South Tyneside	55	NE	Northumberland	29	NE
	Blackpool	59	NW	Blackpool	61	NW	Brighton and Hove	48	SE
	Bournemouth	81	SW	Bournemouth	81	SW	South Tyneside	62	NE
	Portsmouth	83	SE	Portsmouth	82	SE	Blackpool	63	NW
				Southend-on-Sea	88	E			
AA	Southend-on-Sea	89	E	Thanet	93	SE	Portsmouth	88	SE
	Thanet	90	SE	Torbay	94	SW	Southend-on-Sea	92	E
	Lancaster	93	NW	East Lindsey	97	EM	Bournemouth	93	SW
	Torbay	94	SW	North Somerset	98	SW	North Somerset	98	SW
	East Lindsey	98	EM	Lancaster	103	NW	Torbay	99	SW
	North Somerset	106	SW	Tendring	104	E	Thanet	101	SE
	Isle of Wight	108	SE	Isle of Wight	110	SE	East Lindsey	104	EM
	Tendring	109	E	Great Yarmouth	116	E	Tendring	107	E
	Great Yarmouth	117	E	Waveney	121	E	Lancaster	113	NW
	Scarborough	123	Y&H	Hastings	127	SE	Isle of Wight	114	SE
	Waveney	124	E	Scarborough	129	Y&H	Hastings	126	SE
	Hastings	126	SE	Canterbury	141	SE	Great Yarmouth	127	E
	Canterbury	147	SE	Dover	144	SE	Waveney	134	E
	Dover	148	SE	Shepway	145	SE	Scarborough	135	Y&H
	Wyre	151	NW	Arun	153	SE	Arun	145	SE
	Restormel	154	SW	Restormel	154	SW	Canterbury	146	SE
	Shepway	158	SE	Wyre	157	NW	Shepway	154	SE
	Teignbridge	170	SW	Teignbridge	173	SW	Dover	157	SE
	Arun	171	SE	Sedgemoor	174	SW	Wyre	162	NW
	Sedgemoor	176	SW	Eastbourne	176	SE	Eastbourne	163	SE
BA	Penwith	182	SW	Carrick	198	SW	Sedgemoor	167	SW
	North Devon	183	SW	North Devon	202	SW	Teignbridge	171	SW
	Carrick	186	SW	East Devon	205	SW	East Devon	204	SW
	East Devon	193	SW	Penwith	209	SW	North Devon	205	SW
	Eastbourne	194	SE	Weymouth & Port.	230	SW	Rother	218	SE
	Weymouth & Port.	230	SW	Rother	239	SE	Weymouth & Port.	219	SW
	Fylde	241	NW	Fylde	260	NW			
	Rother	244	SE						
LD	West Somerset	332	SW	West Somerset	335	SW	Fylde	253	NW
	Christchurch	340	SW	Christchurch	337	SW	West Somerset	313	SW
	Berwick-upon-Tweed	342	NE	Berwick-upon-Tweed	347	NE	Christchurch	315	SW
	Purbeck	344	SW	Purbeck	348	SW	Purbeck	322	SW

Table A25: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Overall Index of M.D.

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of IMD score, 2004	MD	Observed	6728	738	7466	393.6	3	.000***
		Expected	6662.6	803.4		0.116		
		% within LSOA t.	25.80%	23.50%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	6140	1066	7206			
		Expected	6430.6	775.4				
		% within LSOA t.	23.60%	33.90%	24.7			
	BA	Observed	6207	941	7148			
		Expected	6378.8	769.2				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	30.00%	24.5			
	LD	Observed	6973	396	7369			
		Expected	6576	793				
		% within LSOA t.	26.80%	12.60%	25.2			
Rank of IMD score, 2007	MD	Observed	6711	750	7461	368.2	3	.000***
		Expected	6658.1	802.9		0.112		
		% within LSOA t.	25.80%	23.90%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	6084	1085	7169			
		Expected	6397.6	771.4				
		% within LSOA t.	23.40%	34.50%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	6281	889	7170			
		Expected	6398.4	771.6				
		% within LSOA t.	24.10%	28.30%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	6972	417	7389			
		Expected	6593.9	795.1				
		% within LSOA t.	26.80%	13.30%	25.3			
Rank of IMD score, 2010	MD	Observed	6684	769	7453	288.6	3	.000***
		Expected	6651	802		0.099		
		% within LSOA t.	25.70%	24.50%	25.5			
	AA	Observed	6147	1024	7171			
		Expected	6399.3	771.7				
		% within LSOA t.	23.60%	32.60%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	6296	903	7199			
		Expected	6424.3	774.7				
		% within LSOA t.	24.20%	28.70%	24.7			
	LD	Observed	6921	445	7366			
		Expected	6573.4	792.6				
		% within LSOA t.	26.60%	14.20%	25.2			

Table A26: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Income

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			$\chi 2$, **Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 21,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Income score, 2004	MD	Observed	6715	754	7469	391.5	3	.000***
		Expected	6665.3	803.7		0.116		
		% within LSOA t.	25.80%	24.00%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	6135	1059	7194			
		Expected	6419.9	774.1				
		% within LSOA t.	23.60%	33.70%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	6208	937	7145			
		Expected	6376.1	768.9				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	29.80%	24.5			
	LD	Observed	6990	391	7381			
		Expected	6586.7	794.3				
		% within LSOA t.	26.80%	12.40%	25.3			
Rank of Income score, 2007	MD	Observed	6765	712	7477	410.7	3	.000***
		Expected	6672.4	804.6		0.119		
		% within LSOA t.	26.00%	22.70%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	6118	1070	7188			
		Expected	6414.5	773.5				
		% within LSOA t.	23.50%	34.10%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	6179	958	7137			
		Expected	6369	768				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	30.50%	24.5			
	LD	Observed	6986	401	7387			
		Expected	6592.1	794.9				
		% within LSOA t.	26.80%	12.80%	25.3			
Rank of Income score, 2010	MD	Observed	6740	742	7482	363.3	3	.000***
		Expected	6676.9	805.1		0.112		
		% within LSOA t.	25.90%	23.60%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	6173	1039	7212			
		Expected	6435.9	776.1				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	33.10%	24.7			
	BA	Observed	6184	952	7136			
		Expected	6368.1	767.9				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	30.30%	24.4			
	LD	Observed	6951	408	7359			
		Expected	6567.1	791.9				
		% within LSOA t.	26.70%	13.00%	25.2			

Table A27: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Employment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Employment score, 2004	MD	Observed	6395	904	7299	693.1	3	.000***
		Expected	6513.6	785.4		0.154		
		% within LSOA t.	24.60%	28.80%	25.0			
	AA	Observed	6057	1162	7219			
		Expected	6442.2	776.8				
		% within LSOA t.	23.30%	37.00%	24.7			
	BA	Observed	6334	839	7173			
		Expected	6401.1	771.9				
		% within LSOA t.	24.30%	26.70%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	7262	236	7498			
		Expected	6691.1	806.9				
		% within LSOA t.	27.90%	7.50%	25.7			
Rank of Employment score, 2007	MD	Observed	6432	890	7322	538.9	3	.000***
		Expected	6534.1	787.9		0.136		
		% within LSOA t.	24.70%	28.30%	25.1			
	AA	Observed	6136	1088	7224			
		Expected	6446.6	777.4				
		% within LSOA t.	23.60%	34.60%	24.7			
	BA	Observed	6296	874	7170			
		Expected	6398.4	771.6				
		% within LSOA t.	24.20%	27.80%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	7184	289	7473			
		Expected	6668.8	804.2				
		% within LSOA t.	27.60%	9.20%	25.6			
Rank of Employment score, 2010	MD	Observed	6398	935	7333	485.2	3	.000***
		Expected	6543.9	789.1		0.129		
		% within LSOA t.	24.60%	29.80%	25.1			
	AA	Observed	6206	1010	7216			
		Expected	6439.5	776.5				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	32.20%	24.7			
	BA	Observed	6274	896	7170			
		Expected	6398.4	771.6				
		% within LSOA t.	24.10%	28.50%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	7170	300	7470			
		Expected	6666.2	803.8				
		% within LSOA t.	27.50%	9.60%	25.6			

Table A28: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Health

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Health score, 2004	MD	Observed	6637	750	7387	675.8	3	.000***
		Expected	6592.1	794.9		0.152		
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	23.90%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	6199	1121	7320			
		Expected	6532.3	787.7				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	35.70%	25.1			
	BA	Observed	6117	1024	7141			
		Expected	6372.6	768.4				
		% within LSOA t.	23.50%	32.60%	24.5			
	LD	Observed	7095	246	7341			
		Expected	6551	790				
		% within LSOA t.	27.20%	7.80%	25.1			
Rank of Health score, 2007	MD	Observed	6588	803	7391	579.9	3	.000***
		Expected	6595.7	795.3		0.141		
		% within LSOA t.	25.30%	25.60%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	6215	1112	7327			
		Expected	6538.5	788.5				
		% within LSOA t.	23.90%	35.40%	25.1			
	BA	Observed	6168	953	7121			
		Expected	6354.7	766.3				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	30.30%	24.4			
	LD	Observed	7077	273	7350			
		Expected	6559.1	790.9				
		% within LSOA t.	27.20%	8.70%	25.2			
Rank of Health score, 2010	MD	Observed	6480	872	7352	547.7	3	.000***
		Expected	6560.9	791.1		0.137		
		% within LSOA t.	24.90%	27.80%	25.2			
	AA	Observed	6202	1075	7277			
		Expected	6493.9	783.1				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	34.20%	24.9			
	BA	Observed	6228	919	7147			
		Expected	6377.9	769.1				
		% within LSOA t.	23.90%	29.30%	24.5			
	LD	Observed	7138	275	7413			
		Expected	6615.3	797.7				
		% within LSOA t.	27.40%	8.80%	25.4			

Table A29: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Education

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			χ^2, **Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Education score, 2004	MD	Observed	6547	707	7254	165.9	3	.000***
		Expected	6473.4	780.6		0.075		
		% within LSOA t.	25.10%	22.50%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	6202	958	7160			
		Expected	6389.5	770.5				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	30.50%	24.5			
	BA	Observed	6334	910	7244			
		Expected	6464.5	779.5				
		% within LSOA t.	24.30%	29.00%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	6965	566	7531			
		Expected	6720.6	810.4				
		% within LSOA t.	26.70%	18.00%	25.8			
Rank of Education score, 2007	MD	Observed	6482	736	7218	190.0	3	.000***
		Expected	6441.3	776.7		0.081		
		% within LSOA t.	24.90%	23.40%	24.7			
	AA	Observed	6163	1008	7171			
		Expected	6399.3	771.7				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	32.10%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	6393	852	7245			
		Expected	6465.4	779.6				
		% within LSOA t.	24.50%	27.10%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	7010	545	7555			
		Expected	6742	813				
		% within LSOA t.	26.90%	17.40%	25.9			
Rank of Education score, 2010	MD	Observed	6424	779	7203	161.6	3	.000***
		Expected	6427.9	775.1		0.074		
		% within LSOA t.	24.70%	24.80%	24.7			
	AA	Observed	6201	958	7159			
		Expected	6388.6	770.4				
		% within LSOA t.	23.80%	30.50%	24.5			
	BA	Observed	6408	862	7270			
		Expected	6487.7	782.3				
		% within LSOA t.	24.60%	27.40%	24.9			
	LD	Observed	7015	542	7557			
		Expected	6743.8	813.2				
		% within LSOA t.	26.90%	17.30%	25.9			

Table A30: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Housing

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			$\chi 2$, **Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Housing score, 2004	MD	Observed	6641	821	7462	59.2	3	.000***
		Expected	6659	803		0.045		
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	26.10%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	6675	692	7367			
		Expected	6574.2	792.8				
		% within LSOA t.	25.60%	22.00%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	6488	698	7186			
		Expected	6412.7	773.3				
		% within LSOA t.	24.90%	22.20%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	6244	930	7174			
		Expected	6402	772				
		% within LSOA t.	24.00%	29.60%	24.6			
Rank of Housing score, 2007	MD	Observed	6655	743	7398	15.7	3	.000***
		Expected	6601.9	796.1		0.023		
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	23.70%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	6509	857	7366			
		Expected	6573.4	792.6				
		% within LSOA t.	25.00%	27.30%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	6420	818	7238			
		Expected	6459.1	778.9				
		% within LSOA t.	24.60%	26.00%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	6464	723	7187			
		Expected	6413.6	773.4				
		% within LSOA t.	24.80%	23.00%	24.6			
Rank of Housing score, 2010	MD	Observed	6639	748	7387	26.3	3	.000***
		Expected	6592.1	794.9		0.030		
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	23.80%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	6569	866	7435			
		Expected	6634.9	800.1				
		% within LSOA t.	25.20%	27.60%	25.5			
	BA	Observed	6361	842	7203			
		Expected	6427.9	775.1				
		% within LSOA t.	24.40%	26.80%	24.7			
	LD	Observed	6479	685	7164			
		Expected	6393.1	770.9				
		% within LSOA t.	24.90%	21.80%	24.5			

Table A31: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Crime

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Crime score, 2004	MD	Observed	7242	419	7661	424.6	3	.000***
		Expected	6836.6	824.4		0.121		
		% within LSOA t.	27.80%	13.30%	26.2			
	AA	Observed	6724	713	7437			
		Expected	6636.7	800.3				
		% within LSOA t.	25.80%	22.70%	25.5			
	BA	Observed	6235	965	7200			
		Expected	6425.2	774.8				
		% within LSOA t.	23.90%	30.70%	24.7			
	LD	Observed	5847	1044	6891			
		Expected	6149.5	741.5				
		% within LSOA t.	22.40%	33.20%	23.6			
Rank of Crime score, 2007	MD	Observed	7124	508	7632	234.5	3	.000***
		Expected	6810.7	821.3		0.090		
		% within LSOA t.	27.30%	16.20%	26.1			
	AA	Observed	6648	766	7414			
		Expected	6616.2	797.8				
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	24.40%	25.4			
	BA	Observed	6319	889	7208			
		Expected	6432.4	775.6				
		% within LSOA t.	24.30%	28.30%	24.7			
	LD	Observed	5957	978	6935			
		Expected	6188.7	746.3				
		% within LSOA t.	22.90%	31.10%	23.8			
Rank of Crime score, 2010	MD	Observed	7205	451	7656	487.8	3	.000***
		Expected	6832.1	823.9		0.129		
		% within LSOA t.	27.70%	14.40%	26.2			
	AA	Observed	6837	666	7503			
		Expected	6695.6	807.4				
		% within LSOA t.	26.20%	21.20%	25.7			
	BA	Observed	6325	881	7206			
		Expected	6430.6	775.4				
		% within LSOA t.	24.30%	28.00%	24.7			
	LD	Observed	5681	1143	6824			
		Expected	6089.7	734.3				
		% within LSOA t.	21.80%	36.40%	23.4			

Table A32: Seaside (+R) v Inland – Living environment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Inland n = 26,048 89.2 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 10.8%	Total 29,189	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Living Environment score, 2004	MD	Observed	6829	855	7684	4.0	3	.252
		Expected	6857.1	826.9		0.012		
		% within LSOA t.	26.20%	27.20%	26.3			
	AA	Observed	6504	812	7316			
		Expected	6528.7	787.3				
		% within LSOA t.	25.00%	25.90%	25.1			
	BA	Observed	6424	751	7175			
		Expected	6402.9	772.1				
		% within LSOA t.	24.70%	23.90%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	6291	723	7014			
		Expected	6259.2	754.8				
		% within LSOA t.	24.20%	23.00%	24.0			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2007	MD	Observed	6613	951	7564	72.0	3	.000***
		Expected	6750	814		0.050		
		% within LSOA t.	25.40%	30.30%	25.9			
	AA	Observed	6527	861	7388			
		Expected	6593	795				
		% within LSOA t.	25.10%	27.40%	25.3			
	BA	Observed	6447	728	7175			
		Expected	6402.9	772.1				
		% within LSOA t.	24.80%	23.20%	24.6			
	LD	Observed	6461	601	7062			
		Expected	6302.1	759.9				
		% within LSOA t.	24.80%	19.10%	24.2			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2010	MD	Observed	6549	979	7528	66.7	3	.000***
		Expected	6717.9	810.1		0.048		
		% within LSOA t.	25.10%	31.20%	25.8			
	AA	Observed	6568	796	7364			
		Expected	6571.6	792.4				
		% within LSOA t.	25.20%	25.30%	25.2			
	BA	Observed	6491	734	7225			
		Expected	6447.5	777.5				
		% within LSOA t.	24.90%	23.40%	24.8			
	LD	Observed	6440	632	7072			
		Expected	6311	761				
		% within LSOA t.	24.70%	20.10%	24.2			

Table A33: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Overall Index of M.D.

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of IMD score, 2004	MD	Observed	553	738	1291	66.7	3	.000***
		Expected	518.3	772.7		0.113		
		% within LSOA t.	26.20%	23.50%	24.6			
	AA	Observed	585	1066	1651			
		Expected	662.9	988.1				
		% within LSOA t.	27.80%	33.90%	31.5			
	BA	Observed	553	941	1494			
		Expected	599.8	894.2				
		% within LSOA t.	26.20%	30.00%	28.5			
	LD	Observed	416	396	812			
		Expected	326	486				
		% within LSOA t.	19.70%	12.60%	15.5			
Rank of IMD score, 2007	MD	Observed	555	750	1305	58.2	3	.000***
		Expected	523.9	781.1		0.105		
		% within LSOA t.	26.30%	23.90%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	585	1085	1670			
		Expected	670.5	999.5				
		% within LSOA t.	27.80%	34.50%	31.8			
	BA	Observed	548	889	1437			
		Expected	576.9	860.1				
		% within LSOA t.	26.00%	28.30%	27.4			
	LD	Observed	419	417	836			
		Expected	335.6	500.4				
		% within LSOA t.	19.90%	13.30%	15.9			
Rank of IMD score, 2010	MD	Observed	557	769	1326	64.4	3	.000***
		Expected	532.4	793.6		0.111		
		% within LSOA t.	26.40%	24.50%	25.3			
	AA	Observed	583	1024	1607			
		Expected	645.2	961.8				
		% within LSOA t.	27.70%	32.60%	30.6			
	BA	Observed	508	903	1411			
		Expected	566.5	844.5				
		% within LSOA t.	24.10%	28.70%	26.9			
	LD	Observed	459	445	904			
		Expected	362.9	541.1				
		% within LSOA t.	21.80%	14.20%	17.2			

Table A34: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Income

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Income score, 2004	MD	Observed	529	754	1283	60.4	3	.000***
		Expected	515.1	767.9		0.107		
		% within LSOA t.	25.10%	24.00%	24.4			
	AA	Observed	613	1059	1672			
		Expected	671.3	1000.7				
		% within LSOA t.	29.10%	33.70%	31.9			
	BA	Observed	547	937	1484			
		Expected	595.8	888.2				
		% within LSOA t.	26.00%	29.80%	28.3			
	LD	Observed	418	391	809			
		Expected	324.8	484.2				
		% within LSOA t.	19.80%	12.40%	15.4			
Rank of Income score, 2007	MD	Observed	526	712	1238	88.5	3	.000***
		Expected	497	741		0.130		
		% within LSOA t.	25.00%	22.70%	23.6			
	AA	Observed	583	1070	1653			
		Expected	663.7	989.3				
		% within LSOA t.	27.70%	34.10%	31.5			
	BA	Observed	544	958	1502			
		Expected	603	899				
		% within LSOA t.	25.80%	30.50%	28.6			
	LD	Observed	454	401	855			
		Expected	343.3	511.7				
		% within LSOA t.	21.50%	12.80%	16.3			
Rank of Income score, 2010	MD	Observed	526	742	1268	82.4	3	.000***
		Expected	509.1	758.9		0.125		
		% within LSOA t.	25.00%	23.60%	24.2			
	AA	Observed	569	1039	1608			
		Expected	645.6	962.4				
		% within LSOA t.	27.00%	33.10%	30.6			
	BA	Observed	553	952	1505			
		Expected	604.2	900.8				
		% within LSOA t.	26.20%	30.30%	28.7			
	LD	Observed	459	408	867			
		Expected	348.1	518.9				
		% within LSOA t.	21.80%	13.00%	16.5			

Table A35: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Employment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Employment score, 2004	MD	Observed	669	904	1573	106.7	3	.000***
		Expected	631.5	941.5		0.143		
		% within LSOA t.	31.80%	28.80%	30.0			
	AA	Observed	578	1162	1740			
		Expected	698.6	1041.4				
		% within LSOA t.	27.40%	37.00%	33.2			
	BA	Observed	543	839	1382			
		Expected	554.9	827.1				
		% within LSOA t.	25.80%	26.70%	26.3			
	LD	Observed	317	236	553			
		Expected	222	331				
		% within LSOA t.	15.00%	7.50%	10.5			
Rank of Employment score, 2007	MD	Observed	654	890	1544	75.1	3	.000***
		Expected	619.9	924.1		0.120		
		% within LSOA t.	31.00%	28.30%	29.4			
	AA	Observed	577	1088	1665			
		Expected	668.5	996.5				
		% within LSOA t.	27.40%	34.60%	31.7			
	BA	Observed	539	874	1413			
		Expected	567.3	845.7				
		% within LSOA t.	25.60%	27.80%	26.9			
	LD	Observed	337	289	626			
		Expected	251.3	374.7				
		% within LSOA t.	16.00%	9.20%	11.9			
Rank of Employment score, 2010	MD	Observed	634	935	1569	55.6	3	.000***
		Expected	629.9	939.1		0.103		
		% within LSOA t.	30.10%	29.80%	29.9			
	AA	Observed	587	1010	1597			
		Expected	641.2	955.8				
		% within LSOA t.	27.90%	32.20%	30.4			
	BA	Observed	546	896	1442			
		Expected	578.9	863.1				
		% within LSOA t.	25.90%	28.50%	27.5			
	LD	Observed	340	300	640			
		Expected	257	383				
		% within LSOA t.	16.10%	9.60%	12.2			

Table A36: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Health

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Health score, 2004	MD	Observed	633	750	1383	149.2	3	.000***
		Expected	555.3	827.7		0.169		
		% within LSOA t.	30.00%	23.90%	26.4			
	AA	Observed	576	1121	1697			
		Expected	681.3	1015.7				
		% within LSOA t.	27.30%	35.70%	32.3			
	BA	Observed	548	1024	1572			
		Expected	631.1	940.9				
		% within LSOA t.	26.00%	32.60%	30.0			
	LD	Observed	350	246	596			
		Expected	239.3	356.7				
		% within LSOA t.	16.60%	7.80%	11.4			
Rank of Health score, 2007	MD	Observed	625	803	1428	126.3	3	.000***
		Expected	573.3	854.7		0.155		
		% within LSOA t.	29.70%	25.60%	27.2			
	AA	Observed	559	1112	1671			
		Expected	670.9	1000.1				
		% within LSOA t.	26.50%	35.40%	31.8			
	BA	Observed	554	953	1507			
		Expected	605	902				
		% within LSOA t.	26.30%	30.30%	28.7			
	LD	Observed	369	273	642			
		Expected	257.8	384.2				
		% within LSOA t.	17.50%	8.70%	12.2			
Rank of Health score, 2010	MD	Observed	654	872	1526	101.5	3	.000***
		Expected	612.7	913.3		0.139		
		% within LSOA t.	31.00%	27.80%	29.1			
	AA	Observed	578	1075	1653			
		Expected	663.7	989.3				
		% within LSOA t.	27.40%	34.20%	31.5			
	BA	Observed	520	919	1439			
		Expected	577.7	861.3				
		% within LSOA t.	24.70%	29.30%	27.4			
	LD	Observed	355	275	630			
		Expected	252.9	377.1				
		% within LSOA t.	16.80%	8.80%	12.0			

Table A37: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Education

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Education score, 2004	MD	Observed	714	707	1421	92.0	3	.000***
		Expected	570.5	850.5		0.132		
		% within LSOA t.	33.90%	22.50%	27.1			
	AA	Observed	618	958	1576			
		Expected	632.7	943.3				
		% within LSOA t.	29.30%	30.50%	30.0			
	BA	Observed	490	910	1400			
		Expected	562.1	837.9				
		% within LSOA t.	23.30%	29.00%	26.7			
	LD	Observed	285	566	851			
		Expected	341.7	509.3				
		% within LSOA t.	13.50%	18.00%	16.2			
Rank of Education score, 2007	MD	Observed	732	736	1468	83.4	3	.000***
		Expected	589.4	878.6		0.126		
		% within LSOA t.	34.70%	23.40%	28.0			
	AA	Observed	605	1008	1613			
		Expected	647.6	965.4				
		% within LSOA t.	28.70%	32.10%	30.7			
	BA	Observed	493	852	1345			
		Expected	540	805				
		% within LSOA t.	23.40%	27.10%	25.6			
	LD	Observed	277	545	822			
		Expected	330	492				
		% within LSOA t.	13.10%	17.40%	15.7			
Rank of Education score, 2010	MD	Observed	726	779	1505	61.3	3	.000***
		Expected	604.2	900.8		0.108		
		% within LSOA t.	34.50%	24.80%	28.7			
	AA	Observed	604	958	1562			
		Expected	627.1	934.9				
		% within LSOA t.	28.70%	30.50%	29.8			
	BA	Observed	467	862	1329			
		Expected	533.6	795.4				
		% within LSOA t.	22.20%	27.40%	25.3			
	LD	Observed	310	542	852			
		Expected	342.1	509.9				
		% within LSOA t.	14.70%	17.30%	16.2			

Table A38: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Housing

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Housing score, 2004	MD	Observed	242	821	1063	181.2	3	.000***
		Expected	426.8	636.2		0.186		
		% within LSOA t.	11.50%	26.10%	20.3			
	AA	Observed	503	692	1195			
		Expected	479.8	715.2				
		% within LSOA t.	23.90%	22.00%	22.8			
	BA	Observed	659	698	1357			
		Expected	544.8	812.2				
		% within LSOA t.	31.30%	22.20%	25.9			
	LD	Observed	703	930	1633			
		Expected	655.6	977.4				
		% within LSOA t.	33.40%	29.60%	31.1			
Rank of Housing score, 2007	MD	Observed	308	743	1051	91.1	3	.000***
		Expected	422	629		0.132		
		% within LSOA t.	14.60%	23.70%	20.0			
	AA	Observed	514	857	1371			
		Expected	550.4	820.6				
		% within LSOA t.	24.40%	27.30%	26.1			
	BA	Observed	645	818	1463			
		Expected	587.4	875.6				
		% within LSOA t.	30.60%	26.00%	27.9			
	LD	Observed	640	723	1363			
		Expected	547.2	815.8				
		% within LSOA t.	30.40%	23.00%	26.0			
Rank of Housing score, 2010	MD	Observed	310	748	1058	131.2	3	.000***
		Expected	424.8	633.2		0.158		
		% within LSOA t.	14.70%	23.80%	20.2			
	AA	Observed	466	866	1332			
		Expected	534.8	797.2				
		% within LSOA t.	22.10%	27.60%	25.4			
	BA	Observed	637	842	1479			
		Expected	593.8	885.2				
		% within LSOA t.	30.20%	26.80%	28.2			
	LD	Observed	694	685	1379			
		Expected	553.6	825.4				
		% within LSOA t.	32.90%	21.80%	26.3			

Table A39: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Crime

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Crime score, 2004	MD	Observed	386	419	805	68.1	3	.000***
		Expected	323.2	481.8		0.114		
		% within LSOA t.	18.30%	13.30%	15.3			
	AA	Observed	576	713	1289			
		Expected	517.5	771.5				
		% within LSOA t.	27.30%	22.70%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	640	965	1605			
		Expected	644.4	960.6				
		% within LSOA t.	30.40%	30.70%	30.6			
	LD	Observed	505	1044	1549			
		Expected	621.9	927.1				
		% within LSOA t.	24.00%	33.20%	29.5			
Rank of Crime score, 2007	MD	Observed	425	508	933	47.9	3	.000***
		Expected	374.6	558.4		0.096		
		% within LSOA t.	20.20%	16.20%	17.8			
	AA	Observed	563	766	1329			
		Expected	533.6	795.4				
		% within LSOA t.	26.70%	24.40%	25.3			
	BA	Observed	640	889	1529			
		Expected	613.9	915.1				
		% within LSOA t.	30.40%	28.30%	29.1			
	LD	Observed	479	978	1457			
		Expected	585	872				
		% within LSOA t.	22.70%	31.10%	27.8			
Rank of Crime score, 2010	MD	Observed	398	451	849	43.0	3	.000***
		Expected	340.9	508.1		0.091		
		% within LSOA t.	18.90%	14.40%	16.2			
	AA	Observed	479	666	1145			
		Expected	459.7	685.3				
		% within LSOA t.	22.70%	21.20%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	631	881	1512			
		Expected	607	905				
		% within LSOA t.	29.90%	28.00%	28.8			
	LD	Observed	599	1143	1742			
		Expected	699.4	1042.6				
		% within LSOA t.	28.40%	36.40%	33.2			

Table A40: Seaside (+R) v Coastal – Living environment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Coastal n = 2,107 40.1 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 59.9%	Total 5,248	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Rank of Living Environment score, 2004	MD	Observed	293	855	1148	186.3 0.188	3	.000***
		Expected	460.9	687.1				
		% within LSOA t.	13.90%	27.20%	21.9			
	AA	Observed	457	812	1269			
		Expected	509.5	759.5				
		% within LSOA t.	21.70%	25.90%	24.2			
	BA	Observed	643	751	1394			
		Expected	559.7	834.3				
		% within LSOA t.	30.50%	23.90%	26.6			
	LD	Observed	714	723	1437			
		Expected	576.9	860.1				
		% within LSOA t.	33.90%	23.00%	27.4			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2007	MD	Observed	301	951	1252	307.5 0.242	3	.000***
		Expected	502.7	749.3				
		% within LSOA t.	14.30%	30.30%	23.9			
	AA	Observed	430	861	1291			
		Expected	518.3	772.7				
		% within LSOA t.	20.40%	27.40%	24.6			
	BA	Observed	644	728	1372			
		Expected	550.8	821.2				
		% within LSOA t.	30.60%	23.20%	26.1			
	LD	Observed	732	601	1333			
		Expected	535.2	797.8				
		% within LSOA t.	34.70%	19.10%	25.4			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2010	MD	Observed	327	979	1306	249.7 0.218	3	.000***
		Expected	524.3	781.7				
		% within LSOA t.	15.50%	31.20%	24.9			
	AA	Observed	446	796	1242			
		Expected	498.6	743.4				
		% within LSOA t.	21.20%	25.30%	23.7			
	BA	Observed	604	734	1338			
		Expected	537.2	800.8				
		% within LSOA t.	28.70%	23.40%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	730	632	1362			
		Expected	546.8	815.2				
		% within LSOA t.	34.60%	20.10%	26.0			

Table A41: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Overall Index of M.D.

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of IMD score, 2004	MD	Observed	101	738	839	242.3	3	.000***
		Expected	230	609		0.237		
		% within LSOA t.	8.50%	23.50%	19.4			
	AA	Observed	330	1066	1396			
		Expected	382.6	1013.4				
		% within LSOA t.	27.80%	33.90%	32.3			
	BA	Observed	420	941	1361			
		Expected	373	988				
		% within LSOA t.	35.40%	30.00%	31.5			
	LD	Observed	335	396	731			
		Expected	200.4	530.6				
		% within LSOA t.	28.20%	12.60%	16.9			
Rank of IMD score, 2007	MD	Observed	104	750	854	198.9	3	.000***
		Expected	234.1	619.9		0.214		
		% within LSOA t.	8.80%	23.90%	19.7			
	AA	Observed	367	1085	1452			
		Expected	398	1054				
		% within LSOA t.	30.90%	34.50%	33.6			
	BA	Observed	403	889	1292			
		Expected	354.1	937.9				
		% within LSOA t.	34.00%	28.30%	29.9			
	LD	Observed	312	417	729			
		Expected	199.8	529.2				
		% within LSOA t.	26.30%	13.30%	16.8			
Rank of IMD score, 2010	MD	Observed	110	769	879	167.1	3	.000***
		Expected	240.9	638.1		0.197		
		% within LSOA t.	9.30%	24.50%	20.3			
	AA	Observed	367	1024	1391			
		Expected	381.3	1009.7				
		% within LSOA t.	30.90%	32.60%	32.1			
	BA	Observed	414	903	1317			
		Expected	361	956				
		% within LSOA t.	34.90%	28.70%	30.4			
	LD	Observed	295	445	740			
		Expected	202.8	537.2				
		% within LSOA t.	24.90%	14.20%	17.1			

Table A42: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Income

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Income score, 2004	MD	Observed	122	754	876	217.0	3	.000***
		Expected	240.1	635.9		0.224		
		% within LSOA t.	10.30%	24.00%	20.2			
	AA	Observed	314	1059	1373			
		Expected	376.3	996.7				
		% within LSOA t.	26.50%	33.70%	31.7			
	BA	Observed	429	937	1366			
		Expected	374.4	991.6				
		% within LSOA t.	36.20%	29.80%	31.6			
	LD	Observed	321	391	712			
		Expected	195.2	516.8				
		% within LSOA t.	27.10%	12.40%	16.5			
Rank of Income score, 2007	MD	Observed	117	712	829	154.1	3	.000***
		Expected	227.2	601.8		0.189		
		% within LSOA t.	9.90%	22.70%	19.2			
	AA	Observed	350	1070	1420			
		Expected	389.2	1030.8				
		% within LSOA t.	29.50%	34.10%	32.8			
	BA	Observed	440	958	1398			
		Expected	383.2	1014.8				
		% within LSOA t.	37.10%	30.50%	32.3			
	LD	Observed	279	401	680			
		Expected	186.4	493.6				
		% within LSOA t.	23.50%	12.80%	15.7			
Rank of Income score, 2010	MD	Observed	112	742	854	184.6	3	.000***
		Expected	234.1	619.9		0.207		
		% within LSOA t.	9.40%	23.60%	19.7			
	AA	Observed	340	1039	1379			
		Expected	378	1001				
		% within LSOA t.	28.70%	33.10%	31.9			
	BA	Observed	432	952	1384			
		Expected	379.3	1004.7				
		% within LSOA t.	36.40%	30.30%	32.0			
	LD	Observed	302	408	710			
		Expected	194.6	515.4				
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	13.00%	16.4			

Table A43: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Employment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Employment score, 2004	MD	Observed	152	904	1056	358.1	3	.000***
		Expected	289.4	766.6		0.288		
		% within LSOA t.	12.80%	28.80%	24.4			
	AA	Observed	324	1162	1486			
		Expected	407.3	1078.7				
		% within LSOA t.	27.30%	37.00%	34.3			
	BA	Observed	405	839	1244			
		Expected	341	903				
		% within LSOA t.	34.10%	26.70%	28.7			
	LD	Observed	305	236	541			
		Expected	148.3	392.7				
		% within LSOA t.	25.70%	7.50%	12.5			
Rank of Employment score, 2007	MD	Observed	144	890	1034	302.2	3	.000***
		Expected	283.4	750.6		0.264		
		% within LSOA t.	12.10%	28.30%	23.9			
	AA	Observed	320	1088	1408			
		Expected	385.9	1022.1				
		% within LSOA t.	27.00%	34.60%	32.5			
	BA	Observed	412	874	1286			
		Expected	352.5	933.5				
		% within LSOA t.	34.70%	27.80%	29.7			
	LD	Observed	310	289	599			
		Expected	164.2	434.8				
		% within LSOA t.	26.10%	9.20%	13.8			
Rank of Employment score, 2010	MD	Observed	153	935	1088	282.4	3	.000***
		Expected	298.2	789.8		0.256		
		% within LSOA t.	12.90%	29.80%	25.1			
	AA	Observed	318	1010	1328			
		Expected	364	964				
		% within LSOA t.	26.80%	32.20%	30.7			
	BA	Observed	405	896	1301			
		Expected	356.6	944.4				
		% within LSOA t.	34.10%	28.50%	30.1			
	LD	Observed	310	300	610			
		Expected	167.2	442.8				
		% within LSOA t.	26.10%	9.60%	14.1			

Table A44: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Health

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Health score, 2004	MD	Observed	100	750	850	628.9	3	.000***
		Expected	233	617		0.381		
		% within LSOA t.	8.40%	23.90%	19.6			
	AA	Observed	225	1121	1346			
		Expected	368.9	977.1				
		% within LSOA t.	19.00%	35.70%	31.3			
	BA	Observed	432	1024	1456			
		Expected	399.1	1056.9				
		% within LSOA t.	36.40%	32.60%	33.6			
	LD	Observed	429	246	675			
		Expected	185	490				
		% within LSOA t.	36.20%	7.80%	15.6			
Rank of Health score, 2007	MD	Observed	104	803	907	545.8	3	.000***
		Expected	248.6	658.4		0.355		
		% within LSOA t.	8.80%	25.60%	21.0			
	AA	Observed	235	1112	1347			
		Expected	369.2	977.8				
		% within LSOA t.	19.80%	35.40%	31.1			
	BA	Observed	446	953	1399			
		Expected	383.5	1015.5				
		% within LSOA t.	37.60%	30.30%	32.3			
	LD	Observed	401	273	674			
		Expected	184.7	489.3				
		% within LSOA t.	33.80%	8.70%	15.6			
Rank of Health score, 2010	MD	Observed	114	872	986	445.3	3	.000***
		Expected	270.3	715.7		0.321		
		% within LSOA t.	9.60%	27.80%	22.8			
	AA	Observed	266	1075	1341			
		Expected	367.6	973.4				
		% within LSOA t.	22.40%	34.20%	31.0			
	BA	Observed	454	919	1373			
		Expected	376.3	996.7				
		% within LSOA t.	38.30%	29.30%	31.7			
	LD	Observed	352	275	627			
		Expected	171.9	455.1				
		% within LSOA t.	29.70%	8.80%	14.5			

Table A45: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Education

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Education score, 2004	MD	Observed	152	707	859	70.1	3	.000***
		Expected	235.4	623.6		0.127		
		% within LSOA t.	12.80%	22.50%	19.9			
	AA	Observed	343	958	1301			
		Expected	356.6	944.4				
		% within LSOA t.	28.90%	30.50%	30.1			
	BA	Observed	387	910	1297			
		Expected	355.5	941.5				
		% within LSOA t.	32.60%	29.00%	30.0			
	LD	Observed	304	566	870			
		Expected	238.5	631.5				
		% within LSOA t.	25.60%	18.00%	20.1			
Rank of Education score, 2007	MD	Observed	170	736	906	66.0	3	.000***
		Expected	248.3	657.7		0.124		
		% within LSOA t.	14.30%	23.40%	20.9			
	AA	Observed	345	1008	1353			
		Expected	370.8	982.2				
		% within LSOA t.	29.10%	32.10%	31.3			
	BA	Observed	383	852	1235			
		Expected	338.5	896.5				
		% within LSOA t.	32.30%	27.10%	28.5			
	LD	Observed	288	545	833			
		Expected	228.3	604.7				
		% within LSOA t.	24.30%	17.40%	19.3			
Rank of Education score, 2010	MD	Observed	191	779	970	44.1	3	.000***
		Expected	265.9	704.1		0.101		
		% within LSOA t.	16.10%	24.80%	22.4			
	AA	Observed	358	958	1316			
		Expected	360.7	955.3				
		% within LSOA t.	30.20%	30.50%	30.4			
	BA	Observed	384	862	1246			
		Expected	341.5	904.5				
		% within LSOA t.	32.40%	27.40%	28.8			
	LD	Observed	253	542	795			
		Expected	217.9	577.1				
		% within LSOA t.	21.30%	17.30%	18.4			

Table A46: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Housing

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Housing score, 2004	MD	Observed	416	821	1237	51.1	3	.000***
		Expected	339.1	897.9		0.109		
		% within LSOA t.	35.10%	26.10%	28.6			
	AA	Observed	251	692	943			
		Expected	258.5	684.5				
		% within LSOA t.	21.20%	22.00%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	276	698	974			
		Expected	267	707				
		% within LSOA t.	23.30%	22.20%	22.5			
	LD	Observed	243	930	1173			
		Expected	321.5	851.5				
		% within LSOA t.	20.50%	29.60%	27.1			
Rank of Housing score, 2007	MD	Observed	414	743	1157	70.8	3	.000***
		Expected	317.1	839.9		0.128		
		% within LSOA t.	34.90%	23.70%	26.7			
	AA	Observed	241	857	1098			
		Expected	301	797				
		% within LSOA t.	20.30%	27.30%	25.4			
	BA	Observed	238	818	1056			
		Expected	289.4	766.6				
		% within LSOA t.	20.10%	26.00%	24.4			
	LD	Observed	293	723	1016			
		Expected	278.5	737.5				
		% within LSOA t.	24.70%	23.00%	23.5			
Rank of Housing score, 2010	MD	Observed	423	748	1171	75.8	3	.000***
		Expected	321	850		0.132		
		% within LSOA t.	35.70%	23.80%	27.1			
	AA	Observed	220	866	1086			
		Expected	297.7	788.3				
		% within LSOA t.	18.50%	27.60%	25.1			
	BA	Observed	281	842	1123			
		Expected	307.8	815.2				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	26.80%	26.0			
	LD	Observed	262	685	947			
		Expected	259.6	687.4				
		% within LSOA t.	22.10%	21.80%	21.9			

Table A47: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Crime

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Crime score, 2004	MD	Observed	73	419	492	300.6	3	.000***
		Expected	134.9	357.1		0.264		
		% within LSOA t.	6.20%	13.30%	11.4			
	AA	Observed	108	713	821			
		Expected	225	596				
		% within LSOA t.	9.10%	22.70%	19.0			
	BA	Observed	281	965	1246			
		Expected	341.5	904.5				
		% within LSOA t.	23.70%	30.70%	28.8			
	LD	Observed	724	1044	1768			
		Expected	484.6	1283.4				
		% within LSOA t.	61.00%	33.20%	40.9			
Rank of Crime score, 2007	MD	Observed	63	508	571	325.6	3	.000***
		Expected	156.5	414.5		0.274		
		% within LSOA t.	5.30%	16.20%	13.2			
	AA	Observed	144	766	910			
		Expected	249.4	660.6				
		% within LSOA t.	12.10%	24.40%	21.0			
	BA	Observed	273	889	1162			
		Expected	318.5	843.5				
		% within LSOA t.	23.00%	28.30%	26.9			
	LD	Observed	706	978	1684			
		Expected	461.6	1222.4				
		% within LSOA t.	59.50%	31.10%	38.9			
Rank of Crime score, 2010	MD	Observed	66	451	517	204.1	3	.000***
		Expected	141.7	375.3		0.217		
		% within LSOA t.	5.60%	14.40%	11.9			
	AA	Observed	139	666	805			
		Expected	220.6	584.4				
		% within LSOA t.	11.70%	21.20%	18.6			
	BA	Observed	284	881	1165			
		Expected	319.3	845.7				
		% within LSOA t.	23.90%	28.00%	26.9			
	LD	Observed	697	1143	1840			
		Expected	504.3	1335.7				
		% within LSOA t.	58.80%	36.40%	42.5			

Table A48: Seaside (+R) v Seaside (-R) – Living environment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Seaside (-R) n = 1,186 27.4 %	Seaside (+R) n = 3,141 72.6%	Total 4,327	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Living Environment score, 2004	MD	Observed	143	855	998	124.3	3	.000***
		Expected	273.5	724.5		0.170		
		% within LSOA t.	12.10%	27.20%	23.1			
	AA	Observed	348	812	1160			
		Expected	317.9	842.1				
		% within LSOA t.	29.30%	25.90%	26.8			
	BA	Observed	303	751	1054			
		Expected	288.9	765.1				
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	23.90%	24.4			
	LD	Observed	392	723	1115			
		Expected	305.6	809.4				
		% within LSOA t.	33.10%	23.00%	25.8			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2007	MD	Observed	255	951	1206	54.8	3	.000***
		Expected	330.6	875.4		0.113		
		% within LSOA t.	21.50%	30.30%	27.9			
	AA	Observed	303	861	1164			
		Expected	319	845				
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	27.40%	26.9			
	BA	Observed	302	728	1030			
		Expected	282.3	747.7				
		% within LSOA t.	25.50%	23.20%	23.8			
	LD	Observed	326	601	927			
		Expected	254.1	672.9				
		% within LSOA t.	27.50%	19.10%	21.4			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2010	MD	Observed	265	979	1244	41.7	3	.000***
		Expected	341	903		0.098		
		% within LSOA t.	22.30%	31.20%	28.7			
	AA	Observed	311	796	1107			
		Expected	303.4	803.6				
		% within LSOA t.	26.20%	25.30%	25.6			
	BA	Observed	292	734	1026			
		Expected	281.2	744.8				
		% within LSOA t.	24.60%	23.40%	23.7			
	LD	Observed	318	632	950			
		Expected	260.4	689.6				
		% within LSOA t.	26.80%	20.10%	22.0			

Table A49: District type LSOAs by National LSOA Index of Multiple Deprivation deciles

Index of M.D. decile	Inland	Coastal	Seaside	Seaside (-R)	Seaside (+R)
1	10.3	9.7	8.2	3.3	10
2	10.4	11.1	7.3	3.5	8.8
3	9.9	10.9	10.3	5.6	12.1
4	9.5	11.5	12.4	11.7	12.6
5	9.2	11	14.3	16.1	13.6
6	9.5	9	13.2	15	12.5
7	9.7	10.9	11.6	12.6	11.2
8	10	9.3	10.1	12.6	9.2
9	10.4	9.3	7.7	9.9	6.9
10	11.1	7.4	4.8	9.6	3

Table A50: Number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England by 'seaside with resort' district on IMD, 2010

District	Region	All LSOAs in district	LSOAs in the most deprived 10%	LSOAs in the most deprived 20%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 10%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 20%
Blackpool	NW	94	35	11	37.2	11.7
Hastings	SE	53	15	9	28.3	17.0
Wirral	NW	207	48	17	23.2	8.2
Great Yarmouth	E	61	13	3	21.3	4.9
Sefton	NW	190	35	12	18.4	6.3
Thanet	SE	84	14	11	16.7	13.1
Torbay	SW	89	12	4	13.5	4.5
Brighton and Hove	SE	164	19	18	11.6	11.0
Portsmouth	SE	123	14	14	11.4	11.4
Scarborough	Y&H	71	8	6	11.3	8.5
Lancaster	NW	89	10	8	11.2	9.0
South Tyneside	NE	103	11	31	10.7	30.1
Weymouth & Portland	SW	39	4	6	10.3	15.4
Bournemouth	SW	107	10	7	9.3	6.5
East Lindsey	EM	80	7	10	8.8	12.5
Wyre	NW	69	6	4	8.7	5.8
Eastbourne	SE	59	5	5	8.5	8.5
Southend-on-sea	E	107	9	14	8.4	13.1
Tendring	E	90	7	8	7.8	8.9
North Somerset	SW	124	9	4	7.3	3.2
Waveney	E	73	5	7	6.8	9.6
Shepway	SE	65	4	7	6.2	10.8
Penwith	SW	38	2	5	5.3	13.2
North Devon	SW	58	2	4	3.4	6.9
Rother	SE	58	2	3	3.4	5.2
Arun	SE	94	3	5	3.2	5.3
Sedgemoor	SE	68	2	4	2.9	5.9
Carrick	SW	58	1	5	1.7	8.6
Restormel	SW	64	1	4	1.6	6.3
Dover	SE	67	1	10	1.5	14.9
Canterbury	SE	90	0	8	0	8.9
Isle of Wight	SE	89	0	5	0	5.6
West Somerset	SW	23	0	1	0	4.3
Fylde	NW	51	0	2	0	3.9
Teignbridge	SW	84	0	3	0	3.6
Christchurch	SW	30	0	1	0	3.3
East Devon	SW	82	0	1	0	1.2
Berwick-upon-Tweed	NE	17	0	0	0	0
Purbeck	SW	29	0	0	0	0
Seaside districts (+R)		3,141	314	277	10	8.8

Table A51: Number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England by 'seaside with resort' district on IMD, 2007

District	All LSOAs in district	LSOAs in the most deprived 10%	LSOAs in the most deprived 20%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 10%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 20%
Blackpool	94	30	11	31.9	11.7
Hastings	53	14	7	26.4	13.2
Wirral	207	50	18	24.2	8.7
Great Yarmouth	61	12	5	19.7	8.2
Sefton	190	34	15	17.9	7.9
South Tyneside	103	15	33	14.6	32.0
Thanet	84	12	12	14.3	14.3
Torbay	89	10	4	11.2	4.5
Lancaster	89	9	8	10.1	9.0
Scarborough	71	7	6	9.9	8.5
Portsmouth	123	12	12	9.8	9.8
Brighton and Hove	164	15	20	9.1	12.2
Bournemouth	107	9	8	8.4	7.5
East Lindsey	80	6	9	7.5	11.3
Southend-on-sea	107	8	11	7.5	10.3
Wyre	69	5	5	7.2	7.2
Waveney	73	5	6	6.8	8.2
North Somerset	124	7	6	5.6	4.8
Penwith	38	2	9	5.3	23.7
Weymouth and Portland	39	2	6	5.1	15.4
Shepway	65	3	6	4.6	9.2
Tendring	90	4	8	4.4	8.9
North Devon	58	2	3	3.4	5.2
Carrick	58	1	4	1.7	6.9
Eastbourne	59	1	7	1.7	11.9
Restormel	64	1	5	1.6	7.8
Dover	67	1	5	1.5	7.5
Sedgemoor	68	1	4	1.5	5.9
Arun	94	0	7	0	7.4
Isle of Wight	89	0	6	0	6.7
Christchurch	30	0	2	0	6.7
Rother	58	0	3	0	5.2
West Somerset	23	0	1	0	4.3
Canterbury	90	0	3	0	3.3
Teignbridge	84	0	2	0	2.4
Fylde	51	0	1	0	2.0
Berwick-upon-Tweed	17	0	0	0	0
East Devon	82	0	0	0	0
Purbeck	29	0	0	0	0
Seaside districts	3141	278	278	8.9	8.9

Table A52: Number of LSOAs in the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England by 'seaside with resort' district on IMD, 2004

District	All LSOAs in district	LSOAs in the most deprived 10%	LSOAs in the most deprived 20%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 10%	% of LSOAs falling in the most deprived 20%
Blackpool	94	25	13	26.6	13.8
Wirral	207	52	23	25.1	11.1
Hastings	53	12	8	22.6	15.1
Sefton	190	37	13	19.5	6.8
South Tyneside	103	20	34	19.4	33.0
Great Yarmouth	61	11	5	18.0	8.2
Thanet	84	10	10	11.9	11.9
Portsmouth	123	13	14	10.6	11.4
Scarborough	71	7	8	9.9	11.3
Lancaster	89	8	11	9.0	12.4
Brighton and Hove	164	14	21	8.5	12.8
Waveney	73	5	6	6.8	8.2
East Lindsey	80	5	10	6.3	12.5
Bournemouth	107	6	13	5.6	12.1
Penwith	38	2	6	5.3	15.8
Southend-on-sea	107	5	13	4.7	12.1
Shepway	65	3	4	4.6	6.2
Torbay	89	4	8	4.5	9.0
Tendring	90	4	8	4.4	8.9
Wyre	69	3	8	4.3	11.6
North Somerset	124	5	7	4.0	5.6
North Devon	58	2	4	3.4	6.9
Restormel	64	2	5	3.1	7.8
Weymouth and Portland	39	1	6	2.6	15.4
Eastbourne	59	1	5	1.7	8.5
Dover	67	1	3	1.5	4.5
Sedgemoor	68	1	4	1.5	5.9
Carrick	58	0	4	0	6.9
Isle of Wight	89	0	6	0	6.7
Arun	94	0	6	0	6.4
Canterbury	90	0	5	0	5.6
Teignbridge	84	0	3	0	3.6
Fylde	51	0	1	0	2.0
Rother	58	0	1	0	1.7
Berwick-upon-Tweed	17	0	0	0	0
Christchurch	30	0	0	0	0
East Devon	82	0	0	0	0
Purbeck	29	0	0	0	0
West Somerset	23	0	0	0	0
Seaside districts	3141	259	296	8.2	9.4

Table A53: Resort v Other – Overall Index of M.D.

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			χ^2, **Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Rank of IMD score, 2004	MD	Observed	480	258	738	87.3	3	.000***
		Expected	396.1	341.9		.167		
		% within LSOA t.	28.5%	17.7%	23.5			
	AA	Observed	609	457	1066			
		Expected	572.2	493.8				
		% within LSOA t.	36.1%	31.4%	33.9			
	BA	Observed	417	524	941			
		Expected	505.1	435.9				
		% within LSOA t.	24.7%	36.0%	30.0			
	LD	Observed	180	216	396			
		Expected	212.6	183.4				
		% within LSOA t.	10.7%	14.8%	12.6			
Rank of IMD score, 2007	MD	Observed	493	257	750	85.5	3	.000***
		Expected	402.6	347.4		.165		
		% within LSOA t.	29.2%	17.7%	23.9			
	AA	Observed	605	480	1085			
		Expected	582.4	502.6				
		% within LSOA t.	35.9%	33.0%	34.5			
	BA	Observed	406	483	889			
		Expected	477.2	411.8				
		% within LSOA t.	24.1%	33.2%	28.3			
	LD	Observed	182	235	417			
		Expected	223.8	193.2				
		% within LSOA t.	10.8%	16.2%	13.3			
Rank of IMD score, 2010	MD	Observed	519	250	769	100.9	3	.000***
		Expected	412.8	356.2		.179		
		% within LSOA t.	30.8%	17.2%	24.5			
	AA	Observed	561	463	1024			
		Expected	549.7	474.3				
		% within LSOA t.	33.3%	31.8%	32.6			
	BA	Observed	410	493	903			
		Expected	484.7	418.3				
		% within LSOA t.	24.3%	33.9%	28.7			
	LD	Observed	196	249	445			
		Expected	238.9	206.1				
		% within LSOA t.	11.6%	17.1%	14.2			

Table A54: Resort v Other – Income

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Income score, 2004	MD	Observed	493	261	754	125.6	3	.000***
		Expected	404.7	349.3		.200		
		% within LSOA t.	29.2%	17.9%	24.0			
	AA	Observed	630	429	1059			
		Expected	568.4	490.6				
		% within LSOA t.	37.4%	29.5%	33.7			
	BA	Observed	437	570	1007			
		Expected	540.5	466.5				
		% within LSOA t.	25.9%	39.2%	32.1			
	LD	Observed	126	195	321			
		Expected	172.3	148.7				
		% within LSOA t.	7.5%	13.4%	10.2			
Rank of Income score, 2007	MD	Observed	460	252	712	117.6	3	.000***
		Expected	382.2	329.8		.193		
		% within LSOA t.	27.3%	17.3%	22.7			
	AA	Observed	641	429	1070			
		Expected	574.3	495.7				
		% within LSOA t.	38.0%	29.5%	34.1			
	BA	Observed	431	527	958			
		Expected	514.2	443.8				
		% within LSOA t.	25.6%	36.2%	30.5			
	LD	Observed	154	247	401			
		Expected	215.2	185.8				
		% within LSOA t.	9.1%	17.0%	12.8			
Rank of Income score, 2010	MD	Observed	481	261	742	130.4	3	.000***
		Expected	398.3	343.7		.204		
		% within LSOA t.	28.5%	17.9%	23.6			
	AA	Observed	627	412	1039			
		Expected	557.7	481.3				
		% within LSOA t.	37.2%	28.3%	33.1			
	BA	Observed	426	526	952			
		Expected	511.0	441.0				
		% within LSOA t.	25.3%	36.2%	30.3			
	LD	Observed	152	256	408			
		Expected	219.0	189.0				
		% within LSOA t.	9.0%	17.6%	13.0			

Table A55: Resort v Other – Employment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Employment score, 2004	MD	Observed	590	314	904	113.9	3	.000***
		Expected	485.2	418.8		.190		
		% within LSOA t.	35.0%	21.6%	28.8			
	AA	Observed	646	516	1162			
		Expected	623.7	538.3				
		% within LSOA t.	38.3%	35.5%	37.0			
	BA	Observed	363	476	839			
		Expected	450.4	388.6				
		% within LSOA t.	21.5%	32.7%	26.7			
	LD	Observed	87	149	236			
		Expected	126.7	109.3				
		% within LSOA t.	5.2%	10.2%	7.5			
Rank of Employment score, 2007	MD	Observed	590	300	890	139.7	3	.000***
		Expected	477.7	412.3		.211		
		% within LSOA t.	35.0%	20.6%	28.3			
	AA	Observed	612	476	1088			
		Expected	584.0	504.0				
		% within LSOA t.	36.3%	32.7%	34.6			
	BA	Observed	389	485	874			
		Expected	469.1	404.9				
		% within LSOA t.	23.1%	33.3%	27.8			
	LD	Observed	95	194	289			
		Expected	155.1	133.9				
		% within LSOA t.	5.6%	13.3%	9.2			
Rank of Employment score, 2010	MD	Observed	624	311	935	146.8	3	.000***
		Expected	501.9	433.1		.216		
		% within LSOA t.	37.0%	21.4%	29.8			
	AA	Observed	563	447	1010			
		Expected	542.1	467.9				
		% within LSOA t.	33.4%	30.7%	32.2			
	BA	Observed	400	496	896			
		Expected	480.9	415.1				
		% within LSOA t.	23.7%	34.1%	28.5			
	LD	Observed	99	201	300			
		Expected	161.0	139.0				
		% within LSOA t.	5.9%	13.8%	9.6			

Table A56: Resort v Other – Health

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Health and Disability score, 2004	MD	Observed	489	261	750	156.3 .223	3	.000***
		Expected	402.6	347.4				
		% within LSOA t.	29.0%	17.9%	23.9			
	AA	Observed	669	452	1121			
		Expected	601.7	519.3				
		% within LSOA t.	39.7%	31.1%	35.7			
	BA	Observed	461	563	1024			
		Expected	549.7	474.3				
		% within LSOA t.	27.3%	38.7%	32.6			
	LD	Observed	67	179	246			
		Expected	132.0	114.0				
		% within LSOA t.	4.0%	12.3%	7.8			
Rank of Health and Disability score, 2007	MD	Observed	539	264	803	201.9 .254	3	.000***
		Expected	431.0	372.0				
		% within LSOA t.	32.0%	18.1%	25.6			
	AA	Observed	667	445	1112			
		Expected	596.9	515.1				
		% within LSOA t.	39.6%	30.6%	35.4			
	BA	Observed	407	546	953			
		Expected	511.5	441.5				
		% within LSOA t.	24.1%	37.5%	30.3			
	LD	Observed	73	200	273			
		Expected	146.5	126.5				
		% within LSOA t.	4.3%	13.7%	8.7			
Rank of Health and Disability score, 2010	MD	Observed	602	270	872	235.7 .274	3	.000***
		Expected	468.1	403.9				
		% within LSOA t.	35.7%	18.6%	27.8			
	AA	Observed	635	440	1075			
		Expected	577.0	498.0				
		% within LSOA t.	37.7%	30.2%	34.2			
	BA	Observed	375	544	919			
		Expected	493.3	425.7				
		% within LSOA t.	22.2%	37.4%	29.3			
	LD	Observed	74	201	275			
		Expected	147.8	127.4				
		% within LSOA t.	4.4%	13.8%	8.8			

Table A57: Resort v Other – Education

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Education, Skills and Training score, 2004	MD	Observed	428	279	707	25.5	3	.000***
		Expected	379.5	327.5		.090		
		% within LSOA t.	25.4%	19.2%	22.5			
	AA	Observed	527	431	958			
		Expected	514.2	443.6				
		% within LSOA t.	31.3%	29.6%	30.5			
	BA	Observed	461	449	910			
		Expected	488.5	421.5				
		% within LSOA t.	27.3%	30.9%	29.0			
	LD	Observed	270	296	566			
		Expected	303.8	262.2				
		% within LSOA t.	16.0%	20.3%	18.0			
Rank of Education, Skills and Training score, 2007	MD	Observed	439	297	736	21.7	3	.000***
		Expected	395.1	340.9		.083		
		% within LSOA t.	26.0%	20.4%	23.4			
	AA	Observed	555	453	1008			
		Expected	541.1	466.9				
		% within LSOA t.	32.9%	31.1%	32.1			
	BA	Observed	430	422	852			
		Expected	457.3	394.7				
		% within LSOA t.	25.5%	29.0%	27.1			
	LD	Observed	262	283	545			
		Expected	292.5	252.5				
		% within LSOA t.	15.5%	19.5%	17.4			
Rank of Education, Skills and Training score, 2010	MD	Observed	474	305	779	30.9	3	.000***
		Expected	418.1	360.9		.099		
		% within LSOA t.	28.1%	21.0%	24.8			
	AA	Observed	525	433	958			
		Expected	514.2	443.8				
		% within LSOA t.	31.1%	29.8%	30.5			
	BA	Observed	410	452	862			
		Expected	462.7	399.3				
		% within LSOA t.	24.3%	31.1%	27.4			
	LD	Observed	277	265	542			
		Expected	290.9	251.1				
		% within LSOA t.	16.4%	18.2%	17.3			

Table A58: Resort v Other – Housing

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Barriers to Housing and Services score, 2004	MD	Observed	366	455	821	42.4 .116	3	.000***
		Expected	440.7	380.3				
		% within LSOA t.	21.7%	31.3%	26.1			
	AA	Observed	368	324	692			
		Expected	371.4	320.6				
		% within LSOA t.	21.8%	22.3%	22.0			
	BA	Observed	409	289	698			
		Expected	374.7	323.3				
		% within LSOA t.	24.3%	19.9%	22.2			
	LD	Observed	543	387	930			
		Expected	499.2	430.8				
		% within LSOA t.	32.2%	26.6%	29.6			
Rank of Barriers to Housing and Services score, 2007	MD	Observed	283	460	743	107.8 .185	3	.000***
		Expected	398.8	344.2				
		% within LSOA t.	16.8%	31.6%	23.7			
	AA	Observed	523	334	857			
		Expected	460.0	397.0				
		% within LSOA t.	31.0%	23.0%	27.3			
	BA	Observed	497	321	818			
		Expected	439.1	378.9				
		% within LSOA t.	29.5%	22.1%	26.0			
	LD	Observed	383	340	723			
		Expected	388.1	334.9				
		% within LSOA t.	22.7%	23.4%	23.0			
Rank of Barriers to Housing and Services score, 2010	MD	Observed	304	444	748	93.9 .173	3	.000***
		Expected	401.5	346.5				
		% within LSOA t.	18.0%	30.5%	23.8			
	AA	Observed	512	354	866			
		Expected	464.8	401.2				
		% within LSOA t.	30.4%	24.3%	27.6			
	BA	Observed	529	313	842			
		Expected	452.0	390.0				
		% within LSOA t.	31.4%	21.5%	26.8			
	LD	Observed	341	344	685			
		Expected	367.7	317.3				
		% within LSOA t.	20.2%	23.6%	21.8			

Table A59: Resort v Other – Crime

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**$\chi 2$, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Crime score, 2004	MD	Observed	288	131	419	187.7	3	.000***
		Expected	224.9	194.1		.244		
		% within LSOA t.	17.1%	9.0%	13.3			
	AA	Observed	476	237	713			
		Expected	382.7	330.3				
		% within LSOA t.	28.2%	16.3%	22.7			
	BA	Observed	523	442	965			
		Expected	518.0	447.0				
		% within LSOA t.	31.0%	30.4%	30.7			
	LD	Observed	399	645	1044			
		Expected	560.4	483.6				
		% within LSOA t.	23.7%	44.3%	33.2			
Rank of Crime score, 2007	MD	Observed	350	158	508	240.6	3	.000***
		Expected	272.7	235.3		.277		
		% within LSOA t.	20.8%	10.9%	16.2			
	AA	Observed	511	255	766			
		Expected	411.2	354.8				
		% within LSOA t.	30.3%	17.5%	24.4			
	BA	Observed	485	404	889			
		Expected	477.2	411.8				
		% within LSOA t.	28.8%	27.8%	28.3			
	LD	Observed	340	638	978			
		Expected	525.0	453.0				
		% within LSOA t.	20.2%	43.8%	31.1			
Rank of Crime score, 2010	MD	Observed	337	114	451	278.6	3	.000***
		Expected	242.1	208.9		.298		
		% within LSOA t.	20.0%	7.8%	14.4			
	AA	Observed	442	224	666			
		Expected	357.5	308.5				
		% within LSOA t.	26.2%	15.4%	21.2			
	BA	Observed	501	380	881			
		Expected	472.9	408.1				
		% within LSOA t.	29.7%	26.1%	28.0			
	LD	Observed	406	737	1143			
		Expected	613.5	529.5				
		% within LSOA t.	24.1%	50.7%	36.4			

Table A60: Resort v Other – Environment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Resort n = 1686, 54%	Other n = 1455, 46%	Total 3,141	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*P*
Rank of Living Environment score, 2004	MD	Observed	536	319	855	43.0	3	.000***
		Expected	458.9	396.1		.117		
		% within LSOA t.	31.8%	21.9%	27.2			
	AA	Observed	433	379	812			
		Expected	435.9	376.1				
		% within LSOA t.	25.7%	26.0%	25.9			
	BA	Observed	366	385	751			
		Expected	403.1	347.9				
		% within LSOA t.	21.7%	26.5%	23.9			
	LD	Observed	351	372	723			
		Expected	388.1	334.9				
		% within LSOA t.	20.8%	25.6%	23.0			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2007	MD	Observed	575	376	951	33.1	3	.000***
		Expected	510.5	440.5		.103		
		% within LSOA t.	34.1%	25.8%	30.3			
	AA	Observed	465	396	861			
		Expected	462.2	398.8				
		% within LSOA t.	27.6%	27.2%	27.4			
	BA	Observed	366	362	728			
		Expected	390.8	337.2				
		% within LSOA t.	21.7%	24.9%	23.2			
	LD	Observed	280	321	601			
		Expected	322.6	278.4				
		% within LSOA t.	16.6%	22.1%	19.1			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2010	MD	Observed	586	393	979	29.0	3	.000***
		Expected	525.5	453.5		.096		
		% within LSOA t.	34.8%	27.0%	31.2			
	AA	Observed	435	361	796			
		Expected	427.3	368.7				
		% within LSOA t.	25.8%	24.8%	25.3			
	BA	Observed	359	375	734			
		Expected	394.0	340.0				
		% within LSOA t.	21.3%	25.8%	23.4			
	LD	Observed	308	326	632			
		Expected	339.2	292.8				
		% within LSOA t.	18.1%	22.4%	20.1			

Table A61: Comparing ID 2004 to ID 2010: 'resort' LSOAs in national quartiles

a) Income

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	434	47			481
AA	59	500	68		627
BA		83	315	28	426
LD			54	98	152
	493	630	437	126	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	143	8.50%
getting better	196	11.60%
similar (same quartile)	1347	79.90%
	1686	

b) Living Environment

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	482	103		1	586
AA	54	283	95	3	435
BA		47	224	88	359
LD			47	259	306
	536	433	366	351	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	290	17.20%
getting better	148	8.80%
similar (same quartile)	1248	74.00%
	1686	

c) Employment

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	532	90	2		624
AA	56	444	63		563
BA	2	110	264	24	400
LD		2	34	63	99
	590	646	363	87	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	179	10.60%
getting better	204	12.10%
similar (same quartile)	1303	77.30%
	1686	

d) Barriers to Housing and Services

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	193	42	34	35	304
AA	161	185	113	53	512
BA	12	130	223	164	529
LD		11	39	291	341
	366	368	409	543	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	441	26.20%
getting better	353	20.90%
similar (same quartile)	892	52.90%
	1686	

e) Health and disability

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	430	170	2		602
AA	58	418	156	3	635
BA	1	79	268	27	375
LD		2	35	37	74
	489	669	461	67	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	358	21.20%
getting better	175	10.40%
similar (same quartile)	1153	68.40%
	1686	

f) Education, skills and training

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	386	84	4		474
AA	42	390	90	3	525
BA		52	317	41	410
LD		1	50	226	277
	428	527	461	270	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	222	13.20%
getting better	145	8.60%
similar (same quartile)	1319	78.20%
	1686	

g) Crime

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	201	124	12		337
AA	75	212	137	18	442
BA	11	121	259	110	501
LD	1	19	115	271	406
	288	476	523	399	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	401	23.80%
getting better	342	20.30%
similar (same quartile)	943	55.90%
	1686	

h) Index of Multiple Deprivation

	ID2004				
ID2010	MD	AA	BA	LD	
MD	448	71			519
AA	32	478	51		561
BA		60	311	39	410
LD			55	141	196
	480	609	417	180	1686

Number of LSOAs that are:		
getting worse	161	9.50%
getting better	147	8.70%
similar (same quartile)	1378	81.70%
	1686	

Table A62: Resort LSOAs by deprivation decile – 2004, 2007, and 2010

	% of resort LSOAs (2004)	% of resort LSOAs (2007)	% of resort LSOAs (2010)
10% - (most deprived 10% in England)	8.8	10.1	12.3
20%	12.7	11.7	11.4
30%	14.8	15.2	14.8
40%	15.4	14.4	13.8
50%	12.9	13.7	11.9
60%	11.6	11	11.1
70%	9	9.5	9
80%	8.4	7.4	7.8
90%	4.7	5.3	6
100% (least deprived 10% in England)	1.7	1.5	2.1

Figure A1: IMD / Income deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) *r* = 0.96



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Figure A2: IMD / Employment deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) *r* = 0.95



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Figure A3: IMD / Health deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) $r = 0.88$



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Figure A4: IMD / Education deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) $r = 0.78$



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Figure A5: IMD / Crime deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) *r* = 0.74



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Figure A6: IMD / Living environment deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) *r* = 0.63



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Figure A7: IMD / Housing and services deprivation relationship (resort LSOAs) *r* = 0.24



1 = Most deprived – 1686 = Least deprived

Table A63: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Overall Index of M.D.

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Rank of IMD score, 2004	MD	Observed	384	96	480	23.2	3	.000***
		Expected	351.6	128.4		.118		
		% within LSOA t.	31.1%	21.3%	28.5			
	AA	Observed	450	159	609			
		Expected	446.1	162.9				
		% within LSOA t.	36.4%	35.3%	36.1			
	BA	Observed	257	119	376			
		Expected	275.4	100.6				
		% within LSOA t.	20.8%	26.4%	22.3			
	LD	Observed	144	77	221			
		Expected	161.9	59.1				
		% within LSOA t.	11.7%	17.1%	13.1			
Rank of IMD score, 2007	MD	Observed	398	95	493	25.0	3	.000***
		Expected	361.1	131.9		.122		
		% within LSOA t.	32.2%	21.1%	29.2			
	AA	Observed	441	164	605			
		Expected	443.2	161.8				
		% within LSOA t.	35.7%	36.4%	35.9			
	BA	Observed	277	129	406			
		Expected	297.4	108.6				
		% within LSOA t.	22.4%	28.6%	24.1			
	LD	Observed	119	63	182			
		Expected	133.3	48.7				
		% within LSOA t.	9.6%	14.0%	10.8			
Rank of IMD score, 2010	MD	Observed	417	102	519	24.2	3	.000***
		Expected	380.2	138.8		.120		
		% within LSOA t.	33.8%	22.6%	30.8			
	AA	Observed	410	151	561			
		Expected	410.9	150.1				
		% within LSOA t.	33.2%	33.5%	33.3			
	BA	Observed	277	133	410			
		Expected	300.3	109.7				
		% within LSOA t.	22.4%	29.5%	24.3			
	LD	Observed	131	65	196			
		Expected	143.6	52.4				
		% within LSOA t.	10.6%	14.4%	11.6			

Table A64: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Income

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Income score, 2004	MD	Observed	387	107	494	10.9	3	.012**
		Expected	361.9	132.1		.081		
		% within LSOA t.	31.3%	23.7%	29.3			
	AA	Observed	456	173	629			
		Expected	460.7	168.3				
		% within LSOA t.	36.9%	38.4%	37.3			
	BA	Observed	278	126	404			
		Expected	295.9	108.1				
		% within LSOA t.	22.5%	27.9%	24.0			
	LD	Observed	114	45	159			
		Expected	116.5	42.5				
		% within LSOA t.	9.2%	10.0%	9.4			
Rank of Income score, 2007	MD	Observed	370	90	460	20.5	3	.000***
		Expected	337.0	123.0		.110		
		% within LSOA t.	30.0%	20.0%	27.3			
	AA	Observed	466	175	641			
		Expected	469.5	171.5				
		% within LSOA t.	37.7%	38.8%	38.0			
	BA	Observed	290	141	431			
		Expected	315.7	115.3				
		% within LSOA t.	23.5%	31.3%	25.6			
	LD	Observed	109	45	154			
		Expected	112.8	41.2				
		% within LSOA t.	8.8%	10.0%	9.1			
Rank of Income score, 2010	MD	Observed	387	94	481	27.4	3	.000***
		Expected	352.3	481.0		.128		
		% within LSOA t.	31.3%	28.5%	28.5			
	AA	Observed	460	167	627			
		Expected	459.3	167.7				
		% within LSOA t.	37.2%	37.0%	37.2			
	BA	Observed	277	149	426			
		Expected	312.0	114.0				
		% within LSOA t.	22.4%	33.0%	25.3			
	LD	Observed	111	41	152			
		Expected	111.3	40.7				
		% within LSOA t.	9.0%	9.1%	9.0			

Table A65: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Employment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Rank of Employment score, 2004	MD	Observed	453	137	590	7.0	3	.072
		Expected	432.2	157.8		n/a		
		% within LSOA t.	36.7%	30.4%	35.0			
	AA	Observed	453	193	646			
		Expected	473.2	172.8				
		% within LSOA t.	36.7%	42.8%	38.3			
	BA	Observed	266	97	363			
		Expected	265.9	97.1				
		% within LSOA t.	21.5%	21.5%	21.5			
	LD	Observed	63	24	87			
		Expected	63.7	23.3				
		% within LSOA t.	5.1%	5.3%	5.2			
Rank of Employment score, 2007	MD	Observed	452	138	590	6.5	3	.090
		Expected	432.2	157.8		n/a		
		% within LSOA t.	36.6%	30.6%	35.0			
	AA	Observed	444	168	612			
		Expected	448.3	163.7				
		% within LSOA t.	36.0%	37.3%	36.3			
	BA	Observed	270	119	389			
		Expected	284.9	104.1				
		% within LSOA t.	21.9%	26.4%	23.1			
	LD	Observed	69	26	95			
		Expected	69.6	25.4				
		% within LSOA t.	5.6%	5.8%	5.6			
Rank of Employment score, 2010	MD	Observed	484	140	624	11.8	3	.008**
		Expected	457.1	166.9		.084		
		% within LSOA t.	39.2%	31.0%	37.0			
	AA	Observed	408	155	563			
		Expected	412.4	150.6				
		% within LSOA t.	33.0%	34.4%	33.4			
	BA	Observed	272	128	400			
		Expected	293.0	107.0				
		% within LSOA t.	22.0%	28.4%	23.7			
	LD	Observed	71	28	99			
		Expected	72.5	26.5				
		% within LSOA t.	5.7%	6.2%	5.9			

Table A66: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Health

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Health and disability score, 2004	MD	Observed	397	92	489	26.5 .125	3	.000***
		Expected	358.2	130.8				
		% within LSOA t.	32.1%	20.4%	29.0			
	AA	Observed	481	188	669			
		Expected	490.0	179.0				
		% within LSOA t.	38.9%	41.7%	39.7			
	BA	Observed	316	145	461			
		Expected	337.7	123.3				
		% within LSOA t.	25.6%	32.2%	27.3			
	LD	Observed	41	26	67			
		Expected	49.1	17.9				
		% within LSOA t.	3.3%	5.8%	4.0			
Rank of Health and disability score, 2007	MD	Observed	439	100	539	36.3 .147	3	.000***
		Expected	394.8	144.2				
		% within LSOA t.	35.5%	22.2%	32.0			
	AA	Observed	483	184	667			
		Expected	488.6	178.4				
		% within LSOA t.	39.1%	40.8%	39.6			
	BA	Observed	270	137	407			
		Expected	298.1	108.9				
		% within LSOA t.	21.9%	30.4%	24.1			
	LD	Observed	43	30	73			
		Expected	53.5	19.5				
		% within LSOA t.	3.5%	6.7%	4.3			
Rank of Health and disability score, 2010	MD	Observed	491	111	602	49.5 .171	3	.000***
		Expected	441.0	161.0				
		% within LSOA t.	39.8%	24.6%	35.7			
	AA	Observed	465	170	635			
		Expected	465.1	169.9				
		% within LSOA t.	37.7%	37.7%	37.7			
	BA	Observed	233	375	375			
		Expected	274.7	375.0				
		% within LSOA t.	18.9%	22.2%	22.2			
	LD	Observed	46	74	74			
		Expected	54.2	74.0				
		% within LSOA t.	3.7%	4.4%	4.4			

Table A67: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Education

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Education, Skills and Training score, 2004	MD	Observed	341	87	428	15.1	3	.002**
		Expected	313.5	114.5		.095		
		% within LSOA t.	27.6%	19.3%	25.4			
	AA	Observed	367	160	527			
		Expected	386.0	141.0				
		% within LSOA t.	29.7%	35.5%	31.3			
	BA	Observed	324	137	461			
		Expected	337.7	123.3				
		% within LSOA t.	26.2%	30.4%	27.3			
	LD	Observed	203	67	270			
		Expected	197.8	72.2				
		% within LSOA t.	16.4%	14.9%	16.0			
Rank of Education, Skills and Training score, 2007	MD	Observed	344	95	439	14.9	3	.002**
		Expected	32.6	117.4		.094		
		% within LSOA t.	27.9%	21.1%	26.0			
	AA	Observed	397	158	555			
		Expected	406.5	148.5				
		% within LSOA t.	32.1%	35.0%	32.9			
	BA	Observed	292	138	430			
		Expected	315.0	115.0				
		% within LSOA t.	23.6%	30.6%	25.5			
	LD	Observed	202	60	262			
		Expected	191.9	70.1				
		% within LSOA t.	16.4%	13.3%	15.5			
Rank of Education, Skills and Training score, 2010	MD	Observed	375	99	474	18.9	3	.000***
		Expected	347.2	126.8		.106		
		% within LSOA t.	30.4%	22.0%	28.1			
	AA	Observed	361	164	525			
		Expected	384.6	140.4				
		% within LSOA t.	29.2%	36.4%	31.1			
	BA	Observed	285	125	410			
		Expected	300.3	109.7				
		% within LSOA t.	23.1%	27.7%	24.3			
	LD	Observed	214	63	277			
		Expected	202.9	74.1				
		% within LSOA t.	17.3%	14.0%	16.4			

Table A68: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Housing

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	χ^2 C.V	*df*	*p*
Rank of Barriers to Housing and Services score, 2004	MD	Observed	308	58	366	36.7 .148	3	.000***
		Expected	268.1	97.9				
		% within LSOA t.	24.9%	12.9%	21.7			
	AA	Observed	273	95	368			
		Expected	269.6	98.4				
		% within LSOA t.	22.1%	21.1%	21.8			
	BA	Observed	267	142	409			
		Expected	299.6	109.4				
		% within LSOA t.	21.6%	31.5%	24.3			
	LD	Observed	387	156	543			
		Expected	397.7	145.3				
		% within LSOA t.	31.3%	34.6%	32.2			
Rank of Barriers to Housing and Services score, 2007	MD	Observed	195	88	283	23.4 .118	3	.000***
		Expected	207.3	75.7				
		% within LSOA t.	15.8%	19.5%	16.8			
	AA	Observed	415	108	523			
		Expected	383.1	139.9				
		% within LSOA t.	33.6%	23.9%	31.0			
	BA	Observed	372	125	497			
		Expected	364.1	132.9				
		% within LSOA t.	30.1%	27.7%	29.5			
	LD	Observed	253	130	383			
		Expected	280.5	102.5				
		% within LSOA t.	20.5%	28.8%	22.7			
Rank of Barriers to Housing and Services score, 2010	MD	Observed	235	69	304	22.5 .116	3	.000***
		Expected	222.7	81.3				
		% within LSOA t.	19.0%	15.3%	18.0			
	AA	Observed	397	115	512			
		Expected	375.0	137.0				
		% within LSOA t.	32.1%	25.5%	30.4			
	BA	Observed	385	144	529			
		Expected	387.5	141.5				
		% within LSOA t.	31.2%	31.9%	31.4			
	LD	Observed	218	123	341			
		Expected	249.8	91.2				
		% within LSOA t.	17.7%	27.3%	20.2			

Table A69: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Crime

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			**χ^2, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Rank of Crime score, 2004	MD	Observed	245	43	288	90.1	3	.000***
		Expected	211.0	77.0		.231		
		% within LSOA t.	19.8%	9.5%	17.1			
	AA	Observed	390	86	476			
		Expected	348.7	127.3				
		% within LSOA t.	31.6%	19.1%	28.2			
	BA	Observed	370	153	523			
		Expected	383.1	139.9				
		% within LSOA t.	30.0%	33.9%	31.0			
	LD	Observed	230	169	399			
		Expected	292.3	106.7				
		% within LSOA t.	18.6%	37.5%	23.7			
Rank of Crime score, 2007	MD	Observed	299	51	350	131.4	3	.000***
		Expected	256.4	93.6		.279		
		% within LSOA t.	24.2%	11.3%	20.8			
	AA	Observed	418	93	511			
		Expected	374.3	136.7				
		% within LSOA t.	33.8%	20.6%	30.3			
	BA	Observed	344	141	485			
		Expected	355.3	129.7				
		% within LSOA t.	27.9%	31.3%	28.8			
	LD	Observed	174	166	340			
		Expected	249.1	90.9				
		% within LSOA t.	14.1%	36.8%	20.2			
Rank of Crime score, 2010	MD	Observed	276	61	337	52.3	3	.000***
		Expected	246.9	90.1		.176		
		% within LSOA t.	22.3%	13.5%	20.0			
	AA	Observed	352	90	442			
		Expected	323.8	118.2				
		% within LSOA t.	28.5%	20.0%	26.2			
	BA	Observed	358	143	501			
		Expected	367.0	134.0				
		% within LSOA t.	29.0%	31.7%	29.7			
	LD	Observed	249	157	406			
		Expected	297.4	108.6				
		% within LSOA t.	20.2%	34.8%	24.1			

Table A70: Large v Medium-sized resorts – Environment

Deprivation measure	**Deprivation level**		**LSOA type**			***χ2*, Cramer's V**		
			Large n = 1235, 54%	Medium n = 451, 46%	Total 1,686	$\chi^2_{C.V}$	*df*	*p*
Rank of Living Environment score, 2004	MD	Observed	419	117	536	11.9	3	.008**
		Expected	392.6	143.4		.084		
		% within LSOA t.	33.9%	25.9%	31.8			
	AA	Observed	317	116	433			
		Expected	317.2	115.8				
		% within LSOA t.	25.7%	25.7%	25.7			
	BA	Observed	251	115	366			
		Expected	268.1	97.9				
		% within LSOA t.	20.3%	25.5%	21.7			
	LD	Observed	248	103	351			
		Expected	257.1	93.9				
		% within LSOA t.	20.1%	22.8%	20.8			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2007	MD	Observed	458	117	575	25.6	3	.000***
		Expected	421.2	153.8		.123		
		% within LSOA t.	37.1%	25.9%	34.1			
	AA	Observed	339	126	465			
		Expected	340.6	124.4				
		% within LSOA t.	27.4%	27.9%	27.6			
	BA	Observed	259	107	366			
		Expected	268.1	97.9				
		% within LSOA t.	21.0%	23.7%	21.7			
	LD	Observed	179	101	280			
		Expected	205.1	74.9				
		% within LSOA t.	14.5%	22.4%	16.6			
Rank of Living Environment score, 2010	MD	Observed	457	129	586	19.7	3	.000***
		Expected	429.2	156.8		.108		
		% within LSOA t.	37.0%	28.6%	34.8			
	AA	Observed	325	110	435			
		Expected	318.6	116.4				
		% within LSOA t.	26.3%	24.4%	25.8			
	BA	Observed	254	103	357			
		Expected	261.5	95.5				
		% within LSOA t.	20.6%	22.8%	21.2			
	LD	Observed	199	109	308			
		Expected	225.6	82.4				
		% within LSOA t.	16.1%	24.2%	18.3			

Table A71: Seaside resorts grouped 'domain ranking' and deprivation level, 2010

Deprivation level Domain	Very deprived (Rank 1-8,120)			Above average (Rank 8,121-16,241)			Below average (Rank 16,242-24,362)			Least deprived (Rank 24,363-32,482)		
Multiple deprivation	Skegness	6,985	M	Penzance	8,212	M	Deal	16,456	M	Formby	25,405	M
	Blackpool	7,154	L	Dover	8,385	M	Herne Bay	16,538	M			
				Margate	8,658	L	Southport	16,557	L			
				Great Yarmouth	8,840	L	Hythe	16,672	M			
				Hastings	8,854	L	Crosby	16,728	L			
				Clacton-on-Sea	8,915	L	Broadstairs	18,505	M			
				Ilfracombe	8,942	M	Exmouth	18,511	M			
				New Brighton	9,116	M	Thorton-Cleveleys	19,470	M			
				Bognor Regis	9,285	M	Swanage	19,777	M			
				Ramsgate	9,556	L	Whitstable	19,786	M			
				Fleetwood	10,068	M	Lytham St Annes	21,161	L			
				South Shields	10,140	L	Christchurch	21,468	L			
				Scarborough	10,254	L	Holylake	22,440	M			
				Torquay	10,601	L	Clevedon	23,131	M			
				Folkestone	11,016	L	Sidmouth	23,349	M			
				Heysham	11,128	M	West Kirby	23,717	M			
				Littlehampton	11,639	M						
				Morecambe	11,884	M						
				Minehead	11,984	M						
				Lowestoft	12,045	L						
				Eastbourne	12,474	L						
				Brighton	12,477	L						
				Brixham	12,506	M						
				Whitby	12,525	M						
				Newquay	12,698	M						
				Hove	12,771	L						
				Ryde	13,045	M						
				Paignton	13,078	L						
				Southsea	13,242	L						
				Berwick	13,609	M						
				Bournemouth	13,970	L						
				Weymouth	13,992	L						
				Dawlish	14,231	M						
				Falmouth	14,282	M						
				Bexhill-on-Sea	14,464	L						
				Weston-S-mare	14,578	L						
				Southend-on-Sea	14,943	L						
				Teignmouth	15,363	M						
				Burnham-on-Sea	15,946	M						

Income	Skegness	7,891	M	Great Yarmouth	8,283	L	Hythe	16,855	M		
	Margate	7,895	L	Penzance	8,726	M	Broadstairs	17,044	M		
				Clacton-on-Sea	8,980	L	Thorton-Cleveleys	17,497	M		
				Ramsgate	9,079	L	Exmouth	17,894	M		
				Blackpool	9,097	L	Swanage	18,396	M		
				South Shields	9,166	L	Christchurch	18,726	L		
				New Brighton	9,195	M	Whitstable	18,872	M		
				Dover	9,273	M	Lytham St Annes	19,113	L		
				Hastings	10,213	L	Holylake	20,290	M		
				Ilfracombe	10,402	M	West Kirby	21,039	M		
				Torquay	10,442	L	Sidmouth	21,062	M		
				Folkestone	10,611	L	Clevedon	21,915	M		
				Scarborough	10,799	L	Formby	24,148	M		
				Bognor Regis	10,836	M					
				Fleetwood	10,944	M					
				Brixham	11,287	M					
				Heysham	11,582	M					
				Lowestoft	11,614	L					
				Berwick	11,923	M					
				Ryde	12,398	M					
				Paignton	12,472	L					
				Morecambe	12,789	M					
				Whitby	13,041	M					
				Littlehampton	13,327	M					
				Southend-on-Sea	13,474	L					
				Weston-S-mare	13,500	L					
				Teignmouth	13,533	M					
				Minehead	13,555	M					
				Eastbourne	13,748	L					
				Hove	14,242	L					
				Newquay	14,289	M					
				Bournemouth	14,359	L					
				Falmouth	14,501	M					
				Brighton	14,577	L					
				Deal	14,609	M					
				Burnham-on-Sea	14,978	M					
				Bexhill-on-Sea	15,092	L					
				Dawlish	15,093	M					
				Southport	15,397	L					
				Herne Bay	15,829	M					
				Weymouth	15,928	L					
				Crosby	15,984	L					
				Southsea	16,137	L					

Employment	Skegness	4,601	M	Ilfracombe	8,242	M	Exmouth	16,250	M		
	New Brighton	5,482	M	Ramsgate	8,479	L	Broadstairs	16,302	M		
	South Shields	6,169	L	Heysham	8,561	M	Holylake	16,338	M		
	Clacton-on-Sea	6,695	L	Torquay	8,854	L	West Kirby	16,923	M		
	Penzance	6,974	M	Hastings	8,950	L	Southsea	18,107	L		
	Blackpool	7,118	L	Scarborough	9,066	L	Christchurch	18,462	L		
	Great Yarmouth	7,306	L	Brixham	9,149	M	Formby	19,158	M		
	Dover	7,519	M	Minehead	9,565	M	Whitstable	19,452	M		
	Margate	7,895	L	Morecambe	9,668	M	Swanage	20,360	M		
	Fleetwood	7,958	M	Lowestoft	9,778	L	Clevedon	20,604	M		
				Ryde	10,048	M	Sidmouth	20,819	M		
				Paignton	10,099	L					
				Bognor Regis	10,236	M					
				Berwick	10,561	M					
				Folkestone	10,627	L					
				Dawlish	10,874	M					
				Bexhill-on-Sea	11,006	L					
				Newquay	11,250	M					
				Whitby	11,606	M					
				Weston-S-mare	11,926	L					
				Teignmouth	12,029	M					
				Burnham-on-Sea	12,046	M					
				Crosby	12,093	L					
				Weymouth	12,094	L					
				Eastbourne	12,128	L					
				Southport	12,481	L					
				Deal	12,757	M					
				Littlehampton	13,494	M					
				Southend-on-Sea	13,641	L					
				Falmouth	14,066	M					
				Hove	14,067	L					
				Bournemouth	14,108	L					
				Brighton	14,119	L					
				Thorton-Cleveleys	14,709	M					
				Lytham St Annes	14,826	L					
				Herne Bay	14,883	M					
				Hythe	15,277	M					

Education	Clacton-on-Sea	6,038	L	Margate	8,358	L	New Brighton	16,803	M	Lytham St Annes	24,376	L
	Skegness	6,296	M	Ramsgate	8,640	L	Thorton-Cleveleys	17,133	M	West Kirby	26,499	M
	Great Yarmouth	6,361	L	Blackpool	9,088	L	Southsea	17,155	L	Formby	27,511	M
	Fleetwood	7,113	M	Littlehampton	9,173	M	Swanage	17,323	M	Holylake	28,799	M
	Dover	7,123	M	Ilfracombe	9,212	M	Hythe	17,465	M			
	Lowestoft	8,117	L	Bognor Regis	9,424	M	Brighton	18,629	L			
				Hastings	10,113	L	Broadstairs	18,897	M			
				South Shields	10,411	L	Falmouth	18,918	M			
				Whitby	10,855	M	Clevedon	19,478	M			
				Folkestone	11,176	L	Christchurch	19,658	L			
				Berwick	11,213	M	Southport	19,753	L			
				Heysham	11,736	M	Hove	20,346	L			
				Scarborough	12,055	L	Sidmouth	21,480	M			
				Morecambe	12,477	M	Crosby	22,085	L			
				Brixham	12,542	M						
				Minehead	12,753	M						
				Herne Bay	12,835	M						
				Torquay	13,169	L						
				Weston-S-mare	13,423	L						
				Ryde	13,603	M						
				Paignton	13,627	L						
				Burnham-on-Sea	13,821	M						
				Southend-on-Sea	14,181	L						
				Eastbourne	14,622	L						
				Dawlish	14,622	M						
				Penzance	14,945	M						
				Bexhill-on-Sea	15,016	L						
				Deal	15,231	M						
				Weymouth	15,309	L						
				Teignmouth	15,558	M						
				Bournemouth	15,802	L						
				Whitstable	15,894	M						
				Exmouth	15,981	M						
				Newquay	15,996	M						

Crime and disorder	Southsea	6,759	L	Margate	11,106	L	Lowestoft	16,341	L	Lytham St Annes	24,447	L		
				Blackpool	11,363	L	Morecambe	17,024	M	Swanage	24,583	M		
				Fleetwood	11,423	M	South Shields	17,087	L	Thorton-Cleveleys	24,940	M		
				Dover	11,515	M	Eastbourne	17,804	L	Brixham	25,360	M		
				Torquay	11,650	L	Hove	18,607	L	Sidmouth	25,856	M		
				Hastings	11,911	L	Newquay	19,419	M	Holylake	25,945	M		
				Bognor Regis	12,091	M	Teignmouth	19,866	M	Formby	28,258	M		
				Littlehampton	12,335	M	Paignton	20,254	L	West Kirby	29,389	M		
				Ilfracombe	12,824	M	Broadstairs	20,266	M					
				Ramsgate	12,968	L	Whitby	20,317	M					
				Bournemouth	13,154	L	Burnham-on-Sea	20,370	M					
				Penzance	13,493	M	Exmouth	21,160	M					
				Weston-S-mare	13,721	L	Crosby	21,366	L					
				Skegness	14,213	M	Dawlish	21,399	M					
				Great Yarmouth	14,508	L	Berwick	21,641	M					
				Clacton-on-Sea	14,548	L	New Brighton	21,725	M					
				Falmouth	14,560	M	Bexhill-on-Sea	21,856	L					
				Scarborough	15,009	L	Herne Bay	22,081	M					
				Heysham	15,120	M	Minehead	22,092	M					
				Folkestone	15,274	L	Hythe	22,541	M					
				Brighton	15,656	L	Whitstable	22,598	M					
				Ryde	15,926	M	Christchurch	22,987	L					
				Southend-on-Sea	15,953	L	Clevedon	23,083	M					
				Weymouth	16,118	L	Southport	23,512	L					
							Deal	23,883	M					

Health and disability	Blackpool	4,754	L	Weymouth	8,125	L	Thorton-Cleveleys	16,517	M				
	New Brighton	5,495	M	Hove	8,395	L	Dawlish	16,712	M				
	Skegness	6,021	M	Brighton	8,640	L	Falmouth	17,029	M				
	Hastings	6,109	L	Bognor Regis	8,678	M	Lytham St Annes	17,169	L				
	Morecambe	6,911	M	Penzance	8,857	M	Broadstairs	17,391	M				
	Heysham	7,400	M	Dover	9,001	M	Swanage	17,432	M				
	Scarborough	7,784	L	Southport	9,220	L	Newquay	18,459	M				
	Margate	8,049	L	Ilfracombe	9,532	M	Whitstable	18,459	M				
				Eastbourne	9,576	L	Exmouth	21,234	M				
				South Shields	9,709	L	Christchurch	22,932	L				
				Fleetwood	10,109	M	Clevedon	23,126	M				
				Folkestone	10,189	L	Sidmouth	23,996	M				
				Minehead	10,563	M							
				Bexhill-on-Sea	10,643	L							
				Ramsgate	10,651	L							
				Clacton-on-Sea	10,733	L							
				Whitby	10,902	M							
				Crosby	11,117	L							
				Torquay	11,474	L							
				Brixham	11,641	M							
				Littlehampton	12,402	M							
				Ryde	12,451	M							
				Great Yarmouth	12,856	L							
				Bournemouth	12,861	L							
				Paignton	12,928	L							
				Deal	13,205	M							
				Southend-on-Sea	13,320	L							
				Holylake	13,484	M							
				Hythe	13,704	M							
				Berwick	13,970	M							
				Herne Bay	14,805	M							
				Weston-S-mare	15,047	L							
				Southsea	15,206	L							
				Burnham-on-Sea	15,287	M							
				West Kirby	15,324	M							
				Formby	15,479	M							
				Teignmouth	15,864	M							
				Lowestoft	16,154	L							
Housing and services	Minehead	7,024	M	Newquay	8,125	M	Bournemouth	16,242	L	West Kirby	25,935	M	
	Blackpool	7,783	L	Brighton	8,420	L	Broadstairs	16,338	M	Morecambe	26,291	M	
				Eastbourne	8,689	L	Christchurch	16,366	L	Lytham St Annes	26,396	L	
				Bognor Regis	8,928	M	Swanage	17,036	M	Southport	26,591	L	
				Littlehampton	9,101	M	Ilfracombe	17,134	M	Crosby	27,083	L	

				Hove	9,354	L	Ramsgate	17,484	L	Fleetwood	27,750	M
				Hythe	9,487	M	Ryde	17,665	M	Heysham	27,887	M
				Dawlish	10,253	M	Brixham	17,733	M	Holylake	29,009	M
				Sidmouth	11,585	M	Dover	17,760	M	New Brighton	30,214	M
				Hastings	12,648	L	Weymouth	17,919	L			
				Clacton-on-Sea	12,917	L	Scarborough	18,562	L			
				Exmouth	13,092	M	Penzance	18,662	M			
				Whitstable	13,248	M	Great Yarmouth	18,931	L			
				Southsea	13,682	L	Berwick	19,062	M			
				Folkestone	13,726	L	Lowestoft	19,364	L			
				Whitby	14,141	M	Skegness	19,736	M			
				Herne Bay	14,174	M	Weston-S-mare	19,929	L			
				Paignton	14,687	L	Teignmouth	20,178	M			
				Bexhill-on-Sea	14,872	L	Burnham-on-Sea	20,570	M			
				Falmouth	14,907	M	South Shields	21,993	L			
				Torquay	15,268	L	Southend-on-Sea	22,210	L			
				Margate	15,650	L	Deal	22,403	M			
				Clevedon	15,764	M	Formby	23,307	M			
							Thorton-Cleveleys	23,345	M			
Living environment	Penzance	2,978	M	Hove	8,410	L	Exmouth	17,582	M	West Kirby	27,396	M
	Southsea	4,463	L	Scarborough	9,017	L	Southport	17,620	L	Formby	28,196	M
	New Brighton	5,702	M	Dover	9,437	M	Minehead	17,763	M			
	Falmouth	7,114	M	Bognor Regis	9,530	M	Deal	17,777	M			
	Ilfracombe	7,565	M	Torquay	10,054	L	Berwick	18,042	M			
	Newquay	7,580	M	Heysham	10,215	M	Bexhill-on-Sea	18,616	L			
	Blackpool	7,929	L	Bournemouth	10,694	L	Holylake	18,675	M			
				Great Yarmouth	10,749	L	Lytham St Annes	18,744	L			
				Brighton	11,116	L	Burnham-on-Sea	18,850	M			
				Morecambe	11,221	M	Weston-S-mare	19,678	L			
				Brixham	11,858	M	Clacton-on-Sea	19,817	L			
				Dawlish	11,898	M	Thorton-Cleveleys	19,946	M			
				Ramsgate	12,246	L	Christchurch	20,450	L			
				Hastings	12,393	L	Hythe	20,729	M			
				Fleetwood	12,776	M	South Shields	21,532	L			
				Folkestone	13,001	L	Herne Bay	21,715	M			
				Littlehampton	13,125	M	Whitstable	22,330	M			
				Margate	13,383	L	Sidmouth	22,422	M			
				Southend-on-Sea	13,421	L	Clevedon	22,996	M			
				Paignton	13,459	L						
				Whitby	13,547	M						
				Swanage	13,743	M						
				Crosby	14,138	L						
				Teignmouth	14,192	M						

		Lowestoft	14,486	L		
		Eastbourne	14,680	L		
		Weymouth	14,978	L		
		Skegness	15,845	M		
		Ryde	15,874	M		
		Broadstairs	16,137	M		

Appendix B: Tables of Results (Chapter 6)

All tables and figures are the work of the author.

Table B1: Population composition – results of *t*-tests

Factor	**Resort advantage or disadvantage?**	**t**	**df**	**p**	**d**
Average age, 2001	Advantage	8.6	1684	0.001	0.419
Children, 2010	Disadvantage	8.0	1684	0.001	0.390
Working age, 2010	Disadvantage	6.5	1684	0.001	0.317
Pensioners, 2010	Advantage	8.5	1684	0.001	0.414
Retired, 2001	Advantage	7.7	1684	0.001	0.375
White, 2001	Advantage	0.7	1684	0.514	0.034
One person household, 2001	Disadvantage	0.5	1684	0.615	0.051
One person household above pensionable age, 2001	Advantage	4.1	1684	0.001	0.420
One person household lone parent, 2001	Disadvantage	5.9	1684	0.001	0.604
Dependent children in lone parent families, 2010	Disadvantage	11.7	1684	0.001	0.570
IB/SDA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	9.6	1684	0.001	0.468
ESA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	10.3	1684	0.001	0.502
DLA/AA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	10.6	1684	0.001	0.517
No qualification, 2001	Disadvantage	13.5	1684	0.001	0.658
Qualified to degree or higher, 2001	Advantage	11.1	1684	0.001	0.541
In managerial occupation, 2001	Advantage	11.4	1684	0.001	0.556
In manual occupation, 2001	Disadvantage	11.4	1684	0.001	0.556
Out-of work benefits claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	12.7	1684	0.001	0.619
JSA claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	13.4	1684	0.001	0.653
JSA 6 months, 2010	Disadvantage	12.3	1684	0.001	0.599
JSA 12 months, 2010	Disadvantage	11.2	1684	0.001	0.546
JSA Youth, 2010	Disadvantage	13.9	1684	0.001	0.677
Children in workless families, 2010	Disadvantage	13.4	1680	0.001	0.653
Income Support claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	12.0	1684	0.001	0.585
Pension Credit claimants, 2010	Disadvantage	9.9	1684	0.001	0.482
Have no car or van, 2001	Disadvantage	11.8	1684	0.001	0.575

Table B2: Area condition – results of *t*-tests

Factor	**Resort advantage or disadvantage?**	**t**	**df**	**p**	**D**
Employment in primary industries, 2010	Advantage	0.1	1684	0.910	0.009
Employment in secondary industries, 2010	Advantage	1.6	1684	0.099	0.078
Employment in tertiary industries, 2010	Disadvantage	1.6	1684	0.108	0.078
Employment in public sector, 2010	Disadvantage	2.1	1684	0.040	0.102
Employment in hotel, catering and distribution sector, 2010	Advantage	0.2	1684	0.848	0.010
Employment in tourism-related jobs, 2010	Advantage	0.7	1684	0.462	0.034
Location quotient for public sector, 2010	Disadvantage	1.2	382	0.218	0.321
Location quotient for hotel, catering and distribution sector, 2010	Advantage	1.3	382	0.197	0.347
Location quotient for tourism, 2010	Advantage	1.5	382	0.151	0.401
Employment rate, 2010	Disadvantage	3.6	382	0.001	1.024
Full-time, 2010	Advantage	2.2	1684	0.026	0.607
Part-time, 2010	Disadvantage	2.2	1684	0.028	0.607
Self-employed, 2001	Advantage	6.6	1684	0.001	0.322
Household income, 2010	Advantage	10.6	1684	0.001	0.517
House prices, 2010	Advantage	9.9	382	0.001	1.013
Owner-occupied housing, 2001	Advantage	7.8	1684	0.001	0.380
Social rented housing, 2001	Disadvantage	6.5	1684	0.001	0.317
Private rented housing, 2001	Disadvantage	3.1	1684	0.002	0.151
Overcrowded households, 2001	Disadvantage	2.5	1684	0.014	0.122
Households without central heating, 2001	Disadvantage	5.7	1684	0.001	0.278
Households without sole use of bath, shower or toilet, 2001	Disadvantage	1.3	1684	0.001	0.378
Vacant dwellings, 2001	Disadvantage	13.7	1684	0.001	0.668
Crime rate per 1,000, 2010	Disadvantage	5.0	382	0.001	0.512

Table B3: Results of one-way ANOVA, seven components, four clusters

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Component 1	Between Groups	69.352	3	23.117	27.785	.000
	Within Groups	328.648	395	.832		
	Total	398.000	398			
Component 2	Between Groups	172.910	3	57.637	101.144	.000
	Within Groups	225.090	395	.570		
	Total	398.000	398			
Component 3	Between Groups	8.301	3	2.767	2.805	.040
	Within Groups	389.699	395	.987		
	Total	398.000	398			
Component 4	Between Groups	188.159	3	62.720	118.062	.000
	Within Groups	209.841	395	.531		
	Total	398.000	398			
Component 5	Between Groups	107.219	3	35.740	48.549	.000
	Within Groups	290.781	395	.736		
	Total	398.000	398			
Component 6	Between Groups	120.046	3	40.015	56.866	.000
	Within Groups	277.954	395	.704		
	Total	398.000	398			
Component 7	Between Groups	10.175	3	3.392	3.454	.017
	Within Groups	387.825	395	.982		
	Total	398.000	398			

Table B4: The homogenous subsets from Tukey's test for seven principal components

Component 1

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
4	27	-1.4584782	
3	41		-.0216602
2	243		.0341326
1	88		.3633268
Sig.		1.000	.139

Component 2

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
4	27	-.6457427	
2	243	-.3202950	
3	41	-.3123264	
1	88		1.2280922
Sig.		.111	1.000

Component 3

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05
		1
1	88	-.2249567
4	27	-.2090712
3	41	-.0004582
2	243	.1047732
Sig.		.329

Component 4

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			
		1	2	3	4
3	41	-1.1404235			
2	243		-.1466518		
1	88			.2825341	
4	27				2.1307690
Sig.		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Component 5

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05		
		1	2	3
2	243	-.3916991		
4	27		.3416431	
1	88		.4810455	
3	41			1.0640613
Sig.		1.000	.841	1.000

Component 6

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05		
		1	2	3
2	243	-.2741250		
1	88	-.1140745		
4	27		.5633385	
3	41			1.4985561
Sig.		.765	1.000	1.000

Component 7

Cluster	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05	
		1	2
4	27	-.5515317	
3	41		-.0715387
1	88		-.0274347
2	243		.0832868
Sig.		.066	.856

Table B5: Results of one-way ANOVA, original input variables, four clusters

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Median age of population	Between Groups	7196.088	3	2398.696	102.646	.000
	Within Groups	9230.586	395	23.369		
	Total	16426.674	398			
% pop. children	Between Groups	5447.456	3	1815.819	97.710	.000
	Within Groups	7340.555	395	18.584		
	Total	12788.011	398			
% pop. working age	Between Groups	7703.528	3	2567.843	94.897	.000
	Within Groups	10688.380	395	27.059		
	Total	18391.908	398			
% pop. pensionable age	Between Groups	8246.845	3	2748.948	76.530	.000
	Within Groups	14188.334	395	35.920		
	Total	22435.180	398			
Demographic dependency ratio (number of dependents per 100 people of working age)	Between Groups	47649.242	3	15883.081	70.146	.000
	Within Groups	89439.863	395	226.430		
	Total	137089.104	398			
% pop. white	Between Groups	686.010	3	228.670	46.805	.000
	Within Groups	1929.801	395	4.886		
	Total	2615.811	398			
% of households single person	Between Groups	9878.458	3	3292.819	61.944	.000
	Within Groups	20997.553	395	53.158		
	Total	30876.011	398			
% of households single pensioner	Between Groups	1110.226	3	370.075	26.803	.000
	Within Groups	5453.935	395	13.807		
	Total	6564.161	398			
% of households lone parent with dependent children	Between Groups	2443.767	3	814.589	39.529	.000
	Within Groups	8139.817	395	20.607		
	Total	10583.584	398			
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as managers and professionals	Between Groups	9398.686	3	3132.895	81.883	.000
	Within Groups	15112.970	395	38.261		
	Total	24511.657	398			
% of working age pop. in employment, classified as skilled manual	Between Groups	766.791	3	255.597	42.674	.000
	Within Groups	2365.876	395	5.990		
	Total	3132.667	398			
% of all employee jobs that are tourism-related	Between Groups	18979.532	3	6326.511	32.109	.000
	Within Groups	77827.292	395	197.031		
	Total	96806.824	398			
% of working age pop. self-employed	Between Groups	1761.316	3	587.105	53.864	.000
	Within Groups	4305.418	395	10.900		
	Total	6066.734	398			
Median gross annual household income	Between Groups	578557892.867	3	192852630.956	21.296	.000
	Within Groups	3577021799.224	395	9055751.390		
	Total	4155579692.091	398			
% of all occupied household spaces owned	Between Groups	11546.518	3	3848.839	21.972	.000
	Within Groups	69192.926	395	175.172		
	Total	80739.444	398			
% of all occupied household spaces rented privately	Between Groups	19758.269	3	6586.090	33.429	.000
	Within Groups	77822.743	395	197.020		
	Total	97581.013	398			
% of all occupied household spaces rented from council/social	Between Groups	13743.368	3	4581.123	10.540	.000
	Within Groups	171676.083	395	434.623		
	Total	185419.450	398			
% of households lacking/sharing bath/shower or inside toilet	Between Groups	266.397	3	88.799	34.512	.000
	Within Groups	1016.339	395	2.573		
	Total	1282.736	398			
% of households with no central heating	Between Groups	67.419	3	22.473	.233	.047
	Within Groups	38126.637	395	96.523		
	Total	38194.055	398			
% of households living in overcrowded conditions	Between Groups	5041.576	3	1680.525	69.092	.000
	Within Groups	9607.643	395	24.323		
	Total	14649.219	398			
% of household spaces vacant	Between Groups	760.856	3	253.619	95.818	.000
	Within Groups	1045.516	395	2.647		
	Total	1806.372	398			
Crime	Between Groups	559315700.641	3	186438566.880	5.741	.001
	Within Groups	12828646819.630	395	32477586.885		
	Total	13387962520.271	398			
% of dependent children receiving child tax-credit in out-of-work families	Between Groups	4590.069	3	1530.023	16.012	.000
	Within Groups	37745.156	395	95.557		
	Total	42335.225	398			

% of working age pop. claiming Income Support	Between Groups	359.675	3	119.892	8.902	.000
	Within Groups	5319.585	395	13.467		
	Total	5679.261	398			
% of older people receiving Pension Credit Guarantee Element	Between Groups	2266.372	3	755.457	17.174	.000
	Within Groups	17375.113	395	43.988		
	Total	19641.485	398			
% of working age pop. claiming Out-of-Work benefits	Between Groups	2522.629	3	840.876	15.009	.000
	Within Groups	22129.553	395	56.024		
	Total	24652.182	398			
% of working age pop. claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)	Between Groups	1276.210	3	425.403	67.572	.000
	Within Groups	2486.747	395	6.296		
	Total	3762.958	398			
JSA claimants as % of Out-of-Work benefits claimants	Between Groups	6315.293	3	2105.098	60.051	.000
	Within Groups	13846.705	395	35.055		
	Total	20161.998	398			
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 6 months	Between Groups	322.710	3	107.570	64.347	.000
	Within Groups	660.332	395	1.672		
	Total	983.042	398			
% of working age pop. claiming JSA for over 12 months	Between Groups	93.167	3	31.056	46.937	.000
	Within Groups	261.351	395	.662		
	Total	354.518	398			
JSA claimants (aged 18-24 years) as % of working age pop.	Between Groups	73.297	3	24.432	39.763	.000
	Within Groups	242.708	395	.614		
	Total	316.005	398			
% of working age pop. claiming Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disability Allowance	Between Groups	112.851	3	37.617	2.344	.040
	Within Groups	6339.812	395	16.050		
	Total	6452.663	398			
% of working age pop. claiming Employment and Support Allowance	Between Groups	25.610	3	8.537	6.354	.000
	Within Groups	530.655	395	1.343		
	Total	556.265	398			
% of working age pop. claiming Disability Living Allowance	Between Groups	183.595	3	61.198	9.279	.000
	Within Groups	2605.307	395	6.596		
	Total	2788.903	398			
% of working age pop. with no qualifications	Between Groups	7303.722	3	2434.574	42.265	.000
	Within Groups	22753.007	395	57.603		
	Total	30056.730	398			
% of working age pop. with higher education (i.e., level 4/5 qualifications)	Between Groups	9667.078	3	3222.359	99.004	.000
	Within Groups	12856.428	395	32.548		
	Total	22523.506	398			
% of households without access to a car or van	Between Groups	11157.487	3	3719.162	50.593	.000
	Within Groups	29037.206	395	73.512		
	Total	40194.693	398			
% of dependent children in lone parent families	Between Groups	2137.553	3	712.518	14.277	.000
	Within Groups	19713.313	395	49.907		
	Total	21850.866	398			



Figure B1: Blackpool, Northwest England

(46 clustered LSOAs / 94 resort LSOAs, 49%)



Figure B2: Hastings, Southeast England

(24 clustered LSOAs / 53 resort LSOAs, 45%)



Figure B3: Folkestone, Southeast England

(11 clustered LSOAs / 31 resort LSOAs, 36%)



Figure B4: Scarborough, Yorkshire and the Humber

(12 clustered LSOAs / 34 resort LSOAs, 35%)



Figure B5: Clacton-on-Sea, East of England

(11 clustered LSOAs / 32 resort LSOAs, 34%)



Figure B6: Brighton, Southeast England

(29 clustered LSOAs / 101 resort LSOAs, 29%)



Figure B7: Lowestoft, East of England

(12 clustered LSOAs / 42 resort LSOAs, 29%)



Figure B8: Torquay, Southwest England

(11 clustered LSOAs / 43 resort LSOAs, 26%)



Figure B9: Southend-on-Sea, East of England

(23 clustered LSOAs / 107 resort LSOAs, 22%)



Figure B10: Heysham, Northwest England

(6 clustered LSOAs / 11 resort LSOAs, 55%)



Figure B11: Margate, Southeast England

(14 clustered LSOAs / 27 resort LSOAs, 52%)



Figure B12: Great Yarmouth, East of England

(16 clustered LSOAs / 36 resort LSOAs, 44%)



Figure B13: South Shields, Northeast England

(24 clustered LSOAs / 55 resort LSOAs, 44%)



Figure B14: Ramsgate, Southeast England

(10 clustered LSOAs / 26 resort LSOAs, 39%)



Figure B15: Morecambe, Northwest England

(7 clustered LSOAs / 21 resort LSOAs, 33%)



Figure B16: Falmouth, Southwest England

(3 clustered LSOAs / 14 resort LSOAs, 21%)



Figure B17: Skegness, East Midlands

(7 clustered LSOAs / 12 resort LSOAs, 58%)



Figure B18: Dover, Southeast England

(10 clustered LSOAs / 18 resort LSOAs, 56%)



Figure B19: Ilfracombe, Southwest England

(3 clustered LSOAs / 8 resort LSOAs, 38%)



Figure B20: Weston-Super-Mare, Southwest England

(13 clustered LSOAs / 48 resort LSOAs, 27%)



Figure B21: Weymouth, Southwest England

(8 clustered LSOAs / 31 resort LSOAs, 26%)

Figure B22: Whitby, Yorkshire and the Humber

(2 clustered LSOAs / 9 resort LSOAs, 22%)



Figure B23: Fleetwood, Northwest England

(9 clustered LSOAs / 18 resort LSOAs, 50%)



Figure B24: Penzance, Southwest England

(6 clustered LSOAs / 13 resort LSOAs, 46%)



Figure B25: Littlehampton, Southeast England

(4 clustered LSOAs / 17 resort LSOAs, 24%)